By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

Introduction

The immediate past Chief Justice of Nigeria (Hon. Justice Ariwoola) ought to be remembered for the parting gift of sorts which he handed to the court, lawyers and litigants in the form of the Supreme Court Rules, 2024. Enacted on the eve of his departure in September 2024, the rules have been broadly welcomed by stakeholders for harmonizing the disparate rules of practice and procedure applicable in that court (the last iteration of the rule, in 1985 and the sundry practice directions which have been added to it since then) into what is hopefully a harmonious whole. Is that hope misplaced or is it deserved? Are the rules (or any of their provisions) problematic, anomalous or even out rightly ultra vires (and therefore invalid) vis-a-vis relevant standards and norms such as the Constitution, the Legal Practitioners Act and the African Charter on Human & Peoples rights? Let us find out, but first, the usual preliminaries.

Practice And Procedure of The Supreme Court Of Nigeria

By virtue of section 236 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice of Nigeria is empowered to make rules of practice and procedure applicable in the Supreme Court. Those powers and however not at large, but are to be exercised subject to the provisions any Act of the National Assembly. That statute is the Supreme Court Act, section 9 of which provides that “subject to the provision of any other enactment, the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court shall be in accordance with this Act and rules of
court.”

What Difference Do The New Rules Make?

As previously noted, the new Supreme Court rules (SCR) have been broadly welcomed by all and sundry, given the public’s perception that they introduced innovations to the court’s justice delivery tool-kit. As ever, however, the devil is in the detail and we shall see to what extent, if any, the rules live up to the hype. In this regard, I believe at least three of the supposed innovations of the rules give room for not a little concern. I am referring here to the provisions dealing with costs, right of audience, conditions for prosecuting appeals and restrictions within the exercise of such rights by a party. We take them seriatim.

Costs

The new Rules provide that not only will counsel who supposedly engage in abuse of court process be penalized with punitive costs to be paid personally by such counsel (including those acting for state/federal governments and public institutions), any counsel who defaults in making such payments will not have the right of audience in any superior court in Nigeria. I believe this is problematic for at least two reasons. To start with, the right to counsel of one’s choice- in criminal cases- is a fundamental right under section 36(6)(c) of the constitution. To that extent, it is clear that to deny a suspect or accused person of that right on the ground that the counsel is in default of certain costs awarded against him would violate this constitutional right (which, by the way, is also guaranteed under Article 7 of the African (charter).

Beyond that, however, the Legal Practitioners Act also provides (in section S thereof) that a legal practitioner shall have the right of audience in all courts of law in Nigeria. That right is subject to only one condition under the Act: payment of annual practicing fee by such legal practitioners. The Act is silent on any default by a legal practitioner to pay costs as a ground for denying him audience in court: expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the express mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of others, which might
otherwise be included. See ATT-GEN. OF THE FEDERATION v
ABUBAKAR (2007) ALL FWLR pt. 375 pg.405 @553B

Right of Audience

Yet another problematic provision of the rules is the one which limits the number of Counsel appearing in any given case before the apex court. Under the new rules, this is pegged at 6, including a senior advocate where there are more than one Senior Advocate, the number of Counsel is pegged at a maximum of 8. I believe this is an undue fetter on a party’s right to Counsel of his or her choice, which, criminal cases, is a fundamental right. No rule of court can abridge or curtail a fundamental right under the Constitution or the African Charter.

Not even an Act of the National Assembly. The Constitution is supreme and, next to it, is the African Charter. See ABACHA V FAWEHINMI (2000) 6 NWLR pt.660 pg.228 @315 and IGP v ANPP (2007) 18 NWLR pt. 1066 pg. 457@500C.

