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The Oracle

The Oracle: A Critique of the New Supreme Court Rules and Sundry Legal Anomalies (Pt.1)

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By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

Introduction

The immediate past Chief Justice of Nigeria (Hon. Justice Ariwoola) ought to be remembered for the parting gift of sorts which he handed to the court, lawyers and litigants in the form of the Supreme Court Rules, 2024. Enacted on the eve of his departure in September 2024, the rules have been broadly welcomed by stakeholders for harmonizing the disparate rules of practice and procedure applicable in that court (the last iteration of the rule, in 1985 and the sundry practice directions which have been added to it since then) into what is hopefully a harmonious whole. Is that hope misplaced or is it deserved? Are the rules (or any of their provisions) problematic, anomalous or even out rightly ultra vires (and therefore invalid) vis-a-vis relevant standards and norms such as the Constitution, the Legal Practitioners Act and the African Charter on Human & Peoples rights? Let us find out, but first, the usual preliminaries.

Practice And Procedure of The Supreme Court Of Nigeria

By virtue of section 236 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice of Nigeria is empowered to make rules of practice and procedure applicable in the Supreme Court. Those powers and however not at large, but are to be exercised subject to the provisions any Act of the National Assembly. That statute is the Supreme Court Act, section 9 of which provides that “subject to the provision of any other enactment, the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court shall be in accordance with this Act and rules of
court.”

What Difference Do The New Rules Make?

As previously noted, the new Supreme Court rules (SCR) have been broadly welcomed by all and sundry, given the public’s perception that they introduced innovations to the court’s justice delivery tool-kit. As ever, however, the devil is in the detail and we shall see to what extent, if any, the rules live up to the hype. In this regard, I believe at least three of the supposed innovations of the rules give room for not a little concern. I am referring here to the provisions dealing with costs, right of audience, conditions for prosecuting appeals and restrictions within the exercise of such rights by a party. We take them seriatim.

Costs

The new Rules provide that not only will counsel who supposedly engage in abuse of court process be penalized with punitive costs to be paid personally by such counsel (including those acting for state/federal governments and public institutions), any counsel who defaults in making such payments will not have the right of audience in any superior court in Nigeria. I believe this is problematic for at least two reasons. To start with, the right to counsel of one’s choice- in criminal cases- is a fundamental right under section 36(6)(c) of the constitution. To that extent, it is clear that to deny a suspect or accused person of that right on the ground that the counsel is in default of certain costs awarded against him would violate this constitutional right (which, by the way, is also guaranteed under Article 7 of the African (charter).

Beyond that, however, the Legal Practitioners Act also provides (in section S thereof) that a legal practitioner shall have the right of audience in all courts of law in Nigeria. That right is subject to only one condition under the Act: payment of annual practicing fee by such legal practitioners. The Act is silent on any default by a legal practitioner to pay costs as a ground for denying him audience in court: expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the express mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of others, which might
otherwise be included. See ATT-GEN. OF THE FEDERATION v
ABUBAKAR (2007) ALL FWLR pt. 375 pg.405 @553B

Right of Audience

Yet another problematic provision of the rules is the one which limits the number of Counsel appearing in any given case before the apex court. Under the new rules, this is pegged at 6, including a senior advocate where there are more than one Senior Advocate, the number of Counsel is pegged at a maximum of 8. I believe this is an undue fetter on a party’s right to Counsel of his or her choice, which, criminal cases, is a fundamental right. No rule of court can abridge or curtail a fundamental right under the Constitution or the African Charter.

Not even an Act of the National Assembly. The Constitution is supreme and, next to it, is the African Charter. See ABACHA V FAWEHINMI (2000) 6 NWLR pt.660 pg.228 @315 and IGP v ANPP (2007) 18 NWLR pt. 1066 pg. 457@500C.

