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Opinion: Placing “Place Holders” Placeless

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By Chief Mike Ozekhome SAN, OFR, FCIArb, Ph.D, LL.D

INTRODUCTION

The APC political contraption never ceases to amaze and confound me. It intrigues me to no end. This is a party ( is it really one, going by the text book definition of a political in political Science ?) that rose from its often predicted imminent disintegration into smithereens, like a phoenix from its ashes, in a groggy, fumbling, wobbling, dawdling and near crumbling manner, to holding its first ever National Convention in March, 2022. At this swordy Convention, daggers were drawn and former two time PDP Governor and Senator, Abdullahi Adamu, was virtually crudely shoved down the already parched throats of majority of the APC members who had preferred former Nasarawa State Governor, Umaru Tanko Al-Makura as National Chairman. It was simply a triumph of a powerful minority cabal over a silent helpless majority. I had predicted this when I vigorously kicked against consensus as a substitute for direct primaries in the new Electoral Act of 2022.

THE TINUBU ABRACADABRA

The APC unsurprisingly harvested a turbulent National Primaries Convention on 9th June, 2022, where Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu valiantly shrugged off sustained attempts to muzzle him out of the presidential race through unorthodox means by a cabal believed to be working for President Muhammadu Buhari. Indeed, the “palace coup” executed by this faceless cabal headed by newly selected Adamu (they called it “election by consensus”), had told the whole world that the Senate President, Ahmed Lawan, had been anointed as the “consensus candidate”.

Tinubu, a political maestro, reached for his talismanic bag of “politricks”, fished out an abracadabra magical charm in a deft political move that led to some presidential aspirants stepping down for him right at the very venue of the Convention.

This was after the Northern APC Governors had unanimously and roundly rejected Adamu’s flown kite of “consensus” for Lawan. The NWC of the APC later completed the rejection of the Lawan farce. Tinubu later trounced Ahmed Lawan who garnered a miserable 152 votes (coming 4th position) with 1,271 winning votes. Tinubu also dusted Rotimi Amaechi (316 votes) to second position; while cerebral lawyer, Prof Yemi Osibanjo (whom many had thought taciturn and inscrutinable president Buhari would naturally hand over to, having served him with total loyalty and fidelity for 7 years), came sprawling on his belly to the third position, with a miserly 235 votes. In Nigeria, politics is politricks. It defies logic and sense.

“PLACE HOLDER” ZOOMS IN

So, APC continues to taunt us. From high-falutin and unfulfilled promises of 2015 and 2019 (robust economy; defeating boko haram and insecurity; killing corruption), the APC has now drawn us into a new era where it has introduced a new political terminology into our political lexicon and vocabulary. It is called “place holder”. Editor of Thisday Lawyer pages, daringly courageous, fecund, cerebral and intellectually-grounded writer, social critic and upscale layer, Onikepo Braithwaite (her mother is chief (Mrs) Priscilia Kuye, former NBA President; a fruit does not fall far away from the mother tree), provided us with a most apt title: “RUNNING MATE; DUMMY MATE!! This is one of the best titles I have ever seen as a journalist and writer myself. Thank you, Onikepo, for standing firm and nationalistic.

WHAT IS PLACE HOLDER?

The Free Dictionary defines “placeholder” as “One who holds an office or place, especially as a deputy, proxy, or appointed government official”.
Princeton’s Word Net sees placeholder “As a proxy, procurator; a person authorized to act for another.
Dictionary.com defines it as “something that makes or temporarily fills a place”.

A “Dummy candidate”, says Wikipedia, on the other hand (another terminology for placeholder), is a candidate who stands for election, usually with no intention or realistic chance of winning. Wikipedia is more exhaustive. It says
“a dummy candidate can serve any of the following purposes:

“In instant-runoff voting, a dummy candidate may direct preferences to other candidates in order to increase the serious candidate’s share of the vote.
“A dummy candidate may be used by a serious candidate to overcome limits on advertising or campaign financing. In India, for example there have been cases of serious candidates fielding multiple dummy candidates to distribute their poll expenses. The expenses are directed towards the campaign of the serious candidate, but shown to the election commission under the dummy candidates’ names.

“Dummy candidates with names similar to that of a more established candidate may be fielded by political parties to confuse the voters, and cut that candidate’s vote share. The dummy candidate’s name also may be deceptively similar to that of a retiring incumbent”.

THE PRESIDENT AND VP AS SIAMESE TWINS

The office of the President is an office that demands two good heads, having regard to the premium placed on the office. The Vice-President is not a substitute for the president: he is an ever-present partner, help and associate. While a person cannot occupy the office of the President in perpetuity, the office of the president remains perpetual. Every President must have a Vice-Present. The relation is like that of Siamese twins, tied together by the same umbilical cord. This is why some people have erroneously regarded a VP as a “spare tyre”. No, he is not! Can a “place holder” substitute for this?