Furthermore, however, this particular provision of the new rules is too sweeping as it extends beyond the Supreme Court to all superior courts of record in Nigeria. By virtue of section 6(5) of the Constitution, such courts includes the Court>of Appeal, the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, the High Court of a States, Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT, the Sharia Court of Appeal of States, Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT and of the states. I believe it is anomalous for this provision of the new rules to purport to apply to these other courts because it is trite law rules of practice and practice enacted for one court only apply to that court and cannot apply to that court and cannot apply to other courts: See NNEJI v CHUKWU (1988) 3 NWLR pt. 81 pg. 184 @205 per Oputa, JSC. A head of court is only empowered to enact rules of procedure applicable to that court and no other: TUKUR v. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1988) 1NWLR Pt. 117 pg. 39 @50

Conditions of appeal

Another anomalous provision of the new rules, in my view, is the requirement for a prospective appellant to provide a bon d or guarantee that he will diligently prosecute the appeal. This is novel stipulation is a condition for hearing the appeal. A similar provision is the requirement of an undertaking by the appellant to pay damages to the respondent in the event that the appeal is unsuccessful. I believe that both stipulations are problematic as they impose undue fetters on the exercise of the right of appeal. The apex court has repeatedly frowned upon such restrictions on the right of access to court. See UGWU v ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR pt. 1048 pg. 367 @ 450 per Tobi JSC, where it was held as follows:
“Right of access to court is a constitutional right, which is guaranteed in the constitution, and no law… can subtract from or derogate from it or deny any person of it.” See also GLOBAL EXCELLENCE Vs DUKE (2007) 16 NWLR pt 1059 pg.22, and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples rights.

No stay of proceedings in interlocutory appeals

On the stipulation of the rules that the apex Court will never grant applications for stay of proceedings in interlocutory appeals, the apex Court appears to have departed from its long standing tradition of not denying a party “(be he the appellant or the respondent) the opportunity of being heard for fear that such attitude might cause a temporary delay in the disposal of the case.” See NNEJI v CHUKWU, supra, @ page 200, per Wali, JSC.

Such a shift in the policy of the Apex Court is worrisome because it transcends the practice and procedure of the court and impinges on the fundamental issue of access to court, fair hearing and to have one’s cause heard, all of which are implicitly recognized and guaranteed under the constitution and the African charter as aforesaid.

Elections

The provisions of the rules in election related appeals are also problematic for the simple reason that election matters being sui generis, the relevant prescriptions are to be found in the Electoral Act, 2022, specifically, section 140 thereof, which provide as follows:
“(1) The rules of procedure to be adopted for election petitions and appeals arising therefrom shall be as set out in the first schedule to this Act;
“(2) The president of the court of appeal may issue practice directions to the-
(a) Court of Appeal in respect of pre-election and post-election

(b) Election tribunal, in respect of post-election matters”

Curiously, however, the Act is silent on the Chief Justice of Nigeria.

In other words, it doesn’t confer a similar power on the CJN in respect of electoral appeals to the apex court, as it does on the President of the Court of Appeal. Whether it is deliberate or out of oversight is hard to fathom. What is clear is that, by virtue of the combined provisions of Items 22 and 68 of the Exclusive Legislative List, read along with Paragraph 2(b) or Part III of the Second Schedule to the Constitution, the National Assembly possesses the exclusive power to legislate on the practice and procedure in election-related litigation. To the extent that the Assembly has not delegated that power to the CJN in the same way as it did to the president of the Court of Appeal, the implication is that the Assembly did not intend to do so, but rather to reserve it to itself in appeals at the Supreme Court in electoral matters, on the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius aforesaid and that the provisions of the first schedule to the act have covered the field in such appeals at the apex court. The upshot of this is that the prescriptions of the new rules in electoral appeals at the apex court are ultra vires, the Hon. CJN, with the greatest respect. See ATTORNEY-GENENERAL OF ABIA STATE Vs. ATTORNEY-GENENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2002) 6 NWLR Pt. 763 pg. 264 @ 369 & 391, Per Kutigi, JSC and Uwais, CJN. Respectively. (To be continued).

Though for the week

“The Supreme Court is the last line of defense for the separation of powers and for the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution”. (Brett Kavanaugh).

