The Oracle
The Oracle: President Tinubu Cannot Legally Remove an Elected Governor of a State
Published
1 year agoon
By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhomo SAN
INTRODUCTION
In an era where democracy is supposed to reign supreme giving democracy dividends to beleaguered Nigerians, the nation has once again found itself at crossroads, a sober moment of reckoning where constitutional order is being tested in the most brazen of ways. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, sworn to uphold the Constitution, has taken a most unprecedented and unlawful step: the suspension of a democratically elected Governor, Deputy Governor and an entire State House of Assembly under the thin guise of emergency rule. What emergency? Nigerians and Rivers people did not see or feel any such emergency.
Let me be very firm most categorically and unequivocally that no constitutional provision, statute or any known convention grants the President the imperial and dictatorial authority to single-handedly dissolve the structures of an elected state government. That may probably have been in the locust days of military juntas; but Nigeria is today not under the firm grip of a military dictatorship.
The last time I checked, she is supposed to governed under a constitutional democracy that operates a presidential and republican form of government. The emergency provisions under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution exist to restore order only in times of grave national crisis; certainly not to topple duly elected state officials. Lois X1V of France as an absolute dictator could not have done better and would therefore green with envy from his cold grave, having on 13th April, 1655, stood in front of parliament and imperiously exuded, “L’Etat C’est Moi” (“I am the State”).
A state of emergency does not and cannot translate to a civilian coup d’état, executed by executive fiat through a national broadcast which torpedoed elected structures and whimsically imposed a sole Administrator who would now illegally receive Rivers State allocations from the Federation account under section 162 of the Constitution contrary to the very judgement of the Supreme Court which President Bola Ahmed Tinubu pretended to be executing.
We have seen this script play out before during the infamous 2004 Plateau State emergency, where former President Obasanjo suspended Governor Dariye in what was widely condemned as a travesty of constitutional governance. Then, as now, the excuse was “exceptional circumstances”; but the reality was nothing short of executive lawlessness and overreach masked as national interest. I had criticized it in the same way I also criticized those of former Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Goodluck Ebele Jonathan.
And now, as Rivers State stands at the centre of this unfolding simulated constitutional debacle, one must ask: Is this the signal of a dangerous precedent for and kite-flying to Nigeria, of a looming maximum dictatorship in the offing in a one-party State? Will other “erring” Governors who refuse to align with the central government be next in line? Are we witnessing the return of a dangerous era of impunity where emergency rule becomes the bludgeon of political control rather than a tool for stability?
Let me be very clear about this for historical purposes: President Tinubu clearly lacks the power, authority and vires to suspend democratic structures, especially the removal of Governor Sim Fubara and the Rivers State House of Assembly members. His act constitutes nothing but a gross constitutional aberration and a most illegal, unlawful, wrongful and unconscionable step that has the potential of imploding Nigeria at large and Rivers State in particular. The Constitution must stand hallowed, unassaulted, or democracy will fall and perish. Although time shall tell, but time is certainly not on our side.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR A STATE OF EMERGENCY
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, at page 379, defines “Declaration” as an official or formal statement, especially about the plans of a Government or an organization; the act of making such a statement.
Declaration or proclamation of a state of emergency therefore means proclaiming or making known a situation of emergency. What does “emergency” itself mean?
Emergency Doctrine is variously referred to as “emergency”, “imminent peril” or “sudden peril” Doctrine [Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, Page 523).
A “state of emergency” is defined in Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (P.1620) as “when a government gives itself special powers in order to try to control an unusually difficult or dangerous situation, especially when this involves limiting people’s freedom”. “Emergency powers” are such powers as are conferred on a Government during such an unusual situation to hold the state together.
The Constitution in Section 305, of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as altered (the organic law and grund norm of the land) embraces three adjuncts of a declaration of a state of emergency: (1) Reasons for proclaiming it; (2) How it is proclaimed; (3) How it can be halted both before and after its proclamation. It also envisages two types of State of Emergency: (i) By Mr. President under Section 305 (3) (a) and (b), when the Federation is at War; or the Federation is in imminent danger of invasion or involvement in a state of war. (ii) The scenario where it is the Governor of a State who personally calls for the state of emergency under situations envisaged in Section 305 (3) (c), (d) and (e). This occurs where the threat does not extend beyond the boundaries of the State.
Section 305 of the 199 Constitution, as altered, provides:
1) “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by instrument published in the Official Gazette of the Government of the Federation issue a Proclamation of a state of emergency in the Federation or any part thereof.
2) The President shall immediately after the publication, transmit copies of the Official Gazette of the Government of the Federation containing the proclamation including the details of the emergency to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, each of whom shall forthwith convene or arrange for a meeting of the House of which he is President or Speaker, as the case may be, to consider the situation and decide whether or not to pass a resolution approving the Proclamation.”
None of the factors envisaged in Section 305 of the Constitution has occurred at all to warrant the steps taken by the president. In present scenario the bi-camera National Assembly had not even first met, discussed and approved the president’s emergency proposals before he acted. He did it in advance (in futuro) in expectation of rubber-stamping by a pliable and malleable NASS.
