Opinion
The Oracle: Of Rape, Rapists and False Rape Peddlers (Pt. 2)
Published
4 years agoon
By
Eric
By Mike Ozekhome
INTRODUCTION
There is an upward upsurge of increase of rape case in Nigeria; and there seems to be no end to the menace. There is no day in the country without a reported case of sexual violence, especially rape. Sexual violence victims are also becoming more emboldened in reporting such crimes. We have however seen cases of young ladies attempting to make a career of tagging celebrities and politically exposed persons (PEP) with false rape accusations. Such must be discouraged. Today, we shall continue our discourse of this vexed issue from the angle of the criminal laws governing rape.
THE CRIMINAL CODE ACT (continues)
What the Criminal Code Act insists on is consent between two willing adults, devoid of any fraud, deceit, force or threats. The law contemplates free, express and unequivocal consent from a woman (even if married), before any man can have sexual relations with her. Thus, whenever a man has sexual intercourse with a woman with her consent, but which was obtained fraudulently, deceitfully, or forcefully, or without her consent at all, the crime of rape would be deemed to have occurred.
Section 358 of the Criminal Code imposes the maximum punishment of life imprisonment, with, or without caning, on any person convicted of rape.
Section 359 of the Criminal Code (CC) also criminalizes attempted rape:
“Any person who attempts to commit the offence of rape is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years, with or without caning.”
Section 360 CC also criminalizes “indecent or unlawful sexual assault” on a woman, thus:
“Any person who unlawfully and indecently assaults a woman or girl is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for two years”.
From the above, it is clear that rape is not only immoral, but also illegal. However, the CC definition of rape is now grossly inadequate in the light of contemporary trends. This is because it does not contemplate spousal rape, or a situation whereby a woman withdraws consent midway through sexual intercourse (post-penetration rape). The CC also fails to contemplate the possibility of men being subject to rape by women. The CC should therefore be amended to accommodate the more recent dimensions to the crime of rape.
RAPE AND THE VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSONS PROHIBITION ACT, 2015 (VAPPA).
Section 1 of the Violence Against Persons Prohibition Act, 2015 (VAPPA) provides:
“A person commits rape if:
He or she intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person with any other part of his body or anything else.
The other person does not consent to the penetration; or
The consent is obtained by force or means of threat or intimidation of any kind or by fear of harm or by means of false or fraudulent representation as to the nature of the act or use of any substance or additive capable of taking away the will of such person or in the case of a married person, by impersonating his or her spouse.”
The above definition of rape is more comprehensive and represents the modern trend. Specifically, the Act for the first time in Nigeria, recognizes the possibility of men being victims of rape, through the “anus or mouth”. With another person’s “part of (his) body or anything”. The VAPPA also widens the scope of rape by going beyond vaginal rape to criminalize anal and oral rape.
Similarly, VAPPA expands the scope of rape beyond penile or penis penetration alone. Other avenues of penetration are now recognized to include vagina, anus or mouth which could be “penetrated” without a man or woman’s consent. This could be done by means of a penis, cucumber, dildo, vibrator, strap on, stick, etc. In such cases, rape would be said to have occurred.
Section 1(2)(c) of VAPPA also criminalizes and punishes the act of “gang rape” for a minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment
Section 1(3) of VAPPA has a novel provision for compensation of rape victims; while section 1(4) provides for the publication of a register of convicted sexual offenders, which shall be open to members of the public. The essence of this provision is to create a culture of shaming convicted rapists, so as to deter intending rapists and warn members of the public to be wary of them.
Despite the novel and revolutionary provisions of the VAPPA, it does not have a nationwide application. In fact, as at 2018, the then Minister of Health, Professor Isaac Adewole, declared that only three states in Nigeria, (Anambra, Ebonyi and Oyo) States had domesticated the Act. This means these are the only states in which these provisions apply.
THE PENAL CODE ACT
The Penal Code is the criminal law that applies to the Northern part of Nigeria, and the FCT, as against the Criminal Code, which operates in the Southern part. Section 282 of the Penal Code (PC) defines the crime of rape thus:
“(I) A man is said to commit rape who, except in the case referred to in subsection (2) of this section, has sexual intercourse with a woman in any of the following circumstances-
(a) without her consent;
(b) against her will;
(c) with her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her in fear of death or of hurt;
(d) with her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.”
