Opinion
Panorama: Of Sheikh Gumi, Northwest Governors and Raging Insecurity
Published
5 years agoon
By
Eric
By Sani Sa’idu Baba
My dear country men and women, please permit me to begin today by confessing that Nigeria is under distress. Its woes are most evident in the spate of armed violence and criminality ravaging the component parts. In fact, nothing explains this awry situation better than the apocalyptically volatile situation in the wider northern region.
The northeast is still under the Boko Haram scourge in spite of the counter-insurgency endeavors of the Governor Babagana Zulum’s administration. The north-central area has been afflicted by herdsmen militancy and ethno-religious conflicts, which has plunged the region into crisis. The northwestern region has recently been enmeshed in the rapid upsurge of rural banditry along its international frontiers as well as the forested interior.
But my concern today is particularly the Northwestern region of Nigeria where I come from. For about a decade, the region has been facing insecurity related crises ranging from armed-group violence to kidnappings and banditry, affecting inhabitants of Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto states. Recently, Kaduna and Niger states have joined the fray, and appear to be the central hub of banditry in the entire country. Kano and Jigawa seems to be the only relatively peaceful states in the Northwest today.
Unfortunately, the Nigerian government’s response to the crises in the region has done little to alleviate the security concerns, and the situation appears as if bandits and criminals have overrun our country and effectively taken over its leadership. Any right-thinking Nigerian knows that this is the most burning issue for discourse, especially at a time when a religious scholar, Sheikh Ahmad Gumi, by his consistent questionable attitude and baseless ground, adds salt to festering wounds. Having watched his interviews a couple of times, his comments seem unacceptable. I am speaking as a Muslim, Northerner and partly a Fulani.
Nothing is more dangerous than politicizing issues that has to do with the security of the people; but, despite the red flags Gumi have manifested, Northern leaders have obviously done nothing, and what they are doing if at all they are, is not enough to restore sanity in the land. A flashback to some episodes that had happened recently, the efforts of the government so far (military operations and dialogue), and why such efforts are not sufficient enough would be the focus of my discussion today.
We could recall that the recent spate of banditry-related violence began in 2014 with cattle rustling activity, but the matter became worse in early 2016 when the bandits started killing local miners in Zamfara communities. However, the attacks now affect the entire North West region, especially the border areas with Niger. In what has become a recurring tragedy, not only have thousands been killed, but women have been raped, children have become orphans, villages have been sacked and destroyed, farm produce has been destroyed, property has been stolen, and civilians have been kidnapped for ransom. As a result of these, the affected states including Katsina, Kaduna, Sokoto, and Kebbi established a committee headed by Muhammad Abubakar, a former Inspector-General of Police in 2019. He estimated that between 2011 and 2019, 4,983 women were widowed, 25,050 children were orphaned, and more than 190,340 people were displaced in Zamfara due to armed banditry.
Kidnapping for ransom has become a particularly lucrative and attractive business to many in the North West region, especially among the many unemployed youths. Many residents lament how easily the armed banditry groups storm their communities in broad daylight to either rustle cattle or kidnap people. The kidnappers no longer have interested in kidnapping ordinary villagers, however. Rather, they realize that attacking schools and inter-state transportation routes brings in more money.
Apart from the recent attacks that happened till September, 2021, Terrorism Monitor has for example, recorded at least eight (8) mass kidnappings of school children and university students in the past six months, including: One, In December 2020, there was an attack on Government Science Secondary School students in Kankara, Katsina State, where over 300 students were abducted by a group of armed men on motorcycles. The state government insisted that nothing was paid for the release of the students, but some residents confirmed that 30 million naira was released to the bandits. The late Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau claimed his fighters in the North West region abducted the students, although the abductors had already contacted the state government on the issue of ransom payment before Shekau’s faction released an exclusive video from the bandits’ camp featuring the boys. Two, according to Daily Trust publication on January 6, 2021, there was a kidnapping of more than 317 schoolgirls in Jangebe, Zamfara State. This came just a week after a similar kidnapping incident. Three, on December 19, 2020, two days after the release of the Kankara schoolboys, bandits abducted over 80 Islamic school (Islamiyya) students in Dandume, Katsina State. The children were rescued after a vigilante group and volunteers intercepted them while they were trying to cross the forest.
Four, Armed bandits stormed the Federal College of Forestry Mechanization in Mando, Kaduna State in March 2021 and abducted 39 students. The bandits demanded 500 million naira ransom from the Kaduna State government, but after the governor, Nasir El-Rufai, failed to comply, they reached out to parents of the abducted students. The governor declared that no more payments of ransom would be made after the abduction and promised not to negotiate with any armed group. Three weeks after the abduction the kidnapped students were released in a negotiation facilitated by Shaykh Ahmad Gumi’s dialogue committee with support from former President Olusegun Obasanjo.
Five, In March 2021, an undisclosed number of primary school students in a village in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna State were abducted. A resident and father of one of the victims revealed that the children were rescued by vigilante groups a few days after the abduction. Six, similarly, on April 23, students of Greenfield University in Kaduna State were abducted by bandits who demanded a ransom of 800 million Nigerian naira. Five students were killed in captivity while 14 were released after a payment of ransom. Seven, on June 10th in the same vein, an armed group invaded Nuhu Bamalli Polytechnic in Zaria, Kaduna State. One student was killed and eight people, including lecturers and students, were abducted, which caused the school’s administrators to shut down academic activities immediately. Eight, one week after the Nuhu Bamalli abduction, on June 17, another 102 students of Federal Government College in Birnin Yawuri, Kebbi State were abducted. The governor chose not to negotiate with the abductors and one male and one female student were killed, while five others were rescued after the Nigerian forces operating under Hadarin Daji intercepted the abductors. More than 80 armed bandits were reported killed by the troops with support from Nigerian air force and more than 800 rustled cattle were recovered. However, approximately 95 students remained in the custody of the armed bandits in the forest while vigilantes and volunteers mobilized for another rescue mission.
It is clear that Nigerians are paying ransom to the kidnappers and banditry groups because they have seemingly lost interest and confidence in security intermediates. However, the paying of ransoms is motivating more bandits to join the kidnapping business even as government has remained clueless. Some have even accused the government of sponsoring insecurity indirectly by paying ransoms. According to this perspective, a government serious about tackling the issue would not pay any money to criminal armed groups in the form of ransom for kidnappings because it is an offence against citizens that require proactive and prompt security operatives to curb. Based on the aforementioned, the laxity of the government in restoring sanity in the affected places is obvious. You can imagine the hidden places of those bandits in the forests that extended through the length and breadth of northwest including Rugu, Kamara, Kunduma, and Sububu forests known to the government and all have since become strategic strongholds for banditry groups to carry out their attacks. They retire to those places and live peacefully and fearlessly after their operations. This is depressing to Nigerians.
In response to that however, Nigerian government has launched multiple military operations in the North West region to curtail the menace since 2019, including Operation Harbin Kunama and Exercise Sahel Sanity. The military operation, Exercise Sahel Sanity, headquartered at the Special Army Super Camp IV in Faskari, Katsina State, led to the killing of 220 bandits and the rescue of 642 kidnapped victims from captivity. The troops also destroyed 197 bandits’ enclaves, killed the notorious armed leader called “Dangote” of the eponymous “Dangote Triangle” in Katsina, and arrested 335 suspected bandits and 326 illegal miners in Kebbi, Kaduna, Niger, Zamfara and Katsina states. In July 2020 as gathered by media outlets including Premiumtimes.ng of July 3, 2020 and TheCable.ng of July 7, 2020, Mustapha Inuwa, the Secretary to the Katsina State Government, announced that his state had spent about 30 million Naira on an amnesty programme for repentant bandits and cattle rustlers before it collapsed. Inuwa further stated that the reason for the collapse of the peace deal was that the bandits kept reneging on agreements and betraying their promises to the government. However, based on my understanding, the efforts of Katsina State government solely depended on dialogue with the bandits which has since failed. The recent discovery of some bandits in Katsina State payroll is enough to inform some hidden fruitless agreement.
Moreover, Katsina and Zamfara governments also employed the services of non-state actors, like vigilante groups and Security Volunteers often called Yan Sakai, to curtail the conflict. Although they possess knowledgeable insights and understanding of the local conflict, they have their own disadvantage. For example, some of the vigilante members have seized on the opportunity stemming from the conflict to attack perceived enemies.
My other concern today is about the interference of the controversial Islamic scholar Sheikh Ahmad Gumi on the issue of banditry. He was recently reported to have said that military onslaught would worsen banditry in Nigeria. His utterances has caught my attention on several occasions. I sometimes wonder whether the Sheikh is conscious of the embarrassment he is causing the entire north. I see no reason why criminals should be protected or sympathize with. He even sometimes confer some sort of legitimacy on their nefarious activities. But my surprise is that no governor in the north has ever called him to order or pointed an accusing finger to him against the dangers surrounding most of his actions. Honestly, the intervention of Ahmad Gumi is only doing more harm than good to the country because of the belief in many quarters that he is colluding with the bandits. And that is a threat to the already weakly united Nigeria. The bandits are also seemingly encouraged by his actions. The criminals even requested the President to come and negotiate with them personally. I don’t know what type of negotiation apart from what Katsina and Zamfara states governors earlier considered. I must commend Nasir El-rufai’s in refusing any form of negotiation.
Regional banditry in North West Nigeria will be difficult to resolve if the government continues with its current strategy. In the first place, explosive population growth and climate change in Nigeria are exacerbating economic anxiety and fomenting lawlessness, especially in communities bordering Niger. Moreover, there is unchecked border crossings between herder tribes, as there is virtually no restriction on movements in these border areas. Anyone in Niger Republic can come to Nigeria, commit any crime, and go back to Niger.
Furthermore, corruption plays a significant role as some security agencies allegedly collect bribes from Nigeriens and grant them access to Nigeria without proper investigation. The suggestions of Kano state governor on how to arrive at a lasting solution must be considered. Our governors and stakeholders in their respective states, especially the religious leaders must work in synergy and stand united. They should also stand against Gumi and teach him that those criminals that invaded the north are mostly none-Nigerians, but used the advantage of porous borders and laxity of laws to invade the country. They came to Nigeria from different parts of West Africa, roaming dangerously and violently in and out of the country unchallenged.
Why then would Sheikh Gumi be protecting people that do not belong here on criminal matters? It is not surprising if our Southern counterparts accuses the Nigerian Fulani herders for causing troubles in the land, probably because they could not decipher. But the truth is, not all are Nigerians and our Northern leaders must as a matter of urgency do the needful.
I strongly support the anti-grazing law enforced by the Southwest governors, and I never consider their stand as an effort to humiliate the North. We cannot continue in the old ways in spite of several transformations the world has experienced in recent years.
Peace shall be restored in Northwest and other parts of the country.
Related
You may like
Opinion
Kano Deputy Governorship: Why Murtala Sule Garo is Most Deserving
Published
16 hours agoon
April 21, 2026By
Eric
By Abdullahi Sa’idu Baba (Hafizi)
One of the defining slogans of the Governor of Kano State is “Kano First,” a principle that emphasizes prioritizing the collective interest, development, and unity of Kano State above all else. In line with this vision, Hon. Murtala Sule Garo stands out as the most suitable candidate for the position of Deputy Governor. His track record reflects a history of diligent and selfless service to Kano State, marked by consistent dedication to grassroots development and people-oriented governance. Over the years, he has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to advancing the welfare of the people, making him a natural fit for a leadership role that demands loyalty, competence, and a deep understanding of Kano’s needs.
Throughout his time in office, Garo distinguished himself through people-oriented policies and impactful empowerment initiatives. He became widely known for implementing large-scale programs that directly improved the livelihoods of youth and women across Kano State. Thousands benefited from his initiatives, which included financial support, business tools, and opportunities for economic independence. These efforts not only reduced poverty at the grassroots level but also demonstrated his belief in inclusive governance ensuring that the dividends of democracy reach even the most remote communities. His approach earned him recognition as a leader who “takes government to the people,” a rare quality that continues to endear him to the masses.
Beyond empowerment, Garo’s leadership style is defined by accessibility, generosity, and responsiveness. He has consistently been described as a “man of the people,” someone who listens, engages, and responds without bias. His political strength lies in his deep-rooted connection with communities across Kano, where he has built trust over the years through direct engagement and consistent support. This grassroots network has become one of his greatest political assets, positioning him as a unifying figure capable of mobilizing support across different demographics and political divides.
In the evolving political landscape of Kano State, Murtala Sule Garo has emerged as a leading and widely endorsed candidate for the position of Deputy Governor. Recent political development shows that he enjoys overwhelming support not only from key stakeholders within the APC, but also from the generality of the grassroots Kano electorate, reflecting not only his political relevance but also the confidence party leaders and stakeholders have in his experience, loyalty, and leadership capacity.
Garo’s suitability for the role of Deputy Governor is further strengthened by his extensive experience in governance and party administration. Having served in multiple strategic positions, including organising roles, advisory capacities, and two consecutive terms as commissioner, he possesses both institutional knowledge and practical governance skills. His ability to navigate complex political structures while maintaining strong grassroots support makes him uniquely positioned to complement executive leadership and ensure stability in governance.
Looking ahead to future elections, Murtala Sule Garo’s political capacity remains one of his strongest advantages. He is widely regarded as a mobilizer who can energize the electorate, increase voter participation, and strengthen party unity. His influence at the ward and local government levels provides a strategic advantage for any administration he is part of, as he can effectively translate political goodwill into electoral success. Observers believe that his inclusion in leadership would not only consolidate party structures but also enhance governance outcomes through effective implementation of policies at the grassroots level.
Moreover, Garo represents a bridge between experience and youthful dynamism. His understanding of both traditional political structures and modern governance demands positions him as a forward-thinking leader capable of contributing meaningfully to Kano’s development agenda. His inclusive approach, engaging traditional rulers, youth groups, and stakeholders, suggests that he can foster a sense of collective ownership in governance, which is essential for sustainable development.
In conclusion, Hon. Murtala Sule Garo embodies the qualities of a competent administrator, a grassroots mobilizer, and a unifying political figure. His track record of service, empowerment, and community engagement presents a compelling case for his emergence as the next Deputy Governor of Kano State. With his proven ability to deliver results and connect with the people, he stands not only as a suitable candidate but as a strategic asset capable of driving progress, stability, and inclusive governance in Kano State’s future.
Abdullahi Sa’idu Baba (Hafizi) writes from Kano, and can be reached via Hafeeezsb@gmail.com
Related
Opinion
2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise
Published
4 days agoon
April 18, 2026By
Eric
By Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba
To be candid and straightforward, this article is written to sensitize Nigerians to the growing smear campaign against Atiku Abubakar, a campaign of calumny that appears less about national interest and more about political anxiety. The persistence and intensity of these attacks suggest one thing: there are powerful interests who see him not merely as a contender, but as a genuine threat. Yet, Nigerians are no longer easily distracted. The electorate is becoming more discerning, more interested in good governance.
Closely tied to this is the urgency of the 2027 presidential election. This is not just another electoral cycle, it may well represent a turning point in Nigeria’s history. Although Atiku Abubakar has confirmed 2027 to be his last presidential outing. That reality alone elevates the stakes. It presents Nigeria with a stark choice: to either harness a reservoir of experience at a critical moment or risk drifting further into uncertainty. In clear terms, 2027 is not just about political succession, it is about whether Nigeria recalibrates its direction or continues along a path of deepening national challenges.
The fundamental truth is that, experience and effective leadership are positively correlated, independent of age. Leadership in a complex state like Nigeria requires far more than youthful enthusiasm. It demands institutional memory, policy depth, negotiation skills, and the ability to manage crises with precision. It is therefore misguided to reduce leadership capability to age alone. Age neither guarantees competence nor invalidates it. Across the world, both young and elderly leaders have failed when they lacked the depth of experience required for governance. In Nigeria itself, recent experience with president Tinubu shows that leadership failure cannot be attributed to age alone. This underscores a critical point: the true dividing line between success and failure in leadership is not age, it is experience, particularly practical and relevant experience, which is too often overlooked.
Global political trends reinforce this reality. In the United States, voters returned Donald Trump to power over Kamala Harris, reflecting a preference for perceived experience over age. Figures such as Bernie Sanders remain influential well into their later years, shaping national discourse. Similarly, in Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected again at an advanced age because voters trusted his tested capacity to lead during difficult times. A similar pattern recently played out in West Africa. In Liberia, the younger incumbent George Weah was defeated by the significantly older Joseph Boakai. That outcome was widely interpreted as a preference by Liberians for experience and not youthful appeal. These examples are not coincidences. They illustrate a consistent global pattern that when nations face uncertainty, they turn to experience. Nigeria must not waste the experience of Atiku Abubakar like it happened with remarkable figures like Obafemi Awolowo, Chief MKO Abiola and Malam Aminu Kano in the past.
Beyond the question of age lies another critical issue: political strategy. The debate over who should carry the opposition banner in 2027 must be guided by political reality. Nigeria’s recent history makes this abundantly clear. When Goodluck Jonathan sought re-election, the opposition were less influenced by sentiment. Instead, they made a strategic calculation, searching for a candidate with national reach and electoral strength, an idea that birthed Muhammadu Buhari as the opposition candidate, despite his previous electoral defeats.
It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument that Atiku Abubakar should be excluded on the basis that he has contested before. By that same reasoning, Buhari would never have emerged as a viable candidate. Political persistence is not a weakness; it is often a reflection of conviction, resilience, and determination. Elections are not won by novelty alone, they are won by structure, experience, and the ability to connect with a broad electorate.
Equally unconvincing is the argument that 2027 should be determined by zoning or that it is “still the turn of the South.” If the opposition is serious about unseating president Tinubu, it must prioritize a candidate with the experience, national appeal, and political structure required to achieve that goal. Atiku Abubakar is therefore the “asset” of the today. His eight years as Vice President under Olusegun Obasanjo provided him with deep exposure to governance, economic reform, and institutional development. Beyond public office, he is widely recognized as a seasoned politician and an established businessman with independent wealth, an important factor in a political environment often clouded by concerns about misuse of public resources.
Interestingly, it’s increasingly clear that Nigerians are moving beyond superficial narratives. The electorate is more focused on outcomes, on who can stabilize the economy, strengthen institutions, and restore confidence in governance. The conversation is shifting from age to ability, from rhetoric to results.
As 2027 approaches, the choice before Nigeria is becoming clearer. This is not a contest of personalities or a debate about generational symbolism. It is a question of capacity, preparedness, and national survival. History, both global and local, points in one direction: when experience is sidelined, nations pay the price.
Nigeria cannot afford that mistake again…
Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba writes from Kano, and can be reached via drssbaba@yahoo.com
Related
Opinion
Leadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security
Published
4 days agoon
April 18, 2026By
Eric
By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD
“Security is not built by arms alone, but by the quality of leadership that turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and divergent interests into common purpose.” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD
Abstract
In an era of complex transnational threats, effective regional and continental security hinges less on military capabilities or institutional frameworks and more on the quality of leadership. This article explores how visionary, adaptive, ethical, and inclusive leadership serves as the critical catalyst for transforming shared vulnerabilities into collective strength. Through in-depth case studies of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside comparative insights from the European Union and ASEAN, it demonstrates that leadership determines whether security protocols remain aspirational or deliver tangible protection. The analysis highlights both successes and limitations, identifying key attributes of effective security leadership: strategic foresight, consensus-building, institutional coordination, and accountability. Ultimately, the article argues that investing in high-calibre leadership at every level is essential for building resilient, people-centred security systems capable of addressing contemporary challenges and contributing to a more stable global order.
Introduction
Effective regional and continental security depends far more on leadership than on military hardware, intelligence capabilities, or financial resources alone. Leadership supplies the vision, political will, strategic coherence, ethical foundation, and sustained commitment required to transform fragmented national efforts into unified, sustainable security outcomes. In an era marked by transnational threats — terrorism, organised crime, climate-induced conflicts, cyber vulnerabilities, irregular migration, and hybrid warfare — the quality of leadership at regional and continental levels determines whether security architectures deliver genuine protection or remain aspirational documents on paper.
The Indispensable Role of Leadership in Regional and Continental Security
Leadership in security contexts operates across multiple interconnected layers. At the strategic level, it involves setting a long-term vision that anticipates emerging threats and aligns collective resources before crises escalate. At the operational level, it demands the ability to coordinate institutions, mobilise resources, and execute joint actions efficiently. At the relational level, it requires building and maintaining trust among sovereign states with often competing interests, historical grievances, and differing priorities.
Effective leaders in this domain exhibit several critical attributes. They demonstrate visionary foresight, the capacity to read complex geopolitical and socio-economic trends and translate them into proactive strategies. They exercise adaptive decision-making, adjusting approaches as threats evolve while preserving core principles. They practise inclusive diplomacy, forging consensus without compromising sovereignty. Above all, they uphold ethical integrity and accountability, ensuring that security measures respect human rights and maintain public legitimacy. Without these qualities, even the most sophisticated security protocols risk becoming ineffective or counterproductive.
ECOWAS in West Africa: Leadership-Driven Collective Security
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975 primarily as an economic integration body, has evolved into one of Africa’s most sophisticated and tested regional security mechanisms. This transformation was not inevitable but resulted from deliberate, courageous, and often pragmatic leadership in response to existential threats that threatened to engulf the entire sub-region.
The pivotal moment came in the early 1990s when Liberia descended into a devastating civil war. Faced with the risk of regional contagion, ECOWAS leaders, particularly Nigeria’s General Ibrahim Babangida and Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, took the unprecedented step of creating the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 — Africa’s first sub-regional peacekeeping force. This was a bold departure from the Organisation of African Unity’s strict non-interference policy. ECOMOG’s interventions in Liberia (1990–1997) and Sierra Leone (1997–2000) prevented state collapse, contained the spread of conflict, and created political space for negotiated settlements and eventual democratic transitions.
Leadership played a pivotal role in these outcomes. Nigerian leadership provided the bulk of troops and financial resources, while Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings offered critical diplomatic backing. The willingness of several heads of state to commit substantial national resources despite domestic criticism demonstrated a rare form of collective political will. These interventions also led to important institutional developments, including the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and later the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).
In more recent years, ECOWAS leadership has continued to evolve. During the 2010–2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS applied sustained diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force, contributing significantly to the eventual restoration of constitutional order. In response to the rise of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, ECOWAS has strengthened intelligence sharing, supported the Multinational Joint Task Force, and promoted greater coordination among affected states. The organisation has also demonstrated its preventive diplomacy capacity in The Gambia (2016–2017), where firm but measured leadership helped resolve a dangerous post-election standoff without large-scale violence, and in Guinea (2021), where it applied sanctions and mediation to encourage return to constitutional rule.
Yet ECOWAS leadership has also encountered significant limitations. Divergent national interests, chronic funding shortfalls, and occasional leadership vacuums have sometimes slowed or complicated responses. The recent wave of military coups and political transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger (2021–2023) tested the organisation’s cohesion and exposed the challenge of enforcing normative standards when powerful member states resist collective decisions. These episodes underscore a recurring truth: regional security leadership is only as strong as the political commitment and institutional capacity behind it.
Despite these challenges, ECOWAS remains one of the most advanced regional security mechanisms on the continent. Its evolution from an economic community to a security actor demonstrates how visionary leadership, combined with institutional innovation and political will, can enable a regional organisation to respond effectively to complex security threats. The ECOWAS experience offers enduring lessons: effective regional security leadership must be proactive rather than reactive, adaptive to new threats, inclusive of multiple stakeholders, and continuously reinforced through institutional reform and sustained political will.
African Union’s Continental Leadership: The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has emerged as a central actor in shaping Africa’s security landscape through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Established following the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, APSA represents a fundamental shift in African leadership philosophy — moving from the OAU’s rigid doctrine of non-interference to the AU’s principle of “non-indifference” when grave circumstances threaten peace and stability.
The architecture comprises five key pillars: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund. This comprehensive framework was designed to enable Africa to take primary responsibility for its own peace and security rather than relying predominantly on external actors.
Leadership has been the critical variable in APSA’s performance. The decision by African heads of state to create the Peace and Security Council marked a bold act of continental leadership, giving the AU authority to authorise interventions in cases of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. One of the most visible demonstrations of this leadership was the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched in 2007. Despite enormous challenges, AMISOM — later reconfigured as the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) — helped degrade Al-Shabaab’s control over large parts of the country and created space for political processes and state-building. This mission showcased the AU’s willingness to deploy troops and sustain long-term engagement where international partners were initially hesitant.
Another significant example is the AU’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Darfur (Sudan), South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Lake Chad Basin. In each case, the effectiveness of AU leadership depended heavily on the political will and diplomatic skill of key member states, the AU Commission Chairperson, and the Peace and Security Council. The AU’s successful facilitation of the 2019 political transition in Sudan and its ongoing mediation efforts in multiple conflict zones further illustrate how continental leadership can create pathways for dialogue when national institutions falter.
However, the AU’s leadership has also encountered notable limitations. Funding shortages, logistical constraints, and sometimes divergent interests among member states have hampered rapid and decisive action. The 2011 Libya intervention exposed deep divisions within the AU, while recent political transitions and coups in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea) have tested the Union’s ability to enforce its normative frameworks consistently. These experiences reveal that continental leadership remains vulnerable to the sovereignty concerns of member states and the challenge of translating political consensus into operational effectiveness.
Despite these constraints, the AU has made important strides in institutionalising leadership for peace and security. The adoption of the African Union Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030 and the ongoing efforts to fully operationalise the African Standby Force reflect a long-term strategic vision. The Union has also strengthened its partnership with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, recognising that effective continental security requires layered leadership — with RECs often acting as first responders and the AU providing strategic oversight and legitimacy.
The African Union’s journey demonstrates both the immense potential and the inherent difficulties of continental leadership in security matters. When leadership is bold, united, and well-resourced, the AU can play a transformative role in preventing conflict, managing crises, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. When leadership is fragmented or under-resourced, progress slows and opportunities for timely intervention are lost.
SADC Regional Interventions: Leadership, Solidarity, and the Limits of Collective Action
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) offers a distinct model of regional security leadership shaped by its historical struggle against apartheid and a strong emphasis on sovereignty and consensus. Originally formed in 1980 to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, SADC has gradually expanded its security role through the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.
SADC’s most prominent military intervention occurred in 1998 in Lesotho. Following a disputed election and political violence, South Africa and Botswana, acting under SADC authority, launched Operation Boleas to restore order and facilitate new elections. While the intervention achieved its immediate objectives, it was criticised for limited consultation with other SADC members and for being perceived as South African dominance rather than genuine collective action. This episode highlighted both the potential and the sensitivities of SADC leadership in security matters.
A more sustained and complex engagement has been SADC’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 2013, SADC has supported the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Comprising troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, the FIB was mandated to conduct offensive operations against armed groups. South African leadership was instrumental in pushing for the creation of the FIB, reflecting Pretoria’s strategic interest in stabilising the Great Lakes region. The intervention has had mixed results: it helped degrade some armed groups but has struggled with the sheer complexity of conflict dynamics, resource constraints, and the challenge of addressing root causes such as governance failures and illicit resource exploitation.
More recently, in 2021, SADC deployed the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to address the escalating insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. The mission, led by South African forces with contributions from several member states, aimed to support the Mozambican government in restoring security and protecting civilians. Leadership from South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania was critical in mobilising rapid deployment. While SAMIM has contributed to the degradation of insurgent capabilities and the protection of key economic installations, challenges remain, including coordination with Rwandan forces operating in the same theatre and the need for a stronger focus on addressing underlying socio-economic grievances.
SADC’s security interventions reveal a distinct leadership pattern dominated by a few influential member states, particularly South Africa. This “hegemonic leadership” model has enabled action when consensus is difficult to achieve but has also generated resentment among smaller states wary of South African dominance. Zimbabwe and Angola have also played significant roles in specific contexts, while smaller states have contributed troops and political legitimacy.
The consensus-based decision-making culture within SADC has been both a strength and a limitation. It ensures broad buy-in when agreement is reached, but it can lead to slow or diluted responses when member states have divergent interests. The principle of “quiet diplomacy” has often prioritised political dialogue over forceful intervention, sometimes delaying decisive action.
SADC interventions have achieved notable successes. They have prevented state collapse in Lesotho, contributed to stabilisation efforts in the DRC, and helped contain the Cabo Delgado insurgency. The organisation has also developed important normative frameworks, including the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and mechanisms for electoral observation and conflict prevention.
However, limitations are equally evident. Funding remains chronically inadequate, often forcing reliance on external partners or lead nations. Logistical challenges, interoperability issues among national forces, and uneven political commitment have constrained operational effectiveness. Critics argue that SADC’s responses have sometimes prioritised regime security over human security, particularly in cases involving member states’ internal political crises.
The SADC experience underscores several important lessons about regional security leadership. First, hegemonic leadership can enable rapid action but risks undermining legitimacy and long-term cohesion. Second, consensus-based systems require strong mediation and facilitation skills to convert agreement into effective implementation. Third, sustainable security leadership must address both immediate threats and underlying structural drivers such as poverty, inequality, and governance deficits. Finally, SADC’s trajectory shows that regional organisations can play meaningful security roles even without a single dominant power, provided there is sufficient political will and institutional adaptability.
Comparative Insights from Other Regions
Global experiences reinforce these lessons. The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has succeeded largely because of consistent institutional leadership and shared norms among member states, enabling joint missions and rapid response capabilities. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s consensus-based leadership model has helped maintain stability amid complex geopolitical tensions, although it has occasionally been criticised for slower decision-making. These cases confirm that effective regional security leadership requires a delicate balance between respect for sovereignty and the courage to pursue collective action.
Persistent Challenges and Pathways Forward
Leadership in regional and continental security faces recurring obstacles: divergent national interests, resource constraints, weak institutional capacity, and external interference. Political transitions and electoral cycles can disrupt continuity, while hybrid threats demand leaders capable of integrating diverse tools and actors.
To build more effective security leadership, regional and continental organisations must invest deliberately in leadership development. This includes targeted programmes that cultivate strategic foresight, ethical governance, collaborative skills, and crisis management capabilities. Institutional mechanisms should be designed to ensure policy continuity beyond changes in individual leaders. Greater inclusion of civil society, youth, and women in security decision-making can enhance legitimacy and broaden perspectives. Finally, partnerships with global actors should be pursued in ways that preserve African agency and ownership.
Conclusion
Leadership remains the single most decisive factor in regional and continental security. It is the invisible bridge that transforms fragile agreements into enduring peace, turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and converts divergent national interests into a common purpose. The experiences of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union across the continent, and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside valuable lessons from Europe and Southeast Asia, consistently demonstrate one fundamental truth: even the most sophisticated security architectures will falter without visionary, ethical, and collaborative leadership.
In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, where threats respect no borders, the quality of leadership at every level — from heads of state to technical experts within regional commissions — will ultimately determine whether Africa and other regions merely survive successive crises or rise to build lasting stability and prosperity.
The challenge before current and future leaders is clear: to move beyond rhetoric and embrace the difficult work of forging unity, exercising foresight, upholding accountability, and investing in people-centred security solutions. Those who answer this call will not only secure their nations and regions but will also leave a legacy of peace that benefits generations yet unborn and contributes meaningfully to a more stable global order.
True security is not built by arms alone. It is built by leadership that dares to imagine, unite, and act for the common good.
Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.com, globalstageimpacts@gmail.com
Related


Kano Deputy Governorship: Why Murtala Sule Garo is Most Deserving
El-Rufai to Remain in ICPC Custody Till June
LP: Nenadi Usman Floors Julius Abure at Appeal Court
Tinubu Sacks Edun, Appoints Oyedele As Finance Minister
Timi Frank Petitions US, Demands Gbajabiamila’s Resignation over ‘Anti-Democratic’ Remarks
Alleged Coup Plotters Get April 22 Date for Trial, Slammed with 13-Count Charge
Court Admits Nine Exhibits Against Malami, Family in EFCC Fraud Trial
Why MTN, Airtel Suspended Airtime, Data Borrowing Services + the FCCPC Connection
Leadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security
2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise
Tech and Humanity: When the System Has No Answer, Build One
Again, Iran’s Military Closes Strait of Hormuz
African Heritage Awards: Honours Galore for Ex-AfDB President, Akinwumi Adesina
World Bank Flags ‘Hidden Spending System’ Diverting N34.53trn of Nigeria’s Revenue
Trending
-
Business3 days agoWhy MTN, Airtel Suspended Airtime, Data Borrowing Services + the FCCPC Connection
-
Opinion4 days agoLeadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security
-
Opinion4 days ago2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise
-
Tech and Humanity5 days agoTech and Humanity: When the System Has No Answer, Build One
-
World4 days agoAgain, Iran’s Military Closes Strait of Hormuz
-
Boss Of The Week4 days agoAfrican Heritage Awards: Honours Galore for Ex-AfDB President, Akinwumi Adesina
-
Economy3 days agoWorld Bank Flags ‘Hidden Spending System’ Diverting N34.53trn of Nigeria’s Revenue
-
Voice of Emancipation3 days agoVoice of Emancipation: Nigeria’s Political Climate and the Yoruba Struggle

