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The Oracle: Are INEC Resident Commissioners Homeless Bats? (Pt. 2)

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By Mike Ozekhome

INTRODUCTION

In Nigeria, Resident Electoral Commissioners (REC) is a title given to a person in charge of INEC at the state level. The REC, assisted by relevant government agencies, undertakes the Presidential, National Assembly, Gubernatorial and House of Assembly elections in a state. The REC acts pursuant to powers delegated to him or her by INEC’s National Chairman and the Commission. Among others, the duties of the REC include making available all materials required to conduct a free and fair election. The REC also monitors the activities of all ad hoc staff and provides for proper verification of election results. With some of the above functions, are INEC RECs homeless bats that neither belong to the Commission at the National level, nor accorded recognition at the State level? Today, we shall conclude our discourse on this vexed issue.

WHO THEN IS A MEMBER OF INEC COMMISSION (continues)

These Sections therefore make to clear that REC have their constitutional life of their own; and are not subordinated to the Commission’s Chairman and 12 Commissioners. In any event, if we agree with Okoye that RECs are mere delegates of the Commission’s power, should not the Commission trust and use their reports?

That a REC cannot be present in all nooks and crooners of his state at the same time is no reason to ignore his authenticated results and reports distilled from all the Commission’s officers and ad hoc persons who worked directly under the HOD and the REC. How can he then not be in a position to certify his records and send same to INEC Commissioners in Abuja? And how can the latter ignore this RECs’ joint report and purportedly rely only on that of one/two EPM officers sent from the Commission’s Headquarters who know absolutely nothing about the terrain, nuances and personality traits of the voting population? In any event, an election is monitored and supervised directly by the combined team of the Headquarters EPM officers, the State HOD (under whom the EPM officers work), the Electoral officers and the REC.

This argument is akin to saying that the Inspector-General of Police (IGP) who was created and empowered like State Commissioners of Police by the same Section 215(1) of the 1999 Constitution, can jettison the reports of his State Commissioners of Police? Just why?

In further support of this my humble argument is  section 8 of the old Electoral Act of 2010, as amended, which  provides for the staff of INEC without including the office of the REC. Yet, RECs carried out their duties effectively under the Act until the 2022 Act. The question will then be this: what are RECs under the Electoral Act if they are not constitutionally recognised as members of INEC and also not recognized as staff of INEC? Are they bats; hermaphrodites that do not belong to any class? Why then should they be recognized at all in the first case in the Constitution? Why not simply allow the Chairman and the 12 National Commissioners   be all-in-all, the beginning and the end, of INEC? RECs, it is submitted, are not mere disposable committee of persons which INEC can simply appoint and arbitrarily dispense with under section 7 of the 2010 Electoral Act. Why does the Constitution which provides for the offices of the President and state Governors also provide for the positions of Ministers and Commissioners if the latter were not important or necessary to our polity?

It will be recalled that Okoye had rightly, on 9th July, 2022, reassured Nigerians that “in line with its constitutional and legal obligations, the Commission deployed monitors to the various constituencies and received reports of such exercise…the Commission stands by the monitoring received from our state offices”. Why will INEC now ignore these reports which emanated from the very RECs who are physically on ground? Is it no longer the owner of a house that knows where the yam and knife are kept? Is it a total stranger (the visiting INEC Commissioners and officials) who will know the terrain better and what took place before,  during and after the primarily? Can you have an Army General without foot soldiers? I think not. Or, do you?

What is INEC’s reply, for example, to the glaring anomaly in Kano state, where the REC, Professor Riskwua, Arabu Shehu  told the whole world that the only governorship primary INEC office monitored in Kano had produced Mohammed Sani Abacha, but with the APC leadership and INEC headquarters arbitrarily changing it to one Ambassador Wali? Yet, this was an election monitored in the full glare of the whole world amidst television cameras and the print and social media.

