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The Oracle

The Oracle: Natasha’s Recall, NJC’s Code of Conduct/Judicial Discipline Regulations – Matters Arising

Published

11 months ago

on

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION
The dramatic on/off attempt to recall the Senator representing Kogi central Senatorial District in the National Assembly has focused public attention on that hitherto obscure and seldom used process. While the public has been regaled (if not quite transfixed) with the apparently determined and desperate attempt by her supposed constituents to recall her (and her equally robust push-back), the body at the centre of it all – the electoral umpire – has been no less up-to-the-job with its prompt assessments and verdicts (so far, in her favour). INEC roundly rejected the recall process on the ground that it has not met the constitutional requirements of section 69(a) of the 1999 Constitution.

However, what few observers have noticed (much less commented on) is the legal framework which underpins the entire process – INEC’s Guidelines for Recalling Members of the National and State Houses of Assembly, 2024. I will get to the details shortly, but it is quite interesting that a similar handicap, in my opinion, afflicts an even more sensitive regulatory document, the NJC’s (National Judiciary Council) Regulations for the Discipline of Judicial Officers. I believe both documents are potentially problematic for the following reasons, starting with that of INEC as aforesaid.

INEC’S RECALL GUIDELINES, 2024
This would-be sledgehammer which Senator Natasha’s traducers sought to deploy for her removal is expressed on its face to have been made by INEC pursuant to Sections 69, 110 and 160 of the Constitution, Sections 2(c) and 113 of the Electoral Act, 2022, “and all other powers enabling it in that behalf”. At its foot (its conclusion), it bears the signature of Prof. Mahmood Yakubu, INEC’s Chairman. Therein, in my view, lies the problem. This is because, an enactment which is supposedly made by a multi-member body cannot validly be endorsed or executed by only one of them – without an express authorization to that effect. Administrative bodies must act within the scope of their statutory powers and follow administrative due process. See the cases of Ajiboye V. Attorney-General of the Federation (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 345) 765 and Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40.

The relevant law is Section 27(2) of the Interpretation Act, which provides that where a body established by an enactment comprises three or more persons and is empowered to make subsidiary instruments, for any such instrument to be valid, it should be “executed under the hand of any two of the members thereof as may be authorized by such body generally for that purpose or specially or any particular occasion”.

Now, by virtue of Paragraph 14(1) of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, INEC consists of a Chairman and twelve members (called “National Electoral Commissioners”). Section 148 of the Electoral Act, 2022 empowers INEC to make regulations, guidelines or manuals for the purpose of giving effect to the Act. Even though Section 147 of the Act empowers the Commission to delegate “any of its powers and functions to any National Electoral Commissioner, Resident Electoral Commissioner, electoral officer, or any other officer of the Commission or any other officer appointed under the provisions of (the) Act,” curiously, not only are the Guidelines themselves not expressed to have been made pursuant to the aforesaid provisions of Section 148 of the Electoral Act, more importantly, they are silent on any delegation of the power to enact them by the Commission to its Chairman, as contemplated by Section 147 of the Electoral Act.

The implication of this defect is glaring: the Recall Guidelines are ultra vires the sole executor thereof, INEC’s Chairman, because by virtue of the aforesaid combined provisions of Section 27(2) of the Interpretation Act and Paragraph 14(b) of the Third Schedule to the Constitution, they should have borne the imprimatur (been “executed under the hand”) of at least two of INEC’s Commissioners or officers. There are limits to statutory and constitutional powers due to the supremacy of due process over the ultra vires acts of public officers. See the cases of Attorney-General of Lagos State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 833)1 and Minister of Internal Affairs v. Shugaba Darman (1982) 3 NCLR 915. This ought to have completely put paid to Senator Natasha’s entire recall saga, and forcing INEC to go back to the drawing-board. This remains to be seen, of course. The “wahala” of reviewing without supposed ballot papers of recall. The law might yet hand her a technical victory – seemingly without firing a shot.

NJC’S JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REGULATIONS 2017
This document appears to be even more problematic than INEC’s Guidelines. How is that so? This is so because even though the Regulations were expressly made by the NJC on the 9th day of March, 2017, there is nothing on their face to indicate to suggest that they were executed by any officer of that distinguished body of Jurists – not even the Honourable Chief Justice of Nigeria who is its head by virtue of Paragraph 20(1) of the 3rd Schedule of the 1999 Constitution. The same paragraph provides that the NJC consists of twenty-three members.

Indeed, similar provisions in Section 27(2) of the Interpretation Act prescribe that the NJC Regulations ought to bear the imprimatur of at least two of its members. Its failure in this regard, with the greatest respect, is even worse because I am not aware of any provision – similar to those of Section 147 of the Electoral Act, 2022 – which empowers the Council to delegate any, some or all its powers (especially of enacting subsidiary instruments such as the Regulations) to any of its members (presumably the Hon. CJN). This lacuna is too obvious to be over-emphasized – much less overlooked. It should be squarely addressed by concerned authorities.

RULES OF EVIDENCE
Beyond the foregoing fatal structural defect, a fundamentally more worrisome aspect of the NJC Regulations, in my humble view, are the provisions of Regulation 21(3) thereof which stipulate that the rules of evidence do not apply to the Investigating Committee’s hearings. This provision is curious, to say the least, given that the Regulations are meant to guide an investigation into judicial misconduct – to probe allegations of ethical violations and malfeasance against judicial officers who, by their very calling, are trained to apply (and have been applying virtually throughout their entire careers) the rules of evidence codified in the Evidence Act, 2011.