I hereby call on the NASS to show class for once by roundly rejecting the President’s unconstitutional act of first declaring a state of emergency before its approval and also for acting altra vires by accompanying it with the suspension of elected democratic structures. This will place them on the right path of history. Otherwise, they should be prepared to be damnified by history.
I must emphasize that the declaration of a state of emergency does not translate into a dissolution of governance structures within the affected state. Under a state of emergency, the Governor, as the chief executive of the state, remains in office, whilst the institutions of government at the state level continue to function, unless expressly provided otherwise by law. There is no such law in Rivers State or at the national level.
The framers of the 1999 Constitution were deliberate in ensuring that the power to declare a state of emergency is not an avenue for executive overreach or imperious excursion into the realm of narcissm or ego trip. While the President may take extraordinary measures to maintain peace and order, those measures must align with the provisions of the Constitution. There is no provision howsoever, express or implied, that allowed President Tinubu to remove a sitting Governor and state House of Assembly legislators under the thin guise of emergency powers. There is no war in Nigeria. There is no threat of external aggression or invasion either across the country or in Rivers State. All that we have seen have been tussle for power between the Governor and the House of Assembly and the courts had already waded in with the Governor declaring he would comply with the Supreme Court’s judgement. A mere blow up of oil pipes in two communities by unidentified persons certainly does not constitute a war or external invasion situation.
THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION of POWERS AND FEDERALISM
Nigeria operates a federal system of government, which means that power is divided and shared between the federal, state and Local Government Areas. This structure is designed to prevent excessive concentration of power in any one level of government, for as Lord Acton once explained, “power tends to corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. The President’s authority over the states is limited, just as a Governor cannot interfere with presidential functions at the federal level.
Furthermore, the principle of separation of powers, a cornerstone of constitutional democracy as ablly propounded in 1748 by a great French philosopher, Baron de Montesquieu, ensures that no single branch of government has unchecked authority. The removal of a Governor is a matter strictly within the purview of the State House of Assembly, as stipulated under Section 188 of the Constitution. The process is quite detailed, lengthy and rigorous; and requires a legislative super majority to accomplish. It is not a power and prerogative the President can usurp and exercise as did President Tinubu, regardless of the circumstances.
CAN THE PRESIDENT SUSPEND OR REMOVE A SITTING GOVERNOR, DEPUTY GOVERNOR, OR HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY EVEN UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY?
Nigeria stands at a critical juncture in its democratic evolution. Recent developments in Rivers State, where President Bola Ahmed Tinubu purportedly suspended Governor Siminalayi Fubara, his Deputy, and the entire House of Assembly, call for a meticulous constitutional examination and analysis. At the heart of this matter lies an age-old question: Can the President, under the guise of emergency rule, lawfully suspend or remove a democratically elected Governor, Deputy Governor, or Legislature?
The answer, based on constitutional provisions, legal precedents and the very principles of federalism which we operate, is an unequivocal NO. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended) does not, under any circumstance, empower the President to remove, suspend, or torpedo duly elected state officials even under Section 305, which governs the declaration of a state of emergency.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF EMERGENCY POWERS
In no place does Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution grant the President the power to suspend a Governor, Deputy Governor, or the State House of Assembly. This reality is backed by constitutional jurisprudence and was reaffirmed in Attorney-General of Abia State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 265, where the Supreme Court clarified that the Constitution is supreme and that no authority including the President can act outside its provisions.
Yet, this is not the first time that Nigeria has witnessed an outright abuse of emergency powers. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s 2004 suspension of Plateau State’s Governor Joshua Dariye and the House of Assembly remains a painful reminder of how emergency provisions have been misused to subvert democratic structures.
That unconstitutional precedent, which many Nigerians condemned then as executive overreach reminiscent of military juntas, appears to have resurfaced in Rivers State where President Tinubu’s action has eerily followed that same better-forgotten pattern, with the Judiciary left untouched as a token concession to constitutionalism. But can democracy survive when two out of the three arms of government are arbitrarily dissolved? I believe not.
FEDERALISM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE ROLE OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
Nigeria operates a federal system, meaning that power is distributed between the central and state governments, as explicitly outlined in Sections 4, 5, and 11 of the 1999 Constitution. Under this system, a Governor is not an apron string of or mere extension of the Presidency. He is an independently elected authority answerable to no one but only the people of his state who elected him.
The Constitution does not permit a President to unilaterally whimsically and arbitrarily remove a Governor—not by fiat; not by emergency decree; and certainly not by mere executive pronouncement. The doctrine of separation of powers, a fundamental pillar of democracy, dictates that such removals must be carried out strictly in accordance with constitutional provisions.
This principle was reinforced in Attorney-General of Ogun State & Ors v. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors (1982) 3 NCLR 583, where the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Government cannot unilaterally impose duties or restrictions on state officials. This means that even if a state of emergency is lawfully declared, the Governor remains in office unless impeached through due process.
