Connect with us

Opinion

Opinion: The NASS Cannot Amend the Constitution Through the Back Door

Published

on

By Chief Mike A. A. Ozekhome, SAN, OFR, FCIArb, LL.M, Ph.D, LL.D

 INTRODUCTION

In these trying times that assail our beleaguered Nation, the NASS should be seen to concentrate more on how creatively make laws that engender peace, order and good government of Nigeria; laws that promote prosperity, good governance, social justice and egalitarianism. The recent amendment to the Electoral Act has caused too much needless national hoopla and ruckus. It ought not have been at the centre stage of discourse in a sane society. Is conscripting the political space and discriminatorily barring certain classes of persons from contesting elections simply because they are political appointees, Nigeria’s immediate bane at the moment? I think not. There are more serious pressing issues with the newly amended Act of 2022 that need to be unearthed and discussed. I will highlight one or two anon.

NASS’S EARLIER MISSTEPS

Recall that the NASS had earlier proposed section 52(3) to the Electoral amendment bill which had sought to strip INEC of its independence and overall control over election matters. It had sought to subject INEC to the remote control and supervision of the NASS and the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), on the critical but sore issue of electronic voting and transmission of  election results.

This fatal step was later reluctantly reversed by the NASS after Nigerians rose up in unison against it. I, from my little inconsequential corner, had spilled buckets of ink (permit the hyperbole geared towards emphasis); and made several television appearances, advocating to get the clause extirpated, root and branch, from the amendment bill. The NASS had,at that time, comfortably ignored the fact that under section 158 of the 1999 Constitution, INEC “shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person”. The NASS had conveniently forgotten that it is INEC and INEC alone that is responsible for organising and supervising all elections to political offices; registering, monitoring of political parties; and conducting voter and civic education, including promotion of sound democratic processes. See also section 153 (f).

THE ALBATROSS IN SECTION 84(12) & (13) OF THE AMENDED ELECTORAL ACT

The NASS, while amending the Electoral Act, inserted subsections 12 and 13 into section 84,which, unlawfully, illegally and unconstitutionally, barred and disenfranchised serving political office holders from voting or being voted for at conventions or congresses of political parties. The now struck down offensive section 84(12) had provided thus:

“No political appointee at any level shall be voting delegate or to be voted for at the convention or congress of any political party for the purpose of the nomination of candidates for any election”.

Section 84 (13) drives this home more pungently, thus:

“Where a political party fails to comply with the provisions of this Act in the conduct of its primaries, its candidate for the election shall not be included in the election for the particular position in issue”.

With these two provisions, the NASS had sought to completely emasculate and consign to the vehicle of eletoral oblivion, a section of the political class,simply because they are currently serving their country. I wholly disagree with these subsections of section 84, more so as the qualifications to contest any political election in Nigeria have been exhaustively stipulated in the Nigerian Constitution, our grundnorm.

THE MORE ALARMING OUSTER CLAUSE IN THE AMENDED ELECTORAL ACT

I am surprised that all the critics of the Federal High Court judgement in Umuahia delivered by the Honourable Justice Evelyn Anyadike, have not adverted their learned minds to the more worrisome and  dangerous provision in section 84 (15). After granting the Federal High Court jurisdiction in section 84 (14), to entertain cases from “an aspirant who complains that the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party have not been complied with in selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court for redress”, subsection 15 of section 84 went on to completely oust the jurisdiction of all courts on matters concerning primaries, thus:

“Nothing in this section shall empower the courts to stop the holding of primaries or general elections under this Act pending the determination of a suit”.

Interpreted in another way, section 84(15) is simply saying:

“Courts, please, allow political parties to first do maximum damage during their primaries and general elections, and subsequently entertain emerging suits thereafter after the wrong candidates would have emerged and after resources, time and energy would have been expended by individuals, political parties, INEC and the electorate to conduct sham elections”. I am worried by this obnoxious ouster clause. Are you not?

I believe that the above subsections 12 and 13 of the amended Electoral Act are totally unconstitutional. They are ultra vires the powers of the NASS. What the NASS intended to do by subsections 12 and 13 of section 84 is to amend the Constitution through the backdoor, without going through the tortuous  amendment process prescribed in section 9 thereof; which deals with the mode of altering the provisions of the Constitution.

PRESIDENT BUHARI’S EARLIER OBJECTION

President Muhammadu Buhari had initially kicked and refused to assent to the Electoral Bill as initially amended by the NASS, which contained the above sub sections, especially subsection 12. To escape from the avalanche of criticisms that trailed his initial withholding of assent, Buhari later reluctantly signed the Bill into Law; but with a caveat vide a letter to the NASS, to consider amending section 84(12) subsequently.  He believed that subsection 84(12) imported into the Constitution extraneous matters such as blanket restriction and disqualification of political appointees who ought to be accorded protection. His argument is that a public officer could resign his office, withdraw or retire from service 30 days before the date of election in accordance with section 66(1) (f) of the 1999 Constitution. I think his handlers should have simply done an Executive amendment bill to the NASS; not a mere letter. But, I agree with his serious reservations about section 84(12).

WHY SECTION 84(12) AND (13) ARE OFFENSIVE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL

QUALIFICATION AND DISQUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION

Sections 66 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution provide for circumstances under which certain public officers are qualified or disqualified from contesting for election.

QUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION

Let us start with sections 65 (1) and (2) and 106 of the Constitution which deal with qualification for election, as a member of Senate and House of Representatives; and House of Assembly respectively. See also sections 137(1) (g) and 182(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution.

These sections provide that such a person for Senate or House of Representatives or member House of Assembly of a state shall be qualified to contest election if he is a citizen of Nigeria and has attained the age of 35 years (30 years for a House of Representatives members; and 25 years for a House of Assembly member); is educated up to at least school certificate level or its equivalent; and he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party.

DISQUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION

By virtue of sections 66 (1) and 107 (1) respectively any of the above the Constitution, a person is also disqualified if he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a country other than Nigeria; adjudged to be a lunatic or a person of unsound mind; is under a sentence of death, imposed on him by a court of competent jurisdiction; or a sentence of imprisonment or fine involving dishonesty or fraud. Such a person is also not qualified if he is an undischarged bankrupt; is a member of any secret society; or he has presented a forged certificate to INEC.

The most critical subsection for our discussion here, is section 66(1) (f) which provides that if such a person is employed in the “Public service of the Federation” or “Public service of a state” and has not resigned, withdrawn or retired from such employment THIRTY DAYS before the date of election for a State, he shall be disqualified from contesting or being voted for.

