By Prof Mike Ozekhome

Introduction

Last week we commenced this series with some operational definitions, today we shall continue and conclude on the definitions and take a critical look at some cases – their good parts, deficiencies and worst case scenarios. Read on. 

Definition of Terms (continues)

During the colonial and military regimes, the Executive always attempted to undermine the Judiciary, erode its independence and powers of coercion and have a field day with illegality and impunity.  On those occasions, the Judiciary always stood up courageously to uphold the rule of law.  In Eshugbayi Eleko Vs. Government of Nigeria the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever the deportation of the Oba of Lagos from his domain to an entirely different part of Nigeria on the ground, inter alia, that the Governor had no such power inspite of the fact that the Governor was then vested with both executive and legislative powers. It held:

“No member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice.”

In Lakanmi & Another Vs. A-G, Western State, the Supreme Court courageously declared null and void Edict No. 5 of 1967 promulgated by the Western State Government and Decree No, 48 and 45 of 1968 promulgated by the Federal Military Government, on the ground that they were ad hominem legislations.  The legislations dealt with forfeiture of assets.  The Supreme Court held that the 1963 Constitution clearly provided for separation of powers between the Judicial and the Executive and that Decree No. 45 of 1968 was a clear usurpation of the Judicial powers of the courts.  Chief Rotimi Williams has then argued that the Decree which named specific people and confiscated their property were ad hominem and unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court held that the legislations amounted to judicial rather than legislative acts and struck them down.  In reply, the Federal Military Government of General Yakubu Gown promulgated Decree No. 28 of 1970 to undermine the Judiciary.  The Decree was audacious and even brutal in its title:  “The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers Decree No. 28 of 1970.”  The Decree restated the sacredness and unquestionability of any Decree or Edict promulgated or purported to be promulgated by the military government.  But the Adetokunbo Ademola-led Supreme Court at the time was not intimidated.

In Governor of Lagos State Vs. Ojukwu Kayode Eso,JSC emphatically declared that:

“Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, the Executive, the Legislature (while it lasts) and the Judiciary are equal partners in the running of a successful government. The powers granted by the constitution to these organs by Section 4 (Legislative Powers), Section 5 (Executive Powers) and  Section 6  (Judicial Powers) are classified under an omnibus umbrella  known under part II to the Constitution as Powers of the Federal  Republic of Nigeria’. The organs wield those powers and one must never exist in sabotage of the other or else there is chaos, Indeed there will be no federal government. I think, for one organ, and more especially the Executive, which holds all the physical powers, to put up itself in sabotage or deliberate contempt of the other is to stage  an executive subversion of the constitution it is to uphold. Executive lawlessness tantamount to a deliberate violation of the constitution.”

There are many  cases decided during the military era and under democratic environment that underscore the relentless efforts by other arms  of government, especially the Executive to erode  the independence and vibrancy of the Judiciary as a way  of expanding their own frontiers of influence, unquesitonability and impunity.

Since the Executive has considerable (if not total) influence over the wealth of the State and over the appointment of Judges, it continuously seeks to make the Judiciary dependent by starving it of funds and by influencing the enthronement of mediocrity  on the Bench.  Issues in independence of the Judiciary may thus be broadly classified into three, viz, political independence, economic independence and intellectual independence.  Before looking at these issues in detail, we may take a look at the face of Nigeria’s Judiciary so that the issues can simultaneously be matched with the ease.

The Case (The Good, The Bad, The Ugly)

“Since I made the order of the remand of the accused person last Thursday and up till about 10 minuets before I sat this morning, I have been under untold pressure and threat from many quarters urging me to arrive at a particular decision ever before I listen to the accused.  Let me make it that as a Muslin, the teaching of my religion is clear about death being  the ultimate.  I am therefore not bothered about any such threat.  I am, however, worried about the untold pressure coming, as it were, from unexpected quarters…  To continue with this case will…..be a breach of the solemn pledge I made when I became a judge (i.e) to administer justice without fear or favour and without ill-will or affection.  In view of the foregoing, I hereby remit this case file to the honourable chief judge for re-assignment to another judge.”

In this way,  Honourable Justice Mashood Abass of the Oyo State High Court washed his hands off, like Pontius Pilate, of the trial of Otunba Iyiola Omisore and other accused persons standing trial for the murder of Late Chief Bola Ige, SAN (Slain Attorney-general of the Federation).  After the controversial withdrawal of the judge, allegations of undue pressure, bribery, arm-twisting tactics, threats and promises directed against the judge inundated the media.

Before, the breaking of this unpalatable story, a sordid allegation of bribery had been trailing the Election Tribunal that sat in Akwa Ibom State over the petition of Dr. Imeh Umanah, against the election of the then incumbent governor, Obong Victor Attah.