Why will INEC be accepting from political parties, names of persons who did not undergo statutory primaries monitored by its state officials any officials and headed by the RECs, and instead, accept compromised results that lack electoral integrity from political parties, on primaries that were never conducted, and where conducted, were never monitored by  its state RECs and officials?

These worrisome scenarios are already playing out in many states across Nigeria, including Oyo, Sokoto, Ogun, Kano, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom and Abia, amongst others.

How come, for example, that of the 26 candidates of the ruling APC that emerged from valid primaries duly conducted and monitored by INEC Akwa Ibom State INEC office headed by the REC, Mr Mike Igini, only two names were extracted and accepted from the entire report by INEC headquarters?

Whatever happens to section 29(1) of the Electoral Act which gives INEC teeth that only “candidates that emerged from valid primary” shall be submitted to INEC by political parties for publication? Why will INEC be shying away from, and abdicating the statutory powers and duties generously donated to it by section 84(1) of the Electoral Act, to compulsorily monitor party primaries; and section 84(13) thereof, to reject names of persons submitted by political parties who have not emerged from valid primaries? I cannot understand. Or, can you?

SUMMARY OF THE POWERS OF INEC AND ASPIRANTS

To understand this issue more, it is germane to summarize the relevant provisions of the Electoral Act.

Section 153- deals with Fed Executive Bodies such as -INEC, NJC, FJSC, NCS, NDC, NSC, RMAFC, PSC, NBC, NDSC

PART 1, Section 14(1), third Schedule to the Constitution provides for a Chairman who shall not be less than 40 years); 12 National Commissioners of 35 years just like the 37 RECs.

Section 15(3) of part 1 to the third Schedule provides for 37 RECs for the 36 States and the FCT in accordance with Section 2(3) CFRN.

Section 15 – All Electoral Commissioners must take the Oath of allegiance (no exception, whether Chairman, 12 National Commissioners or 37 RECs.

Section 15 (a) – INEC Supervises, Monitors, organizes, undertakes election to the offices of President, Vice President, Governors, Deputy Governors, Senators, House of Representatives and Houses of Assembly,

Section 15(h) – Commissioners shall delegate powers to RECs

Sections 155, 156, 157- tenure, and removal are by the president for acts of misconduct, infirmity of body or mind or any other reason- it must be supported by 2/3 majority votes of Senate.

36 States RECs shall conduct all NASS, State Assembly and Governorship primaries. The state HOD coordinates all staff, including the Election political Monitoring (EPM) team from the Headquarters in Abuja.

Section 14(3), CFRN & Section 4 of the Federal Character Commission Act even impose more stringent criteria to satisfy Federal Character to prevent imposition of one religion, ethnic group, gender, etc.

Sections 214 & 215 CFRN provides for powers between the –IGP and Commissioners of Police.

Can only have one to 3 EPM staff from Abuja Headquarters monitor say 20 constituency centres, 10 Federal constituencies and 3 Senatorial Districts in one election? Indeed no staff from Headquarters is authorized to write an independent report of the outcome of primaries, without the authorization of the REC.

A Joint report is issued by both state monitors and Headquarters EPM staff monitors at conclusion of primaries which must be approved and signed by the REC before they are forwarded to Headquarters, Abuja, by the REC with a forwarding letter. Indeed the Headquarters staff must report to a State REC with a letter of deployment from the Headquarters EPM for guidance and liaise with the State HOD, before they act.

Section 29 (1) EA provides not later than 180 days to an election submission of list of candidates by political parties that emerged from valid primaries conducted by the political party.

Section 29 (2) provides that information submitted shall be accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by the candidate at the Federal High Court, FCT High Court stating he has fulfilled all  constitutional requirements.

Section 29(3) provides that the Commission shall within 7 days publish above in the candidate’s constituency.

Section 29(5) provides that any aspirant who participated in the primaries and believes that his party’s candidate has provided false documents can go to the Federal High Court.