The above provision merely restates the CC position in the with some omissions. The most glaring omission in the definition of rape under the PC as against the CC is that under the PC, unlike the CC, sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman’s consent, but which was fraudulently obtained, is not viewed as rape.
Under the PC, even where the girl is the wife of a person, such person will still be guilty of rape if she has not attained puberty. The case of the former Governor of Zamfara State who allegedly married a 13 year old girl from Egypt comes in here. In such instance, since the girl had not attained puberty and he had carnal knowledge of her, he would have been guilty of rape if he had been charged to court after shedding his gubernatorial immunity under section 308 of the Constitution.
Similarly, just like the CC, the definition of rape under the Penal Code is limited and does not accommodate some more recent global strands of rape and sexual violence. To this end, it is recommended that both the CC and PC should be amended to cater for some of these contemporary trends.
Section 258 of the Criminal Laws of Lagos State has similar provisions.
In all three laws, rape is narrowly constrained as occurring only when the vagina of the woman is penetrated (“res in rem”). This was judicially held in NATASHA V. STATE, thus:
“The most important and essential ingredient of the offence is penetration. The Court will deem that sexual intercourse is complete upon proof of penetration of the penis into the vagina. Any or even the slightest penetration will be sufficient to constitute the act of sexual intercourse.”
THE CHILD’S RIGHTS ACT, 2003.
Section 31of the Child’s Rights Act provides as follows:
(1) No person, shall have sexual intercourse with a child.
(2) A person who contravenes the provision of subsection (1) of this Section commits an offence of rape and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life.
(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under this Section, it is immaterial that:
(a) the offender believed the person to be of or above the age of eighteen years ; or
(b) the sexual intercourse was with the consent of the child.
From the above definition, any sexual intercourse with a child would be categorized as rape. It is a strict liability offence. It makes no difference that the child consented to such sexual intercourse.
This is because a child is not legally empowered to consent to sexual intercourse. The fact that the offender believes that the child was above the age of eighteen will not exculpate the offender. Thus, it makes no difference that the child looks bigger, older or more mature than his or her age. What is material is that the child is less than eighteen years; and any sexual intercourse with such a child would amount to rape with the attendant punishment of life imprisonment under the Act.
The Act is clearly a protectionist legislation aimed at shielding children from adult sexual predators. The Act also lacks nationwide application. In fact, as at 2019, Chief of Field Office, UNICEF Nigeria, Bauchi Field Office, Mr. Bhanu Pathak, lamented:
“Only 25 states have enacted the law so far. The states which are yet to domesticate the Child Rights Act are from the northern part of Nigeria. I call on all these states to domesticate the Nigeria Child Rights Law to provide a legal framework for the protection of the rights of children in their respective states.”
Accordingly, 11 States in Nigeria are yet to domesticate the Child’s Rights Act. Going by UNICEF statistics, the eleven states yet to ratify the Child Rights Act are Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano Katsina, Kebbi, Yobe, Sokoto and Zamfara States. Why? To continue endanger our innocent children? Haba!
HOW NIGERIAN COURTS DECRY RAPE
The severity of the offence of rape is one that cannot be overemphasized. Nigerian courts frown on it seriously. In Popoola v State (2013) 17 NWLR (PT 1382) 100, the apex court illuminated:
“the offence appeared to be heinous and heartless. The sentence meted out by the trial court amounts to abdicating its role as a judicial officer. I condemn such type of sentence. The sentence is unnecessarily lenient and loose”. The apex court went on:
“I join my learned brother in expressing disappointment that the appellant was given a lenient term of five years in prison. I think that the severity of punishment for rape, with particular reference to statutory variety, should rank next to capital punishment”
(To be continued)
FUN TIMES
“I saw dad with mom last night….. I think he was stealing my milk”. – Anonymous.
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
Rape, mutilation, abuse, and theft are the natural outcome of a world in which force rules, in which human beings are objects. (Chris Hedges).