The relationship between the President and the VP actually starts before the conduct of any election. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) (1999 Constitution) provides that:

“… a candidate for an election to the office of President shall not be deemed to be validly nominated unless he nominates another candidate as his associate from the same political party for his running for the office of President, who is to occupy the office of Vice-President and that candidate shall be deemed to have been duly elected to the office of Vice-President if the candidate for election to the office of President who nominated him as such associate is duly elected as president…”

There are at least five principles embedded in the provision above. First, every President must have a VP. Second, the validity of the nomination of a candidate for the office of the President is predicated solely on him nominating another candidate who shall serve as the VP. Third, if the nomination of a candidate to the office of the VP is provisional, the nomination of a candidate for the office of the President is provisional as well. Fourth, anything that invalidates the nomination of a candidate to the office of the VP, equally affects the candidate for the office of the President. Fifth, the candidate for the office of the President nominates the candidate for the office of the VP and is deemed to have acquiesced and agreed to be bound by any danger inherent his nominee. Sixth, the nominee and the nominator must belong to the same political party.
The nomination of a candidate for the office of the President and that of the VP is therefore joint. If the nomination of the candidate for the office of the VP is provisional, that of the President is equally provisional. It is inchoate. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. This is the first legal implication of taking a dangerous step such as this.
The intermediate court dilated on this relationship in quite an extensive manner in Atiku Abubakar v. Attorney-General, Fed. (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt 1022) 601 at 642. The Court held, Per Abdullahi, PCA, as follows:

“The President and the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are jointly elected at a general election and the relationship between them is not that of a master and servant. In other words, the vice president is not an employee of the President or of the political party on whose platform they are both elected. In the instant case, the plaintiff not being an employee of the President or the political party on whose platform he was elected, he cannot be impliedly or constructively removed by either of them. “The Vice president, not being an employee cannot be impliedly or constructively removed. Assuming he qualifies as an employee, without, for a moment so deciding, his employer would most manifestly be the people of Nigeria, who elected him to the office, acting through their representatives in the national assembly but certainly not the President of the Federal republic of Nigeria nor the sponsoring political party. This assumption is based on the cliche that the power to hire is the power to fire embedded in Section 11 of the Interpretation Act. See Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt. 260) 65. In other words, this matter is a matter that falls squarely within the contemplation of Section 143 of the Constitution which expressly provides for the removal of the President and Vice President from office.”

THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PLACING A PLACE HOLDER

At this stage, it is important, I clarify that a “candidate” for an election is different from the holder of the office of a VP. Section 152 of the Electoral Act, 2022, defines a candidate as a person who has secured the nomination of a political party to contest an election for any elective office. It is only the winning of an election that changes or translates a candidate to a VP. However, one need not be a candidate for an election before he can become a VP. This is because a VP is automatically selected as a running mate by a presidential candidate.

A political party bears the consequences of not submitting at all, or submitting an invalid candidate for an election. This is because by section 131(c) of the Constitution, a candidate for an election to the office of President must be sponsored by a political party. Section 84 (1) of the Electoral Act, 2022, states that a political party seeking to nominate candidates for elections shall organise primaries for the aspirants under the supervision of the Independent National Electoral Commission. Section 29(1) of the Electoral Act mandates every political party to submit to INEC, not later than 180 days before the date appointed for the general election, the candidates it is sponsoring in that general election. The submission of candidate to INEC constitutes a definite and unambiguous statement of the intent of the political party to have that candidate only as its representatives in the election. The nomination of a candidate and submission of his name by that political party to INEC therefore seals the sponsorship of a candidate for an election. Once the window of nomination closes, all parties become functus officio.

CAN THERE BE A SURROGATE RUNNING MATE?

Who then is a placeholder in relation to a candidate? A placeholder is not a candidate for an election. He is an unknown person who has the seal of a political party to occupy the position of an unknown person; a mere faceless surrogate. His position creates uncertainty in a political party as his presence can mar or invalidate the nomination of his principal. This person is clearly unknown to law and the political party that submits such an unknown person to INEC is deemed to be aware of its wrongdoing and must ready to face the consequences of its gamble.
The APC Presidential candidate, Bola Tinubu, had nominated Ibrahim Masari, a Katsina politician, as the party’s place holder or dummy candidate, for his yet to be named running mate, so as to beat the INEC deadline.

Masari had served the APC as its National Welfare Secretary under the Adams Oshiomhole – led, National Working Committee (NWC). It is believed that the issue of Tinubu having a Muslim-Muslim ticket (Prof Babangida Zulum of Borno State is said to be the preferred one) is tearing the party apart. Can they repeat the Abiola-Babagana “Hope 93” successful Muslim-Muslim joint ticket with the present state of the nation where religion is tearing apart? Only time will tell.