The Constitution provides only one legal pathway for the removal of a state Governor, and that is through impeachment, as stipulated in Section 188 of the Constitution. The process is legislative, not executive, requiring a State House of Assembly to initiate and conduct impeachment proceedings as dictated by the Constitution. In any event, the Rivers State House of Assembly (whether rightly or wrongly) had already commenced one against the Governor. Why truncate the constitutional process through an unconstitutional executive fiat? Why? Why?? Why???
THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT AND THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL CONTROL
Some have sought, in most illogical and unscholarly manner, to justify the President’s emergency intervention in Rivers State under the masquerade and facade of maintaining public safety. They cite the Public Order Act, which grants state Governors powers over public assemblies, meetings, and processions. However, even this statute does not authorize the suspension of an entire government structure.
The irony, of course, is that while Governors are designated as the Chief Security Officers of their states, they lack actual control over security forces. Section 215 of the Constitution subordinates a State Commissioner of Police to the Inspector General of Police and the President, meaning that even if Rivers State were experiencing insecurity, it was ultimately to the same traducing Federal Government it would have turned to.
The absurdity of this power imbalance, even though Rivers State had not gotten there, was noted in Attorney-General of Abia State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 264, where the Court observed that the Federal Government cannot pass the blame for state security failures to a Governor who lacks the constitutional means to deploy security personnel.
THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: A CONSTITUTIONAL FIREWALL?
Even if the National Assembly, sought to legislate on emergency rule, section 11(4) of the 1999 Constitution explicitly prohibits it from removing a Governor or Deputy Governor. This means that not only does the President lack the power, but even the National Assembly itself is equally barred from such unconstitutional act.
Prof. Ben Nwabueze, one of Nigeria’s foremost constitutional scholars, had long warned that allowing a President to wield unchecked emergency powers would erode democracy and lead to an authoritarian system where Governors served as vassals at the pleasure of the President rather than the electorate.
In line with this reasoning, Chief F.R.A. Williams had condemned the Plateau State emergency declaration as “a contradiction of all known principles of true federation operating in a democratic society.” Are we not now witnessing history repeat itself in Rivers State?
THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS
One of the most fundamental principles of statutory interpretation is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that the explicit mention of one thing implies the exclusion of all others. Sections 4 and 5 of the 1999 Constitution donate specific executive and legislative powers; but nowhere do they mention any inherent powers allowing the President to remove Governors undemocratically.
This principle was applied in Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 187, where the Supreme Court held that powers not expressly granted by the Constitution cannot be assumed. Thus, any claim that the President possesses inherent emergency powers to remove a supposedly erring Governor is legally baseless. The President can not dorn the garb of a Primary School headmaster who has absolute control over and supervises his pupils.
HOW A GOVERNOR MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE
If Not the President, then who can remove a Governor under emergency rule? The answer remains the State House of Assembly as the only body constitutionally empowered to initiate impeachment proceedings against an erring Governor.
Under Section 188, impeachment is a rigorous and multi-step process, requiring:
a. A written notice signed by at least one-third of Assembly members;
b. A two-thirds majority vote to proceed further;
c. The formation of an investigative panel by the state Chief Judge;
d. A full blown hearing granting the Governor a right to defence either by himself or through a counsel of his choice;
e. A final two-thirds majority vote for removal after thorough hearing, recommendations, etc.
If a Governor remains in office, it is because the State House of Assembly has not found legal grounds for removal. The President’s personal opinions, political considerations, or security concerns do not change this constitutional scenario.
ANY HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR RIVERS STATE?
The declaration of a state of emergency in Rivers State and the subsequent suspension of Governor Siminalayi Fubara, his Deputy, and the State House of Assembly by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu brings Nigeria into another moment of constitutional crisis and democratic reckoning. While this may appear to be a novel occurrence, history reminds us that this is not the first time a Nigerian President had wielded emergency powers in a manner that undermined the very essence of democracy.
Emergency rule in Nigeria has precedents, but each instance had always been marred by legal controversy, constitutional breaches and political opportunism. The most striking parallel to Tinubu’s action in Rivers State can be drawn from the 2004 Plateau State emergency declared by former President Olusegun Obasanjo. In that case, Obasanjo had suspended the Governor and the State House of Assembly, replacing them with a Sole Administrator, Major-General Chris Alli (Rtd.). That action was roundly criticized as an overreach of executive power, much like what is unfolding today in Rivers State. I was one of the critics.
However, even further back in Nigeria’s history, the Western Region crisis of 1962 under the First Republic presents another instructive example. Under the 1960 Independence Constitution, the then Governor-General, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, acting on the advice of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, had declared a state of emergency in the Western Region due to political turmoil. Balewa had removed the Premier, the Governor, all Ministers, and members of the Regional Assembly, installing Dr. Moses Majekodunmi as Sole Administrator.
The striking difference, however, is that this took place under a Westminster parliamentary system, where Parliament held sovereignty. In contrast, Nigeria’s current presidential system operates under constitutional supremacy, not parliamentary supremacy. The framers of the 1999 Constitution deliberately excluded any provision that would allow such sweeping executive powers, particularly those that could enable a President to remove a sitting Governor or dissolve a State House of Assembly under emergency rule.