Furthermore, however, this particular provision of the new rules is too sweeping as it extends beyond the Supreme Court to all superior courts of record in Nigeria. By virtue of section 6(5) of the Constitution, such courts includes the Court>of Appeal, the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, the High Court of a States, Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT, the Sharia Court of Appeal of States, Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT and of the states. I believe it is anomalous for this provision of the new rules to purport to apply to these other courts because it is trite law rules of practice and practice enacted for one court only apply to that court and cannot apply to that court and cannot apply to other courts: See NNEJI v CHUKWU (1988) 3 NWLR pt. 81 pg. 184 @205 per Oputa, JSC. A head of court is only empowered to enact rules of procedure applicable to that court and no other: TUKUR v. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1988) 1NWLR Pt. 117 pg. 39 @50

Conditions of appeal

Another anomalous provision of the new rules, in my view, is the requirement for a prospective appellant to provide a bon d or guarantee that he will diligently prosecute the appeal. This is novel stipulation is a condition for hearing the appeal. A similar provision is the requirement of an undertaking by the appellant to pay damages to the respondent in the event that the appeal is unsuccessful. I believe that both stipulations are problematic as they impose undue fetters on the exercise of the right of appeal. The apex court has repeatedly frowned upon such restrictions on the right of access to court. See UGWU v ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR pt. 1048 pg. 367 @ 450 per Tobi JSC, where it was held as follows:
“Right of access to court is a constitutional right, which is guaranteed in the constitution, and no law… can subtract from or derogate from it or deny any person of it.” See also GLOBAL EXCELLENCE Vs DUKE (2007) 16 NWLR pt 1059 pg.22, and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples rights.

No stay of proceedings in interlocutory appeals

On the stipulation of the rules that the apex Court will never grant applications for stay of proceedings in interlocutory appeals, the apex Court appears to have departed from its long standing tradition of not denying a party “(be he the appellant or the respondent) the opportunity of being heard for fear that such attitude might cause a temporary delay in the disposal of the case.” See NNEJI v CHUKWU, supra, @ page 200, per Wali, JSC.

Such a shift in the policy of the Apex Court is worrisome because it transcends the practice and procedure of the court and impinges on the fundamental issue of access to court, fair hearing and to have one’s cause heard, all of which are implicitly recognized and guaranteed under the constitution and the African charter as aforesaid.

Elections

The provisions of the rules in election related appeals are also problematic for the simple reason that election matters being sui generis, the relevant prescriptions are to be found in the Electoral Act, 2022, specifically, section 140 thereof, which provide as follows:
“(1) The rules of procedure to be adopted for election petitions and appeals arising therefrom shall be as set out in the first schedule to this Act;
“(2) The president of the court of appeal may issue practice directions to the-
(a) Court of Appeal in respect of pre-election and post-election

(b) Election tribunal, in respect of post-election matters”

Curiously, however, the Act is silent on the Chief Justice of Nigeria.

In other words, it doesn’t confer a similar power on the CJN in respect of electoral appeals to the apex court, as it does on the President of the Court of Appeal. Whether it is deliberate or out of oversight is hard to fathom. What is clear is that, by virtue of the combined provisions of Items 22 and 68 of the Exclusive Legislative List, read along with Paragraph 2(b) or Part III of the Second Schedule to the Constitution, the National Assembly possesses the exclusive power to legislate on the practice and procedure in election-related litigation. To the extent that the Assembly has not delegated that power to the CJN in the same way as it did to the president of the Court of Appeal, the implication is that the Assembly did not intend to do so, but rather to reserve it to itself in appeals at the Supreme Court in electoral matters, on the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius aforesaid and that the provisions of the first schedule to the act have covered the field in such appeals at the apex court. The upshot of this is that the prescriptions of the new rules in electoral appeals at the apex court are ultra vires, the Hon. CJN, with the greatest respect. See ATTORNEY-GENENERAL OF ABIA STATE Vs. ATTORNEY-GENENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2002) 6 NWLR Pt. 763 pg. 264 @ 369 & 391, Per Kutigi, JSC and Uwais, CJN. Respectively. (To be continued).

Though for the week

“The Supreme Court is the last line of defense for the separation of powers and for the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution”. (Brett Kavanaugh).