Similarly, the Labour party’s Presidential candidate, Peter Obi, is reported to have also opted to submit the name of his campaign Director General, Doyin Okupe, as his dummy/ place holding running mate.

Whereas section 29(1) of the 2022 Electoral Act, as amended, provides that political parties shall submit names of their candidates, not later than 180 days before the date appointed for the general election, Section 31 of the Act also gives the political parties an opportunity to withdraw and substitute their candidates, not later than 90 days before the election
Section 31 states that “A candidate may withdraw his candidature by notice in writing signed by the candidate to the political party that nominated him for such election and the political party shall covey such withdrawal to the Commission not later than 90 days to the election”.

The Commission had as part of its administrative arrangements given up till 6pm of Friday June 17, 2022, as deadline for the submission of names of candidates for the Presidential and National Assembly election; and 15th July, 2022, for the Governors and State Assembly candidates.

In fulfillment of Section 31 of the Electoral Act, the Commission gave July 15, 2022, as last day for withdrawal by candidates and replacement of withdrawn candidates by the political parties.

Similarly, the Commission also gave the parties up to August 12 for the withdrawal and replacement of withdrawn candidates by the political parties.

This means that the parties who are still facing crises over the choice of running mates still have until the July 15, 2022, to substitute the names being forwarded at the moment, with respect to the Presidential candidates.

Section 31 of the Electoral Act provides that a candidate may withdraw his or her candidature by notice in writing signed by him and delivered personally by that candidate to the political party that nominated him for the election and the Political party shall convey the withdrawal to INEC not later than 90 days before the election. “Candidate” under the Electoral Act, 2022, has a fixed meaning. The law did not say a candidate “includes”. It says it means. The question that calls for dispassionate determination is whether a placeholder qualifies as a candidate who has secured the nomination of his political party to contest an election? The answer can only be answered in the negative. Its identity speaks for itself. If a placeholder is not a candidate, then he is not a person known to law and envisaged by the law. Its nomination and the subsequent submission of this non-existent being to INEC is not a misnomer that can be remedied by replacement or withdrawal under Section 31. Its nomination and submission to INEC seals the fate of the political party that submitted its name.

ANY ESCAPE ROUTE?

The political parties have already submitted names of candidates. Section 142(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended)(the Constitution) clearly provides that the a Presidential candidate must nominate his running mate from the same political party. While Chapter VIII of the PDP Constitution provides for the nomination of candidates for election into public office; Article 20 of the APC Constitution provides for elections into elective positions and appointments. These are clear enough.

Having established that the existence of a placeholder is unknown to law, can this non-existent entity be replaced or substituted by a candidate? Some principles of law might be of help to us here. In the case of ANEGE & ORS v. ALANEME & ORS (2020) LPELR-50445(CA), Per Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu, JCA, considered at pages 19 – 22 whether the court can grant an amendment for the substitution of a non juristic person with a juristic person. He held thus:

“… I have right from the onset stated that after filing the notice of preliminary objection by the defendant at the lower Court, the claimants thereafter filed a motion on notice to substitute the unregistered “Ideato Welfare Association” with “The Registered Trustees of Ideato Cultural and Welfare Association, Calabar” or to amend the status of the 1st and 3rd defendants to show that they are principal officers of the Registered Trustees of Ideato Cultural and Welfare Association, Calabar. A misnomer when associated with issues of juristic personality and mis-description of names of parties simply means the “wrong use of a name or a mistake in naming a person, place or thing, especially in a legal instrument which should ordinarily not lead to a nullification of the proceedings. In other word, a misnomer in the context of litigation occurs where the entity suing or intended to be sued exists, but a wrong name is used to describe that entity. The Supreme Court had recently restated the legal position in APGA Vs Ubah & Ors (2019) LPELR – 48132 (SC) held that if the entity intended to be sued exist but a wrong name is used to describe it, that is a misnomer. The Supreme Court has inter alia held that naming a non-juristic person as a party is not a misnomer and amending same to substitute a juristic person is out of it. This is so because there cannot be a valid amendment of the title of a suit since there never was a legal person who was brought before the Court by the action. And since to be competent a suit must be instituted between legally juristic persons, failing which it is incompetent and a juristic party cannot subsequently be amended to take the place of a non-juristic party originally sued. The correction made by the lower Court by replacing a non-juristic person with one with legal capacity was done without jurisdiction….”

Was a shadowing, ghost and non recognized “placeholder” or “dummy mate” ever contemplated by the Electoral Act of 2022, as a juristic person? I think not. Mr Sheriff Machina has already introduced this dangerous step through his “Deus ex Machina”, by bluntly refusing to step down for Senate President, Ahmed Lawan. Supposing Kabiru Masari, Ahmed Tinubu’s “dummy mate” proves stubborn and refuses to kowtow? What happens? Assuming Dr Doyin Okupe, Peter Obi’s D-G and place holder refuses to yield? What is INEC’s position on these? I see some legal fireworks in the offing in the next few days and weeks ahead. Politrics and Politricians!!!