This provision is problematic because by virtue of the provisions of Item 23 of the Exclusive Legislative List of the Constitution, only the National Assembly is competent to legislate on evidence. See the case of AG Abia State v. AG Federation (2002) LPELR-611 (SC). That being the case, the broader question becomes whether the other evidence-related provisions of the NJC’s said Regulations – namely Regulation 21(2), (4), (5), (7) and (8) might legitimately come under scrutiny. They stipulate as follows:-

<span;><span;>- (2): “All testimony taken at the hearing shall be given under oath or affirmation and recorded”;

<span;><span;>- (4): “The complainant shall be given an opportunity to produce evidence and call witnesses”;

<span;><span;>- (5): “At any hearing of the Investigating Committee, the subject judge has the right to present evidence, to compel the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of witnesses and to cross examine, in person or by Counsel, Committee Witness”;

<span;><span;>- (7): “The Investigating Committee may take oral evidence if it considers it necessary to do so”;

<span;><span;>- (8): “The Investigating Committee must arrange for any evidence given orally to be recorded in a transcript or by electronic recording”.

The significance of the foregoing is underscored by the fact that the NJC is not one of the bodies which are specifically excluded from the application of the Evidence Act, 2011, under the provisions of Section 256 of the Evidence Act. The maxim is expresso uniu est exclusio alterius (the express mention of a thing in a statute implies the exclusion of others which otherwise might be included). See P.H.C.S. LTD VS MIGFO LTD. (2012) All FWLR Pt. 642 pg. 1615.

I humbly submit that the foregoing view is buttressed by Item 68 of the Exclusive Legislative List of the Constitution which stipulate that the power of the National Assembly to legislate on the substantive subject matters of the preceding Items (1-67) in that List includes “any matter incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere in (the) List.”
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PUBLIC AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Yet, another interesting issue is the Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers 2016. Is the fact that it appears to be co-extensive with the Code of Conduct for Public Officers under the Constitution in the Fifth Schedule thereof anomalous in any way?. Has the Constitution covered the field or can the more detailed and specific provisions of the latter co-exist with it? Is enacting a Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers among the powers donated to the NJC under Paragraph 21 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution? That is the question.

This issue is somewhat topical given the ongoing story about the propriety of the chairmanship of the Board of Trustees of the IBB golf club, Abuja, by the President of the Court of Appeal. Given the provisions of Rule 9.3 of the said Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers 2016 which expressly permits judicial officers to join sporting organisations. One wonders whether Hon. Justice Monica Dongban-Mensem breaches any Code of Conduct to so act. I very doubt if the Code of Conduct for Public Officers under the Constitution bans such engagements. Although she may be on sure footing, to so act, this must be subjected to public perception of the Head of the Intermediate Court intermingling with the hordes of politicians that daily patronize the Golf Club. And perception is invariably reality. With Justice Emeka Nwite’s restraining order against her and others from being nominated and presented pending the determination of the Originating suit – the many peels of the onions are just unfolding.

In all, the non-endorsement of the foregoing vital regulatory instruments (including the Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers) in the manner required by law might make them vulnerable to challenge by ambitious counsel and litigants who might fall back on such complaints in the absence of more fundamental objections or defences. Let those in charge of amendments to these laws do the needful immediately.

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The Oracle

The Oracle: The New Digital Colonialism: Navigating AI Policy Under Foreign Tech Dominance (Pt. 4)

Published

5 days ago

on

March 27, 2026

By

Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

The last episode of this treatise concluded our examination of the preferences of the Western (US, EU) and Eastern (China) hemispheres on the subject after which we considered the dangers of weak localization and disproportionate influence of foreign technology on African ecosystems. This was followed by an analysis of the issues generated by AI policy and later we looked at what African States needs to do to tackle the challenge-using Nigeria as a case study. Today, we shall continue with same with special emphasis on the pen in the trans-continental transformation of AI technology and later x-ray the need for technological sovereignty and for crafting an indigenous AI policy agenda. We shall then conclude with an overview of lessons from abroad including the US, EU and China. Enjoy.

AI POLICY AND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION IN AFRICA, WHO WIELDS THE PEN?

In one sentence, we wield the pen. Our governments, independent state actors, entrepreneurs, African men, women and youth all share in this responsibility. The future of Africa’s digital transformation depends on whether we choose to author our own story or allow others to continue writing it for us.

Africa is witnessing an increasing call for technological sovereignty: the ability to control our own infrastructure, data and innovations. This idea, central to decolonial frameworks, insists that we must move away from being a passive consumer of technologies and reclaim control of its digital future. Kwame Nkrumah emphasized the importance of pan-African cooperation for achieving sovereignty. That vision today extends to the digital realm, where regional collaboration and homegrown solutions are critical for breaking dependency on Western corporations. Achille Mbembe further argues that Africa should leverage indigenous knowledge systems and local resources to create technologies that reflect African values, rather than merely importing Western tools ill-suited to its unique needs.

The digital divide between Africa and the West is not merely technical; it is rooted in structural and historical inequalities. The continent’s persistent reliance on foreign technologies reflects centuries of global imbalances that continue to shape how resources and knowledge flow. A central issue is technological dependency: Africa consumes technologies made elsewhere instead of shaping them (Tyler Robinson, ‘Navigating Digital Neocolonialism in Africa’ (cigionline.org) < www.cigionline.org/static/documents/DPH-paper-Stevenson_1.pdf > Accessed on 16th September, 2025).