WHY TINUBU’S EMERGENCY RULE IN RIVERS STATE IS UNPRECEDENTED
Even within the history of emergency rule declarations, Tinubu’s action in Rivers State is particularly alarming. While previous Presidents who declared emergency rule (Balewa in 1962 and Obasanjo in 2004) did so under questionable legal interpretations, they at least had some statutory backing, however flimsy.
Tinubu, on the other hand, has no legal foundation whatsoever to suspend an elected Governor, Deputy Governor, or the State House of Assembly. There is no enabling law, no precedent under the 1999 Constitution, and no Supreme Court ruling that grants the President such sweeping powers.
The 1999 Constitution, as amended, is as clear as a whistle that section 305 which grants the President powers to declare a state of emergency does not provide for the removal or suspension of an elected Governor.
Section 11(4) explicitly denies even the National Assembly the power to remove a Governor under emergency rule; meaning it certainly cannot authorize the President to do so.
The principle of federalism, which underpins Nigeria’s governance structure, dictates that Governors derive their mandate directly from the people and not from the President.
WHAT COULD HAPPEN IF THIS PRECEDENT IS ALLOWED TO STAND?
One of the most dangerous aspects of President Tinubu’s action is the precedent it sets for the future of democracy in Nigeria. If a President can wake up one morning and, under the guise of an emergency, remove a Governor and dissolve the State Legislature, what prevents the same President or future Presidents from doing the same in other states?
In fact, if the logic of this unconstitutional action is stretched further, it raises an even more disturbing possibility:
What if a President wakes up tomorrow and declares an emergency in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT)? The Constitution recognizes the FCT as a state.
Could the President then suspend the Senate and the House of Representatives that supervise the FCT and appoint himself as Sole Administrator of the FCT and Federal Republic of Nigeria?
These hypothetical scenarios, once dismissed as absurd, in my earlier research have now become real threats when constitutional violations are left unchallenged and unchecked.
PRESIDENT TINUBU’S ATTEMPT TO RELY ON NON EXISTENT EMERGENCY LAWS
To compound the legal crisis, Tinubu’s government seeks to justify its actions by invoking emergency regulations that do not exist in Nigeria’s current legal framework. The 1961 Emergency Powers Act, which was made pursuant to Section 65(1) of the 1960 Constitution, is no longer in force. That law had allowed the Governor-General to make sweeping regulations, including appointing an Administrator, restricting fundamental rights, and even suspending state governments.
However, this law ceased to have effect long ago. When Nigeria transitioned from the Westminster system to the presidential system in 1979, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted any provision that could allow such broad emergency powers.
The Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, provide a clear confirmation: the 1961 Emergency Powers Act is described as “omitted; spent”. This means that it has since been consigned to the vehicle of historical oblivion and cannot be resurrected to justify Tinubu’s current unconstitutional acts.
A CLOSING CAVEAT: THE PERILOUS PRECEDENT OF TINUBU’S EMERGENCY RULE IN RIVERS STATE
Not a few Nigerians have argued quite plausibly, too, that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s recent declaration of emergency rule in Rivers State and the suspension of Governor Siminalayi Fubara, his Deputy, and the State House of Assembly was not purely a matter of law and order, but an act driven by political expediency and personal indignation.
The President finds himself presiding over a nation teetering on the brink economic hardship, rising insecurity, public angst, and deep-seated political fractures. Yet, rather than confront these crises headlong with statesmanship, his administration appears to be flexing emergency powers in a manner that raises more questions than it answers. If Rivers State warranted emergency rule, why then have states like Zamfara and Niger where armed bandits and insurgents have reduced governance to an afterthought not received the same treatment?
Even the most ardent defenders of Tinubu’s emergency Decree ( for a Decree it is in reality) must pause and ask: Is Rivers State the greatest threat to national stability, or is it merely the most convenient political battleground? If emergency rule in Rivers was truly about law and order, why was a hand-picked Administrator imposed while duly elected officials were unceremoniously suspended from office? Is this about democratic governance, or is it about power and control?
If Nigeria remains a constitutional democracy, then the same Constitution must apply to all, irrespective of political affiliation or convenience. If Tinubu’s draconian action in Rivers State is allowed to stand, it sets a dangerous precedent where emergency powers become a tool for political suppression and repression rather than a last resort for genuine intractable crises.
So, the question remains: Is this the Nigeria we want or deserve? Or shall we, in our studied silence, watch democracy dismantled piecemeal with one emergency declaration at a time? History will surely judge us all.