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Opinion

2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise

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By Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba

To be candid and straightforward, this article is written to sensitize Nigerians to the growing smear campaign against Atiku Abubakar, a campaign of calumny that appears less about national interest and more about political anxiety. The persistence and intensity of these attacks suggest one thing: there are powerful interests who see him not merely as a contender, but as a genuine threat. Yet, Nigerians are no longer easily distracted. The electorate is becoming more discerning, more interested in good governance.

Closely tied to this is the urgency of the 2027 presidential election. This is not just another electoral cycle, it may well represent a turning point in Nigeria’s history. Although Atiku Abubakar has confirmed 2027 to be his last presidential outing. That reality alone elevates the stakes. It presents Nigeria with a stark choice: to either harness a reservoir of experience at a critical moment or risk drifting further into uncertainty. In clear terms, 2027 is not just about political succession, it is about whether Nigeria recalibrates its direction or continues along a path of deepening national challenges.

The fundamental truth is that, experience and effective leadership are positively correlated, independent of age. Leadership in a complex state like Nigeria requires far more than youthful enthusiasm. It demands institutional memory, policy depth, negotiation skills, and the ability to manage crises with precision. It is therefore misguided to reduce leadership capability to age alone. Age neither guarantees competence nor invalidates it. Across the world, both young and elderly leaders have failed when they lacked the depth of experience required for governance. In Nigeria itself, recent experience with president Tinubu shows that leadership failure cannot be attributed to age alone. This underscores a critical point: the true dividing line between success and failure in leadership is not age, it is experience, particularly practical and relevant experience, which is too often overlooked.

Global political trends reinforce this reality. In the United States, voters returned Donald Trump to power over Kamala Harris, reflecting a preference for perceived experience over age. Figures such as Bernie Sanders remain influential well into their later years, shaping national discourse. Similarly, in Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected again at an advanced age because voters trusted his tested capacity to lead during difficult times. A similar pattern recently played out in West Africa. In Liberia, the younger incumbent George Weah was defeated by the significantly older Joseph Boakai. That outcome was widely interpreted as a preference by Liberians for experience and not youthful appeal. These examples are not coincidences. They illustrate a consistent global pattern that when nations face uncertainty, they turn to experience. Nigeria must not waste the experience of Atiku Abubakar like it happened with remarkable figures like Obafemi Awolowo, Chief MKO Abiola and Malam Aminu Kano in the past.

Beyond the question of age lies another critical issue: political strategy. The debate over who should carry the opposition banner in 2027 must be guided by political reality. Nigeria’s recent history makes this abundantly clear. When Goodluck Jonathan sought re-election, the opposition were less influenced by sentiment. Instead, they made a strategic calculation, searching for a candidate with national reach and electoral strength, an idea that birthed Muhammadu Buhari as the opposition candidate, despite his previous electoral defeats.

It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument that Atiku Abubakar should be excluded on the basis that he has contested before. By that same reasoning, Buhari would never have emerged as a viable candidate. Political persistence is not a weakness; it is often a reflection of conviction, resilience, and determination. Elections are not won by novelty alone, they are won by structure, experience, and the ability to connect with a broad electorate.

Equally unconvincing is the argument that 2027 should be determined by zoning or that it is “still the turn of the South.” If the opposition is serious about unseating president Tinubu, it must prioritize a candidate with the experience, national appeal, and political structure required to achieve that goal. Atiku Abubakar is therefore the “asset” of the today. His eight years as Vice President under Olusegun Obasanjo provided him with deep exposure to governance, economic reform, and institutional development. Beyond public office, he is widely recognized as a seasoned politician and an established businessman with independent wealth, an important factor in a political environment often clouded by concerns about misuse of public resources.

Interestingly, it’s increasingly clear that Nigerians are moving beyond superficial narratives. The electorate is more focused on outcomes, on who can stabilize the economy, strengthen institutions, and restore confidence in governance. The conversation is shifting from age to ability, from rhetoric to results.

As 2027 approaches, the choice before Nigeria is becoming clearer. This is not a contest of personalities or a debate about generational symbolism. It is a question of capacity, preparedness, and national survival. History, both global and local, points in one direction: when experience is sidelined, nations pay the price.