Sections 107 (1), 147 (4) and 192(3) deal with offices of ministers of the Government of the Federation and Commissioners in a state, respectively. A minister or Commissioner shall be deemed to have “resigned” his membership of the National Assembly or a state House of Assembly upon taking the Oath of office as a minister or Commissioner.

THE EXTANT LAWS

It is therefore clear, per adventure, that aside the circumscribing and inhibiting factors restricting a public appointee from contesting offices as described in the above sections of the Constitution, section 84 (12) and 13 are unconstitutional, illegal, null, void and of no effect whatsoever in so far as they import other extraneous disqualifying factors not provided for or envisaged by the Constitution itself. The NASS does not have the legislative power to import into the Constitution other additional disqualifying factors.

SECTION 84(12) & (13) ALSO CONTRAVENE SECTIONS 40 AND 42 OF THE CONSTITUTION

Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution grants every Nigerian the right to assemble and associate freely with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interests. See MOTORCYCLE TRANSPORT UNION OF NIGERIA & ORS VS. DELTA STATE MOTORCYCLIST ASSOC & ORS (2010) LPELR 4503 (CA); LAFIA LG VS. EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR NASSARAWA STATE & ORS (2012) LPELR 20602 (SC).

In addition to the above, section 42 accords every Nigerian the right to freedom from discrimination. See OKAFOR & ORS VS NTOKA (2017) LPELR – 42794 (CA); NMCN VS ADESINA (2016) LPELR – 40610 (CA) The question is, why will any Nigerian be prevented, disenfranchised or barred from being “a voting delegate or to be voted for at the convention or Congress of any political party for the nomination of candidates for any election”, simply because he is a political appointee, when the Constitution itself (the supreme law) has exhaustively outlined factors that are capable of barring a person from contesting any election?

SECTIONS 84 AND 318 OF THE CONSTITUTION CONSIDERED

Section 66(1) (8) provides for “public service” of the federation, or the “public service of a state”. Do political appointees such as ministers, commissioners and personal aids qualify to be protected by these sections. I believe so.

Some people have argued that it is only public servants envisaged in section 84 and as defined in section 318 of the Constitution that are covered by the 30 days resignation notice. They pontificate that political Appointees who hold offices at the pleasure of their appointors are not public servants within the meaning and intendment of sections 84 and 318 of the Constitution.

Specifically, they cite the cases of ONI v. FAYEMI & ORS (2019) LPELR-46622(CA);

WILSON V. AG BENDEL STATE & ORS. (1985) LPELR-3496 (SC); PPA V. PDP & ORS (2009) LPELR-4865(CA); SHITTA-BEY V. AG FEDERATION & ANOR (1995) LPELR-3055 (SC); ABUBAKAR V. The EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR, GOMBE STATE & ORS (2002) LPELR-1124 (CA); MILITARY GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE V. ADEWUNMI (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 82) 280; OJUKWU V. YAR’ADUA (2008) 4NWLR (Pt. 1078/435; AG BENDEL STATE V. AIDEYAN (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 118) 646; ADAMU V. TAKORI (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt 540) 1387 (CA).

I earnestly believe the attention of the courts in these cases was NEVER specifically drawn to the real meaning and effect of the phrases “Public Service of the Federation” and “Public Service of a State” as defined in the Constitution. The definition of “Public Service”, of the Federation, says section 318, means the SERVICE of the Federation in “ANY CAPACITY in RESPECT of the GOVERNMENT of the FEDERATION and INCLUDES service as…….”. The definition of “Public Service of the State” means the SERVICE of the STATE “in ANY CAPACITY in respect of the GOVERNMENT of the STATE and INCLUDES service as …..”.

Surely, in both cases, it is clear that the clause service in “ANY CAPACITY” is used in both the Federal and State governments. Can anyone plausably argue that ministers, commissioners and other appointees of Mr president or a Governor of a State who draw their salaries, allowances and other perquisites of office from the Federal or State treasury are not engaged in “ANY CAPACITY IN THE  SERVICE” in respect of the Governments of the Federation and States?  The other offices lined up in this interpretation section of 318 after “IN ANY CAPACITY” are merely in ADDITION to those offices already mentioned, as the section specifically states that the specie of public officers outlined thereunder is merely in addition to those employed in “any capacity” in both the Federal and state Governments.

More significantly, we must look at the definition of “public officer” in part 1 of the 5th schedule of the Constitution. There, a “public officer” is defined as “a person holding any of the offices specified in part II of this schedule. The person holding the said offices specifically include, amongst others, the President; Vice President; Senate President and his Vice; Speaker of the House of Representatives; Governor; Deputy Governor; CJN; Justices of the Supreme Court; Appeal Court; Attorney General of the Federation and of States; Ministers and Commissioners; SGF; Ambassadors; Chairman; Members and Staff of CCB/CCT; of LGCs; Statutory corporations and companies in which the federal or state Governments or LGCs have controlling interest.”

This category of persons therefore fall within the scope of “public officers” and “public servants”. I humbly submit therefore that political appointees fall within the scope of public servants, such as to enjoy whatever favours are granted to persons within the public service of the Federation or of the State. In any event, why the NASS should be involved in legislating for political parties as to who should be their contestants or voting delegates, thus restricting their constitutionally guaranteed rights. In deepening the plenitude and amplitude of democracy, political parties should be given the freedom and latitude to regulate their activities.

Why should the NASS make a law discriminating against political appointees when they themselves are free to contest, vote and be voted for as delegates at the same congress and conventions? How fair is that; on moral grounds, aside the illegality and unconstitutionality of it as I have copiously pointed out above?

NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VOTING AT GENERAL ELECTIONS AND VOTING AT POLITICAL PARTY CONGRESSES OR CONVENTIONS

I have heard the argument that the eligibility to vote or be voted for only affects general elections, and not elections at party congresses or conventions. I humbly disagree. Voting is voting; and election is election, whether at a general election, or at an election to elect candidates of political parties at party conventions or congresses. Both have to do with exercising one’s right to make a choice as between two or more candidates at an election through the ballot, or a show of hands. This is clear from the provisions of sections 82, 83 and 84 of the Electoral Act, 2022 (as amended). As in any general election, election by a political party at its congress or convention is invalid without the involvement of INEC. “Every registered political party shall give INEC 21 days notice of any convention, congress, conference or meeting convened for the purpose of ‘merger’ and electing members of its executive committee, other governing bodies or nominating candidates for any of the elective offices specified in this Act” (section 82(1)). See also sections 82 (2) and 82 (4).

The clincher is found in sections 82 (5), which provides that “failure of a political party to notify the Commission as stated in subsection 1 shall render the convention, congress, conference or meeting invalid”.

