The Oracle
Is the Judiciary Complicit in the Osun State Local Govt Debacle?
Published
1 year agoon
By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
In a landmark decision in ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ABIA STATE & ORS (2024) LPELR-62576(SC) last year, the Supreme Court gave the local government system full autonomy, warning governors to keep their political fingers off Local Government Councils (LGCs). The legal status of the LGCs in Osun State has however been the subject of intense political and judicial debate following the 2022 local government elections. The matter has seen multiple judicial determinations, culminating in two critical Federal High Court judgements; one obtained by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the other by the Action Peoples Party (APP). While both judgements invalidated the elections conducted by the Osun State Independent Electoral Commission (OSSIEC), the judgement secured by APP remains the extant, binding, and subsisting legal authority, as no superior court has set it aside.
DISTORTION OF THE ESSENCE OF THE JUDGMENTS
In recent times, misinterpretations and misinformation have sought to distort the legal position, with some claiming that a recent Court of Appeal judgement reinstated the sacked local government officials. However, a critical examination of the Court of Appeal’s latest decision shows that it merely struck out the PDP’s appeal on the ground that no cause of action had arisen at the time of its filing. The position of the law in this regard is that when judgements are not to the substance of a case, they do not change the rights and liabilities of parties. See the case of IGBUNBOR V. AFOLABI (2001) FWLR (Pt. 59) 1284 at 165. Importantly, the Court of Appeal did not nullify or overturn the subsisting Federal High Court judgement granted in favour of APP, which therefore remains the authoritative and binding authority affecting the rights of the parties.
It is therefore meet that we clarify the foggy situation by analyzing the relevant judgements, applicable laws, and legal principles that govern the status of the 2022 Osun local government elections. This analysis will demonstrate that the local government councils were legally dissolved and that no subsequent judicial pronouncement had restored them. It will also demonstrate that the latest foiled invasion of many LGCs across Osun State by some APC persons is unconstitutional, illegal and amounted to self-help.
THE 2022 OSUN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS HALLMARKED LEGAL CHALLENGES
The dispute over the Osun local government elections actually commenced in 2022, following the conduct of the elections by OSSIEC. The elections were challenged in court on the basis that OSSIEC had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022, specifically sections 28, 29, 32, 98, and 150 thereof.
The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the Action Peoples Party (APP) had separately instituted legal actions at the Federal High Court, seeking to have the elections nullified. The basis of these suits was OSSIEC’s alleged non-compliance with statutory provisions and constitutional violations.
THE PDP SUIT IN BRIEF
In the case of PDP, it was alleged that OSSIEC was planning to conduct local government election in Osun State in violation of the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022, specifically sections 28, 29, 30 and 150 thereof. PDP also called on the Federal High Court to apply the decision of the Supreme Court in OSSIEC & ANOR V. ACTION CONGRESS & ORS (2010) LLJR-SC (delivered in 2010), to the effect that any notice of a local government election which is not in compliance with the Electoral Act is null and void. The law in existence as at the time of filing the said suit was the OSSIEC Law, 2015 (as amended).
While the suit was pending, the Osun State House of Assembly repealed the existing 2015 amended OSSIEC Law, and enacted the new OSSIEC Law, 2022, which prescribed 360 days’ notice for election, same as contained in the Electoral Act, 2022. OSSIEC then, during the pendency of the action, published a notice of election prescribing only 60 days as against the 360 days specified by the OSSIEC Law and the Electoral Act.
PDP, then, by an order of court, amended its processes to bring in the new development. OSSIEC still went ahead with the conduct of the election and the All Progressives Congress (APC) participated despite the pendency of the suit at the Federal High Court. It was after the election that the APC and some of its candidates brought a joinder application to the suit in a representative capacity, for all its candidates who reportedly participated at the election. The Federal High Court granted their application for joinder and the whole court processes were amended to reflect all the parties and issues. On 25th November, 2022, the Federal High Court delivered a judgment in the suit, nullifying the election and consequentially sacking all the purported elected officials.
SUMMARY OF THE APP SUIT
The APP’s suit was similar to the PDP suit in all respects; the only difference being that the APP’s suit was filed after the enactment of the OSSIEC Law 2022 and after the publication of the 60-day election notice by OSSIEC, as against 360 days provided by the OSSIEC Law and the Electoral Act.
While both parties obtained favourable judgements, the judgement in the APP suit has become the legally binding decision, as APC’s appeal against it was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the 13th of January, 2025, for want of diligent prosecution. This dismissal rendered the APP judgement the final and only subsisting authority on the matter.
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON THE VALIDITY OF THE ELECTIONS
A. The FHC Judgement in APP v. OSIEC (Suit No. FHC/OS/CS/75/2022)
In this case filed by the Action Peoples Party (APP), the Federal High Court (FHC), delivered a landmark judgement that rendered the October 15, 2022, Osun Statw local government elections null and void. The court held that the elections violated the Electoral Act, 2022, and were also inconsistent with the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
The FHC in the APP case held as follows:
– “The election into local government councils across Osun State held on the 15th of October 2022, pursuant to the notice of election issued on the 15th of August 2022, is hereby declared unconstitutional, invalid, null, and void for violation of the Constitution and breach of Sections 28, 29, 32, 98, and 150 of the Electoral Act, 2022.”
– “All persons or individuals occupying offices in the state local government councils by virtue of the said election are accordingly sacked from holding such offices.”
– “Sections 25 and 26 of the Osun State Independent Electoral Commission Law, 2022, having been enacted in contravention of Paragraph 12 of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution and being inconsistent with Sections 29 and 32 of the Electoral Act, 2022, are hereby struck down.”
I agree with the decision of the FHC because it is trite law that any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is null and void and must be struck down because the Constitution is the grundnorm of the land (see section 1(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 [as amended]). The Supreme Court, Per JAURO, JSC, pronounced on the supremacy of the Constitution in NPF & ORS V POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION (2023) LPELR-60782(SC) (P.154, paras. A-F), thus:
“It is equally imperative to restate the elementary principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is the grundnorm, the basic law of the land. It stands head and shoulders above any other law or instrument enacted by the National Assembly, State House of Assembly or any other person or authority empowered in that regard. It is from the Constitution that every other enactment or instrument derive their validity and binding force. The doctrine of the Supremacy of the Nigerian Constitution is traceable to Section 1(1) and (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered), which provides thus: “1. Supremacy of the Constitution (1) This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (3) If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.”