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

Introduction

In Nigeria, the courts under the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Section 6, Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, (as amended) 1999), has the power to hear and enter judgment in favour of a party to the matter, who has succeeded in proving his case. For any judgment delivered by a court of competent jurisdiction to become useful, it must be enforced, otherwise, the judgment cannot be used by the party to discharge the reliefs sought in the judgment by the court. There is no doubt, that the age long law is that a judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction subsists until upset or sit aside on appeal. See NCC v. MOTOPHONE LTD & ANOR (2019) LPELR – 47401 (SC). This article shall focus on the role of the Courts in Nigeria, in the enforcement or execution of judgments delivered by the courts in Nigeria.

Therefore, in reviewing the role of the courts in the enforcement of judgement in Nigeria, we shall also review what courts and enforcement really mean, the types of judgments that is enforceable under Nigeria jurisprudence, the challenges encountered by courts in the enforcement of judgments, if any, and when a judgment is said to be fully and legally enforced or executed by a party to the judgment, through the courts.

What Is A Court?

A Court simply put is a forum, place or building where persons or corporate bodies litigants who have a dispute come to state facts and adduce evidence to prove their individual cases or allegations at trials. A court is constituted and established often by government as an adjudicating body or institution, with authority to decide legal disputes between and amongst disputants and running and managing the processes of justice in criminal and civil courts and adhering to the rule of law, equity and natural justice. The presiding person or groups of persons of these courts are usually called Magistrates, Judges, Justices and or Chairmen of Tribunals, which also serve as special courts.

There are various types of courts established under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [as Amended] 2011, [CFRN], from the Supreme Court of Nigeria (being the highest court of record) to customary courts.

Functions of Courts

The courts function as temples of justice, equity and natural law. The courts in Nigeria have many functions, including but not limited to the following:

1. Interpreting the law: The Courts interprets the Constitution and other laws, statutes and case law.

2. Protecting rights: The courts define citizens’ rights and protect vulnerable groups.

3. Resolving disputes: The courts settle disputes between parties through the application of rules and procedures.

4. Adjudicating: The courts determine guilt and administer punishment to those who have breached the law.

5. Guarding the Constitution: The courts are the guardians of the Constitution other laws, statutes and case law and upholds the rule of law.

6. Ensuring access to justice: The courts ensure that judicial services are accessible to everyone.

7. Upholding the rule of law: The courts protect and preserve the rule of law and ensures that laws are in accordance with the constitution and other higher laws.

8. Respecting human rights: The courts respect human rights and follows principles of fairness, equality, impartiality, legality and natural justice.

9. Delivering effective remedies: The courts deliver effective remedies and exercise their remit with the highest level of integrity.

10. Functions imposed by Statute Law: The courts exercises the role imposed by statutes, laws and the inherent powers of the courts.

What Is Judgment?

The word “judgement” can be termed as a pronouncement or a decision reached by a court over a matter that is pending before it. A person who judgment is entered in his favour is called the judgment creditor. The person whom a judgment is entered against is called the judgment debtor. It will suffice to say that judgment must be entered in favour of one party and not both the Claimant and Defendant. The Supreme Court defined the word ‘judgment’ in SARAKI & ANR. V. KOTOYE (1992) LPELR – 3016 (SC) as:

“A binding, authentic, official judicial determination of the Court in respect of the claims and in an action before it.”

Furthermore, UMANAH v. ATTAH & ORS, (2006) LPELR-3356(SC), Per NIKI TOBI, JSC, in defining what a judgment of court is, held that:

“The law is elementary that a minority judgment, as the name implies, is not the judgment of the court. The judgment of the court is the majority judgment.”

There are generally two types of judgments, to wit: Declaratory judgments and Executory judgments.

Declaratory judgments

A declaratory judgment is a court ruling that defines or clarifies the rights of the parties involved in a legal dispute. It’s a binding decision that can be used to resolve disputes, but it doesn’t require the court to order any action to be taken merely proclaims, or declares the existence of a legal relationship and does not contain any order which may be enforced against the judgment debtor. Furthermore, it is correct to state that a declaratory judgment is a binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship between parties and their rights in a matter before the court.