Global tech giants dominate Africa’s digital landscape, extracting vast amounts of data without adequate investment in local infrastructure or people. Data extraction not only perpetuates Western dominance but also strips Africa of sovereignty over its own digital futures. Without robust regulations or sufficient local technological capacity, African nations remain vulnerable to these external forces.

NEED FOR TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNITY

Against these challenges, the need for technological sovereignty becomes undeniable. Africa must not remain a passive participant in the global digital economy. We must take proactive steps to build our own technological infrastructure and policies. Sovereignty in the digital age is not just about access but about authorship: designing systems that align with African values, priorities and aspirations. Some progress is already visible. Many governments are beginning to reclaim data oversight by establishing national data centres, such as those in Benin and Togo. These centres enable local data governance and prevent exploitation. Even when international institutions provide support, African states are increasingly insisting on local ownership and oversight (ibid).

Partnerships and trade agreements have also played a role in shaping Africa’s digital transformation, sometimes limiting, sometimes enabling. The Policy and Regulatory Initiative for Digital Africa (PRIDA), funded by the European Union and implemented by the African Union, supports broadband access, harmonized digital policies, and the capacity to implement them. While the framework is influenced by European legislation, it ensures stronger protections for African citizens. The Pan-African e-Network Project, originally launched in India but now African-led, connects countries via satellite and fibre, enabling teleeducation and telemedicine across borders. It demonstrates that partnerships can succeed when they are driven and managed by Africans. Similarly, the Smart Africa Alliance was established to transform the continent into a collaborative digital market. By centring ICTs within socio-economic development agendas, the alliance promotes sustainable policies, digital infrastructure, and affordable access across its member states.

TOWARD AN INDIGENOUS AI POLICY AGENDA: RECOMMENDATIONS

While significant progress has been made, more must be done to ensure that Africa wields the pen in shaping its digital destiny. Recommendations emerging from this discussion are clear:
1. Prioritize investment in indigenous technologies and local innovation rather than relying primarily on foreign solutions.

2. Expand digital literacy and capacity-building across the continent to empower citizens to participate meaningfully in the digital economy.

3. Strengthen regional collaboration by developing a unified digital strategy that reflects Africa’s collective interests and unique needs.

4. Establish and enforce robust regulatory frameworks to protect data, safeguard citizens, and curtail exploitative practices of global tech corporations.

5. Pursue strategic partnerships with external actors only on terms that guarantee local ownership, oversight, and long-term autonomy.

6. Operationalise Ethics by Design across all AI and digital identity systems by embedding impact assessments, fairness audits, user consent, and accountability mechanisms at every stage—from policy formulation to system deployment.

7. Mandate algorithmic explainability and independent auditing for all AI models impacting critical sectors such as healthcare, credit, policing, and education, ensuring transparency and bias detection.

8. Localise and secure data within national borders by requiring sensitive national datasets to be stored in certified local data centres, supported with investments in infrastructure and cybersecurity.

9. Extend NDPA protections to vulnerable and marginalised communities by enabling inclusive identity verification methods, community-based registration agents, and exemptions for hard-to-reach populations.

10. Establish a Public Interest Technology Task Force composed of ethicists, technologists, civil society, and legal scholars to provide oversight and human rights evaluations before new systems are rolled out.

11. Prioritise national capacity building in data ethics and digital rights through mandatory training for government agencies, judiciary, MDAs, and law enforcement bodies.

12. Make digital consent comprehensible, accessible, and verifiable by requiring plain-language terms, local translations, audio/visual options, and legal avenues to revoke consent.

13. Decentralise and democratise identity systems by adopting a federated model where local governments, trusted institutions, and community actors can verify identity, reducing exclusion and dependency on centralised systems.

14. Enforce mandatory Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) for high-risk public projects, with findings made public and subject to independent review; impose strict penalties for non-compliance.

15. Create civic engagement pathways in digital governance through open consultations, citizen assemblies on AI ethics, participatory monitoring, and data literacy campaigns to treat citizens as democratic stakeholders.

Only by embracing these recommendations can Africa move from dependency to sovereignty. This continent must wield the pen herself, authoring a digital future rooted in African values and aspirations and ensuring full participation in the global digital economy on our own terms.

LESSONS FROM THE EU, US AND CHINA

THE EU

1. The European Union’s AI Act provides a tiered, risk-based approach to regulating artificial intelligence, distinguishing between unacceptable, high, limited, and minimal risk. Obligations such as transparency, oversight, and outright bans are matched to the level of risk. For Africa, this model illustrates how to avoid over-regulating low-risk tools while ensuring strict oversight of high-risk applications.

2. Closely tied to this is the EU’s privacy-by-design approach, anchored in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Here, privacy safeguards, data minimisation, and “by default” protections are integrated from the outset of system design. Africa can adopt this holistic model by embedding privacy and data rights into both law and practice, with strong enforcement mechanisms.

3. The EU also prioritises transparency, accountability, and liability. High-risk systems must undergo conformity assessments, independent audits, and documentation processes. Liability frameworks are being expanded to ensure that citizens can seek redress when harmed by AI systems. This provides a template for Africa to hold developers, deployers, and regulators accountable.