Consequently, as was decided by the Supreme Court in the case of PEENOK INVESTMENTS LIMITED V HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL (1982) 12 SC 1, there is undoubted power in the Court to declare null and void any law that conflicts with the provisions of the Constitution”. See also the cases of HON. INAJOKU & ORS V. ADELEKE & ORS (2007) ALL FWLR; OLAFISOYE V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2004) ALL FWLR 1106; AINABEBHOLO V. EDO STATE UNIVERSITY WORKERS FARMERS MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD (2007) ALL FWLR 712; PDP v. EDEDE & ANOR (2022) LPELR-57480(CA); PRESIDENT OF THE FRN & ORS v. ISA & ORS (2015) LPELR-25981(CA); and, AG FEDERATION & ORS v. ABUBAKAR & ORS (2007) LPELR-3(SC).
The legal implication of this judgement cannot be overstated. By declaring the 2022 Osun State LG elections unconstitutional, null and void, the court completely erased any legal foundation for the existence of the local government councils elected through that flawed process. The said APP judgement was also a judgement in rem, meaning that it applied to the whole world, all parties and stakeholders, and non-parties alike, irrespective of whether or not they participated in the litigation. In DIKE & ORS V. NZEKA II & ORS (1986) LPELR-945 (SC), the Supreme Court underscored this point most lucidly when it held:
“… A judgment is said to be in rem when it is an adjudication pronounced upon the status of some particular thing or subject matter by a Tribunal having the jurisdiction and the competence to pronounce on that Status. Such a judgment is usually and invariably founded on proceedings instituted against or on something or subject-matter whose status or condition is to be determined. It is thus a solemn declaration on the status of some persons or thing. It is therefore binding on all persons in so far as their interests in the status of the property or person are concerned. That is why a judgment in rem is a judgment contra mundum – binding on the whole world – parties as well as non-parties. ….”
See also the cases of OYETOLA & ANOR v. INEC & ORS (2023) LPELR-60392(SC); and, A.G. ABIA STATE & ORS V. A.G. OF THE FEDERATION (2022) LPELR-57010 (SC).
B. The Dismissal of APC’s Subsequent Appeal and the Finality of the APP Judgement
Following the Federal High Court’s judgement, the All Progressives Congress (APC), which had benefited from the October 2022 elections, appealed the judgement in the case filed by APP. However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the 13th of January, 2025, for want of diligent prosecution.
The legal implication of that dismissal is that the FHC’s judgement in the APP case remains the extant and binding position of the law. Under section 287(3) of the 1999 Constitution, all authorities and persons within Nigeria, including government institutions, political parties, and law enforcement agencies are obligated to enforce and abide by the said judgement, the appeal arising therefrom having been dismissed.
The current legal position on the status of the Osun State LGCs following these decisions of both the FHC, Oshogbo, and the Court of Appeal is that the earlier judgment of the FHC, which nullified the local government elections conducted on October 15, 2022, remains binding and validly subsisting. The election conducted by OSSIEC in 2022 therefore stands nullified, while all candidates in that election remain sacked. This will continue to be the position of the law until the judgment is set aside by the apex court of the land at the instance of the APP.
C. The PDP Case and the Court of Appeal’s Technical Dismissal of Same
The PDP had in a separate case similar to APP’s, also challenged the legality of the OSSIEC conducted elections. The FHC sitting in Oshogbo had held in its favour. However, upon appeal, the Court of Appeal sitting at Akure struck it out on technical grounds. The court held that the PDP’s case was premature and speculative, having been filed prematurely when notice of the election had not yet been issued at the time of filing. This, in the intermediate Court’s view, deprived the FHC of jurisdiction to entertain the case. It is respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeal was right as is trite that where a matter is instituted when no cause of action has arisen, the doctrine of ripeness applies and such a matter becomes merely speculative and amounts to an academic exercise. This position of the law was upheld in the cases of EDEVIE V. OROHWEDOR & ORS (2022) LPELR-58931 (SC); OGBIMI V. OLOLO & ORS (1993) LPELR-2280(SC); and, UWAZURUONYE v. GOVERNOR OF IMO STATE & ORS (2012) LPELR-20604(SC).
It must be understood that this judgement did not invalidate the decision earlier obtained by APP at the FHC. Rather, it was a purely procedural decision that had no bearing whatsoever on the substantive matter – the validity or invalidity of the Osun State LG elections. The Court of Appeal held as follows:
“As at the time the PDP brought the suit, the cause of action had not arisen because the notice of election had not been issued. The suit was therefore premature.”
This judgement merely struck out the PDP’s appeal without ruling on the legality or otherwise of the elections. Nor were consequential orders made. More significantly, no declaration or consequential orders were made reinstating the ousted local government officials. When no consequential orders are made in a suit, the status quo remains as contained in the judgement appealed against. See the cases of AKINBOBOLA V. PLISSON FISKO (NIG) LTD & ORS (1991) LPELR-343(SC) and FCDA STAFF MULTI-PURPOSE (COOP) SOCIETY & ORS V. SAMCHI & ANOR (2018) LPELR-444380(CA). The fundamental issues that could have propelled the Court of Appeal to pronounce on the validity or otherwise of the notice of election and the propriety or otherwise of sacking the APC purported elected council officials who had participated in the said election were never considered by the Court of Appeal as they were treated as academic.
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS: THE INCONTROVERTIBLE DISSOLUTION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS
1. The 2022 Osun State LG Elections Were Null and Void
By virtue of the APP FHC judgement, the 2022 Osun local government elections were clearly unconstitutional and void from the outset. As a matter of law, a void act confers no legal right. When an act is void, it is void for all times and is not required to be set aside. In the case of OYENEYIN & ANOR V. AKINKUGBE & ANOR (2010) LPELR-2875 (SC), the apex court held that:
“In law, a void act is an act which has no legal effect or consequence. It does not confer any legal right or title whatsoever, and it does not impose any legal obligation or liability on any one or make any party liable to suffer any penalty or disadvantage.”
In simple terms, one cannot put something upon nothing and expect it to stand. It will collapse. See the cases of LEONARD MACFOY V. UAC LIMITED (1962) AC 152; OKWUOSA V. GOMWALK & ORS (2017) LPELR-41736 (SC); IFEANYI V. OGBA & ORS (2022) LPELR-58787(SC); and, MUSTAPHA & ORS V. ADENOPO & ORS (2020) LPELR-51409(CA). Consequently, no political party, individual or group can lay any valid claim to any Osun State local government offices based on the voided election.