Related
You may like
Opinion
2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise
Published
2 days agoon
April 18, 2026By
Eric
By Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba
To be candid and straightforward, this article is written to sensitize Nigerians to the growing smear campaign against Atiku Abubakar, a campaign of calumny that appears less about national interest and more about political anxiety. The persistence and intensity of these attacks suggest one thing: there are powerful interests who see him not merely as a contender, but as a genuine threat. Yet, Nigerians are no longer easily distracted. The electorate is becoming more discerning, more interested in good governance.
Closely tied to this is the urgency of the 2027 presidential election. This is not just another electoral cycle, it may well represent a turning point in Nigeria’s history. Although Atiku Abubakar has confirmed 2027 to be his last presidential outing. That reality alone elevates the stakes. It presents Nigeria with a stark choice: to either harness a reservoir of experience at a critical moment or risk drifting further into uncertainty. In clear terms, 2027 is not just about political succession, it is about whether Nigeria recalibrates its direction or continues along a path of deepening national challenges.
The fundamental truth is that, experience and effective leadership are positively correlated, independent of age. Leadership in a complex state like Nigeria requires far more than youthful enthusiasm. It demands institutional memory, policy depth, negotiation skills, and the ability to manage crises with precision. It is therefore misguided to reduce leadership capability to age alone. Age neither guarantees competence nor invalidates it. Across the world, both young and elderly leaders have failed when they lacked the depth of experience required for governance. In Nigeria itself, recent experience with president Tinubu shows that leadership failure cannot be attributed to age alone. This underscores a critical point: the true dividing line between success and failure in leadership is not age, it is experience, particularly practical and relevant experience, which is too often overlooked.
Global political trends reinforce this reality. In the United States, voters returned Donald Trump to power over Kamala Harris, reflecting a preference for perceived experience over age. Figures such as Bernie Sanders remain influential well into their later years, shaping national discourse. Similarly, in Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected again at an advanced age because voters trusted his tested capacity to lead during difficult times. A similar pattern recently played out in West Africa. In Liberia, the younger incumbent George Weah was defeated by the significantly older Joseph Boakai. That outcome was widely interpreted as a preference by Liberians for experience and not youthful appeal. These examples are not coincidences. They illustrate a consistent global pattern that when nations face uncertainty, they turn to experience. Nigeria must not waste the experience of Atiku Abubakar like it happened with remarkable figures like Obafemi Awolowo, Chief MKO Abiola and Malam Aminu Kano in the past.
Beyond the question of age lies another critical issue: political strategy. The debate over who should carry the opposition banner in 2027 must be guided by political reality. Nigeria’s recent history makes this abundantly clear. When Goodluck Jonathan sought re-election, the opposition were less influenced by sentiment. Instead, they made a strategic calculation, searching for a candidate with national reach and electoral strength, an idea that birthed Muhammadu Buhari as the opposition candidate, despite his previous electoral defeats.
It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument that Atiku Abubakar should be excluded on the basis that he has contested before. By that same reasoning, Buhari would never have emerged as a viable candidate. Political persistence is not a weakness; it is often a reflection of conviction, resilience, and determination. Elections are not won by novelty alone, they are won by structure, experience, and the ability to connect with a broad electorate.
Equally unconvincing is the argument that 2027 should be determined by zoning or that it is “still the turn of the South.” If the opposition is serious about unseating president Tinubu, it must prioritize a candidate with the experience, national appeal, and political structure required to achieve that goal. Atiku Abubakar is therefore the “asset” of the today. His eight years as Vice President under Olusegun Obasanjo provided him with deep exposure to governance, economic reform, and institutional development. Beyond public office, he is widely recognized as a seasoned politician and an established businessman with independent wealth, an important factor in a political environment often clouded by concerns about misuse of public resources.
Interestingly, it’s increasingly clear that Nigerians are moving beyond superficial narratives. The electorate is more focused on outcomes, on who can stabilize the economy, strengthen institutions, and restore confidence in governance. The conversation is shifting from age to ability, from rhetoric to results.
As 2027 approaches, the choice before Nigeria is becoming clearer. This is not a contest of personalities or a debate about generational symbolism. It is a question of capacity, preparedness, and national survival. History, both global and local, points in one direction: when experience is sidelined, nations pay the price.