It is a settled law that, whilst an executory judgment is capable of immediate execution, a declaratory judgment gives no such right. It merely declares the rights of the parties. The rights which it confers on the plaintiff can only become enforceable if another and subsequent judgment, albeit relying on the rights it declared, so decrees. Such a subsequent judgment conferring the power of execution is executor (See David Ogunlade v. Ezekiel Adeleye (1992) LPELR – 23040 (SC)). In such an instance, the date of enforceability will be the date of the subsequent (executory) judgment and not the earlier judgment, which is merely declaratory.

Executory Judgments

An executory judgment declares the respective rights of the parties and then proceeds to order the judgment debtor to act in a particular way, hence, it is enforceable. An executory judgment is a court order that is enforceable immediately after it is pronounced. It is also known as an enforceable judgment.

According to D.I. Efevwerhan¸ “every successful litigant desire to enjoy the fruit of his success, which is judgment.” Execution includes the process of carrying into effect the directions in a decree or judgment.

At this point, it may seem confusing for persons who are not well versed in law. However, this shall now digress to how a successful litigant can enforce a judgment against an unwilling judgment debtor.

Enforcement Of Judgment

Enforcement or execution of judgments can be defined as is defined as: “the process whereby a judgment or order of Court is enforced or given effect to according to law.”(See TUKUR v. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 592) AT 608). The execution of a judgment thus encompasses the enforcement of the various writs provided under the laws for giving effect to a judgment and the most comprehensive laws governing enforcement of judgment are the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap S6, LFN 2004 and the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules. (Ibid).

It is one thing to argue your case before a court successfully and get judgment. It is another thing for the judgment creditor to objectify the fruits of his/her judgment. Often times, aside the psychological gratification of the declaration of’ judgment in winning party’s favour, the winning party ends up with a barren trophy, and the tangible realization of the fruits of the victory becomes a mirage. It is often times resulted from either ignorance or from the tiredness of protracted trial.

Before we progress into enforcement of judgment, it is good we know the law applicable in the enforcement of judgement of Nigeria. Some of these laws are:

a. Judgment Enforcement Rules

b. The Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act

c. The 1999 Constitution

d. Foreign Judgments [Enforcement Reciprocal] Act 2004

e. Administration Criminal Justice Act 2015.

f. The Civil Procedure Rules (Federal or States) of the several courts.

There are different modes of enforcing executory Judgments, as enforcement is according to subject matter. Under enforcement of judgment, the modalities for enforcing monetary judgment are different from the modes of enforcing possessory judgments.

A) Money Judgments

Under monetary judgments, the judgment debtor is expected to pay the judgment creditor the awarded sum. This sum may be damages awarded or a debt the Judgment Debtor owed the Judgment Creditor, which may sometimes constitute the subject matter of the suit.
Modalities for Enforcement of Monetary judgments:

a. Writ of Fieri Facias

This is process is adopted by a judgment creditor in a court to levy execution against the property of the judgment debtor; whether movable or immovable. It should be noted that the property must be within the within the jurisdiction of the court where the judgment was delivered. Under the Enforcement of Judgment, it can only be issued at the expiration of three (3) days from the date of delivery of judgment (see Order IV Rule 1(2) of the Judgment Enforcement Rules).

The initial step is on the movable property of judgment debtor. However, it must be limited to the property that may be seized and exempts wearing apparel, bedding and tools and implements of the judgment debtor’s trade to the value of N10, which is unarguably inconsequential because of the devaluation of the naira (see Section 25 of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act).

Another point to note is that seized property cannot be sold until the expiration of 5 clear days from the date of seizure, unless the goods are of a perishable nature or the judgment debtor requests that they be sold in writing. Where the seized and sold property of the judgment debtor cannot settle the debt, his immovable property may be attached but, with the leave of the High Court first. However, before the said leave can be obtained from a court by the judgment creditor, he must first show sufficient proof from the funds generated by the movable property did not settle the debt and that the property he is seeking to attach actually belongs to the judgment debtor.

To be continued

Thought for the week

The Supreme Court is the last line of defense for the separation of powers and for the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. (Brett Kavanaugh).