Nigeria cannot afford that mistake again…

Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba writes from Kano, and can be reached via drssbaba@yahoo.com

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Opinion

Leadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security

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By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

“Security is not built by arms alone, but by the quality of leadership that turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and divergent interests into common purpose.” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

Abstract

In an era of complex transnational threats, effective regional and continental security hinges less on military capabilities or institutional frameworks and more on the quality of leadership. This article explores how visionary, adaptive, ethical, and inclusive leadership serves as the critical catalyst for transforming shared vulnerabilities into collective strength. Through in-depth case studies of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside comparative insights from the European Union and ASEAN, it demonstrates that leadership determines whether security protocols remain aspirational or deliver tangible protection. The analysis highlights both successes and limitations, identifying key attributes of effective security leadership: strategic foresight, consensus-building, institutional coordination, and accountability. Ultimately, the article argues that investing in high-calibre leadership at every level is essential for building resilient, people-centred security systems capable of addressing contemporary challenges and contributing to a more stable global order.

Introduction

Effective regional and continental security depends far more on leadership than on military hardware, intelligence capabilities, or financial resources alone. Leadership supplies the vision, political will, strategic coherence, ethical foundation, and sustained commitment required to transform fragmented national efforts into unified, sustainable security outcomes. In an era marked by transnational threats — terrorism, organised crime, climate-induced conflicts, cyber vulnerabilities, irregular migration, and hybrid warfare — the quality of leadership at regional and continental levels determines whether security architectures deliver genuine protection or remain aspirational documents on paper.

The Indispensable Role of Leadership in Regional and Continental Security

Leadership in security contexts operates across multiple interconnected layers. At the strategic level, it involves setting a long-term vision that anticipates emerging threats and aligns collective resources before crises escalate. At the operational level, it demands the ability to coordinate institutions, mobilise resources, and execute joint actions efficiently. At the relational level, it requires building and maintaining trust among sovereign states with often competing interests, historical grievances, and differing priorities.

Effective leaders in this domain exhibit several critical attributes. They demonstrate visionary foresight, the capacity to read complex geopolitical and socio-economic trends and translate them into proactive strategies. They exercise adaptive decision-making, adjusting approaches as threats evolve while preserving core principles. They practise inclusive diplomacy, forging consensus without compromising sovereignty. Above all, they uphold ethical integrity and accountability, ensuring that security measures respect human rights and maintain public legitimacy. Without these qualities, even the most sophisticated security protocols risk becoming ineffective or counterproductive.

ECOWAS in West Africa: Leadership-Driven Collective Security

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975 primarily as an economic integration body, has evolved into one of Africa’s most sophisticated and tested regional security mechanisms. This transformation was not inevitable but resulted from deliberate, courageous, and often pragmatic leadership in response to existential threats that threatened to engulf the entire sub-region.

The pivotal moment came in the early 1990s when Liberia descended into a devastating civil war. Faced with the risk of regional contagion, ECOWAS leaders, particularly Nigeria’s General Ibrahim Babangida and Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, took the unprecedented step of creating the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 — Africa’s first sub-regional peacekeeping force. This was a bold departure from the Organisation of African Unity’s strict non-interference policy. ECOMOG’s interventions in Liberia (1990–1997) and Sierra Leone (1997–2000) prevented state collapse, contained the spread of conflict, and created political space for negotiated settlements and eventual democratic transitions.

Leadership played a pivotal role in these outcomes. Nigerian leadership provided the bulk of troops and financial resources, while Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings offered critical diplomatic backing. The willingness of several heads of state to commit substantial national resources despite domestic criticism demonstrated a rare form of collective political will. These interventions also led to important institutional developments, including the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and later the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).

In more recent years, ECOWAS leadership has continued to evolve. During the 2010–2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS applied sustained diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force, contributing significantly to the eventual restoration of constitutional order. In response to the rise of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, ECOWAS has strengthened intelligence sharing, supported the Multinational Joint Task Force, and promoted greater coordination among affected states. The organisation has also demonstrated its preventive diplomacy capacity in The Gambia (2016–2017), where firm but measured leadership helped resolve a dangerous post-election standoff without large-scale violence, and in Guinea (2021), where it applied sanctions and mediation to encourage return to constitutional rule.

Yet ECOWAS leadership has also encountered significant limitations. Divergent national interests, chronic funding shortfalls, and occasional leadership vacuums have sometimes slowed or complicated responses. The recent wave of military coups and political transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger (2021–2023) tested the organisation’s cohesion and exposed the challenge of enforcing normative standards when powerful member states resist collective decisions. These episodes underscore a recurring truth: regional security leadership is only as strong as the political commitment and institutional capacity behind it.

Despite these challenges, ECOWAS remains one of the most advanced regional security mechanisms on the continent. Its evolution from an economic community to a security actor demonstrates how visionary leadership, combined with institutional innovation and political will, can enable a regional organisation to respond effectively to complex security threats. The ECOWAS experience offers enduring lessons: effective regional security leadership must be proactive rather than reactive, adaptive to new threats, inclusive of multiple stakeholders, and continuously reinforced through institutional reform and sustained political will.