Nigeria cannot afford that mistake again…
Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba writes from Kano, and can be reached via drssbaba@yahoo.com
Related
Opinion
Leadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security
Published
2 days agoon
April 18, 2026By
Eric
By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD
“Security is not built by arms alone, but by the quality of leadership that turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and divergent interests into common purpose.” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD
Abstract
In an era of complex transnational threats, effective regional and continental security hinges less on military capabilities or institutional frameworks and more on the quality of leadership. This article explores how visionary, adaptive, ethical, and inclusive leadership serves as the critical catalyst for transforming shared vulnerabilities into collective strength. Through in-depth case studies of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside comparative insights from the European Union and ASEAN, it demonstrates that leadership determines whether security protocols remain aspirational or deliver tangible protection. The analysis highlights both successes and limitations, identifying key attributes of effective security leadership: strategic foresight, consensus-building, institutional coordination, and accountability. Ultimately, the article argues that investing in high-calibre leadership at every level is essential for building resilient, people-centred security systems capable of addressing contemporary challenges and contributing to a more stable global order.
Introduction
Effective regional and continental security depends far more on leadership than on military hardware, intelligence capabilities, or financial resources alone. Leadership supplies the vision, political will, strategic coherence, ethical foundation, and sustained commitment required to transform fragmented national efforts into unified, sustainable security outcomes. In an era marked by transnational threats — terrorism, organised crime, climate-induced conflicts, cyber vulnerabilities, irregular migration, and hybrid warfare — the quality of leadership at regional and continental levels determines whether security architectures deliver genuine protection or remain aspirational documents on paper.
The Indispensable Role of Leadership in Regional and Continental Security
Leadership in security contexts operates across multiple interconnected layers. At the strategic level, it involves setting a long-term vision that anticipates emerging threats and aligns collective resources before crises escalate. At the operational level, it demands the ability to coordinate institutions, mobilise resources, and execute joint actions efficiently. At the relational level, it requires building and maintaining trust among sovereign states with often competing interests, historical grievances, and differing priorities.
Effective leaders in this domain exhibit several critical attributes. They demonstrate visionary foresight, the capacity to read complex geopolitical and socio-economic trends and translate them into proactive strategies. They exercise adaptive decision-making, adjusting approaches as threats evolve while preserving core principles. They practise inclusive diplomacy, forging consensus without compromising sovereignty. Above all, they uphold ethical integrity and accountability, ensuring that security measures respect human rights and maintain public legitimacy. Without these qualities, even the most sophisticated security protocols risk becoming ineffective or counterproductive.
ECOWAS in West Africa: Leadership-Driven Collective Security
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975 primarily as an economic integration body, has evolved into one of Africa’s most sophisticated and tested regional security mechanisms. This transformation was not inevitable but resulted from deliberate, courageous, and often pragmatic leadership in response to existential threats that threatened to engulf the entire sub-region.
The pivotal moment came in the early 1990s when Liberia descended into a devastating civil war. Faced with the risk of regional contagion, ECOWAS leaders, particularly Nigeria’s General Ibrahim Babangida and Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, took the unprecedented step of creating the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 — Africa’s first sub-regional peacekeeping force. This was a bold departure from the Organisation of African Unity’s strict non-interference policy. ECOMOG’s interventions in Liberia (1990–1997) and Sierra Leone (1997–2000) prevented state collapse, contained the spread of conflict, and created political space for negotiated settlements and eventual democratic transitions.
Leadership played a pivotal role in these outcomes. Nigerian leadership provided the bulk of troops and financial resources, while Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings offered critical diplomatic backing. The willingness of several heads of state to commit substantial national resources despite domestic criticism demonstrated a rare form of collective political will. These interventions also led to important institutional developments, including the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and later the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).
In more recent years, ECOWAS leadership has continued to evolve. During the 2010–2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS applied sustained diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force, contributing significantly to the eventual restoration of constitutional order. In response to the rise of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, ECOWAS has strengthened intelligence sharing, supported the Multinational Joint Task Force, and promoted greater coordination among affected states. The organisation has also demonstrated its preventive diplomacy capacity in The Gambia (2016–2017), where firm but measured leadership helped resolve a dangerous post-election standoff without large-scale violence, and in Guinea (2021), where it applied sanctions and mediation to encourage return to constitutional rule.