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

In our last episode, we looked at the requirements of citizenship under the law, taking our cue from Sections 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 (Chapter III) of the Constitution which recognizes different categories of Nigerian citizenship, namely by birth, naturalisation and registration and their incidents. Today, we shall consider whether Olisa Agbakoba’s case was rightly decided and also whether a passport issued to a citizen by birth can be withdrawn or forfeited. After which we shall take a cursory look at some laws- international and Nigerian laws guiding passport seizure, retention, revocation and deprivation, consider the human and legal implications as well as provide some remedies. Read on please.

Was Agbakoba’s Case Correctly Decided?

This is the million naira question. It can be seen that the apex court in the case affirmed the prerogative of the Minister of Internal Affairs under Section 5 of the Passport (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act to suspend, withhold or revoke the passport of a Nigeria on the ground, inter alia, of national interest. I believe that, to the extent that the Supreme Court did not consider whether that provision was a valid derogation from the fundamental right to freedom of movement within parameters of Sections 41(2) and 45 of the Constitution, that decision was given somewhat per incuriam.

I submit that, that right (and its concomitant right to a passport) cannot be derogated from merely on the vague, blanket ground of ‘public interest’ (as provided under Section 5 of the Act) but rather on any one or more (if not all) the grounds specifically set out in the Constitution i.e., in the interest of defence, public or defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or for the purpose of protecting of rights and freedom of other persons. While it can be argued that those grounds are all in the public interest. I believe their specification under the Constitution is to prevent abuse and to check arbitrariness.

I believe that this view would be consistent with the contra-profremtum rule of statutory interpretation which states that any statute which seeks to deprive a person of his proprietary rights must be construed strictly against the law-maker and sympathetically in favour of the citizen whose right is at stake. Such laws should be interpreted narrowly and if their provisions are not strictly observed in any given case, they will be struck down. See FCDA V SULEI (1994)3 NWLR pt. 332 pg 257 per Ogundare, JSC, PROVOST, LACOED V EDUN (2004) LPELR- 2929 (SC) Per Tobi, JSC and THE ADMINISTRATORS & EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF GEN. SANI ABACHA V EKE-SPIFF (2009) LPELR-3152 (SC) PER Aderemi, JSC, at pg 41E-42B.

Can A Passport Issued To A Citizen By Birth Be Withdrawn Or Forfeited?

I believe this question is the most fundamental of all and is at the heart of the debate which is subject of this paper. This is because, if a person’s citizenship by birth can neither be forfeited nor taken away from him or by executive fiat, he or she ought not to be denied or deprived of the symbol of that status by the same or any other means except, of course, by personal choice (i.e., renunciation). In other words, I believe that the question is not so much about the invalidity of the provisions of Section 5(1) of the Passport (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act vis-a vis those of Sections 41 and 45 of the Constitution, (although this is crucial) but rather, of the unconstitutionality of any law which purports to empower any person whatsoever (including the president) to withhold, revoke or withdraw the passport of a citizen of Nigeria by birth on ANY GROUND other than those spelt out in section 45 of the Constitution.

The reason is simple: as stated earlier, if the President cannot deprive a citizen by Birth of his or her citizenship (as he can do in respect of citizens by naturalisation or registration under SECTION 30(1) AND (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION), he should not possess the power to withdraw or withhold the pre-eminent symbol of that status: his passport. If the President, as the CEO of the country (under Section 130 (3) of the Constitution) cannot do that, I believe that neither should any of his subordinates or even appointees (such as the Minister of Internal Affairs) in the manner in which Section 5(1) of the Passport (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act stipulates.
Summary

Nigerian Law

1. Constitutional Rights: The Nigerian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of movement (Section 41) and the right to a passport (Section 42).
2. Passport Act: The Passport Act (1961) regulates passport issuance, revocation, and seizure.
3. Immigration Act: The Immigration Act (2015) empowers the Nigeria Immigration Service to seize and revoke passports.