The non-observance of this critical provision was part of the reasons both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court declared the votes cast at the 2015 APC primaries in Zamfara state “wasted votes”. I personally handled both cases against the APC. The Supreme Court agreed with my invocation of the doctrine of “consequential relief”, which I had commended to it, and ordered that the CANDIDATE of the political party (NOT the POLITICAL PARTY) that had the next highest number of votes and constitutional spread in the local Government Areas of Zamfara State should produce the next Governor. That was how Dr Bello Mohammed Matawalle became Governor of Zamfara State under the platform of the PDP. See APC & ANOR VS. KABIRU MARAFA & 170 ORS (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt 1721) 383; APC & ORS VS KARFI & 2 ORS (2017) LPELR – 47024 (SC).

This point becomes clearer when one reads section 84 (3) of the Electoral Act, 2020, as amended. It prohibits a political party from imposing nomination qualification or disqualification criteria, measures, or conditions on any aspirant or candidate for any election in its Constitution, guidelines, or rules for nomination of candidates for elections, except as prescribed under section 65, 66, 106, 107, 131, 137, 177 and 187 of the Constitution. Why will the same NASS audaciously ignore section 84 (3) and make section 84 (12) and (13) in the same Act to bar certain persons from contesting in those same elections which it had warned political parties not to go into, when the Constitution itself has not specifically provided for such? Respectfully, the provision of section 84(12) is not only strange, but bizzare.

We must bring in here the rule of statutory interpretation, to the effect that the provisions of the Constitution are to be read as a whole; and not in parts. Can such critics argue that the same Constitution will take away with the left hand in sections 84 (12) and 318 what it has itself donated in sections 40, 42, 65 (1) and (2), 66 (1), 106, 107 (1), 137 (1) (g), 147 (4), 182 and192 (3), thereof? Can it be argued that the same section 84 which in it sub-section (3) forbade political parties from imposing nomination qualifications or disqualifications criteria, or impose conditions on aspirants or candidates for any election, will turn around in subsections 12 and 13 to outrightly ban such candidates from voting or being voted for, simply because they are political appointees? I think not. See the cases of Nafiu Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8-11 SC-130; Abegunde v. Ondo State House of Assembly & Ors (2015) LPELR-24588 (SC), wherein the Supreme Court emphasized the need to read provisions of the Constitution together as a whole and not in parts.

Some people have cited in aid of their arguments the provisions of section 228(a) of the 1999 Constitution which provides that:

 “The NASS may by law provide guidelines and rules to ensure INTERNAL DEMOCRACY within political parties, including making laws for the conduct of party primaries, party congresses and party conventions”.

This section actually encourages INTERNAL DEMOCRACY within political parties, which is designed to open up the political space and give every member a feeling of belonging. It was never designed or intended to restrict such members from voting and being voted for. The section actually frontally defeats section 84 (12) and (13) of the Electoral Act, 2022, as amended, and renders them unconstitutional, null and void.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT IN UMUAHIA

It is with the solid background of the law and constitutionalism espoused above that I totally agree with the judgment recently delivered by Honourable Justice Evelyn Anyadike of the Federal High Court, Umuahia Division. She scored the bull’s eye in striking down the offensive subsection 12 of section 84 of the new Electoral Act in Suit No. UM/CS/26/2022: CHIEF NDUKA EDEDE V AG FEDERATION.

Most critics have never even cared to read the full order made by Justice Anyadike, so as to understand its true import and purport. She did not just restrict her order to only political appointees as is erroneously widely believed. She actually extended it to “any political appointee, political or public office holder”, as envisaged (according to these critics) in sections 84 and 318 of the 1999 Constitution. She actually aligned her order with these sections with the intention to deepen, widen and liberalize the political space. She thus held as follows:

“1. I Declare that Section 84(12) of the Electoral Act, 2022, cannot validly and constitutionally limit, remove, abrogate, disenfranchise, disqualify, and oust the constitutional right or eligibility of any political appointee, political or public office holder to vote or be voted for at any Convention or Congress of any political party for the purposes of nomination of such person or candidate for any election, where such person has “resigned, withdrawn or retired” from the said political or public office, at least 30 days before the date of the election”.

 

  1. I Declare that the provisions of Section 84(12) of the Electoral Act, 2022, which limits, removes, abrogates, disenfranchises, disqualifies, and ousts the constitutional right and eligibility of any political appointee, political or public office holder to vote or be voted for at any Convention or Congress of any political party for the purposes of nomination of such person or candidate for any election, where such person has “resigned, withdrawn or retired” from the said political or public office, at least 30 days before the date of the election, is grossly ultra vires and inconsistent with Sections 6(6)(a) & (b), 66(1)(f), 107(1)(f), 137(1)(g) and 182(1)(g) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and therefore unconstitutional, invalid, illegal, null, void and of no effect whatsoever.
  2. I hereby nullify and set aside Section 84(12) of the Electoral Act, 2022, for being unconstitutional, invalid, null and void to the extent of its inconsistency with Sections 66(1)(f), 107(1)(f), 137(1)(g) and 182(1)(g) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).
  3. I hereby order the Defendant (The Attorney General of the Federation) to delete the provisions of Section 84(12) from the Electoral Act, 2022, with immediate effect.”

I respectfully agree with this judgment which remains valid until set aside by a higher appellate court. See the cases of AGBON-OJEME V. SALO-OJEME (2020) LPELR 49688(CA); NKWOKEDI & ORS V. OKUGO & ORS (2002) LPELR-2123(SC); EKPE V. EKURE & ANOR (2014) LPELR-24674(CA); UNITY BANK V. ONUMINYA (2019) LPELR-47507(CA).

THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

I commend the judgment of Justice Evelyn Anyadike landmark, for protecting the sanctity of the Constitution – the fons et origo; the grundnorm; which I have always described as the Oba, Eze and Emir of our laws. The Constitution constitutes the birth certificate of a nation. It highlights a Nation’s sovereignty and dignity.

The supremacy of the Constitution as against all other laws and Acts is provided for in section 1(1) and 1(3). By virtue of section 1(3) thereof,

“if any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other to the extent of the inconsistency be void”.

This supremacy has been severally emphasised in a plethora of cases. In UGBOJI V. STATE (2017) LPELR-43427(SC), the Nigerian apex court, per Amiru Sanusi, JSC (Pp. 23-23, paras B-D), held thus:

“My lords, permit me to reiterate that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, had by Section One, made provision to emphasise or assert its supremacy. By that provision, any law/statute or provisions thereof that runs riot and violent to the provisions of the Constitution or is in conflict with the constitutional provision is null and void to the extent of inconsistency. See A.G. ONDO STATE V. A.G. OF THE FEDERATION AND ORS (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt 772) 226.”

Consequently, where the provisions of the Constitution conflict with the provisions of Acts or Bills passed by the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly, the former prevail. See also the cases of OLAGBENRO & ORS V. OLAYIWOLA & ORS (2014) LPELR-22597(CA); A.G. ABIA STATE V. A.G. FEDERATION (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) page 265 at pages 290 and 291; AINABEBHOLO V. EDO STATE UNIVERSITY WORKERS FARMERS MULTI-PURPOSE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD. & ANR. (2007) 2 NWLR (Part 1017) page 33 at page 50, paragraph G and P, 151 paragraphs C-D.

Indeed, the apex court has held in ISHOLA V. AJIBOYE (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt 352) 506, that the Constitution is not only supreme when another law is inconsistent with it, but also when another law seeks to compete with it in an area already covered by the Constitution. This is called the doctrine of covering the field. See AG, ONDO V. AG, FEDERATION (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt 772) 222; AG, OGUN STATE V. AG, FEDERATION (1982) 1-2 SC 7; SARAKI V. FRN (2016) LPELR-40013(SC); INEC V. BALARABE MUSA (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt 806) 72; NWANGWU V. UKACHUKWU & ANOR (2000) LPELR-6913(CA).

Consequently, it is clear that section 84(12) is loudly unconstitutional, null, void, of no effect whatsoever and was dead on arrival. As dead as dodo! This is because the Electoral Act (Amendment) Act, 2022, in section 84(12) imposed fresh hurdles on the part of political appointees to contest election during their party Congresses and conventions. The section is a direct frontal attack on and confrontation with the sanctity and supremacy of the Constitution. In that respect therefore, Justice Anyadike was correct to have struck down the section.

It must also be emphasized here that the Constitution reserves the right to expressly make provisions, and such provisions are usually interpreted literally.

An Act, Bill or even courts, cannot read into, or add words to the Constitution, nor subtract from it. As a result, the golden latin maxim of EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS – the explicit mention of one thing is the exclusion of another – applies to the Constitution. The Constitution has expressly provided for factors that disqualify aspirants who seek to contest elections in Nigeria. See PORTS AND CARGO HANDLINGS SERVICES CO LTD & ORS V. MIGFO (NIG) LTD & ANOR (2012) LPELR-9725(SC); EHUWA V. ONDO STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2006) LPELR-1056(SC); and, WEST AFRICAN UTILITIES METERING & SERVICES LTD V. AKWA IBOM PROPERTY AND INVESTMENTS CO LTD (2019) LPELR-47089(CA).

The NASS has no vires to add to, or subtract from same. Consequently, section 84(12) of the amended Electoral Act is patently null and void, unconstitutional, unlawful, and of no effect whatsoever. I thank Justice Evelyn Anyadike for giving it a well deserved burial through her refreshing judgment.

THE POLITICAL SPECTRE LOOMING IN THE ENTIRE AMENDED CLAUSE

NASS V. BUHARI

I have, as ever always, in this outing, tried to avoid discussing the politics of the amendment brouhaha and concentrate only on my dissertation of the law on the subject matter. Otherwise, if we were to look at the politics of it, many questions immediately spring up for answers. For example, when did we ever witness the 9th NASS oppose President Buhari’s budgets, bills, letters, actions or requests? When did the NASS ever challenge or overrule Buhari’s nepotic, prebendalistic, tribalistic, cronyistic, religious and sectionalistic appointments in the last 7 years? I cannot remember. Or, can you? When did the “Mr-take-a-bow” Senate (my pet name for the present red chamber, for never ever properly screening public appointees (always telling them to take a bow and go); and for always kowtowing to Mr President’s serial requests for humongous loans that haemorage Nigeria ever oppose Buhari? We are talking about loans that await us like booby traps and sentinels at the door steps of generations yet unborn. I cannot remember when the NASS ever opposed Buhari. Or, can you?

THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL IN THIS SUIT

When did the Attorney General of the Federation, Abubakar Malami, ever refuse to appeal a judgement and spontaneously act the judgment with such automatic alacrity, in obeying Justice Anyadike’s order of court, as we just witnessed? Remember how court judgments and orders were serially disobeyed in the El Zakzaki and Ibrahim Dasuki cases? Would Malami have taken the same steps if the judgment had gone against him and the government? I think not.

THE ISSUE OF JOINDER

Why were the NASS (which initially passed the law), and INEC the implementor of  the law not joined in the suit, at least, as INTERESTED and PROPER parties, even if not as NECESSARY parties? See GREEN VS GREEN (1987) NWLR (PT 61) 481.

VOIDANCE OR DELETION?

Why would the Attorney-General seek to delete the offensive section 84 (12) as ordered by the Judge? A court’s duty stops at voiding an Act or law; but not to delete or repeal it. That is a job for the legislature or the Law Revision Commission. When did the Attorney-General (a top player in the Executive) possess statutory powers to delete Acts of the Legislature when laws are normally gazetted by the Legislature after the President and Governor had respectively signed bills into law? One should have thought that merely voiding the Act was sufficient until future amendment of the Act and consequential deletion of the offensive section, based on the court’s judgment in striking it down.

VENUE OF THE SUIT

By the way, why was the case filed at FHC in far away Umuahia, Abia State, when the Attorney-General works and resides in Abuja; and when the NASS and INEC (interested parties) are also located in Abuja? Was it an act of forum-shopping and Judge-shopping? I do not know. Or do you?

LOCUS STANDI

On locus standi, I do not agree with those who questioned the locus standi of Chief Nduka Edede, the plaintiff. Every Nigerian has the locus standi to question the validity of any statute he believes is unconstitutional.

In the case of AKINPELU & 20 ORS. V. AG OYO STATE (1985) 5 NCLR 557, it was held as follows:

“In my view, the question of locus standi vis-à-vis our present Constitution, cannot be adequately thrashed out without considering the effect of Section 4(8) of the Constitution…. In other words, the subsection places on the court a supervisory jurisdiction over the legislative powers by the National Assembly and a House of Assembly. As any citizen is affected by a new law enacted by the legislature, it seems to me therefore that such citizens should be accorded the right to challenge the constitutionality of such enactment. In the case in hand, I accept his evidence adduced by the plaintiffs that they reside in Lagelu Local Government and that they pay rates to Lagelu Local Government Council”.

In line with this trend of thought, the court in EJEH V. AG, IMO STATE (1985) 8 NCLR 390, relied on the causa célèbre of ABRAHAM ADESANYA V. PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATION (1981) 2 NCLR 358, and laid down three principles thus:

“ (1) It behoves any person who is convinced that there is an infraction of the provisions of the Constitution to be able to go to court and ask for appropriate relief if relief is required.