Yet ECOWAS leadership has also encountered significant limitations. Divergent national interests, chronic funding shortfalls, and occasional leadership vacuums have sometimes slowed or complicated responses. The recent wave of military coups and political transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger (2021–2023) tested the organisation’s cohesion and exposed the challenge of enforcing normative standards when powerful member states resist collective decisions. These episodes underscore a recurring truth: regional security leadership is only as strong as the political commitment and institutional capacity behind it.
Despite these challenges, ECOWAS remains one of the most advanced regional security mechanisms on the continent. Its evolution from an economic community to a security actor demonstrates how visionary leadership, combined with institutional innovation and political will, can enable a regional organisation to respond effectively to complex security threats. The ECOWAS experience offers enduring lessons: effective regional security leadership must be proactive rather than reactive, adaptive to new threats, inclusive of multiple stakeholders, and continuously reinforced through institutional reform and sustained political will.
African Union’s Continental Leadership: The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has emerged as a central actor in shaping Africa’s security landscape through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Established following the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, APSA represents a fundamental shift in African leadership philosophy — moving from the OAU’s rigid doctrine of non-interference to the AU’s principle of “non-indifference” when grave circumstances threaten peace and stability.
The architecture comprises five key pillars: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund. This comprehensive framework was designed to enable Africa to take primary responsibility for its own peace and security rather than relying predominantly on external actors.
Leadership has been the critical variable in APSA’s performance. The decision by African heads of state to create the Peace and Security Council marked a bold act of continental leadership, giving the AU authority to authorise interventions in cases of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. One of the most visible demonstrations of this leadership was the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched in 2007. Despite enormous challenges, AMISOM — later reconfigured as the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) — helped degrade Al-Shabaab’s control over large parts of the country and created space for political processes and state-building. This mission showcased the AU’s willingness to deploy troops and sustain long-term engagement where international partners were initially hesitant.
Another significant example is the AU’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Darfur (Sudan), South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Lake Chad Basin. In each case, the effectiveness of AU leadership depended heavily on the political will and diplomatic skill of key member states, the AU Commission Chairperson, and the Peace and Security Council. The AU’s successful facilitation of the 2019 political transition in Sudan and its ongoing mediation efforts in multiple conflict zones further illustrate how continental leadership can create pathways for dialogue when national institutions falter.
However, the AU’s leadership has also encountered notable limitations. Funding shortages, logistical constraints, and sometimes divergent interests among member states have hampered rapid and decisive action. The 2011 Libya intervention exposed deep divisions within the AU, while recent political transitions and coups in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea) have tested the Union’s ability to enforce its normative frameworks consistently. These experiences reveal that continental leadership remains vulnerable to the sovereignty concerns of member states and the challenge of translating political consensus into operational effectiveness.
Despite these constraints, the AU has made important strides in institutionalising leadership for peace and security. The adoption of the African Union Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030 and the ongoing efforts to fully operationalise the African Standby Force reflect a long-term strategic vision. The Union has also strengthened its partnership with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, recognising that effective continental security requires layered leadership — with RECs often acting as first responders and the AU providing strategic oversight and legitimacy.
The African Union’s journey demonstrates both the immense potential and the inherent difficulties of continental leadership in security matters. When leadership is bold, united, and well-resourced, the AU can play a transformative role in preventing conflict, managing crises, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. When leadership is fragmented or under-resourced, progress slows and opportunities for timely intervention are lost.
SADC Regional Interventions: Leadership, Solidarity, and the Limits of Collective Action
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) offers a distinct model of regional security leadership shaped by its historical struggle against apartheid and a strong emphasis on sovereignty and consensus. Originally formed in 1980 to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, SADC has gradually expanded its security role through the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.
SADC’s most prominent military intervention occurred in 1998 in Lesotho. Following a disputed election and political violence, South Africa and Botswana, acting under SADC authority, launched Operation Boleas to restore order and facilitate new elections. While the intervention achieved its immediate objectives, it was criticised for limited consultation with other SADC members and for being perceived as South African dominance rather than genuine collective action. This episode highlighted both the potential and the sensitivities of SADC leadership in security matters.