African Union’s Continental Leadership: The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has emerged as a central actor in shaping Africa’s security landscape through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Established following the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, APSA represents a fundamental shift in African leadership philosophy — moving from the OAU’s rigid doctrine of non-interference to the AU’s principle of “non-indifference” when grave circumstances threaten peace and stability.

The architecture comprises five key pillars: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund. This comprehensive framework was designed to enable Africa to take primary responsibility for its own peace and security rather than relying predominantly on external actors.

Leadership has been the critical variable in APSA’s performance. The decision by African heads of state to create the Peace and Security Council marked a bold act of continental leadership, giving the AU authority to authorise interventions in cases of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. One of the most visible demonstrations of this leadership was the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched in 2007. Despite enormous challenges, AMISOM — later reconfigured as the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) — helped degrade Al-Shabaab’s control over large parts of the country and created space for political processes and state-building. This mission showcased the AU’s willingness to deploy troops and sustain long-term engagement where international partners were initially hesitant.

Another significant example is the AU’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Darfur (Sudan), South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Lake Chad Basin. In each case, the effectiveness of AU leadership depended heavily on the political will and diplomatic skill of key member states, the AU Commission Chairperson, and the Peace and Security Council. The AU’s successful facilitation of the 2019 political transition in Sudan and its ongoing mediation efforts in multiple conflict zones further illustrate how continental leadership can create pathways for dialogue when national institutions falter.

However, the AU’s leadership has also encountered notable limitations. Funding shortages, logistical constraints, and sometimes divergent interests among member states have hampered rapid and decisive action. The 2011 Libya intervention exposed deep divisions within the AU, while recent political transitions and coups in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea) have tested the Union’s ability to enforce its normative frameworks consistently. These experiences reveal that continental leadership remains vulnerable to the sovereignty concerns of member states and the challenge of translating political consensus into operational effectiveness.

Despite these constraints, the AU has made important strides in institutionalising leadership for peace and security. The adoption of the African Union Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030 and the ongoing efforts to fully operationalise the African Standby Force reflect a long-term strategic vision. The Union has also strengthened its partnership with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, recognising that effective continental security requires layered leadership — with RECs often acting as first responders and the AU providing strategic oversight and legitimacy.

The African Union’s journey demonstrates both the immense potential and the inherent difficulties of continental leadership in security matters. When leadership is bold, united, and well-resourced, the AU can play a transformative role in preventing conflict, managing crises, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. When leadership is fragmented or under-resourced, progress slows and opportunities for timely intervention are lost.

SADC Regional Interventions: Leadership, Solidarity, and the Limits of Collective Action

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) offers a distinct model of regional security leadership shaped by its historical struggle against apartheid and a strong emphasis on sovereignty and consensus. Originally formed in 1980 to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, SADC has gradually expanded its security role through the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

SADC’s most prominent military intervention occurred in 1998 in Lesotho. Following a disputed election and political violence, South Africa and Botswana, acting under SADC authority, launched Operation Boleas to restore order and facilitate new elections. While the intervention achieved its immediate objectives, it was criticised for limited consultation with other SADC members and for being perceived as South African dominance rather than genuine collective action. This episode highlighted both the potential and the sensitivities of SADC leadership in security matters.

A more sustained and complex engagement has been SADC’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 2013, SADC has supported the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Comprising troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, the FIB was mandated to conduct offensive operations against armed groups. South African leadership was instrumental in pushing for the creation of the FIB, reflecting Pretoria’s strategic interest in stabilising the Great Lakes region. The intervention has had mixed results: it helped degrade some armed groups but has struggled with the sheer complexity of conflict dynamics, resource constraints, and the challenge of addressing root causes such as governance failures and illicit resource exploitation.

More recently, in 2021, SADC deployed the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to address the escalating insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. The mission, led by South African forces with contributions from several member states, aimed to support the Mozambican government in restoring security and protecting civilians. Leadership from South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania was critical in mobilising rapid deployment. While SAMIM has contributed to the degradation of insurgent capabilities and the protection of key economic installations, challenges remain, including coordination with Rwandan forces operating in the same theatre and the need for a stronger focus on addressing underlying socio-economic grievances.

SADC’s security interventions reveal a distinct leadership pattern dominated by a few influential member states, particularly South Africa. This “hegemonic leadership” model has enabled action when consensus is difficult to achieve but has also generated resentment among smaller states wary of South African dominance. Zimbabwe and Angola have also played significant roles in specific contexts, while smaller states have contributed troops and political legitimacy.

The consensus-based decision-making culture within SADC has been both a strength and a limitation. It ensures broad buy-in when agreement is reached, but it can lead to slow or diluted responses when member states have divergent interests. The principle of “quiet diplomacy” has often prioritised political dialogue over forceful intervention, sometimes delaying decisive action.