(2) A defendant should be wrong in challenging the locus standi or the capacity of a plaintiff to sue, when the cause of action is intended to keep the law and the Constitution of the country serene and inviolate.

(3) Any person whose interest, obligation or rights are regulated by any law of general application is an interested party in a cause, matter or suit involving the determination of the validity or constitutionality of such law, notwithstanding that such a person is not made a party in the proceedings”.

In the said apex case of ADESANYA (supra), celeral Justice Kayode Eso, JSC (of blessed memory) had held, most lucidly that:

“It has to be accepted that our Constitution has undisguisedly put the Judiciary in a pre-eminent position, a position unknown to any other Constitution under the Common Law, where the Judiciary has to see to the correct exercise of the legislative powers by the National Assembly”.           

There are too many questions begging for answers in the way and manner the amendment was handled.

WAY OUT OF THE APPARENT CONUNDRUM

To avoid the present confusion and apparent bad blood generated by the protagonists and antagonists of section 84(12), the following steps could be taken immediately:

Firstly, the NASS should, in its ongoing Constitutional amendment exercise, amend section 66(1)(f) of the Constitution, to specifically include the following category of persons: “all political appointees by whatever name called” ,as persons who must give 30 days notice to be able to contest election.

Secondly, the NASS itself, political parties, politicians, lawyers, NGOs, members of the Civil Society and all those who are aggrieved by Justice Evelyn Anyadike’s judgment, should apply to the Court of Appeal for joinder in the suit as interested parties to force an appeal, or prosecute any appeal arising therefrom. This is legally permissible under the Constitution (section 243 of the party sought to be joined can show that he ought to have been joined in the suit. Court of Appeal Act and Rules. See the cases of MUDASIRU & ORS. V. ONYEARU & ORS. (2013) LPELR- 20354 (CA); KATAMI V. KATAMI (2018) LPELR- 46417 (CA); MOUKARI & ANOR V. WILLIAM & ORS (2021) LPELR-54860 (CA); IN: RE ELEMA (2018) LPELR- 46233 (CA); WAZIRI V. GUMEL (2012) LPELR-2843 (SC). I believe such an application will be granted without much ado. Thirdly, where the Attorney-General willfully refuses to appeal the judgment, such aggrieved persons can challenge the deletion of section 84(12) in a fresh suit. Let us develop our jurisprudence. Let us expand new vistas and expound the frontiers of the law through judicial decisions. Let us situate our arguments within the proper legal regime and constitutional organogram of our laws, devoid of political sentiments, emotions and morality. There is a wide gulf between the “lex lata” (the law as it is) and the “delege ferenda” (the law as we would want it to be). I have observed that many analysts usually anchor their arguments on morals and ethics. Jurisprudence and law are not morality. Such moralists are advised to seek refuge at the pulpits in our churches, monasteries; or mosques; or even shrines. But, certainly not hard-cold law.

Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Opinion

2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise

Published

on

By

By Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba

To be candid and straightforward, this article is written to sensitize Nigerians to the growing smear campaign against Atiku Abubakar, a campaign of calumny that appears less about national interest and more about political anxiety. The persistence and intensity of these attacks suggest one thing: there are powerful interests who see him not merely as a contender, but as a genuine threat. Yet, Nigerians are no longer easily distracted. The electorate is becoming more discerning, more interested in good governance.

Closely tied to this is the urgency of the 2027 presidential election. This is not just another electoral cycle, it may well represent a turning point in Nigeria’s history. Although Atiku Abubakar has confirmed 2027 to be his last presidential outing. That reality alone elevates the stakes. It presents Nigeria with a stark choice: to either harness a reservoir of experience at a critical moment or risk drifting further into uncertainty. In clear terms, 2027 is not just about political succession, it is about whether Nigeria recalibrates its direction or continues along a path of deepening national challenges.

The fundamental truth is that, experience and effective leadership are positively correlated, independent of age. Leadership in a complex state like Nigeria requires far more than youthful enthusiasm. It demands institutional memory, policy depth, negotiation skills, and the ability to manage crises with precision. It is therefore misguided to reduce leadership capability to age alone. Age neither guarantees competence nor invalidates it. Across the world, both young and elderly leaders have failed when they lacked the depth of experience required for governance. In Nigeria itself, recent experience with president Tinubu shows that leadership failure cannot be attributed to age alone. This underscores a critical point: the true dividing line between success and failure in leadership is not age, it is experience, particularly practical and relevant experience, which is too often overlooked.

Global political trends reinforce this reality. In the United States, voters returned Donald Trump to power over Kamala Harris, reflecting a preference for perceived experience over age. Figures such as Bernie Sanders remain influential well into their later years, shaping national discourse. Similarly, in Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected again at an advanced age because voters trusted his tested capacity to lead during difficult times. A similar pattern recently played out in West Africa. In Liberia, the younger incumbent George Weah was defeated by the significantly older Joseph Boakai. That outcome was widely interpreted as a preference by Liberians for experience and not youthful appeal. These examples are not coincidences. They illustrate a consistent global pattern that when nations face uncertainty, they turn to experience. Nigeria must not waste the experience of Atiku Abubakar like it happened with remarkable figures like Obafemi Awolowo, Chief MKO Abiola and Malam Aminu Kano in the past.

Beyond the question of age lies another critical issue: political strategy. The debate over who should carry the opposition banner in 2027 must be guided by political reality. Nigeria’s recent history makes this abundantly clear. When Goodluck Jonathan sought re-election, the opposition were less influenced by sentiment. Instead, they made a strategic calculation, searching for a candidate with national reach and electoral strength, an idea that birthed Muhammadu Buhari as the opposition candidate, despite his previous electoral defeats.

It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument that Atiku Abubakar should be excluded on the basis that he has contested before. By that same reasoning, Buhari would never have emerged as a viable candidate. Political persistence is not a weakness; it is often a reflection of conviction, resilience, and determination. Elections are not won by novelty alone, they are won by structure, experience, and the ability to connect with a broad electorate.

Equally unconvincing is the argument that 2027 should be determined by zoning or that it is “still the turn of the South.” If the opposition is serious about unseating president Tinubu, it must prioritize a candidate with the experience, national appeal, and political structure required to achieve that goal. Atiku Abubakar is therefore the “asset” of the today. His eight years as Vice President under Olusegun Obasanjo provided him with deep exposure to governance, economic reform, and institutional development. Beyond public office, he is widely recognized as a seasoned politician and an established businessman with independent wealth, an important factor in a political environment often clouded by concerns about misuse of public resources.

Interestingly, it’s increasingly clear that Nigerians are moving beyond superficial narratives. The electorate is more focused on outcomes, on who can stabilize the economy, strengthen institutions, and restore confidence in governance. The conversation is shifting from age to ability, from rhetoric to results.

As 2027 approaches, the choice before Nigeria is becoming clearer. This is not a contest of personalities or a debate about generational symbolism. It is a question of capacity, preparedness, and national survival. History, both global and local, points in one direction: when experience is sidelined, nations pay the price.

Nigeria cannot afford that mistake again…

Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba writes from Kano, and can be reached via drssbaba@yahoo.com

Continue Reading

Opinion

Leadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security

Published

on

By

By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

“Security is not built by arms alone, but by the quality of leadership that turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and divergent interests into common purpose.” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

Abstract

In an era of complex transnational threats, effective regional and continental security hinges less on military capabilities or institutional frameworks and more on the quality of leadership. This article explores how visionary, adaptive, ethical, and inclusive leadership serves as the critical catalyst for transforming shared vulnerabilities into collective strength. Through in-depth case studies of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside comparative insights from the European Union and ASEAN, it demonstrates that leadership determines whether security protocols remain aspirational or deliver tangible protection. The analysis highlights both successes and limitations, identifying key attributes of effective security leadership: strategic foresight, consensus-building, institutional coordination, and accountability. Ultimately, the article argues that investing in high-calibre leadership at every level is essential for building resilient, people-centred security systems capable of addressing contemporary challenges and contributing to a more stable global order.

Introduction

Effective regional and continental security depends far more on leadership than on military hardware, intelligence capabilities, or financial resources alone. Leadership supplies the vision, political will, strategic coherence, ethical foundation, and sustained commitment required to transform fragmented national efforts into unified, sustainable security outcomes. In an era marked by transnational threats — terrorism, organised crime, climate-induced conflicts, cyber vulnerabilities, irregular migration, and hybrid warfare — the quality of leadership at regional and continental levels determines whether security architectures deliver genuine protection or remain aspirational documents on paper.

The Indispensable Role of Leadership in Regional and Continental Security

Leadership in security contexts operates across multiple interconnected layers. At the strategic level, it involves setting a long-term vision that anticipates emerging threats and aligns collective resources before crises escalate. At the operational level, it demands the ability to coordinate institutions, mobilise resources, and execute joint actions efficiently. At the relational level, it requires building and maintaining trust among sovereign states with often competing interests, historical grievances, and differing priorities.

Effective leaders in this domain exhibit several critical attributes. They demonstrate visionary foresight, the capacity to read complex geopolitical and socio-economic trends and translate them into proactive strategies. They exercise adaptive decision-making, adjusting approaches as threats evolve while preserving core principles. They practise inclusive diplomacy, forging consensus without compromising sovereignty. Above all, they uphold ethical integrity and accountability, ensuring that security measures respect human rights and maintain public legitimacy. Without these qualities, even the most sophisticated security protocols risk becoming ineffective or counterproductive.

ECOWAS in West Africa: Leadership-Driven Collective Security

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975 primarily as an economic integration body, has evolved into one of Africa’s most sophisticated and tested regional security mechanisms. This transformation was not inevitable but resulted from deliberate, courageous, and often pragmatic leadership in response to existential threats that threatened to engulf the entire sub-region.

The pivotal moment came in the early 1990s when Liberia descended into a devastating civil war. Faced with the risk of regional contagion, ECOWAS leaders, particularly Nigeria’s General Ibrahim Babangida and Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, took the unprecedented step of creating the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 — Africa’s first sub-regional peacekeeping force. This was a bold departure from the Organisation of African Unity’s strict non-interference policy. ECOMOG’s interventions in Liberia (1990–1997) and Sierra Leone (1997–2000) prevented state collapse, contained the spread of conflict, and created political space for negotiated settlements and eventual democratic transitions.

Leadership played a pivotal role in these outcomes. Nigerian leadership provided the bulk of troops and financial resources, while Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings offered critical diplomatic backing. The willingness of several heads of state to commit substantial national resources despite domestic criticism demonstrated a rare form of collective political will. These interventions also led to important institutional developments, including the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and later the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).

In more recent years, ECOWAS leadership has continued to evolve. During the 2010–2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS applied sustained diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force, contributing significantly to the eventual restoration of constitutional order. In response to the rise of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, ECOWAS has strengthened intelligence sharing, supported the Multinational Joint Task Force, and promoted greater coordination among affected states. The organisation has also demonstrated its preventive diplomacy capacity in The Gambia (2016–2017), where firm but measured leadership helped resolve a dangerous post-election standoff without large-scale violence, and in Guinea (2021), where it applied sanctions and mediation to encourage return to constitutional rule.

Yet ECOWAS leadership has also encountered significant limitations. Divergent national interests, chronic funding shortfalls, and occasional leadership vacuums have sometimes slowed or complicated responses. The recent wave of military coups and political transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger (2021–2023) tested the organisation’s cohesion and exposed the challenge of enforcing normative standards when powerful member states resist collective decisions. These episodes underscore a recurring truth: regional security leadership is only as strong as the political commitment and institutional capacity behind it.

Despite these challenges, ECOWAS remains one of the most advanced regional security mechanisms on the continent. Its evolution from an economic community to a security actor demonstrates how visionary leadership, combined with institutional innovation and political will, can enable a regional organisation to respond effectively to complex security threats. The ECOWAS experience offers enduring lessons: effective regional security leadership must be proactive rather than reactive, adaptive to new threats, inclusive of multiple stakeholders, and continuously reinforced through institutional reform and sustained political will.

African Union’s Continental Leadership: The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has emerged as a central actor in shaping Africa’s security landscape through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Established following the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, APSA represents a fundamental shift in African leadership philosophy — moving from the OAU’s rigid doctrine of non-interference to the AU’s principle of “non-indifference” when grave circumstances threaten peace and stability.

The architecture comprises five key pillars: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund. This comprehensive framework was designed to enable Africa to take primary responsibility for its own peace and security rather than relying predominantly on external actors.

Leadership has been the critical variable in APSA’s performance. The decision by African heads of state to create the Peace and Security Council marked a bold act of continental leadership, giving the AU authority to authorise interventions in cases of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. One of the most visible demonstrations of this leadership was the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched in 2007. Despite enormous challenges, AMISOM — later reconfigured as the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) — helped degrade Al-Shabaab’s control over large parts of the country and created space for political processes and state-building. This mission showcased the AU’s willingness to deploy troops and sustain long-term engagement where international partners were initially hesitant.

Another significant example is the AU’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Darfur (Sudan), South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Lake Chad Basin. In each case, the effectiveness of AU leadership depended heavily on the political will and diplomatic skill of key member states, the AU Commission Chairperson, and the Peace and Security Council. The AU’s successful facilitation of the 2019 political transition in Sudan and its ongoing mediation efforts in multiple conflict zones further illustrate how continental leadership can create pathways for dialogue when national institutions falter.

However, the AU’s leadership has also encountered notable limitations. Funding shortages, logistical constraints, and sometimes divergent interests among member states have hampered rapid and decisive action. The 2011 Libya intervention exposed deep divisions within the AU, while recent political transitions and coups in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea) have tested the Union’s ability to enforce its normative frameworks consistently. These experiences reveal that continental leadership remains vulnerable to the sovereignty concerns of member states and the challenge of translating political consensus into operational effectiveness.

Despite these constraints, the AU has made important strides in institutionalising leadership for peace and security. The adoption of the African Union Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030 and the ongoing efforts to fully operationalise the African Standby Force reflect a long-term strategic vision. The Union has also strengthened its partnership with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, recognising that effective continental security requires layered leadership — with RECs often acting as first responders and the AU providing strategic oversight and legitimacy.

The African Union’s journey demonstrates both the immense potential and the inherent difficulties of continental leadership in security matters. When leadership is bold, united, and well-resourced, the AU can play a transformative role in preventing conflict, managing crises, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. When leadership is fragmented or under-resourced, progress slows and opportunities for timely intervention are lost.

SADC Regional Interventions: Leadership, Solidarity, and the Limits of Collective Action

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) offers a distinct model of regional security leadership shaped by its historical struggle against apartheid and a strong emphasis on sovereignty and consensus. Originally formed in 1980 to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, SADC has gradually expanded its security role through the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

SADC’s most prominent military intervention occurred in 1998 in Lesotho. Following a disputed election and political violence, South Africa and Botswana, acting under SADC authority, launched Operation Boleas to restore order and facilitate new elections. While the intervention achieved its immediate objectives, it was criticised for limited consultation with other SADC members and for being perceived as South African dominance rather than genuine collective action. This episode highlighted both the potential and the sensitivities of SADC leadership in security matters.

A more sustained and complex engagement has been SADC’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 2013, SADC has supported the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Comprising troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, the FIB was mandated to conduct offensive operations against armed groups. South African leadership was instrumental in pushing for the creation of the FIB, reflecting Pretoria’s strategic interest in stabilising the Great Lakes region. The intervention has had mixed results: it helped degrade some armed groups but has struggled with the sheer complexity of conflict dynamics, resource constraints, and the challenge of addressing root causes such as governance failures and illicit resource exploitation.

More recently, in 2021, SADC deployed the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to address the escalating insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. The mission, led by South African forces with contributions from several member states, aimed to support the Mozambican government in restoring security and protecting civilians. Leadership from South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania was critical in mobilising rapid deployment. While SAMIM has contributed to the degradation of insurgent capabilities and the protection of key economic installations, challenges remain, including coordination with Rwandan forces operating in the same theatre and the need for a stronger focus on addressing underlying socio-economic grievances.

SADC’s security interventions reveal a distinct leadership pattern dominated by a few influential member states, particularly South Africa. This “hegemonic leadership” model has enabled action when consensus is difficult to achieve but has also generated resentment among smaller states wary of South African dominance. Zimbabwe and Angola have also played significant roles in specific contexts, while smaller states have contributed troops and political legitimacy.

The consensus-based decision-making culture within SADC has been both a strength and a limitation. It ensures broad buy-in when agreement is reached, but it can lead to slow or diluted responses when member states have divergent interests. The principle of “quiet diplomacy” has often prioritised political dialogue over forceful intervention, sometimes delaying decisive action.

SADC interventions have achieved notable successes. They have prevented state collapse in Lesotho, contributed to stabilisation efforts in the DRC, and helped contain the Cabo Delgado insurgency. The organisation has also developed important normative frameworks, including the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and mechanisms for electoral observation and conflict prevention.

However, limitations are equally evident. Funding remains chronically inadequate, often forcing reliance on external partners or lead nations. Logistical challenges, interoperability issues among national forces, and uneven political commitment have constrained operational effectiveness. Critics argue that SADC’s responses have sometimes prioritised regime security over human security, particularly in cases involving member states’ internal political crises.

The SADC experience underscores several important lessons about regional security leadership. First, hegemonic leadership can enable rapid action but risks undermining legitimacy and long-term cohesion. Second, consensus-based systems require strong mediation and facilitation skills to convert agreement into effective implementation. Third, sustainable security leadership must address both immediate threats and underlying structural drivers such as poverty, inequality, and governance deficits. Finally, SADC’s trajectory shows that regional organisations can play meaningful security roles even without a single dominant power, provided there is sufficient political will and institutional adaptability.

Comparative Insights from Other Regions

Global experiences reinforce these lessons. The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has succeeded largely because of consistent institutional leadership and shared norms among member states, enabling joint missions and rapid response capabilities. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s consensus-based leadership model has helped maintain stability amid complex geopolitical tensions, although it has occasionally been criticised for slower decision-making. These cases confirm that effective regional security leadership requires a delicate balance between respect for sovereignty and the courage to pursue collective action.

Persistent Challenges and Pathways Forward

Leadership in regional and continental security faces recurring obstacles: divergent national interests, resource constraints, weak institutional capacity, and external interference. Political transitions and electoral cycles can disrupt continuity, while hybrid threats demand leaders capable of integrating diverse tools and actors.

To build more effective security leadership, regional and continental organisations must invest deliberately in leadership development. This includes targeted programmes that cultivate strategic foresight, ethical governance, collaborative skills, and crisis management capabilities. Institutional mechanisms should be designed to ensure policy continuity beyond changes in individual leaders. Greater inclusion of civil society, youth, and women in security decision-making can enhance legitimacy and broaden perspectives. Finally, partnerships with global actors should be pursued in ways that preserve African agency and ownership.

Conclusion

Leadership remains the single most decisive factor in regional and continental security. It is the invisible bridge that transforms fragile agreements into enduring peace, turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and converts divergent national interests into a common purpose. The experiences of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union across the continent, and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside valuable lessons from Europe and Southeast Asia, consistently demonstrate one fundamental truth: even the most sophisticated security architectures will falter without visionary, ethical, and collaborative leadership.

In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, where threats respect no borders, the quality of leadership at every level — from heads of state to technical experts within regional commissions — will ultimately determine whether Africa and other regions merely survive successive crises or rise to build lasting stability and prosperity.