4. In addition, the EU AI Act prohibits certain practices outright, such as social scoring, manipulative techniques, and some forms of biometric surveillance. Setting non-negotiable boundaries protects citizens while providing clarity for innovators.

5. Finally, the EU demonstrates the value of operational readiness and compliance infrastructure. GDPR compelled companies to build compliance units (e.g., privacy officers, auditing mechanisms), which now serve as the foundation for AI oversight. Africa should similarly invest early in institutions, regulators, and technical capacity to ensure that laws are enforceable in practice.

THE UNITED STATES

1. The United States illustrates how rapid executive action can shape emerging technologies even before legislation matures. For instance, Executive Order 14110 (2023) on AI mandated agency risk assessments, civil rights considerations, and workforce planning. Africa can similarly use presidential or ministerial directives to establish immediate governance frameworks while legislative processes catch up.

2. The Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights (2022) articulates citizen protections, including transparency, fairness, privacy, and the right to opt out. This offers a model for Africa to enshrine AI-related rights in constitutional or statutory instruments, ensuring that protections are not left as policy afterthoughts.

3. The U.S. also underscores the importance of equity and non-discrimination. Policies emphasize audits, training, and oversight in areas such as employment, housing, health, and policing to prevent algorithmic bias. Africa should follow this lead by embedding protections for marginalized groups into its AI strategies, addressing gender, ethnic, and rural-urban disparities

4. At the same time, the U.S. demonstrates how innovation and competition can be promoted alongside regulation. Federal agencies such as NIST, together with grant schemes and research funding, stimulate startups and infrastructure growth. For Africa, combining protective regulation with incentives for local innovation will ensure that governance does not stifle creativity or competitiveness.

CHINA

1. China’s national AI strategy highlights the power of entrepreneurial hubs and incubators as engines of innovation. Africa can adapt this model by building regional AI hubs that connect academia, industry, and startups while attracting diaspora talent.

2. China also leveraged digital financial inclusion by integrating AI into mobile payments and lending platforms. With Africa’s mobile money infrastructure already strong (e.g., M-Pesa), scaling digital finance to directly support entrepreneurs could accelerate indigenous innovation.

3. Through initiatives like Made in China 2025, China has pursued indigenous innovation and self-sufficiency, investing in local chip design, cloud infrastructure, and AI frameworks. Africa, too, must localize its data, develop homegrown AI models, and reduce dependence on foreign technology.

4. The country’s advances in AI for healthcare: diagnostics, wearables, predictive analytics, demonstrate how technology can bridge systemic service gaps. Africa could apply similar solutions to leapfrog chronic shortages in health systems.

5. China’s Digital Silk Road shows how digital exports can extend influence abroad. Africa can flip this approach by creating an African Digital Corridor, exporting its innovations and setting standards based on African values.

6. At the same time, China’s struggles with semiconductors underscore the risks of supply chain dependency. Africa must build resilience through semiconductor R&D, local cloud infrastructure, and open-source software ecosystems.

7. Finally, China shows how standards and regulation can be tools of global influence. By actively shaping AI governance in developing regions, it is carving out international leadership. Africa, through the AU and AfCFTA, can harmonize its own AI standards, strengthening its voice in global digital policy debates. (To be continued).

THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK

“Over time I think we will probably see a closer merger of biological intelligence and digital intelligence”. (Elon Musk).

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The Oracle

The Oracle: The New Digital Colonialism: Navigating AI Policy Uunder Foreign Tech Dominance (Pt. 3)

Published

2 weeks ago

on

March 20, 2026

By

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

The last installment of this intervention traced the evolution of AI, reviewed notable developments in its trajectory; its African dimension and policy trend therein and beyond. This week’s feature goes further afield, reviewing the position in the US, the EU and China. Thereafter we consider the dangers of weak localized and disproportionate influence of foreign technology on African innovation ecosystem. This is followed by a discussion of the issues generated by AI policy and what African States need to do – using Nigeria as an example/template. Enjoy.

USA, EU, CHINA’S PREFERENCES (Continues)

In Africa, the policy landscape is accelerating but uneven. The Global AI Index (www.diplomacy.edu/resource/report-stronger-digital-voices-from-africa/ai-africa-national-policies/ > (Diplomacy.Edu) Accessed on 10th September, 2025) categorizes most African countries as lagging: Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya as nascent, and Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia as waking up (Techpoint Africa, < www.facebook.com/TechpointAfrica/posts/africas-ai-policy-why-a-copy-and-paste-approach-will-fail-this-time-every-countr/1064672189125910/> (Facebook.com, 22nd July, 2025) Accessed on 10th September, 2025). Mauritius led with an AI strategy (Mauritius Artificial Intelligence Strategy, November, 2018 < https://treasury.govmu.org/Documents/Strategies/Mauritius%20AI%20Strategy.pdf > (Treasury.govmu.org) Accessed on 10th September, 2025), followed by Kenya’s AI and blockchain task force (2019) (Kenya Artificial Intelligence Strategy < https://ict.go.ke/sites/default/files/2025-03/Kenya%20AI%20Strategy%202025%20-%202030.pdf > (Ict.go.ke) Accessed on 10th September, 2025), its Digital Master Plan (2022) (Kenya Digital Master Plan, 2022 – 2032 < https://cms.icta.go.ke/sites/default/files/2022-04/Kenya%20Digital%20Masterplan%202022-2032%20Online%20Version.pdf > (Ict.go.ke) Accessed on 10th September, 2025), and Rwanda’s AI policy (Thompson Gyedu Kwarkye, ‘AI policies in Africa: lessons from Ghana and Rwanda’ (TheConversation.com, 25th April, 2025) < https://theconversation.com/ai-policies-in-africa-lessons-from-ghana-and-rwanda-253642 > Accessed on 10th September, 2025), which reflects its national security priorities. Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, Algeria and South Africa have also announced or drafted
AI policies, often framed around economic growth and innovation.
Continental initiatives, such as the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy (African Union, ‘THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY FOR AFRICA (2020-2030)’ < https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38507-doc-dts-english.pdf > Accessed on 10th September, 2025) and the World Bank’s DE4A program (< www.worldbank.org/en/programs/all-africa-digital-transformation > Accessed on 10th September, 2025), emphasize infrastructure, skills and inclusion, but implementation remains fragmented.