In Enugu State, matters came to a head when an Election Tribunal had to relocate to Abuja to complete its job after alleging that Enugu State was no longer safe for its honourable members.  These are bad times for the Judiciary!.

But in Anambra State,  the State Chief Judge, Honourable Justice C. J. Okoli proved to be a pride of the Judiciary when he smartly ‘made himself unavailable’ during the July 10, 2003 abduction of the governor of Anambra State,  Dr. Chris Ngige by his political enemies.  The House of Assembly had passed a motion asking the Chief Judge to swear in the Deputy Governor as incumbent governor, but the Chief Judge was not available to carry out the resolution.  By that act, his lordship saved the Judiciary from being enmeshed in the dirty politics of the state, which almost consumed the other arms of government.

More than any other factor, the abuse of ex-parte injunction by some judges has immensely contributed to the erosion of public confidence in the Judiciary under this democratic dispensation.  Most of the ex parte orders granted under controversial circumstances involved situations where the Executive was either the direct beneficiary or had an interest which the public believed (rightly or wrongly) the Judiciary merely ‘co-operated’ to protect.  This perception is a dangerous omen for independence of the Judiciary, because the Justice must not only be done but must be manifestly seen to have been done.

During this democratic dispensation, an Abuja High Court granted an ex parte order stopping the national convention which of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) when preparation for the convention had already gulped millions of naira and party members had already converged at the venue in Abuja.  Most Nigerians did not believe that the Judge was not acting in the interest of the rival ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) given the controversial and damaging circumstances under which the order was made.  The resulting outrage cost the judge his job.

Another, Abuja High Court made an order restraining the National Assembly from further deliberating on a bill before it to amend the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000.  The Executive was interested in killing the bill. The order was made in defiance of the trite principle of the doctrine of separation of powers which precludes the courts from assuming jurisdiction over a bill that has not become law.  In articulating the position of the Court of Appeal on the question of Judicial interference in the law making process purportedly under section 4(8) of the 1999 Constitution, Hon. Justice Mamman Nasir, P. said:

“though the courts have been given very wide powers under the subsection, the intention is not to authorize the Judiciary to interfere with the legitimate exercise of the powers of the legislature or the procedure to be followed in such exercise at power given to the courts comes into action after the legislature has enacted the law…”.

A similar controversy trailed the ex parte order given by the same Abuja Federal High Court which directed the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to issue a certificate of return to Chief Adolphus Wabara (PDP) as Senator representing the Abia South Senatorial Zone.  INEC complied (apparently reluctantly) and Wabara became the president of the senate the next day.   The source of the controversy was that INEC had earlier declared Elder Dan Imo (ANPP) as the winner of the seat.  As Ogbham-Emeka, a counsel in Mike Ozekhome’s Chambers observed about the controversy in ThisDay Law,

“The question how the Abuja Federal High Court assumed jurisdiction over the matter and how the issue became one suitable for an ex parte order raked up a lot of dust. When the dust subsided not a few people concluded that it was the court and not the electorate that gave Senator Wabara the Abia South Senatorial ‘mandate’.  But that was not to be the end of the regime of such demonstrable judicial anarchy that force litigants to choose which court order to obey and which not to obey, a situation that spells doom for a regime of law and order”. (To be continued).

Thought for the Week

“A functioning, robust democracy requires a healthy, educated, participatory followership and an educated, morally grounded leadership”. (Chinua Achebe).

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

In our last discourse on this series, we examined the procedure for enforcement of fundamental rights, including applications for leave; as well as the substantive application itself and the reactions that follow. Today, we shall continues from where we stopped with the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto and later x-ray the applications to squash proceedings; applications for production and/or release of persons restrained; orders for bail, production and access to medication. Please read on.

SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS (Continues)

In the case of LAWRENCE OLUSEGUN ADEYEMO V. C.O.P, OYO STATE ([2021] LPELR-56272(CA)), the applicant requested the court for a writ of habeas corpus under order 2 of the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) rules 1979 which provision enjoined the applicant to serve all parties who are or might be interested in the proceedings. Although the affected party had put up appearance, but raised a preliminary objection to the application for non-compliance with the statutory conditions. Babalakin. J. (as he then was) struck out the application on the ground that order 2(1)(4) is mandatory whether the application is for mandamus, certiorari, or habeas corpus.

However the Supreme Court in recent times in respect of the fundamental rights enforcements has favourably leaned towards the equitable principle of “Ubi Jus Ubi remedium”, therefore looking more at the substance rather than the form. Hence the liberalization of the procedure for the enforcement of fundamental rights as exposed in the case of ABACHA V. FAWEHINMI ((2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228) and UBI UJONG INAH & ORS V. MARCUS UKOI ((2001) (CA) 41981.