A more sustained and complex engagement has been SADC’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 2013, SADC has supported the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Comprising troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, the FIB was mandated to conduct offensive operations against armed groups. South African leadership was instrumental in pushing for the creation of the FIB, reflecting Pretoria’s strategic interest in stabilising the Great Lakes region. The intervention has had mixed results: it helped degrade some armed groups but has struggled with the sheer complexity of conflict dynamics, resource constraints, and the challenge of addressing root causes such as governance failures and illicit resource exploitation.
More recently, in 2021, SADC deployed the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to address the escalating insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. The mission, led by South African forces with contributions from several member states, aimed to support the Mozambican government in restoring security and protecting civilians. Leadership from South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania was critical in mobilising rapid deployment. While SAMIM has contributed to the degradation of insurgent capabilities and the protection of key economic installations, challenges remain, including coordination with Rwandan forces operating in the same theatre and the need for a stronger focus on addressing underlying socio-economic grievances.
SADC’s security interventions reveal a distinct leadership pattern dominated by a few influential member states, particularly South Africa. This “hegemonic leadership” model has enabled action when consensus is difficult to achieve but has also generated resentment among smaller states wary of South African dominance. Zimbabwe and Angola have also played significant roles in specific contexts, while smaller states have contributed troops and political legitimacy.
The consensus-based decision-making culture within SADC has been both a strength and a limitation. It ensures broad buy-in when agreement is reached, but it can lead to slow or diluted responses when member states have divergent interests. The principle of “quiet diplomacy” has often prioritised political dialogue over forceful intervention, sometimes delaying decisive action.
SADC interventions have achieved notable successes. They have prevented state collapse in Lesotho, contributed to stabilisation efforts in the DRC, and helped contain the Cabo Delgado insurgency. The organisation has also developed important normative frameworks, including the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and mechanisms for electoral observation and conflict prevention.
However, limitations are equally evident. Funding remains chronically inadequate, often forcing reliance on external partners or lead nations. Logistical challenges, interoperability issues among national forces, and uneven political commitment have constrained operational effectiveness. Critics argue that SADC’s responses have sometimes prioritised regime security over human security, particularly in cases involving member states’ internal political crises.
The SADC experience underscores several important lessons about regional security leadership. First, hegemonic leadership can enable rapid action but risks undermining legitimacy and long-term cohesion. Second, consensus-based systems require strong mediation and facilitation skills to convert agreement into effective implementation. Third, sustainable security leadership must address both immediate threats and underlying structural drivers such as poverty, inequality, and governance deficits. Finally, SADC’s trajectory shows that regional organisations can play meaningful security roles even without a single dominant power, provided there is sufficient political will and institutional adaptability.
Comparative Insights from Other Regions
Global experiences reinforce these lessons. The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has succeeded largely because of consistent institutional leadership and shared norms among member states, enabling joint missions and rapid response capabilities. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s consensus-based leadership model has helped maintain stability amid complex geopolitical tensions, although it has occasionally been criticised for slower decision-making. These cases confirm that effective regional security leadership requires a delicate balance between respect for sovereignty and the courage to pursue collective action.
Persistent Challenges and Pathways Forward
Leadership in regional and continental security faces recurring obstacles: divergent national interests, resource constraints, weak institutional capacity, and external interference. Political transitions and electoral cycles can disrupt continuity, while hybrid threats demand leaders capable of integrating diverse tools and actors.
To build more effective security leadership, regional and continental organisations must invest deliberately in leadership development. This includes targeted programmes that cultivate strategic foresight, ethical governance, collaborative skills, and crisis management capabilities. Institutional mechanisms should be designed to ensure policy continuity beyond changes in individual leaders. Greater inclusion of civil society, youth, and women in security decision-making can enhance legitimacy and broaden perspectives. Finally, partnerships with global actors should be pursued in ways that preserve African agency and ownership.
Conclusion
Leadership remains the single most decisive factor in regional and continental security. It is the invisible bridge that transforms fragile agreements into enduring peace, turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and converts divergent national interests into a common purpose. The experiences of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union across the continent, and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside valuable lessons from Europe and Southeast Asia, consistently demonstrate one fundamental truth: even the most sophisticated security architectures will falter without visionary, ethical, and collaborative leadership.
In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, where threats respect no borders, the quality of leadership at every level — from heads of state to technical experts within regional commissions — will ultimately determine whether Africa and other regions merely survive successive crises or rise to build lasting stability and prosperity.
The challenge before current and future leaders is clear: to move beyond rhetoric and embrace the difficult work of forging unity, exercising foresight, upholding accountability, and investing in people-centred security solutions. Those who answer this call will not only secure their nations and regions but will also leave a legacy of peace that benefits generations yet unborn and contributes meaningfully to a more stable global order.
True security is not built by arms alone. It is built by leadership that dares to imagine, unite, and act for the common good.
Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.com, globalstageimpacts@gmail.com
Related
Opinion
Nation Building Reimagined: Integrated Principles and Strategies for Sustainable Growth
Published
1 week agoon
April 11, 2026By
Eric
By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD
“True nation building is not the work of the state alone, but a harmonious convergence where empowered peoples provide the foundation, innovative corporates generate the momentum, and visionary institutions ensure direction — together forging sustainable prosperity, social cohesion, and enduring national strength for current and future generations” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD
Nation building is a deliberate and continuous process of constructing cohesive, resilient, and prosperous societies capable of realising their full potential. It extends far beyond political structures or state institutions to encompass three interdependent spheres: peoples (individuals and communities), corporates (businesses and private-sector organisations), and nations (governance institutions and the state). When these spheres are strategically aligned through sound principles and practical strategies, they generate all-round exploits — inclusive economic growth, social cohesion, innovation, human flourishing, and global competitiveness.
This comprehensive framework offers actionable guidance for sustaining productive and progressive development. It is grounded in universal principles validated by international development experience, economic history, and governance studies, making it relevant for scholars, policymakers, business leaders, and development practitioners worldwide.
Foundational Principles of Effective Nation Building
Successful nation building rests on six core principles that transcend cultural, geographical, and ideological differences:
Inclusive Human Dignity and Agency — Recognising every citizen as both beneficiary and active architect of national progress through equal opportunity and rights protection.
Institutional Integrity and Rule of Law — Building transparent, accountable institutions that foster trust and predictability.
Economic Dynamism and Shared Prosperity — Promoting broad-based growth that benefits individuals, businesses, and the state simultaneously.
Social Cohesion and Cultural Resilience — Forging unity while respecting diversity to create a shared national identity and purpose.
Adaptive Leadership and Long-Term Vision — Combining strategic foresight with the flexibility to learn and adjust.
Sustainable Resource Stewardship — Balancing present needs with intergenerational equity in environmental and fiscal matters.
These principles provide a universal compass for development, as evidenced by cross-national data from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and the UNDP Human Development Reports.
Core Strategies Across the Three Spheres
For Peoples (Individuals and Communities): Nation building begins with empowering citizens. Key strategies include universal access to quality education and skills development, robust health and social protection systems, community-driven development programmes, and targeted initiatives for youth and women empowerment. These efforts enhance social mobility, reduce vulnerability, and foster active civic participation.
For Corporates (Businesses and Private Sector): Corporates serve as the primary engine of wealth creation and innovation. Effective strategies involve creating an enabling business environment, promoting public-private partnerships, enforcing strong corporate governance and ethical standards, and implementing talent development and local content policies. When supported appropriately, the private sector generates jobs, technological advancement, and tax revenues that fuel broader development.
For Nations (State Institutions and Governance): The state provides the overarching framework for progress. Strategies include institutional reform and capacity building, decentralisation for better responsiveness, evidence-based policy making, and strategic regional and global integration. Strong institutions ensure equitable rules, policy continuity, and effective service delivery.
Sustaining Progressive Growth in Nigeria
In Nigeria, this integrated framework offers a practical pathway to convert demographic and natural endowments into sustained prosperity. At the peoples’ level, investments in education, health, and skills development can transform the large youth population into a productive demographic dividend. For corporates, policy predictability, infrastructure development, and public-private partnerships can drive diversification beyond oil into agriculture, manufacturing, and digital services. At the national level, institutional reforms, anti-corruption measures, and evidence-based governance would reduce policy inconsistency and enhance public trust.
When these elements reinforce one another, Nigeria can achieve higher productivity, reduced poverty, greater social cohesion, and improved global competitiveness — creating a virtuous cycle of inclusive growth.