2. All Purported Local Government Officials Remain Legally Removed from Office
Since the FHC in the APP case had expressly sacked all persons occupying the local government positions and no appellate court has reversed that judgement, all the said officials remain legally removed from office. The said judgement remains binding on all parties and the whole world until set aside.
Indeed, the Supreme Court had upheld this position of the law in NGERE & ANOR v. OKURUKET & ORS (2014) LPELR-22883(SC), where it held:
“…The judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction subsists until upset on appeal. While the judgment subsists, every person affected by it or against whom an order is made must obey it even if it appears wrong. Judgments take effect immediately they are delivered and every Court has inherent power to proceed to enforce judgments at once. The enforcements on delivery can only be interrupted by a stay of execution provided there is an appeal.”
3. The Court of Appeal’s Judgement in the PDP Appeal Did Not Reinstate Anyone
Contrary to the position of the sacked LG officials who had sought to forcibly gate-crash into their offices, the Court of Appeal never reinstated any sacked LG officials. It merely struck out the PDP’s case without considering or commenting on the validity or otherwise of the voided elections. Consequently, any claim that the Court of Appeal reinstated the ousted chairmen is a deliberate distortion of facts and a result to sophistry.
4. The APP Judgement Is Binding on All Parties
Since APC’s appeal against the APP FHC judgement was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, that judgement remains final and binding on all political parties, individuals and institutions in Osun State. See the case of NOEKOER V. EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE & ORS (2018) LPELR-44350(SC), where the apex court held that:
“it is well settled law that the judgement of a competent court subsists and remains binding until it is set aside on appeal”.
5. Any Attempt to Reoccupy Local Government Offices Is Unconstitutional and Amounts to Self Help
Any action taken by political actors to forcefully invade and reoccupy LG offices as was witnessed few days ago is not only illegal but also constitutes a contemptuous disregard of a valid and subsisting court judgement; and indeed a resort to self help, viet armis. The law forbids such resort to self-help by parties in a pending matter with a view to usurping the functions of a court of law. The Supreme Court in AGBAI & ORS V. OKOGBUE (1991) LPELR-225 (SC) 69-70, F-A, trenchantly cautioned that:
“The ratio decidendi of the decision of this Court in Ojukwu’s case is that once there is lis inter partes and the Courts of law are seised with the dispute, no person or authority, whether parties to the lis or not, is allowed by the Constitution to usurp the functions of the Court of law. It is the duty of every person or authority not to interfere with the legal and judicial process from taking its due course.”
The Supreme Court further confirms this position in NWAKIRE v COP (1992) LPELR-2097 (SC) 42-43, A-D, where it held thus:
“That self-help is not allowed in adjudication has been firmly ensconced in the jurisprudence of this nation like the Rock of Gibraltar, which position remains as constant, in Caesar’s words in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, “as the Northern Star”.
See the causa celere case of MILITARY GOVERNOR OF LAGOS STATE V. OJUKWU & ANOR (1986) LPELR-3186 (SC). See also GARBA V. FCSC (1988) LPELR-1304 (SC) 28-29.
6. The Court of Appeal did not make any consequential Order of Re-instatement of the Sacked LG Officials
It must again be emphasised for the umpteenth time that the Court of Appeal in the PDP appeal decision never validated the election conducted by OSSIEC in 2022 under any guise as the issues on the validity of the election that could have led to a pronouncement on whether or not the APC candidates were rightly sacked were never considered. As a result, there was no consequential order for reinstatement by the Court of Appeal. The only consequential order by the Court of Appeal was an order directing PDP to pay a cost of N250,000 to the Appellants. NO MORE, NO LESS!
CONCLUSION
UPHOLDING THE RULE OF LAW
The Judiciary’s intervention in both the PDP and APP cases rather than show a Judiciary that is complicit, actually underscored the supremacy of the Electoral Act over state laws in regulating local government elections. Under Nigerian legal jurisprudence, the doctrine of “covering the field” applies here, which provides that all state laws which are inconsistent with federal laws are to the extent of those inconsistencies, null and void. In the case of A.G LAGOS STATE V. EKO HOTELS (2017) LPELR-43713(SC), the apex court expounded on the doctrine of covering the field thus:
“If any law enacted by the House of Assembly of a State is inconsistent with any law validly made by the National Assembly, the Law made by the National Assembly will prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of its inconsistency be void” – Section 4(5) CFRN 1999 {As Amended}. This, in clear language, means that only the law validly enacted by the federal legislature will prevail on that which is also validly made by the state house of assembly but this is only where that State Law is inconsistent with that of the Federal law.”
Similarly, in FRIDAY & ORS v. GOV OF ONDO STATE & ANOR (2012) LPELR-7886(CA), the appellate court held thus:
“…It is thus legal and legitimate for both the National Assembly and a State House of Assembly to legislate on same subject matter provided there is no inconsistency from the State law. Where there is inconsistency however, the State law will be declared null and void to the extent of its inconsistency, and in order not to create any vacuum, resort will be had to the old jurisprudential principle of covering the field, that is to say, that since there is a Federal Legislation on the subject matter, it is not necessary for a Federating State to legislate on that area and the provision made by the National Assembly covers the subject matter in question.”
See also the cases of O.S.I.E.C. V. A.C (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 273; NPF & ORS V. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION (2023) LPELR-60782 (SC); INEC V. MUSA (2003) LPELR-24927 (SC); and, AIRTEL NETWORKS LTD V. AG OF KWARA STATE & ANOR (2014) LPELR-23790 (CA).
All the judgements involved in these cases actually reaffirmed the necessity for electoral bodies to adhere strictly to established legal frameworks, ensuring transparency and compliance in the electoral process. See the cases of AUGUSTINE & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2024) LPELR-61876(SC) and BUHARI Vs. INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (1120) 246. Such a judgement serves as a significant precedent for future electoral disputes in Nigeria, thus emphasizing the importance of lawful conduct in the governance process. The Court of Appeal in the PDP appeal having struck out the suit without considering the merit of the decision as regards the validity or otherwise of the election conducted by OSSIEC in 2022, the effect is that the suit filed by the PDP never existed in the eyes of the law.
However, the Court of Appeal in the PDP case did not strike down the judgment of the FHC in the APP case, nor did it validate the 2022 LG election and re-instate the sacked LG officials. The FHC’s decision in the APP case thus remains the only definitive legal authority on the status of the 2022 Osun State LG elections. Until and unless the Supreme Court decides otherwise, the said elections remain null, void, and of no effect whatsoever. No person elected in that flawed process can lay any lawful claim to any office.