APPLICATION TO QUASH ANY PROCEEDINGS

Sometimes it may be necessary for an applicant by way of certiorari to apply to the court for an order that such proceedings be removed from a particular court or tribunal to another court for the purpose of being quashed for lack of power and/or jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings or make such order.

However, an applicant shall not be able to question the validity of any order, warrant, commitment, conviction, inquisition or record unless before the hearing of his application (Motion or summons), he has served a certified copy (CTC) thereof together with a Copy of the application on the Attorney-General of the Federation or of the State in which the applicant is being heard (as the case may be).

The court in granting an application seeking to quash proceedings, shall direct that the order, proceedings, conviction or the records of an inquisition be quashed forthwith upon being removed into the court hearing the application.

APPLICATION FOR PRODUCTION AND/OR RELEASE OF PERSON RESTRAINED

By virtue of Order 4 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court or judge to whom the application is made ex-parte may make an order forthwith for his release from such detention.

The court may also direct that an originating summons (as in form 2) be issued or that an application therefore be made by notice of motion (as in form 3). The court may also as it deem fit adjourn the ex-parte application so that notice thereof may be given to the person against whom the order for the release of the applicant is sought.

ORDER FOR BAIL, PRODUCTION, AND ACCESS TO MEDICATION

Pursuant to order 4 of the bail application, the court upon application may grant to the detainee reliefs including bail, production of the detainee, access to mediation etc.

The court may grant bail at ex-parte stage, pending the substantive application. Where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court may subject to its discretion order that the person restrained be produced in court. And where such order is so made, it shall constitute a sufficient warrant to any superintendent of a prison, police officer in charge of a police station, police officer in charge of the complainant or any other person responsible for his detention, to produce or ensure the production of the person so restrained or detained in court.

For the purpose of enforcing a person’s fundamental rights, no matter where a detainee is kept he can be allowed access to his personal physician or medically prescribed drugs.

It suffices to note here, that once an order has been made by the court pursuant to the Enforcement Rules, and for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights provided for in the constitution, such order must be complied with. Failure to obey or comply with any order so made by the court under these rules will incur proceedings for the committal of the party disobeying such an order.

CONCLUSION

Without any controversy, the idea of human rights and personal liberties has become firm and secured. The universality and immutability of human rights are now globally accepted. Consequently, any nation that slacks or shyies away from the diligent protection and enforcement of human rights stand the precarious risk of being shunned by decent and civilised nations. The United Nations seems to have captured the importance and primacy of the issue of human rights and its protection when it poignantly stated as follows:

“Human Rights and fundamental freedoms are the birth right of all human beings, their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Government” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

It is the duty of every Government everywhere and every courts of law in every jurisdiction to promote, protect, uphold, and ensure enforcement of fundamental Human rights at all times, because these rights encapsulate the very essence of man.

The end.

THOUGHTS FOR THE WEEK

“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI.

“Because no matter who we are or where we come from, we’re all entitled to the basic human rights of clean air to breathe, clean water to drink, and healthy land to call home”. – Martin Luther King III

“Human rights are not only violated by terrorism, repression or assassination, but also by unfair economic structures that creates huge inequalities”. – Pope Francis.

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

Last week’s installment examined amongst others, the features of what constitutes violation of fundamental rights and posed the question- whether enforcement of such rights is restricted to the mechanism of the FREP Rules? This week contuse the same theme by discussing the procedure for enforcing fundamental rights, including applications for leave; the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto. Please read on.

PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT (Continues)
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal (Benin Division) dilated on the procedure in the case of N.U.T Vs. COSST ((2007) 23 E-WRN / 03 (CA).), thus:

“By virtue of Order 1 rule 2(2) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, no application for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement within that state of any such rights shall be made unless leave therefore has been granted in accordance with the rules. Thus, while an applicant can approach the High Court in a state where the infringement of his rights occurs or is likely to occur for redress he has to obtain leave of the appropriate High Court before he can apply to enforce his rights. In the instant case, even if the case was a fundamental right case the suit was not commended by due process, as the respondents approached the court by way of originating summons contrary to the provision of Order 1 rule 2(2) of the Fundamental Right (Enforcement) Rules.

An application for the enforcement of fundamental right becomes incompetent if the main claim does not fall within the ambit or precinct of chapter IV of the Constitution. Any claim that falls outside chapter IV of the Constitution becomes ancillary claim. Therefore, for an applicant for enforcement of fundamental rights to be competent, it must be within the provisions of chapter IV of the Constitution.