Section 29(6) provides the Federal High Court will disqualify the candidate and his political party and declare the candidate with the 2nd highest valid votes with necessary spread, winner.

Section 29(8) provides that a political party which presents the name of the candidate who does not meet the qualification commits an offence and shall on conviction be fined 10M.

Section 31 provides that a candidate can withdraw his candidature voluntarily, in writing signed by him and delivered personally to his party and the political party shall convey this to the Commission at least 90 days to the election.

Section 84(3) provides that no political party shall impose qualification or disqualification criteria or conditions on any aspirant or candidate in its Constitution, guidelines or rules beyond those in sections 65, 66, 106, 107, 131, 137, 177, 187 CFRN, 1999.

Section 84(13) provides that where there is failure by a political party to comply with the provisions of this Act in the conduct of its primaries, the Commission shall not include the name of the candidate for the position.

Section 84(14) provides that aspirants who complain that the conduct of primaries regarding guidelines of a political party have not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate may go to the Federal High Court.

Section 285(14) also provides as section 84(14) above. Under section 84(14) of the Electoral Act, (285(14) defines a “pre-election” matter.

CONCLUSION

I will conclude my contribution as follows. It is crystal clear,  per adventure, that the appointment, duration and termination of offices of RECs, including those of INEC Chairman and the 12 National Commissioners, (all of whom form part of Federal bodies established under section 153 (1) of the Constitution), are respectively provided for in sections 154 and 155(1) and (2) of the Constitution. This provision applies with equal force to the Chairman, National Commissioners and all RECs. No difference could have been contemplated when no other section of the Constitution provides separately for RECs. Even disqualification criteria for membership of INEC is the same under section 156 for both RECs, the Chairman and the 12 National Commissioners. The same scenario plays out in the mode of removal of members of INEC and other federal bodies from office, under section 157(1). This is by the “President acting on an address supported by 2/3 majority of the Senate praying that he so be removed for inability to discharge the functions of the office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for misconduct”. My humble submission here is that since the Constitution has not made any other provision regarding the mode of removal of RECs, it goes without saying that section 157 (1) also applies to them with equal force, since their office is also a constitutional creation.

Indeed section 6 of the 2022 Electoral Act also replicated Section 157 (1) of the Constitution specifically for RECs.  (The end).

THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK

 “Sincerity makes the very least person to be of more value than the most talented hypocrite”. (Charles Spurgeon).

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Opinion

Reimagining the African Leadership Paradigm: A Comprehensive Blueprint

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By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

“To lead Africa forward is to move from transactional authority to transformational stewardship—where institutions outlive individuals, data informs vision, and service is the only valid currency of governance” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

The narrative of African leadership in the 21st century stands at a critical intersection of profound potential and persistent paradox. The continent, pulsating with the world’s youngest demographic and endowed with immense natural wealth, nonetheless contends with systemic challenges that stifle its ascent. This divergence between capacity and outcome signals not merely a failure of policy, but a deeper crisis of leadership philosophy and practice. As the global order undergoes seismic shifts, the imperative for African nations to fundamentally re-strategize their approach to governance has transitioned from an intellectual exercise to an existential necessity. Nigeria, by virtue of its demographic heft, economic scale, and cultural influence, serves as the continent’s most significant crucible for this transformation. The journey of Nigerian leadership from its current state to its potential apex offers a blueprint not only for its own 200 million citizens but for an entire continent in search of a new compass.

Deconstructing the Legacy Model: A Diagnosis of Systemic Failure

To construct a resilient future, we must first undertake an unflinching diagnosis of the present. The prevailing leadership archetype across much of Africa, with clear manifestations in Nigeria’s political economy, is built upon a foundation that has proven tragically unfit for purpose. This model is characterized by several interlocking dysfunctions:

·         The Primacy of Transactional Politics Over Transformational Vision: Governance has too often been reduced to a complex system of transactions—votes exchanged for short-term patronage, positions awarded for loyalty over competence, and resource allocation serving political expediency rather than national strategy. This erodes public trust and makes long-term, cohesive planning impossible.