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The Oracle

The Oracle: The Independence of the Judiciary in a Democratic Dispensation (Pt. 3)

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By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

Introduction

Another public outrage attended the ex parte order granted by a Lagos High Court against the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) restraining it from calling out workers on a planned nationwide strike to protest the hike in price of petroleum products by the Federal Government.  An Abuja High Court had refused the application because there was no genuine case of urgency. The Federal Government went down to Lagos and surprisingly a Lagos High Court, which had co-ordinate jurisdiction with the Abuja High Court granted the order.  The NLC president, Adams Oshiomhole  had to tell the whole world that the order was not binding on the NLC as it was obtained from the “Black market”.  The strike went on as planned and the image of the Judiciary was worse off and its independence seriously put in question.

Another controversial ex-parte order was that made by a judge in the Abuja Division of the Federal High Court restraining the governor of Anambra State Dr. Chris  Ngige from parading himself as governor. The order (which, apart from the questionability of the perceived extreme urgency attending it) could not be reconciled with the state of immunity enjoyed by the governor under the Constitution. The governor had to borrow the “Black market” appellation from Oshiomhole.  Even more  controversial and outrageous ex parte orders were dished out by the same court on the Anambra crisis alone.

At the heart of the issue of abuse of ex parte orders (especially in political issues) is the attendant erosion of public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the Judiciary.   The ugly implications were rightly summed up by a writer as follows:

“In these instances of judicial recklessness, there was always the palpable belief that unseen hands moved the court to issue such controversial ex parte orders.  That is the meaning of the ‘black market’ reference made by Oshiomhole and Ngige.  None of them was prepared to obey a ‘black market’ order obtained outside the ‘official market’! They never obeyed and nothing happened!

Abuse of ex parte injunction aside from the grave implications it has on the independence of the Judiciary, is also capable of wide scale socio-political disaster as was the case with the annulment of the June 12 Presidential Election.  The Judiciary set the key note of the disaster that followed when an Abuja High Court presided over the late Hon. Justice Bassey Ikpeme made an ex parte order restraining the conduct of the presidential election.

In the popular case of Kotoye V C. B. N 24 the Supreme Court settled the principles governing the grant of ex parte injunctions. Principally, the order can be made,

  • When there is a real urgency but not a self-induced or self-imposed urgency.
  • Where it is necessary to preserve the res which is in danger or imminent danger of being destroyed, and
  • Where there is a real impossibility of bringing the application for such injunction on notice and serving the other party.

When these factors are inapplicable, a wise judge that imbibed good judicial milk would exercise his/her discretion by turning down the application and asking the applicant to put the respondent on notice.  The institution has always stood against the menace of this abuse over the years.  The former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Hon.  Justice Mohammed Bello once bemoaned,

“indeed, there is urgent need among some of us, the judges, to appreciate that ex parte injunction which was devised as a vehicle for the carriage of instant justice in proper cases should not be converted into a bulldozer for the  demolition of substantial justice, we should all realize that justice should be done to public functionaries and public institutions.

It has also been reiterated that lawyers equally have a role to play in the war against abuse of ex parte injunction.  In this direction, the Hon. Justice C. P.N. Selong opined thus:

“In as much as the speech of the learned Chief Justice was directed at judges, I beg to opine that the same caution should apply to legal practitioners, after all both judges and legal practitioners are Ministers in the Temple of Justice.  It is my humble view that an honest lawyer who abides by the ethics of the profession should not bring an application which is manifestly unjust”.

The need for restraint from both the Bench and the Bar on the issue was reiterated at the Annual Bar Conference, Enugu by the then Chief Justice of Nigeria, Honourable Justice Mohammadu L. Uwais, who counseled thus:

“I think it is not out of place to appeal to legal practitioners at large to exercise more restraint in and desist from advising their clients to bring absurd applications to court for ex parte injunctions.  You will agree with me that unless such applications are brought, the inconsiderate and reckless judges amongst us will not find the opportunity to embarrass the judiciary and the profession in general’’.

It must be noted, that it is not in all cases where a judge grants an order perceived to be wrong that an actual case of influence arises.  However, the perception of the public about justice is important – whether such perception is rightly or wrongly placed.  This is because the standard of justice has always been objective:  based on the notion of the reasonable man.  Justice must not just be done, but manifestly be seen to be done.  As one writer aptly put it:

“The role of the Judiciary in maintaining socio-political order cannot be compromised and once the citizen believes that somebody, other than the law and his judicial conscience, tells the judge what to say or do, then, the dangers of a system break down and institutional failure becomes real”.