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The Oracle
The Oracle: The Independence of the Judiciary in a Democratic Dispensation (Pt. 3)
Published
4 days agoon
July 3, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
Introduction
Another public outrage attended the ex parte order granted by a Lagos High Court against the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) restraining it from calling out workers on a planned nationwide strike to protest the hike in price of petroleum products by the Federal Government. An Abuja High Court had refused the application because there was no genuine case of urgency. The Federal Government went down to Lagos and surprisingly a Lagos High Court, which had co-ordinate jurisdiction with the Abuja High Court granted the order. The NLC president, Adams Oshiomhole had to tell the whole world that the order was not binding on the NLC as it was obtained from the “Black market”. The strike went on as planned and the image of the Judiciary was worse off and its independence seriously put in question.
Another controversial ex-parte order was that made by a judge in the Abuja Division of the Federal High Court restraining the governor of Anambra State Dr. Chris Ngige from parading himself as governor. The order (which, apart from the questionability of the perceived extreme urgency attending it) could not be reconciled with the state of immunity enjoyed by the governor under the Constitution. The governor had to borrow the “Black market” appellation from Oshiomhole. Even more controversial and outrageous ex parte orders were dished out by the same court on the Anambra crisis alone.
At the heart of the issue of abuse of ex parte orders (especially in political issues) is the attendant erosion of public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the Judiciary. The ugly implications were rightly summed up by a writer as follows:
“In these instances of judicial recklessness, there was always the palpable belief that unseen hands moved the court to issue such controversial ex parte orders. That is the meaning of the ‘black market’ reference made by Oshiomhole and Ngige. None of them was prepared to obey a ‘black market’ order obtained outside the ‘official market’! They never obeyed and nothing happened!
Abuse of ex parte injunction aside from the grave implications it has on the independence of the Judiciary, is also capable of wide scale socio-political disaster as was the case with the annulment of the June 12 Presidential Election. The Judiciary set the key note of the disaster that followed when an Abuja High Court presided over the late Hon. Justice Bassey Ikpeme made an ex parte order restraining the conduct of the presidential election.
In the popular case of Kotoye V C. B. N 24 the Supreme Court settled the principles governing the grant of ex parte injunctions. Principally, the order can be made,
- When there is a real urgency but not a self-induced or self-imposed urgency.
- Where it is necessary to preserve the res which is in danger or imminent danger of being destroyed, and
- Where there is a real impossibility of bringing the application for such injunction on notice and serving the other party.
When these factors are inapplicable, a wise judge that imbibed good judicial milk would exercise his/her discretion by turning down the application and asking the applicant to put the respondent on notice. The institution has always stood against the menace of this abuse over the years. The former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Hon. Justice Mohammed Bello once bemoaned,
“indeed, there is urgent need among some of us, the judges, to appreciate that ex parte injunction which was devised as a vehicle for the carriage of instant justice in proper cases should not be converted into a bulldozer for the demolition of substantial justice, we should all realize that justice should be done to public functionaries and public institutions.
It has also been reiterated that lawyers equally have a role to play in the war against abuse of ex parte injunction. In this direction, the Hon. Justice C. P.N. Selong opined thus:
“In as much as the speech of the learned Chief Justice was directed at judges, I beg to opine that the same caution should apply to legal practitioners, after all both judges and legal practitioners are Ministers in the Temple of Justice. It is my humble view that an honest lawyer who abides by the ethics of the profession should not bring an application which is manifestly unjust”.
The need for restraint from both the Bench and the Bar on the issue was reiterated at the Annual Bar Conference, Enugu by the then Chief Justice of Nigeria, Honourable Justice Mohammadu L. Uwais, who counseled thus:
“I think it is not out of place to appeal to legal practitioners at large to exercise more restraint in and desist from advising their clients to bring absurd applications to court for ex parte injunctions. You will agree with me that unless such applications are brought, the inconsiderate and reckless judges amongst us will not find the opportunity to embarrass the judiciary and the profession in general’’.
It must be noted, that it is not in all cases where a judge grants an order perceived to be wrong that an actual case of influence arises. However, the perception of the public about justice is important – whether such perception is rightly or wrongly placed. This is because the standard of justice has always been objective: based on the notion of the reasonable man. Justice must not just be done, but manifestly be seen to be done. As one writer aptly put it:
“The role of the Judiciary in maintaining socio-political order cannot be compromised and once the citizen believes that somebody, other than the law and his judicial conscience, tells the judge what to say or do, then, the dangers of a system break down and institutional failure becomes real”.
Accordingly, the resolve of the National Judicial Council (NJC) to henceforth deal with judges who grant ex parte orders with recklessness cannot but be supported and encouraged. Charity begins at home. The filthy Augean stable must be cleansed.
We have concentrated on the issue of in-house cleaning by the Judiciary itself because we realize that the most ready and devastating blow to the independence of the Judiciary in the mind of the public is usually struck by the inability of some of the judges themselves to conduct the affairs of the Bench so judicially and judiciously as to inspire public confidence in their independence from external influence. Even some lawyers themselves fall into the league of those members of the public who doubt the independence of the Judiciary on the ground of questionable judicial orders. In this regard, Uche Onyegorocha, a lawyer and member of the House of Representatives while responding to a question from the press on the unpopular pronouncements of a Federal High Court judge, said:
“I see undue influence in the whole process. I see a person that is not acting independently. Like I said earlier I see people playing the drum for him in the bush and he is dancing on the street”.