·         The Tyranny of the Short-Term Electoral Cycle: Leadership decisions are frequently held hostage to the next election, sacrificing strategic investments in education, infrastructure, and industrialization on the altar of immediate, visible—yet fleeting—gains. This creates a perpetual cycle of reactive governance, preventing the execution of decade-spanning national projects.

·         Administrative Silos and Bureaucratic Inertia: Government ministries and agencies often operate as isolated fiefdoms, with limited inter-departmental collaboration. This siloed approach fragments policy implementation, leads to contradictory initiatives, and renders the state apparatus inefficient and unresponsive to complex, cross-sectoral challenges like climate change, public health, and national security.

·         The Demographic Disconnect: Africa’s most potent asset is its youth. Yet, a vast governance gap separates a dynamic, digitally-native, and globally-aware generation from political structures that remain opaque, paternalistic, and slow to adapt. This disconnect fuels alienation, brain drain, and social unrest.

·         The Weakness of Institutions and the Cult of Personality: When the strength of a state is vested in individuals rather than institutions, it creates systemic vulnerability. Independent judiciaries, professional civil services, and credible electoral commissions are weakened, leading to arbitrariness in the application of law, erosion of meritocracy, and a deep-seated crisis of public confidence.

The tangible outcomes of this flawed model are the headlines that define the continent’s challenges: infrastructure deficits that strangle commerce, public education and healthcare systems in states of distress, jobless economic growth, multifaceted security threats, and the chronic hemorrhage of human capital. To re-strategize leadership is to directly address these outputs by redesigning the very system that produces them.

Pillars of a Reformed Leadership Architecture: A Holistic Framework

The new leadership paradigm must be constructed not as a minor adjustment, but as a holistic architectural endeavor. It requires foundational pillars that are interdependent, mutually reinforcing, and built to endure beyond political transitions.

1. The Philosophical Core: Embracing Servant-Leadership and Ethical Stewardship
The most profound change must be internal—a recalibration of the leader’s fundamental purpose. The concept of the leader as a benevolent “strongman” must give way to the model of the servant-leader. This philosophy, rooted in both timeless African communal values (ubuntu) and modern ethical governance, posits that the true leader exists to serve the people, not vice versa. It is characterized by deep empathy, radical accountability, active listening, and a commitment to empowering others. Success is measured not by the leader’s personal accumulation of power or wealth, but by the tangible flourishing, security, and expanded opportunities of the citizenry. This ethos fosters trust, the essential currency of effective governance.

2. Strategic Foresight and Evidence-Based Governance
Leadership must be an exercise in building the future, not just administering the present. This requires the collaborative development of a clear, compelling, and inclusive national vision—a strategic narrative that aligns the energies of government, private sector, and civil society. For Nigeria, frameworks like Nigeria’s Agenda 2050 and the National Development Plan must be de-politicized and treated as binding national covenants. Furthermore, in the age of big data, governance must transition from intuition-driven to evidence-based. This necessitates significant investment in data collection, analytics, and policy-informing research. Whether designing social safety nets, deploying security resources, or planning agricultural subsidies, decisions must be illuminated by rigorous data, ensuring efficiency, transparency, and measurable impact.

3. Institutional Fortification: Building the Enduring Pillars of State
A nation’s longevity and stability are directly proportional to the strength and independence of its institutions. Re-strategizing leadership demands an unwavering commitment to institutional architecture:

·         An Impervious Judiciary: The rule of law must be absolute, with a judicial system insulated from political and financial influence, guaranteeing justice for the powerful and the marginalized alike.

·         Electoral Integrity as Sacred Trust: Democratic legitimacy springs from credible elections. Investing in independent electoral commissions, transparent technology, and robust legal frameworks is non-negotiable for political stability.