Still, foreign influence looms large. Many African AI and data governance frameworks are modeled directly on external templates, particularly the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (< https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/ > Accessed on 10th September, 2025). Nigeria’s NDPR (< https://nitda.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/NDPR-Implementation-Framework.pdf > Accessed on 10th September, 2025), a near copy of the GDPR, introduced concepts like consent, data subject rights and cross-border transfers. While it helped raise awareness and created local compliance industries, it omitted key protections (such as breach notifications, children’s rights and strong enforcement). Similar GDPR-inspired laws have been enacted in Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. This copy-paste strategy provides structure but often lacks localization, leaving gaps in enforcement and contextual fit (Bolu Abiodun ‘Africa’s AI policy: Why a copy and paste approach will fail this time’ (Techpoint.Africa, 22nd July, 2025) < https://techpoint.africa/insight/africas-ai-policy-copy-paste/ > Accessed on 10th September, 2025).
Critics warn that the real problem is not copying but exclusion. As Mozilla’s Kiito Shilongo and other researchers argue, many African AI policies are drafted with heavy input from foreign agencies and consultants, while local communities, startups, and civil society are sidelined. This participatory deficit means policies risk reflecting donor interests more than citizens’ rights. In Rwanda, for example, AI policy was shaped through government agencies and international NGOs with a strong focus on security. Ghana’s was more inclusive, involving startups, academia and telecoms, but leaned toward development goals over safety. Both approaches highlight the political nature of AI policymaking and the different ways foreign partnerships shape outcomes.

DANGERS OF WEAK LOCALIZATION

The consequences of weak localization are serious. AI systems trained abroad often misidentify African faces, misinterpret African languages, and replicate systemic biases, raising concerns about discrimination and digital rights. Yet, while African AI strategies often mention ethics and human rights, we lack the institutions and consultation processes such as the six-month public consultations typical in the EU that make such commitments enforceable. As Shilongo notes, perhaps Africa should copy less of the content of Western frameworks and more of the participatory processes that make them legitimate.

In short, Africa’s AI policy moment reflects both progress and peril: policies are emerging, but without deeper local ownership, institutional capacity and participatory design, we risk entrenching dependency rather than building sovereignty.

DISPROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ON AFRICAN INNOVATION ECOSYSTEMS – REAL LIFE EXAMPLES

The critique of foreign dominance in Africa’s digital space is best illustrated through concrete examples that reveal how global technology companies shape local innovation ecosystems, often in ways that mirror older colonial patterns of extraction and dependency.

Language exclusion: Africa is home to over 2,000 languages (https://alp.fas.harvard.edu/introduction-african-languages > Accessed on 16th September, 2025), around one-third of the world’s total, yet, as of May 2024, Apple’s Siri, Google Assistant and Amazon’s Alexa collectively support none of them. This linguistic exclusion reinforces dependency on foreign platforms while marginalizing African cultures in the digital sphere.

Exploited labour: In 2019, South African graduate Daniel Motaung began work as a content moderator for Sama, a subcontractor for Facebook. Relocated to Kenya, he earned $2.20 per hour to review traumatic content described by colleagues as “mental torture”. When Motaung and others attempted to unionize, he was dismissed and later sued Sama and Facebook for union-busting and exploitation. This case underscores how “responsible outsourcing” in Africa often conceals exploitative labor practices.

Resource extraction: The Democratic Republic of Congo holds nearly half of the world’s known cobalt reserves, vital for powering smartphones and electric cars. In Kolwesi alone, thousands of children reportedly mine cobalt under dangerous conditions, while profits flow largely abroad. Much like colonial resource extraction, Africa provides the raw materials that power global digital economies but sees little local benefit.

Surveillance and bias: In Johannesburg, Vumacam has deployed more than 5,000 CCTV cameras integrated with AI analytics for private security firms. Activists warn that this reliance on facial recognition, already proven to misidentify darker-skinned faces at disproportionately high rates entrenches South Africa’s long history of racialized surveillance. Foreign-designed technologies thus risk reinforcing systemic inequalities under the guise of safety.

Connectivity myths: Mark Zuckerberg’s Internet.org initiative (launched in 2013) was marketed as a philanthropic effort to connect the unconnected. Projects like Free Basics promised free access to online services in over 60 countries. Yet leaked documents revealed that millions of Global South users were secretly charged for “free” data, generating nearly $100 million in 2021 alone. Framed as altruism, these projects extended Facebook’s market reach while extracting revenue from vulnerable populations.