But beyond the question of conduct of the members of the Bench in handling cases brought before them are more technical and political issues of political, economic/fiscal and intellectual independence. These we shall presently address.
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
The Judiciary ought to be apolitical in a democratic dispensation to safeguard its independence. Accordingly, judges should not only be free from political affiliation, but the system should be organized in such a manner as to ensure that a judge does not give a decision biased in favour of a political party, especially the ruling party. Accordingly, Nwabueze identified two forms of judicial involvement in politics (i.e organized politics) as:
- decisions biased in favour of a ruling party, and
- judicial membership of political parties.
It is submitted that Nigeria’s adoption of multiparty democracy is healthy for the protection of the ‘political independence’ of the Judiciary. The term ‘political independence’ should be understood to mean the freedom of the Judiciary from having any form of political influence exerted ion it as to undermine its independence from any individual, group or another arm of government. Nigeria should strive to refuse any attempt to reduce the country into a one-party democracy since the political independence of the Judiciary would obviously be difficult to be achieved therein. The concept of an apolitical judge is utopian in a one-party system. According to Mr. Justice Georges, a former Chief Justice of Tanzania,
“The concept of the judge as neutral, belonging to no party in the multiparty democracy, can have no meaning …. Where there is one party”.
It has been argued that the involvement of the Executive in the appointment of Judges undermines the imperatives for the freedom of the Judiciary from political influence. It is however, our view that the system of appointment under the Constitution is the best we can have at present. If more caution is employed in the appointment of judges, no problem of want of independence would be posed by the appointment method. Nigeria is not yet ripe for election of judges or else the system would be thoroughly polluted by politics. (We shall look at the issue of appointment of judges subsequently).
Indications that a cross section of Nigerians believe that a section of the Judiciary might have compromised their judicial oath can be gleaned from this passage from a major national daily:
“The Chief Justice of the Federation, from indications, prefers his colleagues to stand above the fray of Nigeria’s turbulent political process. This position may have been informed by the ignominious role played by the judiciary in the country’s chequered political history. But despite the goodwill enjoyed by the judiciary due to a mature handling of suits, that sought to stop the recent general elections, the (sic) a section of the bench may have unwittingly placed this third arm of government in the dock”. (To be continued).
Thought for the Week
“We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and the judiciary is the safeguard of our property and our liberty and our property under the Constitution” – Charles Evans Hughes
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The Oracle: The Independence of the Judiciary in a Democratic Dispensation (Pt. 2)
Published
2 weeks agoon
June 26, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome
Introduction
Last week we commenced this series with some operational definitions, today we shall continue and conclude on the definitions and take a critical look at some cases – their good parts, deficiencies and worst case scenarios. Read on.
Definition of Terms (continues)
During the colonial and military regimes, the Executive always attempted to undermine the Judiciary, erode its independence and powers of coercion and have a field day with illegality and impunity. On those occasions, the Judiciary always stood up courageously to uphold the rule of law. In Eshugbayi Eleko Vs. Government of Nigeria the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever the deportation of the Oba of Lagos from his domain to an entirely different part of Nigeria on the ground, inter alia, that the Governor had no such power inspite of the fact that the Governor was then vested with both executive and legislative powers. It held:
“No member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice.”
In Lakanmi & Another Vs. A-G, Western State, the Supreme Court courageously declared null and void Edict No. 5 of 1967 promulgated by the Western State Government and Decree No, 48 and 45 of 1968 promulgated by the Federal Military Government, on the ground that they were ad hominem legislations. The legislations dealt with forfeiture of assets. The Supreme Court held that the 1963 Constitution clearly provided for separation of powers between the Judicial and the Executive and that Decree No. 45 of 1968 was a clear usurpation of the Judicial powers of the courts. Chief Rotimi Williams has then argued that the Decree which named specific people and confiscated their property were ad hominem and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the legislations amounted to judicial rather than legislative acts and struck them down. In reply, the Federal Military Government of General Yakubu Gown promulgated Decree No. 28 of 1970 to undermine the Judiciary. The Decree was audacious and even brutal in its title: “The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers Decree No. 28 of 1970.” The Decree restated the sacredness and unquestionability of any Decree or Edict promulgated or purported to be promulgated by the military government. But the Adetokunbo Ademola-led Supreme Court at the time was not intimidated.
In Governor of Lagos State Vs. Ojukwu Kayode Eso,JSC emphatically declared that:
“Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, the Executive, the Legislature (while it lasts) and the Judiciary are equal partners in the running of a successful government. The powers granted by the constitution to these organs by Section 4 (Legislative Powers), Section 5 (Executive Powers) and Section 6 (Judicial Powers) are classified under an omnibus umbrella known under part II to the Constitution as Powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’. The organs wield those powers and one must never exist in sabotage of the other or else there is chaos, Indeed there will be no federal government. I think, for one organ, and more especially the Executive, which holds all the physical powers, to put up itself in sabotage or deliberate contempt of the other is to stage an executive subversion of the constitution it is to uphold. Executive lawlessness tantamount to a deliberate violation of the constitution.”