SADC interventions have achieved notable successes. They have prevented state collapse in Lesotho, contributed to stabilisation efforts in the DRC, and helped contain the Cabo Delgado insurgency. The organisation has also developed important normative frameworks, including the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and mechanisms for electoral observation and conflict prevention.

However, limitations are equally evident. Funding remains chronically inadequate, often forcing reliance on external partners or lead nations. Logistical challenges, interoperability issues among national forces, and uneven political commitment have constrained operational effectiveness. Critics argue that SADC’s responses have sometimes prioritised regime security over human security, particularly in cases involving member states’ internal political crises.

The SADC experience underscores several important lessons about regional security leadership. First, hegemonic leadership can enable rapid action but risks undermining legitimacy and long-term cohesion. Second, consensus-based systems require strong mediation and facilitation skills to convert agreement into effective implementation. Third, sustainable security leadership must address both immediate threats and underlying structural drivers such as poverty, inequality, and governance deficits. Finally, SADC’s trajectory shows that regional organisations can play meaningful security roles even without a single dominant power, provided there is sufficient political will and institutional adaptability.

Comparative Insights from Other Regions

Global experiences reinforce these lessons. The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has succeeded largely because of consistent institutional leadership and shared norms among member states, enabling joint missions and rapid response capabilities. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s consensus-based leadership model has helped maintain stability amid complex geopolitical tensions, although it has occasionally been criticised for slower decision-making. These cases confirm that effective regional security leadership requires a delicate balance between respect for sovereignty and the courage to pursue collective action.

Persistent Challenges and Pathways Forward

Leadership in regional and continental security faces recurring obstacles: divergent national interests, resource constraints, weak institutional capacity, and external interference. Political transitions and electoral cycles can disrupt continuity, while hybrid threats demand leaders capable of integrating diverse tools and actors.

To build more effective security leadership, regional and continental organisations must invest deliberately in leadership development. This includes targeted programmes that cultivate strategic foresight, ethical governance, collaborative skills, and crisis management capabilities. Institutional mechanisms should be designed to ensure policy continuity beyond changes in individual leaders. Greater inclusion of civil society, youth, and women in security decision-making can enhance legitimacy and broaden perspectives. Finally, partnerships with global actors should be pursued in ways that preserve African agency and ownership.

Conclusion

Leadership remains the single most decisive factor in regional and continental security. It is the invisible bridge that transforms fragile agreements into enduring peace, turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and converts divergent national interests into a common purpose. The experiences of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union across the continent, and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside valuable lessons from Europe and Southeast Asia, consistently demonstrate one fundamental truth: even the most sophisticated security architectures will falter without visionary, ethical, and collaborative leadership.

In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, where threats respect no borders, the quality of leadership at every level — from heads of state to technical experts within regional commissions — will ultimately determine whether Africa and other regions merely survive successive crises or rise to build lasting stability and prosperity.

The challenge before current and future leaders is clear: to move beyond rhetoric and embrace the difficult work of forging unity, exercising foresight, upholding accountability, and investing in people-centred security solutions. Those who answer this call will not only secure their nations and regions but will also leave a legacy of peace that benefits generations yet unborn and contributes meaningfully to a more stable global order.

True security is not built by arms alone. It is built by leadership that dares to imagine, unite, and act for the common good.

Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.comglobalstageimpacts@gmail.com

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Opinion

Nation Building Reimagined: Integrated Principles and Strategies for Sustainable Growth

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By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

“True nation building is not the work of the state alone, but a harmonious convergence where empowered peoples provide the foundation, innovative corporates generate the momentum, and visionary institutions ensure direction — together forging sustainable prosperity, social cohesion, and enduring national strength for current and future generations” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

Nation building is a deliberate and continuous process of constructing cohesive, resilient, and prosperous societies capable of realising their full potential. It extends far beyond political structures or state institutions to encompass three interdependent spheres: peoples (individuals and communities), corporates (businesses and private-sector organisations), and nations (governance institutions and the state). When these spheres are strategically aligned through sound principles and practical strategies, they generate all-round exploits — inclusive economic growth, social cohesion, innovation, human flourishing, and global competitiveness.

This comprehensive framework offers actionable guidance for sustaining productive and progressive development. It is grounded in universal principles validated by international development experience, economic history, and governance studies, making it relevant for scholars, policymakers, business leaders, and development practitioners worldwide.

