Opinion

The Oracle: Different People, Different Forms of Government (Pt.11)

Published

5 years ago

September 3, 2021

Eric

By Chief Mike Ozekhome

INTRODUCTION

Last week, we discussed totalitarianism, capitalism and a bit of communism, as forms of government that run against the grain of democracy. Democracy appears to be the most popular and accepted form of government across the world. Readers, globally, have been urging me to continue with this enlightening project. I will therefore continue our discourse today with Communism and Aristocracy.

WHAT IS COMMUNISM? (continues)

The concept of communism revolves around the theory or system of social organization in which all property is owned by the community and each person contributes and receives according to their abilities and needs. Communism seeks to create a classless society in which the major means of production such as mines, mills, factories and natural resources are owned not by private individuals but the public.

Communism seeks to replace private ownership of properties, and control the means of production and the absence of social classes, money and the state. Propagated by Karl Marx, communism believes that inequality and suffering actually resulted from capitalism. According to its protagonists, communism is actually a higher advanced form of socialism. Communism is thus regarded as “revolutionary socialism” of Karl Marx.

KARL MARX AND COMMUNISM

Karl Marx, a 19^th century thinker and writer often tended to use the terms communism and socialism interchangeably. In his book, “Critique of Gotha Programme” (1875), Marx actually identified two phases of communism that would replace or overthrown capitalism. The first phase would be a transitional system where the working class would control government and economy; and yet, still find it necessary to pay citizen according to how long, head or well they worked.

The second phase would be one where communism is fully realized. This would be the phase where there is no class division, or even government. In this phase, the production and distribution of goods would be based upon the principle of “from each according to his ability; to each according his needs”. This distinction was later to be copied by many Marxists, including Russian Russian’s revolutionary “Vladimir Lenin”

ORIGIN OF COMMUNISM

The term “communism” came into focus in the 1840s. But Communist societies had been described as far back as the 4^th century BCE, when the great Philosopher, Plato, wrote the “Republic”. Plato had described an idea society in which the governing class serves only the interest of the entire community. This system was practised by the first set of Christians. In his book, Utopia (1516), the English Humanist, Thomas More, envisaged an imaginary society in which use of money is abolished, while all the people shall houses, meals, clothes, and other goods.

Communism was however populated by Karl Marx, who carefully outlined this system of government with Fredrich Engels in the book, “The Communist Manifesto”, written in 1848. Marx’s embrace of communism was partly ignited by the inequalities caused by the industrial revolution.

Lenin was later to argue in his “State and Revolution” book (1917) that socialism corresponded with Marx’s first phase of communism, why communism proper was that achieved in the second phase.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks reinforced this distinction in 1918 (a year after they seized power in Russia). This is why communism is always identifies with the now defunct Soviet Union. It was later adopted by the People’s Republic of China.

Thus, for much of the 20^th century, about one-third of the entire world’s population was governed by communist regimes, usually single party that brooded no dissent or plurality of voices. Party leaders institutionalized command economies, in which the state controlled properly while bureaucrats determined wages, prices and other means of production and distribution of services and goods.

These systems were grossly inefficient, leading to their eventual breakdown.

Today, only China, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam, practice communism, even with full adulteration of the original Marxist ideology. Marx, Lenin and Stalin would chuckle in their graves at this form of communism.

It is thus clear that Marxism was targeted at abolishing the bourgeoisie (who owned the means of production and earned surplus profit) and replace it with the Proletariat (who sold their labour to the bourgeoisie). Leon Trotsky opposed Stalinism, but embraced Leninism. Maoism (named after Chinese leader Mao Zedong) was crafted after Marxism-Leninism.

For years, in the Western world, many of the young and even some not so young, were attracted by the communist ideology. But, persistent bad news seeping out of many communist lands and the one-way flow of refugees has left many disillusioned.

Communism has been criticized from the angle of historical materialism. It is viewed as a kind of historical determinism, which suppresses liberal democratic rights and the distortion of price signal.

ARISTOCRACY

“Government by the nobility, a privileged minority, or an elite class thought best qualified to rule.”

The argument of proponents of this form of government is that it is logical that the best kind of government would result if it was composed only of the best people. To this school of thought, the best people are better educated, more qualified, and more competent, and therefore better able to lead others. Even at that, an aristocratic government headed by such an elite class may still be one of different genre. For example, it could be rule by the wealthy called a plutocracy. It could be rule by the clergy known as a theocracy. It may boil down to rule by government officials, called a bureaucracy.

In the past, many primitive societies, under the rulership of tribal elders or chiefs, were aristocracies. At one time or another, some countries such as Rome, England, and Japan, to name but three, all had aristocratic governments. In ancient Greece, the word “aristocracy” was used in reference to the city-states, or poleis, in which a small group governed. Often a number of prominent families shared power amongst themselves. In some cases, however, single families seized power illegally and set up a more tyrannical type of rule of other families considered less powerful.

Athens like other Greek city states, was originally an aristocracy. However, as cultural changes weakened class distinctions and disrupted its unity, the city was forced to take on democratic forms. Sparta, for example, on the other hand, was reputedly founded in the ninth century B.C. It was ruled by a military oligarchy. The city of Sparta soon rivaled the much older Athens, and both cities fought for supremacy of the Greek world of their time. It was virtually a “fight-to-finish”. Thus, rule by the many, as in Athens, came into intense conflict with rule by the few, as in Sparta. Of course, their rivalry was quite complex, because it involved more than just a disagreement about government.

WHY AND HOW A NOBLE IDEAL WAS PERVERTED

Political differences were often the subject of philosophical arguments among early Greek philosophers. Plato’s former student, Aristotle, made a distinction between aristocracies and oligarchies. He classified pure aristocracy as a good form of government, a noble ideal that enabled persons with special abilities and high morals to devote themselves to public service for the benefit of others. He argued however, that when headed by an oppressive and selfish elite, a pure aristocracy which is ordinarily good, deteriorated into an unjust oligarchy. This, he canvassed, was a perverted form of government having departed from the nobility and morality of pure and ideal aristocracy.

While advocating rule by ‘the best,’ Aristotle even admitted that combining aristocracy with democracy would probably produce the desired results, an idea that still appeals to some political thinkers till date. In fact, the ancient Romans actually did combine these two forms of government with some measure of success. “Politics [in Rome] was everyone’s affair,” says The Collins Atlas of World History. Nevertheless, at the same time, “the richest citizens and those who were fortunate enough to be high born formed an oligarchy which shared out among itself, the offices of magistrate, military commander and priest.”

Interestingly, even in late medieval and early modern history, European urban centres combined democratic and aristocratic elements in their government. Says Collier’s Encyclopedia: “The extremely conservative Venetian Republic, which Napoleon finally overthrew, provides the classic example of such an oligarchy; but the Free Cities of the Holy Roman Empire, the cities of the Hanseatic League, and the chartered towns of England and western Europe reveal the same general tendencies toward tight oligarchial control by a relatively small but proud and highly cultured patriciate [aristocracy].”

The argument has been powerfully advanced, and with some strong justification, that all governments are in every case aristocratic in nature, since all of them actually strive to have the best qualified people in charge. The concept of a ruling class, till date, has served to strengthen this view. Some reference work has therefore posited that, “Ruling class and elite are becoming synonymous terms to describe as actual what Plato and Aristotle argued for as ideal.”

SEARCHING FOR “THE BEST”

In ancient China under the royal house of Chou, centuries before these Greek philosophers made their appearance on the stage, a feudal society (based on lords and vassals) was already bringing a measure of stability and peace to ancient China. But after 722 B.C.E, during what is called the “Ch’un Ch’iu period”, the feudal system incrementally weakened. In the last part of this period, a new elite emerged, composed of people regarded as the former “gentlemen”. These people had served in feudal households, one who were descendants of the old nobility. Members of this new elite moved into key government positions. Confucius, the renowned Chinese sage, as The New Encyclopedia Britannica points out, stressed that “ability and moral excellence, rather than birth, were what fitted a man for leadership.” Confucius many words on marble litter our moral and leadership landscapes.

However, over two thousand years later in Europe, the process of picking the elite, those best qualified to rule, had little to do with “ability and moral excellence.” Harvard professor, Carl J. Friedrich, notes that “the elite in aristocratic England of the eighteenth century was an elite based primarily on blood descent and riches. The same thing was true in Venice.” He adds: “In some countries such as eighteenth-century Prussia, the elite was based on blood descent and military prowess.”

This idea that the good qualities of ‘better people’ were necessarily passed on to their offsprings, accounts for the closely-knot marriage practices of monarchs in the past. During the Middle Ages, the idea of biological superiority prevailed. To marry a commoner was abominable, as it amounted to polluting and diluting the nobleness of the clan. This was offensive to divine law. Monarchs were therefore obliged to marry only those of noble birth. This idea of strict biological superiority later gave way to a more rationalized and accepted justification, that of a superiority based on better opportunities, education, talents, or achievements. (To be continued).

FUN TIMES

There are two sides to every coin. Life itself contains not only the good, but also the bad and the ugly. Let us now explore these.

“A TEACHER asked a student in a Warri School

What is ‘2’ raised to power ‘5?

The student stood up and replied

Wetin ‘2’ dey raise power for ‘5’? Dem be mate? ‘2’ leave ‘3’, ‘4’ come dey raise power for ‘5’. Him wan die? Him no know say ‘5’ use three years senior am?”

THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK

The theory of Communism may be summed up in one sentence: Abolish all private property. (Karl Marx).

Opinion

Kano Deputy Governorship: Why Murtala Sule Garo is Most Deserving

Published

20 hours ago

April 21, 2026

Eric

By Abdullahi Sa’idu Baba (Hafizi)

One of the defining slogans of the Governor of Kano State is “Kano First,” a principle that emphasizes prioritizing the collective interest, development, and unity of Kano State above all else. In line with this vision, Hon. Murtala Sule Garo stands out as the most suitable candidate for the position of Deputy Governor. His track record reflects a history of diligent and selfless service to Kano State, marked by consistent dedication to grassroots development and people-oriented governance. Over the years, he has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to advancing the welfare of the people, making him a natural fit for a leadership role that demands loyalty, competence, and a deep understanding of Kano’s needs.

Throughout his time in office, Garo distinguished himself through people-oriented policies and impactful empowerment initiatives. He became widely known for implementing large-scale programs that directly improved the livelihoods of youth and women across Kano State. Thousands benefited from his initiatives, which included financial support, business tools, and opportunities for economic independence. These efforts not only reduced poverty at the grassroots level but also demonstrated his belief in inclusive governance ensuring that the dividends of democracy reach even the most remote communities. His approach earned him recognition as a leader who “takes government to the people,” a rare quality that continues to endear him to the masses.

Beyond empowerment, Garo’s leadership style is defined by accessibility, generosity, and responsiveness. He has consistently been described as a “man of the people,” someone who listens, engages, and responds without bias. His political strength lies in his deep-rooted connection with communities across Kano, where he has built trust over the years through direct engagement and consistent support. This grassroots network has become one of his greatest political assets, positioning him as a unifying figure capable of mobilizing support across different demographics and political divides.

In the evolving political landscape of Kano State, Murtala Sule Garo has emerged as a leading and widely endorsed candidate for the position of Deputy Governor. Recent political development shows that he enjoys overwhelming support not only from key stakeholders within the APC, but also from the generality of the grassroots Kano electorate, reflecting not only his political relevance but also the confidence party leaders and stakeholders have in his experience, loyalty, and leadership capacity.

Garo’s suitability for the role of Deputy Governor is further strengthened by his extensive experience in governance and party administration. Having served in multiple strategic positions, including organising roles, advisory capacities, and two consecutive terms as commissioner, he possesses both institutional knowledge and practical governance skills. His ability to navigate complex political structures while maintaining strong grassroots support makes him uniquely positioned to complement executive leadership and ensure stability in governance.

Looking ahead to future elections, Murtala Sule Garo’s political capacity remains one of his strongest advantages. He is widely regarded as a mobilizer who can energize the electorate, increase voter participation, and strengthen party unity. His influence at the ward and local government levels provides a strategic advantage for any administration he is part of, as he can effectively translate political goodwill into electoral success. Observers believe that his inclusion in leadership would not only consolidate party structures but also enhance governance outcomes through effective implementation of policies at the grassroots level.

Moreover, Garo represents a bridge between experience and youthful dynamism. His understanding of both traditional political structures and modern governance demands positions him as a forward-thinking leader capable of contributing meaningfully to Kano’s development agenda. His inclusive approach, engaging traditional rulers, youth groups, and stakeholders, suggests that he can foster a sense of collective ownership in governance, which is essential for sustainable development.

In conclusion, Hon. Murtala Sule Garo embodies the qualities of a competent administrator, a grassroots mobilizer, and a unifying political figure. His track record of service, empowerment, and community engagement presents a compelling case for his emergence as the next Deputy Governor of Kano State. With his proven ability to deliver results and connect with the people, he stands not only as a suitable candidate but as a strategic asset capable of driving progress, stability, and inclusive governance in Kano State’s future.

Abdullahi Sa’idu Baba (Hafizi) writes from Kano, and can be reached via Hafeeezsb@gmail.com

Opinion

2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise

Published

4 days ago

April 18, 2026

Eric

By Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba

To be candid and straightforward, this article is written to sensitize Nigerians to the growing smear campaign against Atiku Abubakar, a campaign of calumny that appears less about national interest and more about political anxiety. The persistence and intensity of these attacks suggest one thing: there are powerful interests who see him not merely as a contender, but as a genuine threat. Yet, Nigerians are no longer easily distracted. The electorate is becoming more discerning, more interested in good governance.

Closely tied to this is the urgency of the 2027 presidential election. This is not just another electoral cycle, it may well represent a turning point in Nigeria’s history. Although Atiku Abubakar has confirmed 2027 to be his last presidential outing. That reality alone elevates the stakes. It presents Nigeria with a stark choice: to either harness a reservoir of experience at a critical moment or risk drifting further into uncertainty. In clear terms, 2027 is not just about political succession, it is about whether Nigeria recalibrates its direction or continues along a path of deepening national challenges.

The fundamental truth is that, experience and effective leadership are positively correlated, independent of age. Leadership in a complex state like Nigeria requires far more than youthful enthusiasm. It demands institutional memory, policy depth, negotiation skills, and the ability to manage crises with precision. It is therefore misguided to reduce leadership capability to age alone. Age neither guarantees competence nor invalidates it. Across the world, both young and elderly leaders have failed when they lacked the depth of experience required for governance. In Nigeria itself, recent experience with president Tinubu shows that leadership failure cannot be attributed to age alone. This underscores a critical point: the true dividing line between success and failure in leadership is not age, it is experience, particularly practical and relevant experience, which is too often overlooked.

Global political trends reinforce this reality. In the United States, voters returned Donald Trump to power over Kamala Harris, reflecting a preference for perceived experience over age. Figures such as Bernie Sanders remain influential well into their later years, shaping national discourse. Similarly, in Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected again at an advanced age because voters trusted his tested capacity to lead during difficult times. A similar pattern recently played out in West Africa. In Liberia, the younger incumbent George Weah was defeated by the significantly older Joseph Boakai. That outcome was widely interpreted as a preference by Liberians for experience and not youthful appeal. These examples are not coincidences. They illustrate a consistent global pattern that when nations face uncertainty, they turn to experience. Nigeria must not waste the experience of Atiku Abubakar like it happened with remarkable figures like Obafemi Awolowo, Chief MKO Abiola and Malam Aminu Kano in the past.

Beyond the question of age lies another critical issue: political strategy. The debate over who should carry the opposition banner in 2027 must be guided by political reality. Nigeria’s recent history makes this abundantly clear. When Goodluck Jonathan sought re-election, the opposition were less influenced by sentiment. Instead, they made a strategic calculation, searching for a candidate with national reach and electoral strength, an idea that birthed Muhammadu Buhari as the opposition candidate, despite his previous electoral defeats.

It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument that Atiku Abubakar should be excluded on the basis that he has contested before. By that same reasoning, Buhari would never have emerged as a viable candidate. Political persistence is not a weakness; it is often a reflection of conviction, resilience, and determination. Elections are not won by novelty alone, they are won by structure, experience, and the ability to connect with a broad electorate.

Equally unconvincing is the argument that 2027 should be determined by zoning or that it is “still the turn of the South.” If the opposition is serious about unseating president Tinubu, it must prioritize a candidate with the experience, national appeal, and political structure required to achieve that goal. Atiku Abubakar is therefore the “asset” of the today. His eight years as Vice President under Olusegun Obasanjo provided him with deep exposure to governance, economic reform, and institutional development. Beyond public office, he is widely recognized as a seasoned politician and an established businessman with independent wealth, an important factor in a political environment often clouded by concerns about misuse of public resources.

Interestingly, it’s increasingly clear that Nigerians are moving beyond superficial narratives. The electorate is more focused on outcomes, on who can stabilize the economy, strengthen institutions, and restore confidence in governance. The conversation is shifting from age to ability, from rhetoric to results.

As 2027 approaches, the choice before Nigeria is becoming clearer. This is not a contest of personalities or a debate about generational symbolism. It is a question of capacity, preparedness, and national survival. History, both global and local, points in one direction: when experience is sidelined, nations pay the price.

Nigeria cannot afford that mistake again…

Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba writes from Kano, and can be reached via drssbaba@yahoo.com

Opinion

Leadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security

Published

4 days ago

April 18, 2026

Eric

By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

“Security is not built by arms alone, but by the quality of leadership that turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and divergent interests into common purpose.” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

Abstract

In an era of complex transnational threats, effective regional and continental security hinges less on military capabilities or institutional frameworks and more on the quality of leadership. This article explores how visionary, adaptive, ethical, and inclusive leadership serves as the critical catalyst for transforming shared vulnerabilities into collective strength. Through in-depth case studies of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside comparative insights from the European Union and ASEAN, it demonstrates that leadership determines whether security protocols remain aspirational or deliver tangible protection. The analysis highlights both successes and limitations, identifying key attributes of effective security leadership: strategic foresight, consensus-building, institutional coordination, and accountability. Ultimately, the article argues that investing in high-calibre leadership at every level is essential for building resilient, people-centred security systems capable of addressing contemporary challenges and contributing to a more stable global order.

Introduction

Effective regional and continental security depends far more on leadership than on military hardware, intelligence capabilities, or financial resources alone. Leadership supplies the vision, political will, strategic coherence, ethical foundation, and sustained commitment required to transform fragmented national efforts into unified, sustainable security outcomes. In an era marked by transnational threats — terrorism, organised crime, climate-induced conflicts, cyber vulnerabilities, irregular migration, and hybrid warfare — the quality of leadership at regional and continental levels determines whether security architectures deliver genuine protection or remain aspirational documents on paper.

The Indispensable Role of Leadership in Regional and Continental Security

Leadership in security contexts operates across multiple interconnected layers. At the strategic level, it involves setting a long-term vision that anticipates emerging threats and aligns collective resources before crises escalate. At the operational level, it demands the ability to coordinate institutions, mobilise resources, and execute joint actions efficiently. At the relational level, it requires building and maintaining trust among sovereign states with often competing interests, historical grievances, and differing priorities.

Effective leaders in this domain exhibit several critical attributes. They demonstrate visionary foresight, the capacity to read complex geopolitical and socio-economic trends and translate them into proactive strategies. They exercise adaptive decision-making, adjusting approaches as threats evolve while preserving core principles. They practise inclusive diplomacy, forging consensus without compromising sovereignty. Above all, they uphold ethical integrity and accountability, ensuring that security measures respect human rights and maintain public legitimacy. Without these qualities, even the most sophisticated security protocols risk becoming ineffective or counterproductive.

ECOWAS in West Africa: Leadership-Driven Collective Security

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975 primarily as an economic integration body, has evolved into one of Africa’s most sophisticated and tested regional security mechanisms. This transformation was not inevitable but resulted from deliberate, courageous, and often pragmatic leadership in response to existential threats that threatened to engulf the entire sub-region.

The pivotal moment came in the early 1990s when Liberia descended into a devastating civil war. Faced with the risk of regional contagion, ECOWAS leaders, particularly Nigeria’s General Ibrahim Babangida and Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, took the unprecedented step of creating the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 — Africa’s first sub-regional peacekeeping force. This was a bold departure from the Organisation of African Unity’s strict non-interference policy. ECOMOG’s interventions in Liberia (1990–1997) and Sierra Leone (1997–2000) prevented state collapse, contained the spread of conflict, and created political space for negotiated settlements and eventual democratic transitions.

Leadership played a pivotal role in these outcomes. Nigerian leadership provided the bulk of troops and financial resources, while Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings offered critical diplomatic backing. The willingness of several heads of state to commit substantial national resources despite domestic criticism demonstrated a rare form of collective political will. These interventions also led to important institutional developments, including the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and later the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).

In more recent years, ECOWAS leadership has continued to evolve. During the 2010–2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS applied sustained diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force, contributing significantly to the eventual restoration of constitutional order. In response to the rise of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, ECOWAS has strengthened intelligence sharing, supported the Multinational Joint Task Force, and promoted greater coordination among affected states. The organisation has also demonstrated its preventive diplomacy capacity in The Gambia (2016–2017), where firm but measured leadership helped resolve a dangerous post-election standoff without large-scale violence, and in Guinea (2021), where it applied sanctions and mediation to encourage return to constitutional rule.

Yet ECOWAS leadership has also encountered significant limitations. Divergent national interests, chronic funding shortfalls, and occasional leadership vacuums have sometimes slowed or complicated responses. The recent wave of military coups and political transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger (2021–2023) tested the organisation’s cohesion and exposed the challenge of enforcing normative standards when powerful member states resist collective decisions. These episodes underscore a recurring truth: regional security leadership is only as strong as the political commitment and institutional capacity behind it.

Despite these challenges, ECOWAS remains one of the most advanced regional security mechanisms on the continent. Its evolution from an economic community to a security actor demonstrates how visionary leadership, combined with institutional innovation and political will, can enable a regional organisation to respond effectively to complex security threats. The ECOWAS experience offers enduring lessons: effective regional security leadership must be proactive rather than reactive, adaptive to new threats, inclusive of multiple stakeholders, and continuously reinforced through institutional reform and sustained political will.

African Union’s Continental Leadership: The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has emerged as a central actor in shaping Africa’s security landscape through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Established following the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, APSA represents a fundamental shift in African leadership philosophy — moving from the OAU’s rigid doctrine of non-interference to the AU’s principle of “non-indifference” when grave circumstances threaten peace and stability.

The architecture comprises five key pillars: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund. This comprehensive framework was designed to enable Africa to take primary responsibility for its own peace and security rather than relying predominantly on external actors.

Leadership has been the critical variable in APSA’s performance. The decision by African heads of state to create the Peace and Security Council marked a bold act of continental leadership, giving the AU authority to authorise interventions in cases of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. One of the most visible demonstrations of this leadership was the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched in 2007. Despite enormous challenges, AMISOM — later reconfigured as the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) — helped degrade Al-Shabaab’s control over large parts of the country and created space for political processes and state-building. This mission showcased the AU’s willingness to deploy troops and sustain long-term engagement where international partners were initially hesitant.

Another significant example is the AU’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Darfur (Sudan), South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Lake Chad Basin. In each case, the effectiveness of AU leadership depended heavily on the political will and diplomatic skill of key member states, the AU Commission Chairperson, and the Peace and Security Council. The AU’s successful facilitation of the 2019 political transition in Sudan and its ongoing mediation efforts in multiple conflict zones further illustrate how continental leadership can create pathways for dialogue when national institutions falter.

However, the AU’s leadership has also encountered notable limitations. Funding shortages, logistical constraints, and sometimes divergent interests among member states have hampered rapid and decisive action. The 2011 Libya intervention exposed deep divisions within the AU, while recent political transitions and coups in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea) have tested the Union’s ability to enforce its normative frameworks consistently. These experiences reveal that continental leadership remains vulnerable to the sovereignty concerns of member states and the challenge of translating political consensus into operational effectiveness.

Despite these constraints, the AU has made important strides in institutionalising leadership for peace and security. The adoption of the African Union Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030 and the ongoing efforts to fully operationalise the African Standby Force reflect a long-term strategic vision. The Union has also strengthened its partnership with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, recognising that effective continental security requires layered leadership — with RECs often acting as first responders and the AU providing strategic oversight and legitimacy.

The African Union’s journey demonstrates both the immense potential and the inherent difficulties of continental leadership in security matters. When leadership is bold, united, and well-resourced, the AU can play a transformative role in preventing conflict, managing crises, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. When leadership is fragmented or under-resourced, progress slows and opportunities for timely intervention are lost.

SADC Regional Interventions: Leadership, Solidarity, and the Limits of Collective Action

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) offers a distinct model of regional security leadership shaped by its historical struggle against apartheid and a strong emphasis on sovereignty and consensus. Originally formed in 1980 to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, SADC has gradually expanded its security role through the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

SADC’s most prominent military intervention occurred in 1998 in Lesotho. Following a disputed election and political violence, South Africa and Botswana, acting under SADC authority, launched Operation Boleas to restore order and facilitate new elections. While the intervention achieved its immediate objectives, it was criticised for limited consultation with other SADC members and for being perceived as South African dominance rather than genuine collective action. This episode highlighted both the potential and the sensitivities of SADC leadership in security matters.

A more sustained and complex engagement has been SADC’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 2013, SADC has supported the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Comprising troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, the FIB was mandated to conduct offensive operations against armed groups. South African leadership was instrumental in pushing for the creation of the FIB, reflecting Pretoria’s strategic interest in stabilising the Great Lakes region. The intervention has had mixed results: it helped degrade some armed groups but has struggled with the sheer complexity of conflict dynamics, resource constraints, and the challenge of addressing root causes such as governance failures and illicit resource exploitation.

More recently, in 2021, SADC deployed the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to address the escalating insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. The mission, led by South African forces with contributions from several member states, aimed to support the Mozambican government in restoring security and protecting civilians. Leadership from South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania was critical in mobilising rapid deployment. While SAMIM has contributed to the degradation of insurgent capabilities and the protection of key economic installations, challenges remain, including coordination with Rwandan forces operating in the same theatre and the need for a stronger focus on addressing underlying socio-economic grievances.