There are many cases decided during the military era and under democratic environment that underscore the relentless efforts by other arms of government, especially the Executive to erode the independence and vibrancy of the Judiciary as a way of expanding their own frontiers of influence, unquesitonability and impunity.
Since the Executive has considerable (if not total) influence over the wealth of the State and over the appointment of Judges, it continuously seeks to make the Judiciary dependent by starving it of funds and by influencing the enthronement of mediocrity on the Bench. Issues in independence of the Judiciary may thus be broadly classified into three, viz, political independence, economic independence and intellectual independence. Before looking at these issues in detail, we may take a look at the face of Nigeria’s Judiciary so that the issues can simultaneously be matched with the ease.
The Case (The Good, The Bad, The Ugly)
“Since I made the order of the remand of the accused person last Thursday and up till about 10 minuets before I sat this morning, I have been under untold pressure and threat from many quarters urging me to arrive at a particular decision ever before I listen to the accused. Let me make it that as a Muslin, the teaching of my religion is clear about death being the ultimate. I am therefore not bothered about any such threat. I am, however, worried about the untold pressure coming, as it were, from unexpected quarters… To continue with this case will…..be a breach of the solemn pledge I made when I became a judge (i.e) to administer justice without fear or favour and without ill-will or affection. In view of the foregoing, I hereby remit this case file to the honourable chief judge for re-assignment to another judge.”
In this way, Honourable Justice Mashood Abass of the Oyo State High Court washed his hands off, like Pontius Pilate, of the trial of Otunba Iyiola Omisore and other accused persons standing trial for the murder of Late Chief Bola Ige, SAN (Slain Attorney-general of the Federation). After the controversial withdrawal of the judge, allegations of undue pressure, bribery, arm-twisting tactics, threats and promises directed against the judge inundated the media.
Before, the breaking of this unpalatable story, a sordid allegation of bribery had been trailing the Election Tribunal that sat in Akwa Ibom State over the petition of Dr. Imeh Umanah, against the election of the then incumbent governor, Obong Victor Attah.
In Enugu State, matters came to a head when an Election Tribunal had to relocate to Abuja to complete its job after alleging that Enugu State was no longer safe for its honourable members. These are bad times for the Judiciary!.
But in Anambra State, the State Chief Judge, Honourable Justice C. J. Okoli proved to be a pride of the Judiciary when he smartly ‘made himself unavailable’ during the July 10, 2003 abduction of the governor of Anambra State, Dr. Chris Ngige by his political enemies. The House of Assembly had passed a motion asking the Chief Judge to swear in the Deputy Governor as incumbent governor, but the Chief Judge was not available to carry out the resolution. By that act, his lordship saved the Judiciary from being enmeshed in the dirty politics of the state, which almost consumed the other arms of government.
More than any other factor, the abuse of ex-parte injunction by some judges has immensely contributed to the erosion of public confidence in the Judiciary under this democratic dispensation. Most of the ex parte orders granted under controversial circumstances involved situations where the Executive was either the direct beneficiary or had an interest which the public believed (rightly or wrongly) the Judiciary merely ‘co-operated’ to protect. This perception is a dangerous omen for independence of the Judiciary, because the Justice must not only be done but must be manifestly seen to have been done.
During this democratic dispensation, an Abuja High Court granted an ex parte order stopping the national convention which of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) when preparation for the convention had already gulped millions of naira and party members had already converged at the venue in Abuja. Most Nigerians did not believe that the Judge was not acting in the interest of the rival ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) given the controversial and damaging circumstances under which the order was made. The resulting outrage cost the judge his job.
Another, Abuja High Court made an order restraining the National Assembly from further deliberating on a bill before it to amend the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000. The Executive was interested in killing the bill. The order was made in defiance of the trite principle of the doctrine of separation of powers which precludes the courts from assuming jurisdiction over a bill that has not become law. In articulating the position of the Court of Appeal on the question of Judicial interference in the law making process purportedly under section 4(8) of the 1999 Constitution, Hon. Justice Mamman Nasir, P. said:
“though the courts have been given very wide powers under the subsection, the intention is not to authorize the Judiciary to interfere with the legitimate exercise of the powers of the legislature or the procedure to be followed in such exercise at power given to the courts comes into action after the legislature has enacted the law…”.
A similar controversy trailed the ex parte order given by the same Abuja Federal High Court which directed the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to issue a certificate of return to Chief Adolphus Wabara (PDP) as Senator representing the Abia South Senatorial Zone. INEC complied (apparently reluctantly) and Wabara became the president of the senate the next day. The source of the controversy was that INEC had earlier declared Elder Dan Imo (ANPP) as the winner of the seat. As Ogbham-Emeka, a counsel in Mike Ozekhome’s Chambers observed about the controversy in ThisDay Law,
“The question how the Abuja Federal High Court assumed jurisdiction over the matter and how the issue became one suitable for an ex parte order raked up a lot of dust. When the dust subsided not a few people concluded that it was the court and not the electorate that gave Senator Wabara the Abia South Senatorial ‘mandate’. But that was not to be the end of the regime of such demonstrable judicial anarchy that force litigants to choose which court order to obey and which not to obey, a situation that spells doom for a regime of law and order”. (To be continued).