Any claim to the contrary is a deliberate misinterpretation of the legal position and constitutes an attempt to undermine the rule of law and subvert the judicial process. Such would also serve as a subterfuge to the powers and decisions of arguably the most important arm of government – the Judiciary.
THE COURT’S DECISION IN THE OSUN LG BROUHAHA MUST BE EXECUTED
It is now the duty of law enforcement agencies and government institutions to ensure that all judicial decisions involved in these cases are respected and upheld. It is trite that all persons and authorities must obey judgements of courts and parties are not permitted to pick and choose which judgements to obey, or which to disobey. This legal principle was emphasised in the case of PDP v. LALONG & ORS (2023) LPELR-61629(CA), where the intermediate court held thus:
“By the provision of Section 287 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, all authorities and persons, including this Court, are expected to observe and ensure the compliance of order/judgments of the Court including High Court particularly orders/judgments that are in rem…An order of a competent Court of law, no matter its nature, is absolute and binding on all and sundry without question until it is legally and legitimately set aside by a competent Court of appellate jurisdiction. The fact of its being final or interim does not therefore affect its application and effectiveness. It remains valid and enforceable and must be obeyed”.
See also the cases of NGERE & ANOR v. OKURUKET & ORS (2014) LPELR-22883(SC); SHUGABA V. U.B.N. PLC (1999) LPELR – 3068 (SC); and, OBOH & ANOR V. NFL & ORS (2016) LPELR-50559 (CA).
THE LAW MUST BE VISITED ON THOSE WHO RESORTED TO SELF-HELP
I watched with dismay and disgust the act of certain LG officials who forcefully barged into the LG headquarters, attempting to reclaim office in the false and erroneous belief that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the PDP case had re-instated them to their official positions, such was nothing short of brigandage and crude resort to self help. It must be condemned in the strongest terms and I so condemn it. It was selfish and uncalled for. In the same vein, all those who aided and abetted this democratic aberration must be fished out and charged before the law courts, however highly placed they are.
ANY AVAILABLE REMEDY?
My above take is not to say that there is no remedy available to the sacked officials; they still have a right of appeal to the Supreme Court in the APP case. But until the Supreme Court overturns the valid and subsisting judgment in rem of the FHC in the APP case, the said judgment remains binding on all parties.
The irresistible conclusion to be drawn from these events is that all LG offices across Osun State remain vacant and that the sacked APC officials cannot lay claim to the benefit of any judgement to occupy the council offices until they obtain a different outcome, if any, from the apex court. This is the LAW.
THE WAY FORWARD
To save themselves from needless orchestrated violence, all the political parties in Osun State should go for fresh polls and test their popularity in a free, fair and credible election. Politicians should leave the Judiciary alone by playing clean politics. As to the title of this piece, my humble submission is that the Judiciary was not in any way complicit in the Osun State LG imbroglio. Rather, it acted in good faith, striving fiercely to defend the rule of law and uphold electoral integrity.
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The Oracle
The Oracle: The New Digital Colonialism: Navigating AI Policy Under Foreign Tech Dominance (Pt. 5)
Published
6 days agoon
April 4, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
In our last outing, we continued from the dangers of weak localization and disproportionate influence of foreign technology on African ecosystems. Followed by an in-depth analysis of the issues generated by AI policy and later at what African States needs to do to tackle the challenge-using Nigeria as a case study with special emphasis on the pen in the trans-continental transformation of AI technology and later x-ray the need for technological sovereignty and for crafting an indigenous AI policy agenda. We shall then conclude with an overview of lessons from abroad including the US, EU and China. Today, we shall take a look at the Future of African Digital Sovereignty, starting from Lagos to Accra, Cape Town to Cairo, Dakar to Dares Salaam, and in fact all fifty-four nations of African continent. We shall thereafter conclude with how the choices made by the African nations today with respect to AI governance, data sovereignty, and technological infrastructure will determine whether the continent will remain passive a consumer of foreign systems or emerges as an active shaper of global digital futures. Enjoy.
THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY
Imagine this: the year is 2050. From Lagos to Accra, Cape Town to Cairo, Dakar to Dares Salaam, all fifty-four nations of our beloved continent stand as co-authors of a shared digital destiny. The pen that once wavered in the hands of fragmented states has become steady, guided by unity, foresight and the vision to craft a future defined not by dependence, but by sovereignty, equity and innovation.
Across Africa, technology is no longer imported as a foreign product but created, nurtured and exported as a global standard. In Lagos, young engineers design energy-efficient AI chips that rival and surpass those made in Silicon Valley. In Kigali, a hub once celebrated for its early smart city experiments, Africa’s first quantum computing centre now powers healthcare breakthroughs across continents. Nairobi has become the headquarters of the Pan-African AI Ethics Council, an institution that sets the global benchmark for human-centred artificial intelligence. Accra, Addis Ababa and Johannesburg anchor Africa’s digital economy with data centres that rival those of Europe and Asia, ensuring that Africa’s data never again flows outward without reciprocity.
The transformation began with a recognition: technology is not neutral. Africans understood that algorithms, data systems and biometric technologies are instruments of power. Instead of uncritically adopting systems that excluded the rural, the poor, the disabled or the linguistically diverse, the continent chose a different path: technology that reflects African values of dignity, community and justice. The lessons of early missteps, such as exclusionary ID systems and exploitative data mining by foreign corporations, were not forgotten. They became rallying points for reform.
By 2035, every African nation had adopted a binding Digital Bill of Rights, enshrining privacy, dignity, transparency and accessibility as constitutional guarantees. Consent is no longer a perfunctory box to be ticked but an active and meaningful right, accessible even to citizens with low literacy or those living in remote communities. Algorithms deployed in courts, schools, banks and hospitals are explainable, accountable and open to independent audit. Citizens are not passive subjects of technology but active shapers—through participatory platforms that allow them to influence how data is collected, how AI is used, and how rights are protected.
The institutions that guard this ecosystem are robust, independent and trusted. The African Data Protection Commission; born out of a coalition of all fifty-four nations, operates with technical excellence and political autonomy. It not only oversees compliance but actively invests in capacity-building across the continent. Local regulators are no longer captured by external interests; they are guardians of sovereignty. Civil society, academia and entrepreneurs are embedded in digital governance as co-creators, not outsiders. The result is an ecosystem where technology is democratized and trust is the currency of digital life.