Accordingly, the resolve of the National Judicial Council (NJC) to henceforth deal with judges who grant ex parte orders with recklessness cannot but be supported and encouraged.  Charity begins at home.  The filthy Augean stable must be cleansed.

We have concentrated on the issue of in-house cleaning by the Judiciary itself because we realize that the most ready and devastating blow to the independence of the Judiciary in the mind of the public is usually struck by the inability of some of the judges themselves to conduct the affairs of the Bench so judicially and judiciously as to inspire public confidence in their independence from external influence. Even some lawyers themselves fall into the league of those members of the public who doubt the independence of the Judiciary on the ground of questionable judicial orders.  In this regard, Uche Onyegorocha, a lawyer and member of the House of Representatives while responding to a question from the press on the unpopular pronouncements of a Federal High Court judge, said:

“I see undue influence in the whole process.  I see a person that is not acting independently.  Like I said earlier I see people playing the drum for him in the bush and he is dancing on the street”.

But beyond the question of conduct of the members of the Bench in handling cases brought before them are more technical and political issues of political, economic/fiscal and intellectual independence. These we shall presently address.

POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

The Judiciary ought to be apolitical in a democratic dispensation to safeguard its independence.  Accordingly, judges should not only be free from political affiliation, but the system should be organized in such a manner as to ensure that a judge does not give a decision biased in favour of a political party, especially the ruling party.  Accordingly, Nwabueze identified two forms of judicial involvement in politics (i.e organized politics) as:

  • decisions biased in favour of a ruling party, and
  • judicial membership of political parties.

It is submitted that Nigeria’s adoption of multiparty democracy is healthy for the protection of the ‘political independence’ of the Judiciary.  The term ‘political independence’ should be understood to mean the freedom of the Judiciary from having any form of political influence exerted ion it as to undermine its independence from any individual, group or another arm of government.  Nigeria should strive to refuse any attempt to reduce the country into a one-party democracy since the political independence of the Judiciary would obviously be difficult to be achieved therein. The concept of an apolitical judge is utopian in a one-party system.  According to Mr. Justice Georges, a former Chief Justice of Tanzania,

“The concept of the judge as neutral, belonging to no party in the multiparty democracy, can have no meaning …. Where there is one party”.

It has been argued that the involvement of the Executive in the appointment of Judges undermines the imperatives for the freedom of the Judiciary from political influence.  It is however, our view that the system of appointment under the Constitution is the best we can have at present. If more caution is employed in the appointment of judges, no problem of want of independence would be posed by the appointment method.  Nigeria is not yet ripe for election of judges or else the system would be thoroughly polluted by politics.  (We shall look at the issue of appointment of judges subsequently).

Indications that a cross section of Nigerians believe that a section of the Judiciary might have compromised their judicial oath can be gleaned from this passage from a major national daily:

“The Chief Justice of the Federation, from indications, prefers his colleagues to stand above the fray of Nigeria’s turbulent political process.  This position may have been informed by the ignominious role played by the judiciary in the country’s chequered political history.  But despite the goodwill enjoyed by the judiciary due to a mature handling of suits, that sought to stop the recent general elections, the (sic) a section of the bench may have unwittingly placed this third arm of government in the dock”. (To be continued).

Thought for the Week

“We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and the judiciary is the safeguard of our property and our liberty and our property under the Constitution” – Charles Evans Hughes

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The Oracle

The Oracle: The Independence of the Judiciary in a Democratic Dispensation (Pt. 2)

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By Prof Mike Ozekhome

Introduction

Last week we commenced this series with some operational definitions, today we shall continue and conclude on the definitions and take a critical look at some cases – their good parts, deficiencies and worst case scenarios. Read on. 