International Law

1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): Article 13(2) guarantees the right to leave and return to one’s country.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): Article 12(2) protects the right to freedom of movement.
3. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Article 12(1) guarantees the right to freedom of movement.

Human Rights Implications

1. Right to Freedom of Movement: Passport seizures, retention, or revocation can restrict movement, violating this right.
2. Right to Nationality: Deprivation of a passport can lead to statelessness, violating the right to nationality.
3. Right to Family Life: Passport restrictions can separate families, violating the right to family life.
4. Right to Education and Work: Passport restrictions can limit access to education and employment opportunities.

Legal Implications

1. Administrative Justice: Passport seizures or revocation must follow due process, as outlined in the Nigerian Constitution.
2. Judicial Review: Affected individuals can seek judicial review of passport-related decisions.
3. International Obligations: Nigeria must uphold international human rights obligations, including those related to passport rights.

Remedies

1. Judicial Review: Challenge passport seizures or revocation in court.
2. Administrative Appeals: Appeal to relevant authorities, such as the Nigeria Immigration Service.
3. Human Rights Commission: File complaints with the National Human Rights Commission.
4. International Mechanisms: Petition international human rights bodies, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

Conclusion

A passport is a symbol of one’s citizenship. It is the pre-eminent marker which identifies its holder as a citizen of a particular country. While you can be a citizen without necessarily holding a passport, you cannot possess a passport unless you are citizen of a country: they are two sides of the same coin.

Our Constitution has covered the field of citizenship, vide Chapter III, Sections 25 to 32 thereof which recognises three categories of citizens by birth, by naturalisation and by registration. While the last two can be taken away by the President under the Constitution, the former cannot.

The Constitution empowers the President (vide Section 32) to make regulations prescribing matters required or necessary for effectuating or carrying out the provisions of that chapter, subject only to one condition: that any such regulation should be laid before the National Assembly. Crucially, there is no role for a Minister or any other person under the Constitution in this regard in terms of conferring or depriving a person of citizenship of Nigeria.
In other words, the Constitution has covered the field. Accordingly, to the extent that the National Assembly purports to empower the Minister of Internal Affairs to withdraw or cancel any passport issued to any person on the ground, inter alia, of public interest (vide Section 5(1) of the Passports (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act), that provision is not only otiose, it is ultra vires, invalid, null and void because it is inconsistent with the aforesaid constitutional provisions which specifically empower only the President to deprive a person of his citizenship. The mere fact that those clauses refer to ‘citizenship’ and not ‘passport’ is irrelevant; as previously submitted, the latter is but evidence of the former: you can’t have the latter without the former.

The power conferred on the Minister of Internal Affairs to revoke or withdraw passports under Section 5(1) of the Passports (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, should, ideally, be conferred on the President. This would be consistent with the spirit and letters of Chapter III of the Constitution which clearly manifests an intention by the framers of the Constitution to confer on the President absolute control of the citizenship ecosystem – including, of course, passports. As the apex court famously held in OSADEBAY V. ATTN-GEN OF BENDEL STATE (1991) 1 NWLR Pt. 169 pg. 525, S.C, per Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC, “it cannot be presumed that the framers of the Constitution intended to confer a right with one hand and to take it away with the other”

The Constitution should be construed as a whole and its makers cannot possibly intend to set the President up against his own appointee. The Minister is not a bean-stalk planted by Jack: he cannot outgrow himself. Under the Constitution, only the President can deprive a person of his or her citizenship and then only in two instances: citizenship by naturalisation and citizenship by registration. Not by birth. If otherwise, it would mean that the President’s appointee or agent- the Minister is more powerful than the President, which would not be a travesty, it would be a constitutional aberration.

Once the Constitution has covered a legislative field, no other person, body or authority is permitted to legislate in respect of same subject matter: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ABIA STATE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2002)6 NWLR PT.763 Pg 264 at 39q per Kutigi and Uwais, JSC and CJN. (The end).

Thought for the week

“As a global community, we face a choice. Do we want migration to be a source of prosperity and international solidarity, or a byword for inhumanity and social friction” (Antonio Guterres).