Infrastructure, once the Achilles’ heel of African development, is now its greatest strength. Universal broadband covers the continent, powered by a mix of green energy grids, solar satellites and fibre networks woven through deserts, forests and cities. Every village is a node in Africa’s digital constellation. Data centres, built and managed by Africans, ensure that information flows within Africa before it flows outward. These infrastructures are interoperable, resilient and sovereign.
Economic life thrives within this digital ecosystem. The African Continental Free Trade Area has blossomed into the world’s largest digital single market, seamlessly integrating fintech, e-commerce and cross-border innovation. A farmer in Mali can sell directly to buyers in Morocco using blockchain-backed platforms that guarantee fair prices, transparency, and security. A nurse in Uganda consults instantly with a doctor in Tunisia through AI-powered telemedicine networks. Start-ups in Lusaka or Ouagadougou scale as easily as those in Paris or Singapore, because Africa’s venture ecosystem is rich, connected and self-sustaining.
Yet the utopia is not measured by economic prosperity alone. Africa’s digital future has become a moral compass for the world. By embedding Ethics by Design into every innovation, Africa proved that technology could uplift rather than exclude. AI systems in Africa are trained on diverse datasets that reflect the continent’s multitude of languages, cultures, and histories, ensuring that bias is minimized and inclusion maximized. Assistive technologies empower people with disabilities to thrive. Rural communities once disconnected are now innovators, shaping tools that respond to their own realities—tools built in Hausa, Wolof, Amharic, Zulu and hundreds of other African languages.
Education has been re-imagined. Many children across the continent now have access to quality, personalized, AI-driven learning, designed with local contexts in mind. Universities collaborate through the Pan-African Digital Knowledge Network, pooling resources to create world-leading research in AI, biotechnology, renewable energy and cyber security. Brain drain has reversed—talent flows into Africa, not away from it.
Crucially, Africa’s rise did not come through isolation but through strategic partnership. Unlike the extractive digital colonialism of the past, today’s partnerships are forged on reciprocity and respect. Africa sits at the table of global digital governance as an equal, co-drafting the ethical frameworks that guide the use of AI, biotechnology and space technologies. Where once it was a consumer, Africa is now a producer, standard-setter and exporter of innovation and ideas.
This Africa is not utopia because it is flawless. It is utopia because it has embedded resilience, justice and inclusion into the fabric of its digital transformation. It has proven that sovereignty is not about closing borders but about opening opportunities, not about resisting technology but about owning it, shaping it, and ensuring it serves humanity.
CONCLUSION
Africa stands at a crossroads. The choices made today about AI governance, data sovereignty, and technological infrastructure will determine whether the continent remains a passive consumer of foreign systems or emerges as an active shaper of global digital futures. To avoid a new wave of digital colonialism, African states must embed ethics, sovereignty, and inclusion into their AI policies, invest in indigenous innovation, and strengthen regional collaboration. Only then can Africa wield the pen of authorship—crafting a digital destiny rooted in dignity, justice, and self-determination. (The end).
THOUGHTS FOR THE WEEK
“Historically, privacy was almost implicit, because it was hard to find and gather information. But in the digital world, whether it’s digital cameras or satellites or just what you click on, we need to have more explicit rules – not just for governments but for private companies”. – Bill Gates.
“Social media is changing the way we communicate and the way we are perceived, both positively and negatively. Every time you post a photo, or update your status, you are contributing to your own digital footprint and personal brand” – Amy Jo Martin.
Related
The Oracle
The Oracle: The New Digital Colonialism: Navigating AI Policy Under Foreign Tech Dominance (Pt. 4)
Published
2 weeks agoon
March 27, 2026By
Eric
Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
The last episode of this treatise concluded our examination of the preferences of the Western (US, EU) and Eastern (China) hemispheres on the subject after which we considered the dangers of weak localization and disproportionate influence of foreign technology on African ecosystems. This was followed by an analysis of the issues generated by AI policy and later we looked at what African States needs to do to tackle the challenge-using Nigeria as a case study. Today, we shall continue with same with special emphasis on the pen in the trans-continental transformation of AI technology and later x-ray the need for technological sovereignty and for crafting an indigenous AI policy agenda. We shall then conclude with an overview of lessons from abroad including the US, EU and China. Enjoy.
AI POLICY AND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION IN AFRICA, WHO WIELDS THE PEN?
In one sentence, we wield the pen. Our governments, independent state actors, entrepreneurs, African men, women and youth all share in this responsibility. The future of Africa’s digital transformation depends on whether we choose to author our own story or allow others to continue writing it for us.
Africa is witnessing an increasing call for technological sovereignty: the ability to control our own infrastructure, data and innovations. This idea, central to decolonial frameworks, insists that we must move away from being a passive consumer of technologies and reclaim control of its digital future. Kwame Nkrumah emphasized the importance of pan-African cooperation for achieving sovereignty. That vision today extends to the digital realm, where regional collaboration and homegrown solutions are critical for breaking dependency on Western corporations. Achille Mbembe further argues that Africa should leverage indigenous knowledge systems and local resources to create technologies that reflect African values, rather than merely importing Western tools ill-suited to its unique needs.
The digital divide between Africa and the West is not merely technical; it is rooted in structural and historical inequalities. The continent’s persistent reliance on foreign technologies reflects centuries of global imbalances that continue to shape how resources and knowledge flow. A central issue is technological dependency: Africa consumes technologies made elsewhere instead of shaping them (Tyler Robinson, ‘Navigating Digital Neocolonialism in Africa’ (cigionline.org) < www.cigionline.org/static/documents/DPH-paper-Stevenson_1.pdf > Accessed on 16th September, 2025).
Global tech giants dominate Africa’s digital landscape, extracting vast amounts of data without adequate investment in local infrastructure or people. Data extraction not only perpetuates Western dominance but also strips Africa of sovereignty over its own digital futures. Without robust regulations or sufficient local technological capacity, African nations remain vulnerable to these external forces.
NEED FOR TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNITY
Against these challenges, the need for technological sovereignty becomes undeniable. Africa must not remain a passive participant in the global digital economy. We must take proactive steps to build our own technological infrastructure and policies. Sovereignty in the digital age is not just about access but about authorship: designing systems that align with African values, priorities and aspirations. Some progress is already visible. Many governments are beginning to reclaim data oversight by establishing national data centres, such as those in Benin and Togo. These centres enable local data governance and prevent exploitation. Even when international institutions provide support, African states are increasingly insisting on local ownership and oversight (ibid).