This point reverberated in W.A.E.C Vs. Akinwumi, (2008) JELR 49485 (SC), where the Supreme Court succinctly held that:

“In ascertaining the justicieability or competence of a suit commenced by way of application under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, the court must ensure that the enforcement of the fundamental rights under chapter IV of the Constitution is the claim and not ancillary claim. Where the claim is not the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be said to be properly invoked, and the action is liable to be struck out on ground of incompetence.”

Also, in Unilorin Vs. Oluwadare (2008) JELR 55842 (CA), the court adumbrated the point as follows, when it held that:

“When an application is brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, a condition precedent to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction is that the enforcement of fundamental rights or the securing of the enforcement thereof should be the main claim and not an accessory claim. Enforcement of fundamental right or securing the enforcement thereof should, from the appellant’s claim as presented, be the principal or fundamental claim as presented, and not accessory claim. However, where the main claim or principal claim is not the enforcement or securing the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be properly exercised as it will be incompetent. In the instant case, the respondent’s claim, being a challenge to his expulsion as a student from the 1st Appellant institution, is not one of those claims/reliefs envisaged by the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules.

See also Gafar Vs. Govt., Kwara State, (2007) JELR 53915 (SC); Unical Vs. Ugochukwu 2007-LD-CA-232.

It is important to note that an applicant seeking redress for the infringement of his Fundamental Rights shall in addition to declaratory and injunctive orders also be entitled to an award of damages. This is because in fundamental right cases, the law presumes that damages flow naturally from the injury suffered by the victim as a result of the violation of the rights.

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE

By virtue of Judgment (Enforcement) Rules in Nigeria, no application for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement within a state, of any such rights shall be made unless leave therefore has been granted in accordance with these rules. Also, any application for such leave must be made ex-parte to the appropriate court and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought, and grounds on which it is sought and by an affidavit verifying the facts relied on.

The deadline for filling an application for leave is not later than 12 (twelve) Months after the date of the happening of the event complained of, unless the judge is satisfied that extenuating circumstances exist. In case of ongoing act, an action can be brought after 12 Months deadline, at any point during the continuation of the wrong. An applicant must however file the application for leave not later than the day preceding the date of hearing. The court may in granting leave to the applicant impose such terms and condition as it may deem fit, as security for cost.
It is to be noted that leave once granted, shall operate as a stay of all actions relating to or connected with a complaint which forms the subject matter of the application until the determination of the substantive suit.

The ex-parte application for leave must specify the provisions of the enforcement procedure Rules under which it is brought, the precise content of the relief to be requested once the application for leave has been granted and cursory reference to relevant laws. This must be accompanied by an affidavit verifying relevant facts to be relied on.

The deadline for filing an application for leave is not later than 12(twelve) months after the date of the happening of the event complained of, unless the judge is satisfied that extenuating circumstances exist. In cases of ongoing act, an action can be brought after 12month deadline, at any point during the continuation of the wrong. An applicant must however file the application for leave not later than the day preceding the date of hearing. The court may in granting leave to the applicant impose such terms and conditions as it may deem fit, as security for cost.

It is to be noted that leave once granted, shall operate as a stay of all actions relating to or connected with a complaint which forms the subject matter of the application until the determination of the substantive suit.

The ex-parte application for leave must specify the provisions of the enforcement procedure Rules under which it is brought, the precise content of the relief to be requested once the application for leave has been granted and a cursory reference to relevant laws. This must be accompanied by an affidavit verifying relevant facts to be relied on.

SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS

After obtaining leave, the applicant can apply for an enforcement order by way of NOTICE OF MOTION (as in form 1) or ORIGINATING SUMMONS (as in form 2). In the celebrated case of SHUGABA, A. DARMAN V. MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & ORS. ((1981) 2 NCLR 459). It was held inter-alia that the proper procedure to be followed in an application for enforcement or securing the enforcement of fundamental rights and redress for violation of same is guided by the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rule 1979 which requires that where leave has been granted to apply for the order being asked the application for, such order must be made by notice of motion or originating summons to the appropriate court.

The motion or summons, together with a copy of the statement submitted in conjunction with the application for leave, must then be served on all persons directly affected. Unless the court directs otherwise, there must be at least 8 clear days between service of the motion or summons and the date fixed for hearing.

A substantive application either by motion or summons seeking for substantive reliefs, remedies or orders may include such prayers as:

a. Unconditional release of the detainee
b. Payment of a certain sum of money as compensation in the event of the arrest and detention being illegal, unwarranted, null and void.

The court may equally make any other ancillary order after hearing argument from counsel on all sides based on the affidavit and counter-affidavit.

It should be noted that failure to adhere to the procedure laid down by the Enforcement Rules may lead to the entire proceedings being nullified. The court shall upon objection being raised for non-compliance with the rules strike the entire proceedings out. (To be continued).

THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK

“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI