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Rejoinder to Simon Kolawole’s Misrepresentation of The Patriots’ Position on the 1999 Constitution

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By Prof. Mike Ozekhome, SAN, CON, OFR, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION
On Sunday, July 27, 2025, respected columnist,Simon Kolawole, published an opinion piece in ThisDay titled,“Back to the 1999 Constitution – Again?” In the said piece, Kolawole sought to downplay or outrightly discredit the persistent and growing calls for the restructuring of Nigeria’s constitutional framework. He targeted, in particular, the longstanding position advanced by patriotic intellectuals and elder statesmen under the collective known as The Patriots, portraying them as revisionists of Nigeria’s constitutional history. But Kolawole’s interpretation not only misrepresents the actual arguments being advanced by The Patriots, it also rests on selective history, unverified assumptions, and a concerning disregard for legal scholarship and political truth. He claimed, among other things, that The Patriots had falsely asserted that the 1999 Constitution was authored by the military and that their stance was either uninformed or deliberately misleading. (See Simon Kolawole, “Let’s Tell Ourselves the Truth about the Constitution,” ThisDay, July 28, 2024.)

PURPOSE OF THIS INTERVENTION
This rejoinder seeks to correct these misrepresentations and restate – clearly and accurately-the long-held position of The Patriots on the 1999 Constitution. It will also address broader issues surrounding the unsuitability of Nigeria’s overcentralized federal structure in a pluralistic society, and highlight areas of the Constitution, particularly the Exclusive Legislative List, that require urgent reform if Nigeria is to remain a just, united, and functional federation.

CLARIFYING THE PATRIOTS’ POSITION ON THE 1999 CONSTITUTION

Simon Kolawole alleges that The Patriots have repeatedly claimed that the 1999 Constitution was “written by the military” and that such a claim is false because “it was drafted by a committee of legal experts and approved by the Provisional Ruling Council.” He suggests that this position lacks intellectual rigor and should be dismissed by well-meaning Nigerians.

However, this is a complete mischaracterization of the Patriots’ position. The Patriots have never claimed that soldiers sat down with pens and drafted the Constitution in a vacuum. No.What they have consistently stated is that the 1999 Constitution is a product of military imposition, lacking the democratic legitimacy that should accompany any foundational legal document in a pluralistic society such as Nigeria.

In a public statement by Professor Ben Nwabueze, SAN – renowned constitutional law scholar and founding member (later Chairman) of The Patriots-it was clearly argued that:
“The 1999 Constitution was imposed by a military regime without a referendum, without public debate, and without the participation of the Nigerian people. It cannot therefore be considered a people’s Constitution.”

Similarly, in a 2001 press briefing, Chief FRA Williams, SAN, another founding member and pioneer chairman of The Patriots, described the 1999 Constitution as:
“A document that merely adapted the 1979 Constitution and was handed down to us by a departing military junta.”

The use of the term “military Constitution” by The Patriots refers therefore not to its literal authorship by soldiers, but to the flawed process of imposition and the absence of participatory legitimacy through a people’s referendum. It is this absence of democratic authorship and validation that underpins The Patriots’ sustained call for a truly autochthonous Constitution-one emerging from the will and deliberation of the Nigerian people.

To suggest otherwise, as Kolawole did, is to either misunderstand the semantics of constitutional discourse or to deliberately distort the message.I prefer to believe that the former is the case. The consequence of such distortion is dangerous: it undermines the gravity and urgency of constitutional reforms by reducing it to a mere semantic disagreement rather than the existential democratic concern that it actually is.

CRITIQUE OF NIGERIA’S OVERCENTRALIZATION
The evolution of Nigeria’s federal structure is marked by a troubling contradiction: although it is constitutionally designated a federation, the actual distribution of power closely resembles that of a unitary state. This paradox can be traced back to the 1966 military coup and the subsequent unification of the country under a single military command structure. The military, inherently centralist in its command hierarchy, dismantled the regional autonomy that had defined Nigeria’s First Republic (1960–1966). (See Olumide Akanbi, “The Evolution of Nigeria’s Federalism and the Military Factor,” Journal of African Federalism, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2018, p. 45.). What some Northern soldiers considered to be the original sin of General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, (the then Head of State who seized power during the chaos and crises that ensued during the 15th January, 1966 military coup),was his promulgation of Decree No. 34 pf 1967 which abrogated the federal stricture in favour of a unitary one.
Before the 1966 military intervention, Nigeria’s federalism allowed each of the three (later four) regions (with the creation of the Midwest Region on 10th August, 1963, from Western Region by popular referendum of the people) to exercise substantial control over local affairs. These regions had their own Constitutions, public services, and developmental priorities. However, from General Yakubu Gowon’s Decree No. 8 of 1967, which effectively abolished regional governments in favor of 12 militarily-administered states, to the eventual promulgation of the 1999 Constitution by General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s regime, Nigeria has grown increasingly centralized. Thus, there has never been any conscious effort by successive governments – colonial, civil or military, since Nigeria’s Lugardian almagamation on January 1, 1914 – to have a buy-in of the people through a referendum. None from the 1922 Clifford Constitution;1946 Richards Constitution; 1951 Macpherson Constitution; 1954 Lyttleton Constitution; 1960 Independent Constitution; 1963 Republican Constitution; 1979 Constitution; 1989 Constitution; and up to the 1999 Constitution.

This over centralization of powers at the centre poses severe governance challenges in a country as ethnically,culturally, religiously and linguistically diverse as Nigeria. With about 374 ethnic groups (Prof Onigu Otite), at least 500 spoken languages and strong regional identities, a one-size-fits-all approach to governance is both ineffective and inflammatory. As Rotimi Suberu notes, “centralized federalism in Nigeria breeds disaffection, weakens accountability, and fuels centrifugal tensions.” (Rotimi Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, p. 112.)
For example, the same educational policy enforced in Zamfara State may be culturally, religiously or economically inappropriate in Bayelsa State. Federal government’s directives on land use, resource control or school curriculum rarely accommodates local realities. Similarly, national security priorities are often applied uniformly without sensitivity to regional insecurity dynamics such as the age-long farmer-herder clashes in the Middle Belt, or self-determination agitations in the South East.
Another critical example is the administration of religion. While the federal Constitution of 1999 claims secularism (section 10), certain states enforce Sharia law, while others either remain secular, practise traditional religion,or remain Christian-dominated. Yet, national laws, judicial and other public structures fail to reflect these peculiar realities, often resulting in policy flip-flops and conflict or discrimination claims. This dissonance between forced constitutional uniformity and lived practical plurality experiences is an enduring source of national instability.
Nigeria’s flawed federalism also impedes development. Federating states are heavily dependent on federally-allocated funds (under section 162 of the 1999 Constitution). This disincentivizes local innovation or internally generated revenue (IGR) strategies. Because federal allocation is distributed by formula rather than performance or resource ownership, states have limited autonomy to plan large-scale infrastructure, education, or healthcare interventions independent of Abuja. This also breeds discrimination and resentment. Oil-rich Bayelsa State, for example, shares from the Federation Account less than may non-oil producing communities notwithstanding the attendant oil and gas–related environmental degradation and prevalent poverty.

OVERHAULING THE EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATIVE LIST
The Exclusive Legislative List in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) contains 68 whole items which only the federal government has power to legislate upon. (See Part I, Second Schedule, Constitution of the 1999 Constitution.This list is excessive and counter-productive in a federal system we pretend to operate in our pluralistic society. It takes away vital areas of governance from the reach of states and local governements, despite their proximity to the people. Among the most problematic items are police and security, prisons, railways, mineral resources, electricity generation and transmission, labour and trade unions, education (particularly tertiary), taxation of certain commodities, matrimonial matters, licensing, etc.

This dominant central control over crucial sectors greatly undermines Nigeria’s federal claim and limits each state’s ability to respond to its unique developmental needs.
Take policing, for example. In the United States and India (both federal democracies with complex diversities), subnational units maintain their own police forces with full jurisdictional authority. Yet in Nigeria, only the federal government is constitutionally empowered to create or control the police force under sections 214 and 215 of the 1999 Constitution. The implication is that state governors, though constitutionally described as “chief security officers” of their states, can not control security within their borders. (See Yusuf Olaolu Ali, SAN, Federalism and the Nigerian Constitution: A Legal Perspective, Spectrum Law Review, 2016, p. 78.)

This unitarinsm has proven disastrous. States facing terrorist insurgency, mass kidnapping and ethnic violence are unable to develop local policing models or equip forces that understand the terrain and speak local languages or respond to such vices as they occur. The result is a reactive and overstretched federal police, further alienating citizens from security providers.
Similarly, prison administration is fully centralized; yet most of the crimes prosecuted in Nigeria occur under state criminal laws,not federal laws. This mismatch causes logistical and financial burdens on the federal system while delaying justice. A state-based correctional system, aligned with state judicial authority, would be more efficient and localized to deal with local offences.

In the education sector, control over accreditation, curriculum and policy located at the federal level stifles local creativity and ignores peculiar local needs. States such as Lagos and Rivers which have made giant strides in digital learning and school reforms are constantly required to comply with federal laws that may not reflect their educational needs,local priorities or resources.

Another major area of great concern is resource control and mining. Under the 1999 Constitution, all mineral resources are owned by the federal government, with states entitled only to derivation funds. This has perpetuated sustained injustice leading to the conflict in the Niger Delta.It has created a retrogrssive culture of dependence where resource-rich states remain poor due to limited control over their God-given assets while non-oil producing states live fat on such poor states.An unjust and obnoxious system of sharing the cake without contributing to its baking has thus emerged.

Globally, federations assign such matters to local authorities. In Canada, provinces control natural resources and generate revenue from them. In India, states co-legislate on police, education and public health under a Concurrent List. In the U.S., the Tenth Amendment reserves unenumerated powers to the states. Nigeria’s failure to adopt similar devolution of powers has painfully hindered innovation, democratic accountability and balanced development.

What is therefore needed is a restructuring of the Exclusive Legislative List, pruning it to only essential national matters such as defence, foreign affairs, banking and currency, while moving most socio-economic functions to the Concurrent or Residual Lists. This would not only align with global federalist principles but also reflect Nigeria’s diverse socio-political realities. Only a brand new Constitution emanating from the people’s will after a Constituent Assembly and referendum can bring about such a revolutionary outcome,not piecemeal amendment of the present 1999 Constitution.

ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN CONSTITUTION-MAKING:
THE LEGISLATURE AS ENABLER, NOT ORIGINATOR
It is axiomatic that under constitutional democracy, sovereignty resides in the people. The legislature, while clothed with enormous powers of lawmaking, is not the primary source or originator of the people’s will. Rather, it is a conduit-a servant and enabler-of that will. Nigeria’s National Assembly, as presently constituted, draws its powers from the 1999 Constitution which is itself a product of military fiat, not of popular affirmation of the people. This reality raises a fundamental legal-philosophical contradiction: can a creature of a flawed document presume to re-birth it? Can a child reconfigure its own paternity? The National Assembly, being a product of a schedule attached to Decree No. 24 of 1999, cannot, ab initio, claim any right to author a new grundnorm that overrides its own existential basis. All it can do is to amend, amend and amend the flawed Constitution under section 9 thereof. The reason is that being the tail (representative agent), it cannot wag the dog (the people that own the will).

The National Assembly’s attempts at constitutional amendment-however noble-have therefore largely been elitist and parliamentary, not popular or plebiscitary. Several constitutional alteration bills have been passed (up to 5 already); yet none has bridged the democratic gap of a sovereign national consensus. None has dared to make Chapter 2 justiciable (the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principle of State Policy). They would never! The people thus watch from the sidelines as professional politicians hold sway over what should be their social contract. That is akin to medical doctors prescribing medication to patients they have not examined. The people’s voice is conspicuously absent in the very document that governs their lives. The legislative arm must therefore reposition itself-not as the progenitor of a new Constitution, but as the facilitator of a new constitutional order birthed by the people themselves through a referendum.
[See Mike Ozekhome, “The Illegality and Illegitimacy of the 1999 Constitution,” ThisDay, April 22, 2024].

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM VS. CONSTITUTIONAL REWRITING
There exists a grave conceptual and legal dissonance in conflating constitutional reform with constitutional rewriting. Reform is cosmetic; rewriting is foundational. The former merely plasters the gaping cracks of a collapsing edifice. The latter reconstructs its very foundation. Nigeria’s current approach has been that of tentative and timid reforms. Reforms through amendments involve mere tinkering with clauses, altering sections, inserting or deleting subsections-all within the same defective legal framework. This is akin to merely repainting a termite-ridden house while ignoring the need to first fumigate and wholly rebuild; or merely cutting off the branches of a tree threatening the foundations of a house, rather than uprooting it completely.
Rewriting on the other hand is a revolutionary act-peaceful, yet radical. It is negotiated. It requires a complete break from the past; a tabula rasa; a fresh convening of the people; and a new social contract that reflects the genuine aspirations of today’s Nigerians;not those of 1998 military oligarch. Countries like South Africa, Kenya and some others have walked this noble path through convocation of Constituent Assemblies participation in national referenda. Why not Nigeria?
To continue operating the 1999 Constitution is to perpetuate a fraud-a self-deceit that we live under democracy when in fact we are governed by relics of khaki rule. The National Assembly must embrace its transitional role and work with civil society, the judiciary, the executive and all Nigerian stakeholders to midwife-not manufacture-a new constitutional dawn.
[See Jibrin Ibrahim, “Why Nigeria Needs a New Constitution, Not Another Amendment,” Premium Times, March 4, 2021].