Partnerships and trade agreements have also played a role in shaping Africa’s digital transformation, sometimes limiting, sometimes enabling. The Policy and Regulatory Initiative for Digital Africa (PRIDA), funded by the European Union and implemented by the African Union, supports broadband access, harmonized digital policies, and the capacity to implement them. While the framework is influenced by European legislation, it ensures stronger protections for African citizens. The Pan-African e-Network Project, originally launched in India but now African-led, connects countries via satellite and fibre, enabling teleeducation and telemedicine across borders. It demonstrates that partnerships can succeed when they are driven and managed by Africans. Similarly, the Smart Africa Alliance was established to transform the continent into a collaborative digital market. By centring ICTs within socio-economic development agendas, the alliance promotes sustainable policies, digital infrastructure, and affordable access across its member states.
TOWARD AN INDIGENOUS AI POLICY AGENDA: RECOMMENDATIONS
While significant progress has been made, more must be done to ensure that Africa wields the pen in shaping its digital destiny. Recommendations emerging from this discussion are clear:
1. Prioritize investment in indigenous technologies and local innovation rather than relying primarily on foreign solutions.
2. Expand digital literacy and capacity-building across the continent to empower citizens to participate meaningfully in the digital economy.
3. Strengthen regional collaboration by developing a unified digital strategy that reflects Africa’s collective interests and unique needs.
4. Establish and enforce robust regulatory frameworks to protect data, safeguard citizens, and curtail exploitative practices of global tech corporations.
5. Pursue strategic partnerships with external actors only on terms that guarantee local ownership, oversight, and long-term autonomy.
6. Operationalise Ethics by Design across all AI and digital identity systems by embedding impact assessments, fairness audits, user consent, and accountability mechanisms at every stage—from policy formulation to system deployment.
7. Mandate algorithmic explainability and independent auditing for all AI models impacting critical sectors such as healthcare, credit, policing, and education, ensuring transparency and bias detection.
8. Localise and secure data within national borders by requiring sensitive national datasets to be stored in certified local data centres, supported with investments in infrastructure and cybersecurity.
9. Extend NDPA protections to vulnerable and marginalised communities by enabling inclusive identity verification methods, community-based registration agents, and exemptions for hard-to-reach populations.
10. Establish a Public Interest Technology Task Force composed of ethicists, technologists, civil society, and legal scholars to provide oversight and human rights evaluations before new systems are rolled out.
11. Prioritise national capacity building in data ethics and digital rights through mandatory training for government agencies, judiciary, MDAs, and law enforcement bodies.
12. Make digital consent comprehensible, accessible, and verifiable by requiring plain-language terms, local translations, audio/visual options, and legal avenues to revoke consent.
13. Decentralise and democratise identity systems by adopting a federated model where local governments, trusted institutions, and community actors can verify identity, reducing exclusion and dependency on centralised systems.
14. Enforce mandatory Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) for high-risk public projects, with findings made public and subject to independent review; impose strict penalties for non-compliance.
15. Create civic engagement pathways in digital governance through open consultations, citizen assemblies on AI ethics, participatory monitoring, and data literacy campaigns to treat citizens as democratic stakeholders.
Only by embracing these recommendations can Africa move from dependency to sovereignty. This continent must wield the pen herself, authoring a digital future rooted in African values and aspirations and ensuring full participation in the global digital economy on our own terms.
LESSONS FROM THE EU, US AND CHINA
THE EU
1. The European Union’s AI Act provides a tiered, risk-based approach to regulating artificial intelligence, distinguishing between unacceptable, high, limited, and minimal risk. Obligations such as transparency, oversight, and outright bans are matched to the level of risk. For Africa, this model illustrates how to avoid over-regulating low-risk tools while ensuring strict oversight of high-risk applications.
2. Closely tied to this is the EU’s privacy-by-design approach, anchored in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Here, privacy safeguards, data minimisation, and “by default” protections are integrated from the outset of system design. Africa can adopt this holistic model by embedding privacy and data rights into both law and practice, with strong enforcement mechanisms.
3. The EU also prioritises transparency, accountability, and liability. High-risk systems must undergo conformity assessments, independent audits, and documentation processes. Liability frameworks are being expanded to ensure that citizens can seek redress when harmed by AI systems. This provides a template for Africa to hold developers, deployers, and regulators accountable.
4. In addition, the EU AI Act prohibits certain practices outright, such as social scoring, manipulative techniques, and some forms of biometric surveillance. Setting non-negotiable boundaries protects citizens while providing clarity for innovators.
5. Finally, the EU demonstrates the value of operational readiness and compliance infrastructure. GDPR compelled companies to build compliance units (e.g., privacy officers, auditing mechanisms), which now serve as the foundation for AI oversight. Africa should similarly invest early in institutions, regulators, and technical capacity to ensure that laws are enforceable in practice.
THE UNITED STATES
1. The United States illustrates how rapid executive action can shape emerging technologies even before legislation matures. For instance, Executive Order 14110 (2023) on AI mandated agency risk assessments, civil rights considerations, and workforce planning. Africa can similarly use presidential or ministerial directives to establish immediate governance frameworks while legislative processes catch up.
2. The Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights (2022) articulates citizen protections, including transparency, fairness, privacy, and the right to opt out. This offers a model for Africa to enshrine AI-related rights in constitutional or statutory instruments, ensuring that protections are not left as policy afterthoughts.
3. The U.S. also underscores the importance of equity and non-discrimination. Policies emphasize audits, training, and oversight in areas such as employment, housing, health, and policing to prevent algorithmic bias. Africa should follow this lead by embedding protections for marginalized groups into its AI strategies, addressing gender, ethnic, and rural-urban disparities
4. At the same time, the U.S. demonstrates how innovation and competition can be promoted alongside regulation. Federal agencies such as NIST, together with grant schemes and research funding, stimulate startups and infrastructure growth. For Africa, combining protective regulation with incentives for local innovation will ensure that governance does not stifle creativity or competitiveness.
CHINA
1. China’s national AI strategy highlights the power of entrepreneurial hubs and incubators as engines of innovation. Africa can adapt this model by building regional AI hubs that connect academia, industry, and startups while attracting diaspora talent.
2. China also leveraged digital financial inclusion by integrating AI into mobile payments and lending platforms. With Africa’s mobile money infrastructure already strong (e.g., M-Pesa), scaling digital finance to directly support entrepreneurs could accelerate indigenous innovation.
3. Through initiatives like Made in China 2025, China has pursued indigenous innovation and self-sufficiency, investing in local chip design, cloud infrastructure, and AI frameworks. Africa, too, must localize its data, develop homegrown AI models, and reduce dependence on foreign technology.