Taken together, these examples reveal how global technology firms, mostly U.S.-based, operate in Africa with strategies that echo colonial logics. They build critical infrastructures (clouds, platforms, connectivity) aligned with their own commercial interests, entrench market monopolies and rely on low-wage labour or raw resource extraction with little local reinvestment. Their technologies often embed cultural and racial biases reflective of narrow developer demographics, yet are exported globally under the banner of “progress,” “development,” or “connecting people.”

As Western jurisdictions strengthen data protection and AI regulation, African countries often remain vulnerable due to weaker frameworks and limited enforcement capacity. This asymmetry creates fertile ground for digital colonialism; a modern-day “Scramble for Africa” where foreign firms extract and control data much like colonial powers once extracted minerals (Danielle Coleman, ‘Digital Colonialism: The 21st Century Scramble for Africa Through Extraction and Control of User Data and the Limitations of Data Protection Laws’ (Law.Umich.Edu) < https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol24/iss2/6/ > Accessed on 16th September, 2025). Under the guise of innovation, these companies wield disproportionate influence over African AI and digital ecosystems, shaping policy choices, technical architectures, and even societal norms, while leaving Africa in a position of dependency rather than empowerment.

THE ISSUES GENERATED BY AI POLICY

While global AI policy is advancing through risk-based regulation, ethical standards, and participatory governance, Africa’s AI landscape remains fragmented, heavily modeled on external frameworks, and vulnerable to digital dependency. The disproportionate power of foreign technology companies manifested in many ways including linguistic exclusion, exploitative labour, resource extraction, biased surveillance and deceptive connectivity projects echoes colonial logics of extraction and control. Without decisive intervention, the continent risks entrenching digital colonialism, a new form of dependency in which policy choices, infrastructures and innovation ecosystems are shaped externally, undermining both democratic values and long-term development.

WHAT AFRICAN STATES MUST DO

To avoid replicating historical asymmetries in digital form, African states must assert sovereignty over their AI policies, data governance and digital infrastructures. This requires moving beyond passive adoption toward active regulatory design, investment in local infrastructure (such as data centers, compute resources and research capacity) and strengthening institutional oversight with technically competent regulators. Equally critical is the creation of participatory policy processes that center human rights, economic development, and indigenous innovation. Only by combining legal safeguards, domestic capacity, and strategic partnerships built on equality, not dependence, can Africa transform digital technologies into engines of genuine development rather than renewed extraction.

THE NIGERIAN EXAMPLE: DATA SOVEREIGNTY OR DATA SURRENDER

With the rapid expansion of national digital infrastructure across Nigeria, a far more pressing issue has risen to the fore: the question of who truly owns and governs the data that powers this infrastructure. As digital systems increasingly underpin the delivery of public services, financial transactions, education platforms, health records, and national security functions, data becomes not only a technical asset but a core element of state power. Data sovereignty means that data generated within a country’s borders is governed by that nation’s laws and regulatory frameworks; this ensures local control over data access, storage, and usage (Folashadé Soulé, ‘Digital Sovereignty in Africa: Moving beyond Local Data Ownership’ CIGI (2024) <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/digital-sovereignty-in-africa-moving-beyond-local-data-ownership/> Accessed on the 14th of June, 2025.). It has become a critical aspect of national policy and governance. In Nigeria, this issue has grown increasingly complex, particularly in light of the pervasive presence of foreign cloud providers, offshore data processors, and international technology firms that collect, process, and sometimes export Nigerian user data without clear or enforceable jurisdictional frameworks.

Foreign digital platforms have historically played a central role in the Nigerian data ecosystem either as providers of essential services like email, storage, and analytics, or as developers of social media and financial applications used daily by millions of Nigerians (Fola Odufuwa et al., ‘Digital Technology Adoption by Microenterprises: Nigeria Report’ (2024) <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/383202125_Digital_Technology_Adoption_by_Microenterprises_Nigeria_Report> Accessed on the 14th of June, 2025.). While these platforms often promise global connectivity and technical sophistication, they also introduce serious risks. Data generated within Nigeria is frequently routed through foreign servers, stored in jurisdictions with significantly different privacy protections, and subjected to external political and commercial interests (Patrick Aloamaka, ‘DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA: LESSONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ UCC Law Journal (2023) 3 (1).). This dislocation of Nigerian data is what scholars term extraterritorial data flow which raises serious questions about control, privacy, and national security. The potential misuse of this data, whether for commercial exploitation, surveillance, or even geopolitical leverage, makes the issue of domestic data governance all the more urgent. (To be continued).

THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK

“Over time I think we will probably see a closer merger of biological intelligence and digital intelligence”. (Elon Musk).

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The Oracle

The Oracle: The New Digital Colonialism: Navigating AI Policy Under Foreign Tech Dominance (Pt. 2)

Published

3 weeks ago

on

March 13, 2026

By

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

The inaugural installment of this piece was necessarily foundational, providing the background to the emergence of AI; how it transformed the digital space; applicable regulatory frameworks; its algorithimic transparency/accountability; its ethical dimensions and implications and the threat of foreign tech dominance/digital colonialism. This sophomore edition traces the evolution of AI; notable developments; the history of technological dependency in Africa and policy trends in the continent and beyond. Enjoy.