·         A Re-professionalized Civil Service: The bureaucracy must be transformed into a merit-driven, technologically adept, and well-remunerated engine of state, shielded from the spoils system and empowered to implement policy effectively.

·         Robust, Transparent Accountability Ecosystems: Anti-corruption agencies require genuine operational independence, adequate funding, and protection. Complementing this, transparent public procurement platforms and mandatory asset declarations for public officials must become normalized practice.

4. Collaborative and Distributed Leadership: The Power of the Collective
The monolithic state cannot solve wicked problems alone. The modern leader must be a convener-in-chief, architecting platforms for sustained collaboration. This involves actively fostering a triple-helix partnership:

·         The Public Sector sets the vision, regulates, and provides enabling infrastructure.

·         The Private Sector drives investment, innovation, scale, and job creation.

·         Academia and Civil Society contribute research, grassroots intelligence, independent oversight, and specialized implementation capacity.
This model distributes responsibility, leverages diverse expertise, and fosters innovative solutions—from public-private partnerships in infrastructure to tech-driven civic engagement platforms.

5. Human Capital Supremacy: The Ultimate Strategic Investment
A nation’s most valuable asset walks on two feet. Re-strategized leadership places a supreme, non-negotiable priority on developing human potential. For Nigeria and Africa, this demands a generational project:

·         Revolutionizing Education: Curricula must be overhauled to foster critical thinking, digital literacy, STEM proficiency, and entrepreneurial mindset—skills for the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Investment in teacher training and educational infrastructure is paramount.

·         Building a Preventive, Resilient Health System: Focus must shift from curative care in central hospitals to robust, accessible primary healthcare. A healthy population is a productive population, forming the basis of economic resilience.

·         Creating an Enabling Environment for Talent: Beyond education and health, leadership must provide the ecosystem where talent can thrive: reliable electricity, ubiquitous broadband, access to venture capital, and a regulatory environment that encourages innovation and protects intellectual property. The goal is to make the domestic environment more attractive than the diaspora for the continent’s best minds.

6. Assertive, Strategic Engagement in Global Affairs
African leadership must shed any vestiges of a supplicant mentality and adopt a posture of strategic agency. This means actively shaping continental and global agendas:

·         Leveraging the AfCFTA: Moving beyond signing agreements to actively dismantling non-tariff barriers, harmonizing standards, and investing in cross-border infrastructure to turn the agreement into a real engine of intra-African trade and industrialization.

·         Diplomacy for Value Creation: Foreign policy should be strategically deployed to attract sustainable foreign direct investment, secure technology transfer agreements, and build partnerships based on mutual benefit, not aid dependency.

·         Advocacy for Structural Reform: African leaders must collectively and persistently advocate for reforms in global financial institutions and multilateral forums to ensure a more equitable international system.

The Nigerian Imperative: From National Challenges to a National Charter

Applying this framework to Nigeria requires translating universal principles into specific, context-driven actions:

·         Integrated Security as a Foundational Priority: Security strategy must be comprehensive, blending advanced intelligence capabilities, professionalized security forces, with parallel investments in community policing, youth employment programs in high-risk areas, and accelerated development to address the root causes of instability.

·         A Determined Pursuit of Economic Complexity: Leadership must orchestrate a decisive shift from rent-seeking in the oil sector to value creation across diversified sectors: commercialized agriculture, light and advanced manufacturing, a thriving creative industry, and a dominant digital services sector.

·         Constitutional and Governance Re-engineering: To harness its diversity, Nigeria requires a sincere national conversation on restructuring. This likely entails moving towards a more authentic federalism with greater fiscal autonomy for states, devolution of powers, and mechanisms that ensure equitable resource distribution and inclusive political representation.

·         Pioneering a Just Energy Transition: Nigeria must craft a unique energy pathway—strategically utilizing its gas resources for domestic industrialization and power generation, while simultaneously positioning itself as a regional hub for renewable energy technology, investment, and innovation.