Advancing Development in West Africa
Within the ECOWAS region, the framework supports deeper integration and collective resilience. Strategies for social cohesion help address cross-border challenges such as irregular migration, climate impacts, and youth unemployment. Corporate-focused approaches encourage intra-regional trade and industrialisation through harmonised policies and stronger value chains. Institutional strategies promote policy coordination, joint humanitarian response, and shared security mechanisms.
By applying this model, West African countries can move from fragmented national efforts toward coordinated regional progress, enhancing food security, energy access, and economic competitiveness while building resilience against external shocks.
Driving Continental Transformation in Africa
Across Africa, the principles and strategies align closely with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Sustainable resource stewardship helps convert natural wealth into long-term human and infrastructure investments. The corporate strategies support regional value chains and industrialisation, while institutional reforms strengthen governance and reduce trade barriers.
When implemented continent-wide, this approach fosters inclusive industrialisation, technological advancement, and reduced external dependency — positioning Africa as a major driver of global growth in the 21st century.
Global Relevance and Contribution
On the global stage, the framework provides timely lessons for both developed and developing nations navigating technological disruption, climate change, and rising inequality. The emphasis on shared prosperity and social cohesion offers pathways to mitigate polarisation. The integration of corporates as development partners demonstrates how private-sector innovation can serve public goals. Institutional strategies of adaptive leadership and evidence-based policy making are universally applicable in managing complex transnational challenges.
Nations adopting this model contribute to global stability by reducing conflict drivers, enhancing food and energy security, and participating constructively in multilateral systems. In this way, the framework supports the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and helps build a more equitable and resilient world order.
Conclusion: A Practical Pathway to Enduring Progress
The principles and strategies of nation building presented here constitute a balanced, interconnected discipline capable of sustaining productive and progressive growth across multiple scales. For Nigeria, they chart a course from potential to performance. For West Africa, they strengthen regional solidarity. For Africa, they accelerate continental transformation. And for the global community, they offer practical wisdom for building fairer, more stable societies.
True nation building succeeds when peoples, corporates, and state institutions reinforce one another in a virtuous cycle. Its greatest strength lies in this holistic integration — recognising that sustainable development requires empowered citizens, innovative enterprises, and effective governance working in harmony.
In an increasingly interdependent world, embracing these principles with consistency, courage, and collective ownership is not merely beneficial but essential. Nations and regions that do so will unlock enduring prosperity, resilience, and a respected place in the global community. The framework provides both the vision and the practical tools needed to turn potential into lasting achievement for current and future generations.
Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.com, globalstageimpacts@gmail.com
Related


World Bank Flags ‘Hidden Spending System’ Diverting N34.53trn of Nigeria’s Revenue
Why MTN, Airtel Suspended Airtime, Data Borrowing Services + the FCCPC Connection
Voice of Emancipation: Nigeria’s Political Climate and the Yoruba Struggle
Tinubu, Victim of Historical Amnesia – Atiku
2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise
Again, Iran’s Military Closes Strait of Hormuz
African Heritage Awards: Honours Galore for Ex-AfDB President, Akinwumi Adesina
Leadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security
Tech and Humanity: When the System Has No Answer, Build One
Supreme Court Fixes April 22 for Hearing in ADC Leadership Crisis
Dele Momodu Proposes Atiku/Obi Ticket As ‘Best Bet’ to Unseat Tinubu in 2027
Man Rescued Amid Attempt to Jump into Lagos Lagoon
The Oracle: Human Rights: Our Everyday Essential Pt.2
2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise
Trending
-
Opinion2 days agoLeadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security
-
Tech and Humanity3 days agoTech and Humanity: When the System Has No Answer, Build One
-
Headline6 days agoSupreme Court Fixes April 22 for Hearing in ADC Leadership Crisis
-
Featured5 days agoDele Momodu Proposes Atiku/Obi Ticket As ‘Best Bet’ to Unseat Tinubu in 2027
-
Featured4 days agoMan Rescued Amid Attempt to Jump into Lagos Lagoon
-
The Oracle3 days agoThe Oracle: Human Rights: Our Everyday Essential Pt.2
-
Opinion2 days ago2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise
-
Business1 day agoWhy MTN, Airtel Suspended Airtime, Data Borrowing Services + the FCCPC Connection