THE EVOLUTION OF AI

AI has progressed from rule-based systems to machine learning and deep learning models capable of autonomous decision-making. Applications range from healthcare diagnostics to autonomous vehicles, predictive policing, and financial algorithms. While AI enhances productivity, concerns arise over:

Job displacement due to automation. (Brynjolfsson, E., & McAfee, A. (2014). The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. W. W. Norton & Company).

Surveillance capitalism, where personal data is exploited for profit.

Algorithmic governance, where AI influences public policy without sufficient oversight (O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of Math Destruction. Crown Publishing.). The conceptual origins of Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be traced to the mid-20th century, when pioneering figures such as Alan Turing and John McCarthy began to explore the possibility of creating machines capable of simulating human intelligence. Turing’s seminal 1950 paper, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” posed the provocative question, “Can machines think?”—a question that laid the philosophical groundwork for modern AI research. (Turing, Alan M. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Mind 59, no. 236 (1950): 433–460.) McCarthy, who coined the term “artificial intelligence” in 1956, convened the historic Dartmouth Conference, widely considered the birth of AI as a formal field of inquiry (McCarthy, John et al., “A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence,” (1955).

EARLY ASPIRATIONS AND TECHNOLOGICAL MILESTONES

Early AI efforts focused on symbolic logic, rule-based systems, and expert systems, which relied on hand-coded rules to simulate decision-making processes. These systems, while limited in scope, found application in fields such as medical diagnostics (e.g., MYCIN) and chess-playing algorithms. The emergence of machine learning in the late 20th century—particularly supervised learning techniques—ushered in a new era in which machines could learn patterns from data rather than rely solely on pre-programmed rules.
The exponential growths in computing power, availability of big data, and algorithmic innovation have since culminated in what many scholars refer to as the “AI revolution.”

NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS

Notable developments include deep learning techniques powered by artificial neural networks, natural language processing exemplified by large language models (LLMs), and computer vision systems that rival or exceed human performance in specific domains (LeCun, Yann, Bengio, Yoshua, and Hinton, Geoffrey. “Deep Learning.” Nature 521, no. 7553 (2015): 436–444).

FROM AUTOMATION TO AUTONOMY

AI has transitioned from automating repetitive tasks to performing complex cognitive functions previously thought to be the exclusive domain of humans. Self-driving cars, AI legal assistants, autonomous drones, and AI-generated art demonstrate the breadth of AI’s applications. As these systems grow in sophistication, they increasingly exhibit autonomy—the capacity to make decisions and take actions without direct human intervention. This shift raises profound questions about accountability, transparency, and control.

ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPERENCY AND CONTROL

For example, autonomous weapons systems capable of selecting and engaging targets without human oversight challenge existing norms under international humanitarian law (IHL). Similarly, AI systems deployed in judicial or parole decisions raise concerns about bias, fairness, and due process, especially when the logic behind decisions is opaque even to their developers—a phenomenon referred to as the “black box problem.” (Pasquale, Frank. The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information. Harvard University Press, 2015).

HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCY IN AFRICA

The critique that digital technologies embody, enable, or reproduce colonial power relations is not new. As early as the 1970s, debates around communication and technology were linked to questions of sovereignty, inequality and dependency. In March 1976, at the Non-Aligned Media Seminar in Tunis, representatives from 38 NAM states and 13 observers declared that “colonialist, imperialist and racist powers have created effective means of information and communication which are conditioning the masses to the interests of these powers.” This seminar built on earlier efforts of the Non-Aligned Movement (est. 1955), which, by its 1973 Algiers summit, had embraced the decolonization of information, communication, and culture as part of the wider struggle for independence.

The Tunis meeting marked the birth of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO); a call to redress global inequalities in media ownership, information flows, and infrastructure. Tunisian minister Mustapha Masmoudi highlighted the imbalance: “Almost 80 percent of the world news flow emanates from the major transnational agencies; however these devote only 20 to 30 percent of news coverage to the developing countries”. NWICO gained traction at UNESCO, culminating in the 1980 MacBride Report, which directly challenged the Western doctrine of “free flow of information.” The United States and the UK eventually withdrew from UNESCO in protest, but NWICO left a lasting intellectual and political legacy: it framed global communication as a site of structural inequality and technological dependency.

Building on these debates, communication scholars introduced the idea of electronic colonialism. Herbert Schiller’s Mass Communication and American Empire argued that U.S. commercial media systems were becoming instruments of empire. Thomas McPhail later extended this, defining electronic colonialism as “the dependent relationship of poorer regions on post-industrial nations, caused and established by the importation of communication hardware and foreign-produced software, along with engineers, technicians and related information protocols” (Jacob Mahlangu, ‘Technological Apartheid: The Digital Divide Between Africa and the West’ (Sagepub.com, 6th May, 2025) < https://advance.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.31124/advance.174652029.93416488/v1#:~:text=The%20digital%20divide%20between%20Africa%20and%20the%20West%20represents%20not,colonialism%2C%20and%20contemporary%20digital%20imperialism). This lens made clear that dependency was not only economic but also infrastructural and epistemic.

Parallel critiques arose in anthropology and development studies. Post-development theorists such as Arturo Escobar and James Ferguson argued that development projects often failed to empower but instead re-entrenched colonial hierarchies. They identified technology as a key tool in this process, framed as a “solution” but often deployed in paternalistic ways that deepened dependency. ICT4D (Information and Communication Technologies for Development) initiatives of the late 1990s and early 2000s exemplified this tension. While promising to democratize knowledge and spur development, many projects replicated older patterns: reliance on imported technology, disregard for local context, and reinforcement of global asymmetries.