Conclusion: A Collective Endeavor of Audacious Hope

Re-strategizing leadership in Africa and in Nigeria is not an event, but a generational process. It is not the abandonment of culture but its evolution—melding the deep African traditions of community, consensus, and elder wisdom with the modern imperatives of transparency, innovation, and individual rights. This task extends far beyond the political class. It is a summons to a new generation of leaders in every sphere: the tech entrepreneur in Yaba, the reform-minded civil servant in Abuja, the agri-preneur in Kebbi, the investigative journalist in Lagos, and the community activist in the Niger Delta.

Ultimately, this is an endeavor of audacious hope. It is the conscious choice to build systems stronger than individuals, institutions more enduring than terms of office, and a national identity richer than our ethnic sum. Nigeria possesses all the requisite raw materials for greatness: human brilliance, cultural richness, and natural bounty. The final, indispensable ingredient is a leadership strategy worthy of its people. The blueprint is now detailed; the call to action is urgent. The future awaits not our complaints, but our constructive and courageous labor. Let the work begin in earnest.

Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His work addresses complex institutional challenges, with a specialized focus on West African security dynamics, conflict resolution, and sustainable development.

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Opinion

Rivers State: Two Monkeys Burn the Village to Prove They Are Loyal to Jagaban

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By Sly Edaghese

Teaser

Rivers State is not collapsing by accident. It is being offered as a sacrifice. Two men, driven by fear of irrelevance and hunger for protection, have chosen spectacle over stewardship—setting fire to a whole people’s future just to prove who kneels better before power.

There comes a point when a political tragedy degenerates into farce, and the farce mutates into a curse. Rivers State has crossed that point. What is unfolding there is not governance, not even conflict—it is ritual madness, a grotesque contest in which two men are willing to burn an entire state just to be noticed by one man sitting far away in Abuja.

This is not ambition.

This is desperation wearing designer jacket.

At the center of this inferno stand two performers who have mistaken power for immortality and loyalty for slavery. One is a former god. The other is a former servant. Both are now reduced to naked dancers in a marketplace, grinding their teeth and tearing flesh to entertain Jagaban.

The first is Nyesom Wike—once feared, once untouchable, now frantic. A man whose political identity has collapsed into noise, threats, and recycled bravado. His ministerial appointment was never a validation of statesmanship; it was a severance package for betrayal. Tinubu did not elevate Wike because he admired him—he tolerated him because he was useful. And usefulness, in politics, is key, but it has an expiry date.

Wike governed Rivers State not as a public trust but as a private estate. He did not build institutions; he built dependencies. He did not groom leaders; he bred loyalists. Before leaving office, he salted the land with his men—lawmakers, commissioners, council chairmen—so that even in absence, Rivers State would still answer to his shadow. His obsession was simple and sick: if I cannot rule it, no one else must.

Enter Siminalayi Fubara—a man selected, not tested; installed, not trusted by the people but trusted by his maker. Fubara was meant to be an invisible power in a visible office—a breathing signature, a ceremonial governor whose only real duty was obedience.

But power has a way of awakening even the most timid occupant.

Fubara wanted to act like a governor. That single desire triggered a full-scale political assassination attempt—not with bullets, but with institutions twisted into weapons. A state of emergency was declared with obscene haste. The governor was suspended like a naughty schoolboy. His budget was butchered. His local government elections were annulled and replaced with a pre-arranged outcome favorable to his tormentor. Lawmakers who defected and lost their seats by constitutional law were resurrected like political zombies and crowned legitimate.

This was not law.

This was organized humiliation.

And when degradation alone failed, Wike went further—dragging Fubara into a room to sign an agreement that belonged more to a slave plantation than a democratic republic.

One clause alone exposed the rot:
👉 Fubara must never seek a second term.

In plain language: you may warm the chair, but you will never own it.

Then came the most revealing act of all—Wike leaked the agreement himself. A man so intoxicated by dominance that he thought publicizing oppression would strengthen his grip.