4. The country’s advances in AI for healthcare: diagnostics, wearables, predictive analytics, demonstrate how technology can bridge systemic service gaps. Africa could apply similar solutions to leapfrog chronic shortages in health systems.
5. China’s Digital Silk Road shows how digital exports can extend influence abroad. Africa can flip this approach by creating an African Digital Corridor, exporting its innovations and setting standards based on African values.
6. At the same time, China’s struggles with semiconductors underscore the risks of supply chain dependency. Africa must build resilience through semiconductor R&D, local cloud infrastructure, and open-source software ecosystems.
7. Finally, China shows how standards and regulation can be tools of global influence. By actively shaping AI governance in developing regions, it is carving out international leadership. Africa, through the AU and AfCFTA, can harmonize its own AI standards, strengthening its voice in global digital policy debates. (To be continued).
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
“Over time I think we will probably see a closer merger of biological intelligence and digital intelligence”. (Elon Musk).
Related
The Oracle
The Oracle: The New Digital Colonialism: Navigating AI Policy Uunder Foreign Tech Dominance (Pt. 3)
Published
3 weeks agoon
March 20, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
The last installment of this intervention traced the evolution of AI, reviewed notable developments in its trajectory; its African dimension and policy trend therein and beyond. This week’s feature goes further afield, reviewing the position in the US, the EU and China. Thereafter we consider the dangers of weak localized and disproportionate influence of foreign technology on African innovation ecosystem. This is followed by a discussion of the issues generated by AI policy and what African States need to do – using Nigeria as an example/template. Enjoy.
USA, EU, CHINA’S PREFERENCES (Continues)
In Africa, the policy landscape is accelerating but uneven. The Global AI Index (www.diplomacy.edu/resource/report-stronger-digital-voices-from-africa/ai-africa-national-policies/ > (Diplomacy.Edu) Accessed on 10th September, 2025) categorizes most African countries as lagging: Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya as nascent, and Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia as waking up (Techpoint Africa, < www.facebook.com/TechpointAfrica/posts/africas-ai-policy-why-a-copy-and-paste-approach-will-fail-this-time-every-countr/1064672189125910/> (Facebook.com, 22nd July, 2025) Accessed on 10th September, 2025). Mauritius led with an AI strategy (Mauritius Artificial Intelligence Strategy, November, 2018 < https://treasury.govmu.org/Documents/Strategies/Mauritius%20AI%20Strategy.pdf > (Treasury.govmu.org) Accessed on 10th September, 2025), followed by Kenya’s AI and blockchain task force (2019) (Kenya Artificial Intelligence Strategy < https://ict.go.ke/sites/default/files/2025-03/Kenya%20AI%20Strategy%202025%20-%202030.pdf > (Ict.go.ke) Accessed on 10th September, 2025), its Digital Master Plan (2022) (Kenya Digital Master Plan, 2022 – 2032 < https://cms.icta.go.ke/sites/default/files/2022-04/Kenya%20Digital%20Masterplan%202022-2032%20Online%20Version.pdf > (Ict.go.ke) Accessed on 10th September, 2025), and Rwanda’s AI policy (Thompson Gyedu Kwarkye, ‘AI policies in Africa: lessons from Ghana and Rwanda’ (TheConversation.com, 25th April, 2025) < https://theconversation.com/ai-policies-in-africa-lessons-from-ghana-and-rwanda-253642 > Accessed on 10th September, 2025), which reflects its national security priorities. Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, Algeria and South Africa have also announced or drafted
AI policies, often framed around economic growth and innovation.
Continental initiatives, such as the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy (African Union, ‘THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY FOR AFRICA (2020-2030)’ < https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38507-doc-dts-english.pdf > Accessed on 10th September, 2025) and the World Bank’s DE4A program (< www.worldbank.org/en/programs/all-africa-digital-transformation > Accessed on 10th September, 2025), emphasize infrastructure, skills and inclusion, but implementation remains fragmented.
Still, foreign influence looms large. Many African AI and data governance frameworks are modeled directly on external templates, particularly the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (< https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/ > Accessed on 10th September, 2025). Nigeria’s NDPR (< https://nitda.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/NDPR-Implementation-Framework.pdf > Accessed on 10th September, 2025), a near copy of the GDPR, introduced concepts like consent, data subject rights and cross-border transfers. While it helped raise awareness and created local compliance industries, it omitted key protections (such as breach notifications, children’s rights and strong enforcement). Similar GDPR-inspired laws have been enacted in Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. This copy-paste strategy provides structure but often lacks localization, leaving gaps in enforcement and contextual fit (Bolu Abiodun ‘Africa’s AI policy: Why a copy and paste approach will fail this time’ (Techpoint.Africa, 22nd July, 2025) < https://techpoint.africa/insight/africas-ai-policy-copy-paste/ > Accessed on 10th September, 2025).
Critics warn that the real problem is not copying but exclusion. As Mozilla’s Kiito Shilongo and other researchers argue, many African AI policies are drafted with heavy input from foreign agencies and consultants, while local communities, startups, and civil society are sidelined. This participatory deficit means policies risk reflecting donor interests more than citizens’ rights. In Rwanda, for example, AI policy was shaped through government agencies and international NGOs with a strong focus on security. Ghana’s was more inclusive, involving startups, academia and telecoms, but leaned toward development goals over safety. Both approaches highlight the political nature of AI policymaking and the different ways foreign partnerships shape outcomes.
DANGERS OF WEAK LOCALIZATION
The consequences of weak localization are serious. AI systems trained abroad often misidentify African faces, misinterpret African languages, and replicate systemic biases, raising concerns about discrimination and digital rights. Yet, while African AI strategies often mention ethics and human rights, we lack the institutions and consultation processes such as the six-month public consultations typical in the EU that make such commitments enforceable. As Shilongo notes, perhaps Africa should copy less of the content of Western frameworks and more of the participatory processes that make them legitimate.
In short, Africa’s AI policy moment reflects both progress and peril: policies are emerging, but without deeper local ownership, institutional capacity and participatory design, we risk entrenching dependency rather than building sovereignty.
DISPROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ON AFRICAN INNOVATION ECOSYSTEMS – REAL LIFE EXAMPLES
The critique of foreign dominance in Africa’s digital space is best illustrated through concrete examples that reveal how global technology companies shape local innovation ecosystems, often in ways that mirror older colonial patterns of extraction and dependency.