By the late 2000s, scholars in postcolonial computing extended these critiques to human–computer interaction (HCI). They demonstrated how design practices in “development tech” mirrored colonial flows: low-cost labor and raw materials from the Global South, transformed into finished products exported back under narratives of benevolence. The One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) project (< https://laptop.org/ > Accessed on 16th September, 2025) epitomized this, marketed as a humanitarian innovation but dependent on the feminized labour of Asian workers in global supply chains.

In 2013, Dal Yong Jin introduced platform imperialism, analyzing how U.S. tech giants like Google, Apple and Facebook exerted global dominance through platform capitalism, intellectual property regimes and cross-border expansion (Jin, Dal Yong, ‘“The Construction of Platform Imperialism in the Globalization Era.” Triple C: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal For a Global Sustainable Information Society’ ( Researchgate.net, January, 2013) < https://researchgate.net/publication/275652379_Jin_Dal_Yong_2013_The_Construction_of_Platform_Imperialism_in_the_Globalization_Era_Triple_C_Communication_Capitalism_Critique_Open_Access_Journal_For_a_Global_Sustainable_Information_Society_111_145-#:~:text=Abstract,accumulation%20in%20the%20digital%20age. > Accessed on 16th September, 2025). His argument made explicit that digital platforms were not neutral infrastructures but instruments of geopolitical power.

These intellectual trajectories resonate strongly with dependency theory, advanced by Samir Amin, which argued that underdevelopment in the Global South is not accidental but structurally produced through dependence on the North. Applied to technology, this means Africa’s reliance on imported hardware, software, and infrastructures reinforces systemic subordination in the global digital hierarchy. Postcolonial thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Edward Said similarly highlighted how colonialism survives in cultural, psychological, and technological forms, keeping the Global South positioned as consumer rather than producer.

From NWICO to electronic colonialism, from ICT4D critiques to postcolonial computing and platform imperialism, the throughline is clear: each era has witnessed renewed forms of technological dependency. What changes are the technologies themselves: satellites, mass media, ICTs, platforms, and now AI, but the structural critique persists. Today’s debates on digital colonialism continue this intellectual lineage, reframing old concerns around sovereignty, extraction and dependency in terms of data, algorithms and artificial intelligence. Far from a rupture, this is the latest chapter in a long struggle for technological self-determination in Africa and the wider Global South.

AI POLICY TRENDS GLOBALLY AND IN AFRICA

Global AI policy is crystallizing around a few core themes: risk-based regulation of high-impact systems, the embedding of human rights (< https://2021-2025.state.gov/risk-management-profile-for-ai-and-human-rights/#:~:text=In%20March%202024%2C%20all%20193,the%20enjoyment%20of%20human%20rights.%E2%80%9D > (State.gov, 25th July, 2024) Accessed on 10th September, 2025) and ethics principles, and the development of technical standards to operationalize trustworthiness. The European Union’s AI (https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai > Accessed on 10th September, 2025) Act illustrates this risk-based approach by classifying systems according to potential harm and imposing proportionate obligations, while still promoting innovation. Similarly, the OECD AI Principles (< https://oecd.ai/en/ai-principles > (OECD.ai) Accessed on 10th September, 2025), the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (US) (< www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework > (NIST.gov) Accessed on 10th September, 2025), and UNESCO’s global AI ethics recommendations (< www.unesco.org/en/artificial-intelligence/recommendation-ethics#:~:text=Recommendation%20on%20the%20Ethics%20of%20Artificial%20Intelligence,human%20oversight%20of%20AI%20systems. > (UNESCO.Org) Accessed on 10th September, 2025) provide international benchmarks centered on transparency, accountability, robustness, and human oversight.

USA, EU, CHINA’S PREFERENCES

National strategies, however, diverge. The United States favours voluntary, sector-specific frameworks to preserve innovation flexibility (Tatevik Davtyan, ‘THE U.S. APPROACH TO AI REGULATION: FEDERAL LAWS, POLICIES, AND STRATEGIES EXPLAINED’ (scholarlycommons.law.case.edu, 24th January, 2025) < https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?params=/context/jolti/article/1172/&path_info=auto_convert.pdf > Accessed on 10th September, 2025). China pursues a state-driven, techno-industrial strategy linking AI to national development goals(Kyle Chan, Gregory Smith, Jimmy Goodrich, Gerard Dipippo, Konstantin F, Pilz ‘China’s Evolving Industrial Policy for AI’ (Rand.org, 26th June, 2025) < www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA4012-1.html > Accessed on 10th September, 2025). The EU relies on its regulatory power (“the Brussels effect”) to set global supplier standards (Marco Almada, Anca Radu, ‘The Brussels Side-Effect: How the AI Act Can Reduce the Global Reach of EU Policy’ (Cambridge.org, 19th February, 2024) < www.cambridge.org/core/journals/german-law-journal/article/brussels-sideeffect-how-the-ai-act-can-reduce-the-global-reach-of-eu-policy/032C72AEC537EBB6AE96C0FD90387E3E > Accessed on 10th September, 2025). Together, these approaches create a patchwork of norms that countries and companies must navigate. (To be continued).

THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK

“Like all technologies before it, Artificial Intelligence will reflect the values of its creators. So inclusivity matters – from who designs it to who sits on the company boards and which ethical perspectives are included” – Kate Crawford

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