That leak was not strategy; it was confession. It told Nigerians that this was never about peace, order, or party discipline—it was about absolute control over another human being.

But history has a cruel sense of humor.

While Wike strutted like a victorious warlord and his loyal lawmakers sharpened new knives, Fubara did something dangerous: he adapted. He studied power where it truly resides. He learned Tinubu’s language—the language of survival, alignment, and betrayal without apology. Then he did what Nigerian politics rewards most:

He crossed over.

Not quietly. Not shamefully. But theatrically. He defected to the APC, raised a party card numbered 001 and crowned himself leader of the party in Rivers State. He pledged to deliver the same Rivers people to Tinubu just as Wike also has pledged.

That moment was not boldness.

It was cold-blooded realism.

And in one stroke, Wike’s myth collapsed.

The once-feared enforcer became a shouting relic—touring local governments like a prophet nobody believes anymore, issuing warnings that land on deaf ears, reminding Nigerians of favors that no longer matter. He threatened APC officials, cursed betrayal, and swore eternal vengeance. But vengeance without access is just noise.

Today, the humiliation is complete.

Fubara enters rooms Wike waits outside.

Presidential aides shake hands with the new alignment.

The old king rants in press conferences, sounding increasingly like a man arguing with a locked door.

And yet, the darkest truth remains: neither of these men cares about Rivers State.

One is fighting to remain relevant.

The other is fighting to remain protected.

The people—the markets, the schools, the roads, the civil servants—are expendable extras in a drama scripted far above their heads.

Some say Tinubu designed this blood sport—unable to discard Wike outright, he simply unleashed his creation against him. Whether genius or negligence, the effect is the same: Rivers State is being eaten alive by ambition.

This is what happens when politics loses shame.

This is what happens when loyalty replaces competence.

This is what happens when leaders treat states like bargaining chips and citizens like ashes.

Two monkeys are burning the village—not to save it, not to rule it—but to prove who can scream loudest while it burns.

And Jagaban watches, hands folded.

But when the fire dies down, when the music stops, when the applause fades, there will be nothing left to govern—only ruins, regret, and two exhausted dancers staring at the ashes, finally realizing that power does not clap forever.

Sly Edaghese sent in this piece from Wisconsin, USA.

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Opinion

What Will Be the End of Wike?

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By Pelumi Olajengbesi Esq.

Every student of politics should now be interested in what will be the end of Wike. Wike is one of those names that mean different things to different people within Nigeria’s political culture. To his admirers, he is courage and capacity, to his critics, he is disruption and excess, and to neutral observers like me, he is simply a fascinating case study in the mechanics of power.

In many ways, he was instrumental to the emergence of President Tinubu, and he has long sat like a lord over the politics of Rivers, having pushed aside nearly every person who once mattered in that space. He waged war against his party, the PDP, and drove it to the edge. Wike waged war against his successor and reduced him to submission. He fights anyone who stands in his way.

He is powerful, loved by many, and deeply irritating to many others. Yet for all his strength, one suspects that Wike does not enjoy peace of mind, because before he is done with one fight, another fight is already forming. From Rivers to Ibadan, Abuja to Imo, and across the country, he is the only right man in his own way. He is constantly in motion, constantly in battle, and constantly singing “agreement is agreement,” while forgetting that politics is merely negotiation and renegotiation.

To his credit, Wike may often be the smartest political planner in every room. He reads everybody’s next move and still creates a countermove. In that self image, Governor Fubara was meant to remain on a leash, manageable through pressure, inducement, and the suggestion that any disobedience would be framed as betrayal of the President and the new federal order.

But politics has a way of punishing anyone who believes control is permanent. The moment Fubara joined the APC, the battlefield shifted, and old tricks began to lose their edge. Whether by real alignment, perceived alignment, or even the mere possibility of a different alignment, once Fubara was no longer boxed into the corner Wike designed for him, Wike’s entire method required review. The fight may remain, but the terrain has changed. When terrain changes, power must either adapt or harden into miscalculation.