The challenge before current and future leaders is clear: to move beyond rhetoric and embrace the difficult work of forging unity, exercising foresight, upholding accountability, and investing in people-centred security solutions. Those who answer this call will not only secure their nations and regions but will also leave a legacy of peace that benefits generations yet unborn and contributes meaningfully to a more stable global order.

True security is not built by arms alone. It is built by leadership that dares to imagine, unite, and act for the common good.

Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.comglobalstageimpacts@gmail.com

Continue Reading

Opinion

Nation Building Reimagined: Integrated Principles and Strategies for Sustainable Growth

Published

on

By

By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

“True nation building is not the work of the state alone, but a harmonious convergence where empowered peoples provide the foundation, innovative corporates generate the momentum, and visionary institutions ensure direction — together forging sustainable prosperity, social cohesion, and enduring national strength for current and future generations” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

Nation building is a deliberate and continuous process of constructing cohesive, resilient, and prosperous societies capable of realising their full potential. It extends far beyond political structures or state institutions to encompass three interdependent spheres: peoples (individuals and communities), corporates (businesses and private-sector organisations), and nations (governance institutions and the state). When these spheres are strategically aligned through sound principles and practical strategies, they generate all-round exploits — inclusive economic growth, social cohesion, innovation, human flourishing, and global competitiveness.

This comprehensive framework offers actionable guidance for sustaining productive and progressive development. It is grounded in universal principles validated by international development experience, economic history, and governance studies, making it relevant for scholars, policymakers, business leaders, and development practitioners worldwide.

Foundational Principles of Effective Nation Building

Successful nation building rests on six core principles that transcend cultural, geographical, and ideological differences:

Inclusive Human Dignity and Agency — Recognising every citizen as both beneficiary and active architect of national progress through equal opportunity and rights protection.
Institutional Integrity and Rule of Law — Building transparent, accountable institutions that foster trust and predictability.
Economic Dynamism and Shared Prosperity — Promoting broad-based growth that benefits individuals, businesses, and the state simultaneously.
Social Cohesion and Cultural Resilience — Forging unity while respecting diversity to create a shared national identity and purpose.
Adaptive Leadership and Long-Term Vision — Combining strategic foresight with the flexibility to learn and adjust.
Sustainable Resource Stewardship — Balancing present needs with intergenerational equity in environmental and fiscal matters.
These principles provide a universal compass for development, as evidenced by cross-national data from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and the UNDP Human Development Reports.

 

Core Strategies Across the Three Spheres

For Peoples (Individuals and Communities): Nation building begins with empowering citizens. Key strategies include universal access to quality education and skills development, robust health and social protection systems, community-driven development programmes, and targeted initiatives for youth and women empowerment. These efforts enhance social mobility, reduce vulnerability, and foster active civic participation.

For Corporates (Businesses and Private Sector): Corporates serve as the primary engine of wealth creation and innovation. Effective strategies involve creating an enabling business environment, promoting public-private partnerships, enforcing strong corporate governance and ethical standards, and implementing talent development and local content policies. When supported appropriately, the private sector generates jobs, technological advancement, and tax revenues that fuel broader development.

For Nations (State Institutions and Governance): The state provides the overarching framework for progress. Strategies include institutional reform and capacity building, decentralisation for better responsiveness, evidence-based policy making, and strategic regional and global integration. Strong institutions ensure equitable rules, policy continuity, and effective service delivery.

Sustaining Progressive Growth in Nigeria

In Nigeria, this integrated framework offers a practical pathway to convert demographic and natural endowments into sustained prosperity. At the peoples’ level, investments in education, health, and skills development can transform the large youth population into a productive demographic dividend. For corporates, policy predictability, infrastructure development, and public-private partnerships can drive diversification beyond oil into agriculture, manufacturing, and digital services. At the national level, institutional reforms, anti-corruption measures, and evidence-based governance would reduce policy inconsistency and enhance public trust.

When these elements reinforce one another, Nigeria can achieve higher productivity, reduced poverty, greater social cohesion, and improved global competitiveness — creating a virtuous cycle of inclusive growth.

Advancing Development in West Africa

Within the ECOWAS region, the framework supports deeper integration and collective resilience. Strategies for social cohesion help address cross-border challenges such as irregular migration, climate impacts, and youth unemployment. Corporate-focused approaches encourage intra-regional trade and industrialisation through harmonised policies and stronger value chains. Institutional strategies promote policy coordination, joint humanitarian response, and shared security mechanisms.

By applying this model, West African countries can move from fragmented national efforts toward coordinated regional progress, enhancing food security, energy access, and economic competitiveness while building resilience against external shocks.

Driving Continental Transformation in Africa

Across Africa, the principles and strategies align closely with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Sustainable resource stewardship helps convert natural wealth into long-term human and infrastructure investments. The corporate strategies support regional value chains and industrialisation, while institutional reforms strengthen governance and reduce trade barriers.

When implemented continent-wide, this approach fosters inclusive industrialisation, technological advancement, and reduced external dependency — positioning Africa as a major driver of global growth in the 21st century.

Global Relevance and Contribution

On the global stage, the framework provides timely lessons for both developed and developing nations navigating technological disruption, climate change, and rising inequality. The emphasis on shared prosperity and social cohesion offers pathways to mitigate polarisation. The integration of corporates as development partners demonstrates how private-sector innovation can serve public goals. Institutional strategies of adaptive leadership and evidence-based policy making are universally applicable in managing complex transnational challenges.

Nations adopting this model contribute to global stability by reducing conflict drivers, enhancing food and energy security, and participating constructively in multilateral systems. In this way, the framework supports the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and helps build a more equitable and resilient world order.

Conclusion: A Practical Pathway to Enduring Progress

The principles and strategies of nation building presented here constitute a balanced, interconnected discipline capable of sustaining productive and progressive growth across multiple scales. For Nigeria, they chart a course from potential to performance. For West Africa, they strengthen regional solidarity. For Africa, they accelerate continental transformation. And for the global community, they offer practical wisdom for building fairer, more stable societies.

True nation building succeeds when peoples, corporates, and state institutions reinforce one another in a virtuous cycle. Its greatest strength lies in this holistic integration — recognising that sustainable development requires empowered citizens, innovative enterprises, and effective governance working in harmony.

In an increasingly interdependent world, embracing these principles with consistency, courage, and collective ownership is not merely beneficial but essential. Nations and regions that do so will unlock enduring prosperity, resilience, and a respected place in the global community. The framework provides both the vision and the practical tools needed to turn potential into lasting achievement for current and future generations.

Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.com, globalstageimpacts@gmail.com

Continue Reading

Trending