Definition of Terms (continues)

During the colonial and military regimes, the Executive always attempted to undermine the Judiciary, erode its independence and powers of coercion and have a field day with illegality and impunity.  On those occasions, the Judiciary always stood up courageously to uphold the rule of law.  In Eshugbayi Eleko Vs. Government of Nigeria the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever the deportation of the Oba of Lagos from his domain to an entirely different part of Nigeria on the ground, inter alia, that the Governor had no such power inspite of the fact that the Governor was then vested with both executive and legislative powers. It held:

“No member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice.”

In Lakanmi & Another Vs. A-G, Western State, the Supreme Court courageously declared null and void Edict No. 5 of 1967 promulgated by the Western State Government and Decree No, 48 and 45 of 1968 promulgated by the Federal Military Government, on the ground that they were ad hominem legislations.  The legislations dealt with forfeiture of assets.  The Supreme Court held that the 1963 Constitution clearly provided for separation of powers between the Judicial and the Executive and that Decree No. 45 of 1968 was a clear usurpation of the Judicial powers of the courts.  Chief Rotimi Williams has then argued that the Decree which named specific people and confiscated their property were ad hominem and unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court held that the legislations amounted to judicial rather than legislative acts and struck them down.  In reply, the Federal Military Government of General Yakubu Gown promulgated Decree No. 28 of 1970 to undermine the Judiciary.  The Decree was audacious and even brutal in its title:  “The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers Decree No. 28 of 1970.”  The Decree restated the sacredness and unquestionability of any Decree or Edict promulgated or purported to be promulgated by the military government.  But the Adetokunbo Ademola-led Supreme Court at the time was not intimidated.

In Governor of Lagos State Vs. Ojukwu Kayode Eso,JSC emphatically declared that:

“Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, the Executive, the Legislature (while it lasts) and the Judiciary are equal partners in the running of a successful government. The powers granted by the constitution to these organs by Section 4 (Legislative Powers), Section 5 (Executive Powers) and  Section 6  (Judicial Powers) are classified under an omnibus umbrella  known under part II to the Constitution as Powers of the Federal  Republic of Nigeria’. The organs wield those powers and one must never exist in sabotage of the other or else there is chaos, Indeed there will be no federal government. I think, for one organ, and more especially the Executive, which holds all the physical powers, to put up itself in sabotage or deliberate contempt of the other is to stage  an executive subversion of the constitution it is to uphold. Executive lawlessness tantamount to a deliberate violation of the constitution.”

There are many  cases decided during the military era and under democratic environment that underscore the relentless efforts by other arms  of government, especially the Executive to erode  the independence and vibrancy of the Judiciary as a way  of expanding their own frontiers of influence, unquesitonability and impunity.

Since the Executive has considerable (if not total) influence over the wealth of the State and over the appointment of Judges, it continuously seeks to make the Judiciary dependent by starving it of funds and by influencing the enthronement of mediocrity  on the Bench.  Issues in independence of the Judiciary may thus be broadly classified into three, viz, political independence, economic independence and intellectual independence.  Before looking at these issues in detail, we may take a look at the face of Nigeria’s Judiciary so that the issues can simultaneously be matched with the ease.

The Case (The Good, The Bad, The Ugly)

“Since I made the order of the remand of the accused person last Thursday and up till about 10 minuets before I sat this morning, I have been under untold pressure and threat from many quarters urging me to arrive at a particular decision ever before I listen to the accused.  Let me make it that as a Muslin, the teaching of my religion is clear about death being  the ultimate.  I am therefore not bothered about any such threat.  I am, however, worried about the untold pressure coming, as it were, from unexpected quarters…  To continue with this case will…..be a breach of the solemn pledge I made when I became a judge (i.e) to administer justice without fear or favour and without ill-will or affection.  In view of the foregoing, I hereby remit this case file to the honourable chief judge for re-assignment to another judge.”

In this way,  Honourable Justice Mashood Abass of the Oyo State High Court washed his hands off, like Pontius Pilate, of the trial of Otunba Iyiola Omisore and other accused persons standing trial for the murder of Late Chief Bola Ige, SAN (Slain Attorney-general of the Federation).  After the controversial withdrawal of the judge, allegations of undue pressure, bribery, arm-twisting tactics, threats and promises directed against the judge inundated the media.