It is within this context that the gradually brewing crisis deserves careful attention, because what is emerging is not merely another loud exchange, but a visible clash with vital stakeholders within the Tinubu government and the wider ruling party environment. There is now a fixed showdown with the APC National Secretary, a man who is himself not allergic to confrontation, and who understands that a fight, if properly timed, can yield political advantage, institutional relevance, and bargaining power. When such a figure publicly demands that Nyesom Wike should resign as a minister in Tinubu’s cabinet, it is not a joke, It is about who is permitted to exercise influence, in what space, and on what terms. It is also about the anxiety that follows every coalition built on convenience rather than shared identity, because convenience has no constitution and gratitude is not a structure.

Wike embodies that anxiety in its most dramatic form. He is a man inside government, but not fully inside the party that controls government. He is a man whose usefulness to a winning project is undeniable, yet whose political style constantly reminds the winners that he is not naturally theirs. In every ruling party, there is a crucial difference between allies and stakeholders. Allies help you win, and stakeholders own the structure that decides who gets what after victory. Wike’s problem is that he has operated like both. His support for Tinubu, and his capacity to complicate the opposition’s arithmetic, gave him relevance at the centre. That relevance always tempts a man to behave like a co-owner.

Wike has built his political life on the logic of territorial command. He defines the space, polices the gate, punishes disloyalty, rewards submission, and keeps opponents permanently uncertain. That method is brutally effective when a man truly owns and controls the structure, because it produces fear, and fear produces compliance. This is why Wike insists on controlling the Rivers equation, even when that insistence conflicts with the preferences of the national centre.

The APC leadership is not reacting only to words. It is reacting to what the words represent. When a minister speaks as though a state chapter of the ruling party should be treated like a guest in that state’s politics, the party reads it as an attempt to subordinate its internal structure to an external will. Even where the party has tolerated Wike because of what he helped deliver, it cannot tolerate a situation where its own officials begin to look over their shoulders for permission from a man who is not formally one of them. Once a party believes its chain of command is being bypassed, it will choose institutional survival over interpersonal loyalty every time.

Wike’s predicament is the classic risk of power without full institutional belonging. Informal influence can be louder than formal power, but it is also more fragile because it depends on continuous tolerance from those who control formal instruments. These instruments include party hierarchy, candidate selection, and the legitimacy that comes with membership.

An outsider ally can be celebrated while he is useful, but the coalition that celebrates him can begin to step away the moment his methods create more cost than value. The cost is not only electoral, it can also be organisational. A ruling party approaching the next political cycle becomes sensitive to discipline, structure, and coherence. If the leadership suspects that one person’s shadow is creating factions, confusing loyalties, or humiliating party officials, it will attempt to cut that shadow down. It may not do so because it hates the person, but because it fears the disorder and the precedent.

So the question returns with greater urgency, what will be the end of Wike? If it comes, it may not come with fireworks. Strongmen often do not fall through one decisive attack. They are slowly redesigned out of relevance. The end can look like isolation, with quiet withdrawal of access, gradual loss of influence over appointments, and the emergence of new centres of power within the same territory he once treated as private estate. It can look like neutralisation, with Wike remaining in office, but watching the political value of the office drain because the presidency and the party no longer need his battles. It can look like forced realignment, with him compelled to fully submit to the ruling party structure, sacrificing the freedom of being an independent ally, or losing the cover that federal power provides.

Yet it is also possible that his story does not end in collapse, because Wike is not a novice. The same instinct that made him influential can also help him survive if he adapts. But adaptation would require a difficult shift. It would require a move from territorial warfare to coalition management. It would require a move from ruling by fear to ruling by accommodation. It would require a move from being merely feared to being structurally useful without becoming structurally threatening. Wike may be running out of time.

Pelumi Olajengbesi is a Legal Practitioner and Senior Partner at Law Corridor

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