Language exclusion: Africa is home to over 2,000 languages (https://alp.fas.harvard.edu/introduction-african-languages > Accessed on 16th September, 2025), around one-third of the world’s total, yet, as of May 2024, Apple’s Siri, Google Assistant and Amazon’s Alexa collectively support none of them. This linguistic exclusion reinforces dependency on foreign platforms while marginalizing African cultures in the digital sphere.
Exploited labour: In 2019, South African graduate Daniel Motaung began work as a content moderator for Sama, a subcontractor for Facebook. Relocated to Kenya, he earned $2.20 per hour to review traumatic content described by colleagues as “mental torture”. When Motaung and others attempted to unionize, he was dismissed and later sued Sama and Facebook for union-busting and exploitation. This case underscores how “responsible outsourcing” in Africa often conceals exploitative labor practices.
Resource extraction: The Democratic Republic of Congo holds nearly half of the world’s known cobalt reserves, vital for powering smartphones and electric cars. In Kolwesi alone, thousands of children reportedly mine cobalt under dangerous conditions, while profits flow largely abroad. Much like colonial resource extraction, Africa provides the raw materials that power global digital economies but sees little local benefit.
Surveillance and bias: In Johannesburg, Vumacam has deployed more than 5,000 CCTV cameras integrated with AI analytics for private security firms. Activists warn that this reliance on facial recognition, already proven to misidentify darker-skinned faces at disproportionately high rates entrenches South Africa’s long history of racialized surveillance. Foreign-designed technologies thus risk reinforcing systemic inequalities under the guise of safety.
Connectivity myths: Mark Zuckerberg’s Internet.org initiative (launched in 2013) was marketed as a philanthropic effort to connect the unconnected. Projects like Free Basics promised free access to online services in over 60 countries. Yet leaked documents revealed that millions of Global South users were secretly charged for “free” data, generating nearly $100 million in 2021 alone. Framed as altruism, these projects extended Facebook’s market reach while extracting revenue from vulnerable populations.
Taken together, these examples reveal how global technology firms, mostly U.S.-based, operate in Africa with strategies that echo colonial logics. They build critical infrastructures (clouds, platforms, connectivity) aligned with their own commercial interests, entrench market monopolies and rely on low-wage labour or raw resource extraction with little local reinvestment. Their technologies often embed cultural and racial biases reflective of narrow developer demographics, yet are exported globally under the banner of “progress,” “development,” or “connecting people.”
As Western jurisdictions strengthen data protection and AI regulation, African countries often remain vulnerable due to weaker frameworks and limited enforcement capacity. This asymmetry creates fertile ground for digital colonialism; a modern-day “Scramble for Africa” where foreign firms extract and control data much like colonial powers once extracted minerals (Danielle Coleman, ‘Digital Colonialism: The 21st Century Scramble for Africa Through Extraction and Control of User Data and the Limitations of Data Protection Laws’ (Law.Umich.Edu) < https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol24/iss2/6/ > Accessed on 16th September, 2025). Under the guise of innovation, these companies wield disproportionate influence over African AI and digital ecosystems, shaping policy choices, technical architectures, and even societal norms, while leaving Africa in a position of dependency rather than empowerment.
THE ISSUES GENERATED BY AI POLICY
While global AI policy is advancing through risk-based regulation, ethical standards, and participatory governance, Africa’s AI landscape remains fragmented, heavily modeled on external frameworks, and vulnerable to digital dependency. The disproportionate power of foreign technology companies manifested in many ways including linguistic exclusion, exploitative labour, resource extraction, biased surveillance and deceptive connectivity projects echoes colonial logics of extraction and control. Without decisive intervention, the continent risks entrenching digital colonialism, a new form of dependency in which policy choices, infrastructures and innovation ecosystems are shaped externally, undermining both democratic values and long-term development.
WHAT AFRICAN STATES MUST DO
To avoid replicating historical asymmetries in digital form, African states must assert sovereignty over their AI policies, data governance and digital infrastructures. This requires moving beyond passive adoption toward active regulatory design, investment in local infrastructure (such as data centers, compute resources and research capacity) and strengthening institutional oversight with technically competent regulators. Equally critical is the creation of participatory policy processes that center human rights, economic development, and indigenous innovation. Only by combining legal safeguards, domestic capacity, and strategic partnerships built on equality, not dependence, can Africa transform digital technologies into engines of genuine development rather than renewed extraction.
THE NIGERIAN EXAMPLE: DATA SOVEREIGNTY OR DATA SURRENDER
With the rapid expansion of national digital infrastructure across Nigeria, a far more pressing issue has risen to the fore: the question of who truly owns and governs the data that powers this infrastructure. As digital systems increasingly underpin the delivery of public services, financial transactions, education platforms, health records, and national security functions, data becomes not only a technical asset but a core element of state power. Data sovereignty means that data generated within a country’s borders is governed by that nation’s laws and regulatory frameworks; this ensures local control over data access, storage, and usage (Folashadé Soulé, ‘Digital Sovereignty in Africa: Moving beyond Local Data Ownership’ CIGI (2024) <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/digital-sovereignty-in-africa-moving-beyond-local-data-ownership/> Accessed on the 14th of June, 2025.). It has become a critical aspect of national policy and governance. In Nigeria, this issue has grown increasingly complex, particularly in light of the pervasive presence of foreign cloud providers, offshore data processors, and international technology firms that collect, process, and sometimes export Nigerian user data without clear or enforceable jurisdictional frameworks.
Foreign digital platforms have historically played a central role in the Nigerian data ecosystem either as providers of essential services like email, storage, and analytics, or as developers of social media and financial applications used daily by millions of Nigerians (Fola Odufuwa et al., ‘Digital Technology Adoption by Microenterprises: Nigeria Report’ (2024) <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/383202125_Digital_Technology_Adoption_by_Microenterprises_Nigeria_Report> Accessed on the 14th of June, 2025.). While these platforms often promise global connectivity and technical sophistication, they also introduce serious risks. Data generated within Nigeria is frequently routed through foreign servers, stored in jurisdictions with significantly different privacy protections, and subjected to external political and commercial interests (Patrick Aloamaka, ‘DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA: LESSONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ UCC Law Journal (2023) 3 (1).). This dislocation of Nigerian data is what scholars term extraterritorial data flow which raises serious questions about control, privacy, and national security. The potential misuse of this data, whether for commercial exploitation, surveillance, or even geopolitical leverage, makes the issue of domestic data governance all the more urgent. (To be continued).
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
“Over time I think we will probably see a closer merger of biological intelligence and digital intelligence”. (Elon Musk).
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