Before, the breaking of this unpalatable story, a sordid allegation of bribery had been trailing the Election Tribunal that sat in Akwa Ibom State over the petition of Dr. Imeh Umanah, against the election of the then incumbent governor, Obong Victor Attah.

In Enugu State, matters came to a head when an Election Tribunal had to relocate to Abuja to complete its job after alleging that Enugu State was no longer safe for its honourable members.  These are bad times for the Judiciary!.

But in Anambra State,  the State Chief Judge, Honourable Justice C. J. Okoli proved to be a pride of the Judiciary when he smartly ‘made himself unavailable’ during the July 10, 2003 abduction of the governor of Anambra State,  Dr. Chris Ngige by his political enemies.  The House of Assembly had passed a motion asking the Chief Judge to swear in the Deputy Governor as incumbent governor, but the Chief Judge was not available to carry out the resolution.  By that act, his lordship saved the Judiciary from being enmeshed in the dirty politics of the state, which almost consumed the other arms of government.

More than any other factor, the abuse of ex-parte injunction by some judges has immensely contributed to the erosion of public confidence in the Judiciary under this democratic dispensation.  Most of the ex parte orders granted under controversial circumstances involved situations where the Executive was either the direct beneficiary or had an interest which the public believed (rightly or wrongly) the Judiciary merely ‘co-operated’ to protect.  This perception is a dangerous omen for independence of the Judiciary, because the Justice must not only be done but must be manifestly seen to have been done.

During this democratic dispensation, an Abuja High Court granted an ex parte order stopping the national convention which of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) when preparation for the convention had already gulped millions of naira and party members had already converged at the venue in Abuja.  Most Nigerians did not believe that the Judge was not acting in the interest of the rival ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) given the controversial and damaging circumstances under which the order was made.  The resulting outrage cost the judge his job.

Another, Abuja High Court made an order restraining the National Assembly from further deliberating on a bill before it to amend the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000.  The Executive was interested in killing the bill. The order was made in defiance of the trite principle of the doctrine of separation of powers which precludes the courts from assuming jurisdiction over a bill that has not become law.  In articulating the position of the Court of Appeal on the question of Judicial interference in the law making process purportedly under section 4(8) of the 1999 Constitution, Hon. Justice Mamman Nasir, P. said:

“though the courts have been given very wide powers under the subsection, the intention is not to authorize the Judiciary to interfere with the legitimate exercise of the powers of the legislature or the procedure to be followed in such exercise at power given to the courts comes into action after the legislature has enacted the law…”.

A similar controversy trailed the ex parte order given by the same Abuja Federal High Court which directed the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to issue a certificate of return to Chief Adolphus Wabara (PDP) as Senator representing the Abia South Senatorial Zone.  INEC complied (apparently reluctantly) and Wabara became the president of the senate the next day.   The source of the controversy was that INEC had earlier declared Elder Dan Imo (ANPP) as the winner of the seat.  As Ogbham-Emeka, a counsel in Mike Ozekhome’s Chambers observed about the controversy in ThisDay Law,

“The question how the Abuja Federal High Court assumed jurisdiction over the matter and how the issue became one suitable for an ex parte order raked up a lot of dust. When the dust subsided not a few people concluded that it was the court and not the electorate that gave Senator Wabara the Abia South Senatorial ‘mandate’.  But that was not to be the end of the regime of such demonstrable judicial anarchy that force litigants to choose which court order to obey and which not to obey, a situation that spells doom for a regime of law and order”. (To be continued).

Thought for the Week

“A functioning, robust democracy requires a healthy, educated, participatory followership and an educated, morally grounded leadership”. (Chinua Achebe).

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The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 4)

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By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

In our last discourse on this series, we examined the procedure for enforcement of fundamental rights, including applications for leave; as well as the substantive application itself and the reactions that follow. Today, we shall continues from where we stopped with the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto and later x-ray the applications to squash proceedings; applications for production and/or release of persons restrained; orders for bail, production and access to medication. Please read on.

SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS (Continues)

In the case of LAWRENCE OLUSEGUN ADEYEMO V. C.O.P, OYO STATE ([2021] LPELR-56272(CA)), the applicant requested the court for a writ of habeas corpus under order 2 of the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) rules 1979 which provision enjoined the applicant to serve all parties who are or might be interested in the proceedings. Although the affected party had put up appearance, but raised a preliminary objection to the application for non-compliance with the statutory conditions. Babalakin. J. (as he then was) struck out the application on the ground that order 2(1)(4) is mandatory whether the application is for mandamus, certiorari, or habeas corpus.

However the Supreme Court in recent times in respect of the fundamental rights enforcements has favourably leaned towards the equitable principle of “Ubi Jus Ubi remedium”, therefore looking more at the substance rather than the form. Hence the liberalization of the procedure for the enforcement of fundamental rights as exposed in the case of ABACHA V. FAWEHINMI ((2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228) and UBI UJONG INAH & ORS V. MARCUS UKOI ((2001) (CA) 41981.

APPLICATION TO QUASH ANY PROCEEDINGS

Sometimes it may be necessary for an applicant by way of certiorari to apply to the court for an order that such proceedings be removed from a particular court or tribunal to another court for the purpose of being quashed for lack of power and/or jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings or make such order.

However, an applicant shall not be able to question the validity of any order, warrant, commitment, conviction, inquisition or record unless before the hearing of his application (Motion or summons), he has served a certified copy (CTC) thereof together with a Copy of the application on the Attorney-General of the Federation or of the State in which the applicant is being heard (as the case may be).

The court in granting an application seeking to quash proceedings, shall direct that the order, proceedings, conviction or the records of an inquisition be quashed forthwith upon being removed into the court hearing the application.

APPLICATION FOR PRODUCTION AND/OR RELEASE OF PERSON RESTRAINED

By virtue of Order 4 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court or judge to whom the application is made ex-parte may make an order forthwith for his release from such detention.

The court may also direct that an originating summons (as in form 2) be issued or that an application therefore be made by notice of motion (as in form 3). The court may also as it deem fit adjourn the ex-parte application so that notice thereof may be given to the person against whom the order for the release of the applicant is sought.

ORDER FOR BAIL, PRODUCTION, AND ACCESS TO MEDICATION

Pursuant to order 4 of the bail application, the court upon application may grant to the detainee reliefs including bail, production of the detainee, access to mediation etc.

The court may grant bail at ex-parte stage, pending the substantive application. Where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court may subject to its discretion order that the person restrained be produced in court. And where such order is so made, it shall constitute a sufficient warrant to any superintendent of a prison, police officer in charge of a police station, police officer in charge of the complainant or any other person responsible for his detention, to produce or ensure the production of the person so restrained or detained in court.

For the purpose of enforcing a person’s fundamental rights, no matter where a detainee is kept he can be allowed access to his personal physician or medically prescribed drugs.

It suffices to note here, that once an order has been made by the court pursuant to the Enforcement Rules, and for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights provided for in the constitution, such order must be complied with. Failure to obey or comply with any order so made by the court under these rules will incur proceedings for the committal of the party disobeying such an order.

CONCLUSION

Without any controversy, the idea of human rights and personal liberties has become firm and secured. The universality and immutability of human rights are now globally accepted. Consequently, any nation that slacks or shyies away from the diligent protection and enforcement of human rights stand the precarious risk of being shunned by decent and civilised nations. The United Nations seems to have captured the importance and primacy of the issue of human rights and its protection when it poignantly stated as follows:

“Human Rights and fundamental freedoms are the birth right of all human beings, their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Government” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

It is the duty of every Government everywhere and every courts of law in every jurisdiction to promote, protect, uphold, and ensure enforcement of fundamental Human rights at all times, because these rights encapsulate the very essence of man.

The end.

THOUGHTS FOR THE WEEK

“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI.

“Because no matter who we are or where we come from, we’re all entitled to the basic human rights of clean air to breathe, clean water to drink, and healthy land to call home”. – Martin Luther King III

“Human rights are not only violated by terrorism, repression or assassination, but also by unfair economic structures that creates huge inequalities”. – Pope Francis.

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