SADC’s security interventions reveal a distinct leadership pattern dominated by a few influential member states, particularly South Africa. This “hegemonic leadership” model has enabled action when consensus is difficult to achieve but has also generated resentment among smaller states wary of South African dominance. Zimbabwe and Angola have also played significant roles in specific contexts, while smaller states have contributed troops and political legitimacy.

The consensus-based decision-making culture within SADC has been both a strength and a limitation. It ensures broad buy-in when agreement is reached, but it can lead to slow or diluted responses when member states have divergent interests. The principle of “quiet diplomacy” has often prioritised political dialogue over forceful intervention, sometimes delaying decisive action.

SADC interventions have achieved notable successes. They have prevented state collapse in Lesotho, contributed to stabilisation efforts in the DRC, and helped contain the Cabo Delgado insurgency. The organisation has also developed important normative frameworks, including the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and mechanisms for electoral observation and conflict prevention.

However, limitations are equally evident. Funding remains chronically inadequate, often forcing reliance on external partners or lead nations. Logistical challenges, interoperability issues among national forces, and uneven political commitment have constrained operational effectiveness. Critics argue that SADC’s responses have sometimes prioritised regime security over human security, particularly in cases involving member states’ internal political crises.

The SADC experience underscores several important lessons about regional security leadership. First, hegemonic leadership can enable rapid action but risks undermining legitimacy and long-term cohesion. Second, consensus-based systems require strong mediation and facilitation skills to convert agreement into effective implementation. Third, sustainable security leadership must address both immediate threats and underlying structural drivers such as poverty, inequality, and governance deficits. Finally, SADC’s trajectory shows that regional organisations can play meaningful security roles even without a single dominant power, provided there is sufficient political will and institutional adaptability.

Comparative Insights from Other Regions

Global experiences reinforce these lessons. The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has succeeded largely because of consistent institutional leadership and shared norms among member states, enabling joint missions and rapid response capabilities. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s consensus-based leadership model has helped maintain stability amid complex geopolitical tensions, although it has occasionally been criticised for slower decision-making. These cases confirm that effective regional security leadership requires a delicate balance between respect for sovereignty and the courage to pursue collective action.

Persistent Challenges and Pathways Forward

Leadership in regional and continental security faces recurring obstacles: divergent national interests, resource constraints, weak institutional capacity, and external interference. Political transitions and electoral cycles can disrupt continuity, while hybrid threats demand leaders capable of integrating diverse tools and actors.

To build more effective security leadership, regional and continental organisations must invest deliberately in leadership development. This includes targeted programmes that cultivate strategic foresight, ethical governance, collaborative skills, and crisis management capabilities. Institutional mechanisms should be designed to ensure policy continuity beyond changes in individual leaders. Greater inclusion of civil society, youth, and women in security decision-making can enhance legitimacy and broaden perspectives. Finally, partnerships with global actors should be pursued in ways that preserve African agency and ownership.

Conclusion

Leadership remains the single most decisive factor in regional and continental security. It is the invisible bridge that transforms fragile agreements into enduring peace, turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and converts divergent national interests into a common purpose. The experiences of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union across the continent, and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside valuable lessons from Europe and Southeast Asia, consistently demonstrate one fundamental truth: even the most sophisticated security architectures will falter without visionary, ethical, and collaborative leadership.

In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, where threats respect no borders, the quality of leadership at every level — from heads of state to technical experts within regional commissions — will ultimately determine whether Africa and other regions merely survive successive crises or rise to build lasting stability and prosperity.

The challenge before current and future leaders is clear: to move beyond rhetoric and embrace the difficult work of forging unity, exercising foresight, upholding accountability, and investing in people-centred security solutions. Those who answer this call will not only secure their nations and regions but will also leave a legacy of peace that benefits generations yet unborn and contributes meaningfully to a more stable global order.

True security is not built by arms alone. It is built by leadership that dares to imagine, unite, and act for the common good.

Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.com, globalstageimpacts@gmail.com