Thought for the Week
“A functioning, robust democracy requires a healthy, educated, participatory followership and an educated, morally grounded leadership”. (Chinua Achebe).
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The Oracle
The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 4)
Published
2 months agoon
May 22, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
In our last discourse on this series, we examined the procedure for enforcement of fundamental rights, including applications for leave; as well as the substantive application itself and the reactions that follow. Today, we shall continues from where we stopped with the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto and later x-ray the applications to squash proceedings; applications for production and/or release of persons restrained; orders for bail, production and access to medication. Please read on.
SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS (Continues)
In the case of LAWRENCE OLUSEGUN ADEYEMO V. C.O.P, OYO STATE ([2021] LPELR-56272(CA)), the applicant requested the court for a writ of habeas corpus under order 2 of the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) rules 1979 which provision enjoined the applicant to serve all parties who are or might be interested in the proceedings. Although the affected party had put up appearance, but raised a preliminary objection to the application for non-compliance with the statutory conditions. Babalakin. J. (as he then was) struck out the application on the ground that order 2(1)(4) is mandatory whether the application is for mandamus, certiorari, or habeas corpus.
However the Supreme Court in recent times in respect of the fundamental rights enforcements has favourably leaned towards the equitable principle of “Ubi Jus Ubi remedium”, therefore looking more at the substance rather than the form. Hence the liberalization of the procedure for the enforcement of fundamental rights as exposed in the case of ABACHA V. FAWEHINMI ((2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228) and UBI UJONG INAH & ORS V. MARCUS UKOI ((2001) (CA) 41981.
APPLICATION TO QUASH ANY PROCEEDINGS
Sometimes it may be necessary for an applicant by way of certiorari to apply to the court for an order that such proceedings be removed from a particular court or tribunal to another court for the purpose of being quashed for lack of power and/or jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings or make such order.
However, an applicant shall not be able to question the validity of any order, warrant, commitment, conviction, inquisition or record unless before the hearing of his application (Motion or summons), he has served a certified copy (CTC) thereof together with a Copy of the application on the Attorney-General of the Federation or of the State in which the applicant is being heard (as the case may be).
The court in granting an application seeking to quash proceedings, shall direct that the order, proceedings, conviction or the records of an inquisition be quashed forthwith upon being removed into the court hearing the application.
APPLICATION FOR PRODUCTION AND/OR RELEASE OF PERSON RESTRAINED
By virtue of Order 4 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court or judge to whom the application is made ex-parte may make an order forthwith for his release from such detention.
The court may also direct that an originating summons (as in form 2) be issued or that an application therefore be made by notice of motion (as in form 3). The court may also as it deem fit adjourn the ex-parte application so that notice thereof may be given to the person against whom the order for the release of the applicant is sought.
ORDER FOR BAIL, PRODUCTION, AND ACCESS TO MEDICATION
Pursuant to order 4 of the bail application, the court upon application may grant to the detainee reliefs including bail, production of the detainee, access to mediation etc.
The court may grant bail at ex-parte stage, pending the substantive application. Where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court may subject to its discretion order that the person restrained be produced in court. And where such order is so made, it shall constitute a sufficient warrant to any superintendent of a prison, police officer in charge of a police station, police officer in charge of the complainant or any other person responsible for his detention, to produce or ensure the production of the person so restrained or detained in court.
For the purpose of enforcing a person’s fundamental rights, no matter where a detainee is kept he can be allowed access to his personal physician or medically prescribed drugs.
It suffices to note here, that once an order has been made by the court pursuant to the Enforcement Rules, and for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights provided for in the constitution, such order must be complied with. Failure to obey or comply with any order so made by the court under these rules will incur proceedings for the committal of the party disobeying such an order.
CONCLUSION
Without any controversy, the idea of human rights and personal liberties has become firm and secured. The universality and immutability of human rights are now globally accepted. Consequently, any nation that slacks or shyies away from the diligent protection and enforcement of human rights stand the precarious risk of being shunned by decent and civilised nations. The United Nations seems to have captured the importance and primacy of the issue of human rights and its protection when it poignantly stated as follows:
“Human Rights and fundamental freedoms are the birth right of all human beings, their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Government” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
It is the duty of every Government everywhere and every courts of law in every jurisdiction to promote, protect, uphold, and ensure enforcement of fundamental Human rights at all times, because these rights encapsulate the very essence of man.
The end.
THOUGHTS FOR THE WEEK
“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI.
“Because no matter who we are or where we come from, we’re all entitled to the basic human rights of clean air to breathe, clean water to drink, and healthy land to call home”. – Martin Luther King III
“Human rights are not only violated by terrorism, repression or assassination, but also by unfair economic structures that creates huge inequalities”. – Pope Francis.
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