Foundational Principles of Effective Nation Building

Successful nation building rests on six core principles that transcend cultural, geographical, and ideological differences:

Inclusive Human Dignity and Agency — Recognising every citizen as both beneficiary and active architect of national progress through equal opportunity and rights protection.
Institutional Integrity and Rule of Law — Building transparent, accountable institutions that foster trust and predictability.
Economic Dynamism and Shared Prosperity — Promoting broad-based growth that benefits individuals, businesses, and the state simultaneously.
Social Cohesion and Cultural Resilience — Forging unity while respecting diversity to create a shared national identity and purpose.
Adaptive Leadership and Long-Term Vision — Combining strategic foresight with the flexibility to learn and adjust.
Sustainable Resource Stewardship — Balancing present needs with intergenerational equity in environmental and fiscal matters.
These principles provide a universal compass for development, as evidenced by cross-national data from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and the UNDP Human Development Reports.

 

Core Strategies Across the Three Spheres

For Peoples (Individuals and Communities): Nation building begins with empowering citizens. Key strategies include universal access to quality education and skills development, robust health and social protection systems, community-driven development programmes, and targeted initiatives for youth and women empowerment. These efforts enhance social mobility, reduce vulnerability, and foster active civic participation.

For Corporates (Businesses and Private Sector): Corporates serve as the primary engine of wealth creation and innovation. Effective strategies involve creating an enabling business environment, promoting public-private partnerships, enforcing strong corporate governance and ethical standards, and implementing talent development and local content policies. When supported appropriately, the private sector generates jobs, technological advancement, and tax revenues that fuel broader development.

For Nations (State Institutions and Governance): The state provides the overarching framework for progress. Strategies include institutional reform and capacity building, decentralisation for better responsiveness, evidence-based policy making, and strategic regional and global integration. Strong institutions ensure equitable rules, policy continuity, and effective service delivery.

Sustaining Progressive Growth in Nigeria

In Nigeria, this integrated framework offers a practical pathway to convert demographic and natural endowments into sustained prosperity. At the peoples’ level, investments in education, health, and skills development can transform the large youth population into a productive demographic dividend. For corporates, policy predictability, infrastructure development, and public-private partnerships can drive diversification beyond oil into agriculture, manufacturing, and digital services. At the national level, institutional reforms, anti-corruption measures, and evidence-based governance would reduce policy inconsistency and enhance public trust.

When these elements reinforce one another, Nigeria can achieve higher productivity, reduced poverty, greater social cohesion, and improved global competitiveness — creating a virtuous cycle of inclusive growth.

Advancing Development in West Africa

Within the ECOWAS region, the framework supports deeper integration and collective resilience. Strategies for social cohesion help address cross-border challenges such as irregular migration, climate impacts, and youth unemployment. Corporate-focused approaches encourage intra-regional trade and industrialisation through harmonised policies and stronger value chains. Institutional strategies promote policy coordination, joint humanitarian response, and shared security mechanisms.

By applying this model, West African countries can move from fragmented national efforts toward coordinated regional progress, enhancing food security, energy access, and economic competitiveness while building resilience against external shocks.

Driving Continental Transformation in Africa

Across Africa, the principles and strategies align closely with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Sustainable resource stewardship helps convert natural wealth into long-term human and infrastructure investments. The corporate strategies support regional value chains and industrialisation, while institutional reforms strengthen governance and reduce trade barriers.

When implemented continent-wide, this approach fosters inclusive industrialisation, technological advancement, and reduced external dependency — positioning Africa as a major driver of global growth in the 21st century.

Global Relevance and Contribution

On the global stage, the framework provides timely lessons for both developed and developing nations navigating technological disruption, climate change, and rising inequality. The emphasis on shared prosperity and social cohesion offers pathways to mitigate polarisation. The integration of corporates as development partners demonstrates how private-sector innovation can serve public goals. Institutional strategies of adaptive leadership and evidence-based policy making are universally applicable in managing complex transnational challenges.

Nations adopting this model contribute to global stability by reducing conflict drivers, enhancing food and energy security, and participating constructively in multilateral systems. In this way, the framework supports the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and helps build a more equitable and resilient world order.

Conclusion: A Practical Pathway to Enduring Progress

The principles and strategies of nation building presented here constitute a balanced, interconnected discipline capable of sustaining productive and progressive growth across multiple scales. For Nigeria, they chart a course from potential to performance. For West Africa, they strengthen regional solidarity. For Africa, they accelerate continental transformation. And for the global community, they offer practical wisdom for building fairer, more stable societies.

True nation building succeeds when peoples, corporates, and state institutions reinforce one another in a virtuous cycle. Its greatest strength lies in this holistic integration — recognising that sustainable development requires empowered citizens, innovative enterprises, and effective governance working in harmony.

In an increasingly interdependent world, embracing these principles with consistency, courage, and collective ownership is not merely beneficial but essential. Nations and regions that do so will unlock enduring prosperity, resilience, and a respected place in the global community. The framework provides both the vision and the practical tools needed to turn potential into lasting achievement for current and future generations.

Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.com, globalstageimpacts@gmail.com

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