NEW REFERENDUM-BASED CONSTITUTIONS: GLOBAL TESTAMENT TO POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE
The world is replete with nations that emerged from constitutional darkness into the light of participatory democracy and popular governance. Some examples will suffice here to advance this point. Kenya, in 2010, rose from the ashes of electoral violence to birth a new people-oriented Constitution through a referendum. The Kenyan model was not merely legal-it was moral. It sought to heal, not just to rule. South Africa’s 1996 Constitution is another golden standard: a document forged through exhaustive public consultations, grassroots submissions, and national soul-searching, culminating in a powerful symbol of unity post-apartheid.
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution also passed through a national referendum, marking the country’s rebirth after years of military interregnum. In 2022, Chile attempted a similar feat by proposing a new Constitution through a popularly elected Constituent Assembly. Although that version was rejected in a referendum, the process itself showcased the democratic principle: the people must be heard, not herded; their will must prevail, not discarded.
In Iran, a new Islamic Republic Constitution was birthed in 1979 after a 99.5% referendum of the Iranian people. A people’s referendum in Bangladesh in 1991reintroduced a parliamentary system of government, abolished the office of the Vice President and provided that the President must be elected by the Parliament. Morocco held a referendum on 1st July, 2011, for constitutional reforms in response to wide-spread protests. Egypt subjected its new Constitution to a referendum in 2012. The Eritrean people in 1994 carried out a referendum which gave the people a “sense of ownership of the Constitution”. Tunisia, following a revolution and months of protests, set up a Constituent Assembly that drafted a new Constitution on 26th January, 2014, after a people’s referendum. Iraq, on October 15, 2005, carried out a referendum to adopt her new Constitution.
The United States of America (after whom Nigeria’s Constitution is modelled) held a constitutional convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, between May 25 and September 17, 1787, to birth a new Constitution and have a “more perfect union”. Of the 55 Delegates that attended the Convention presided over by George Washington (who later became the first American President), 39 delegates signed a new Constitution after a people’s referendum. Broad outlines of a new Constitution were proposed, debated and agreed upon by these delegates that represented the autonomous confederates. It was this initiative that brought about America’s federal system of government; Executive Presidency; Republicanism; Separation of Powers (a doctrine earlier popularized in 1748 by Baron de Montesquieu, a great French philosopher); and judicial review. It witnesses inclusive inputs by great Federalists such as George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, John Adams and John Marshal. Since 1789 when the Constitution birthed ( 236 whole years ago),has just 7,591 words with only 27 amendments. The reason it has withstood its stability and acceptability is because it emanated directly from the will of the people and so enjoys their legitimacy and respectability.Why not Nigeria,I ask? (See Mike Ozekhome: Constitutional Autochthony and a Referendum for a New People’s Constitution: A Comparison with the 1999 Constitution; February, 2025, Mikeozekhomeschambers.com).
What unites the above examples is one common thread-referendum. This is the power of the people expressed directly; not elected, selected or appointed through legislative surrogates. The people must see their fingerprint on the agreed charter that governs them. That is the essence of legitimacy through a yes-or-no referendum on the people’s grundnorm. Referendum makes a Constitution autochthonous, homegrown,people-owned.
[See Yash Ghai, “Kenya’s Constitution: An Instrument for Change,” Open Society Foundations, August 2011]
[See Christina Murray and Heinz Klug, “Constitution-Making in South Africa: A Model for the World?” Review of Constitutional Studies, 1997].

LESSONS FOR NIGERIA FROM THESE COUNTRIES
Nigeria must jettison the illusion that piecemeal amendments can yield a legitimate, people’s Constitution. We must learn from America, our African and Latin American siblings that the legitimacy of a Constitution lies not in its legal grammar but in its popular genesis. A new Nigerian Constitution must be drafted by a Constituent Assembly comprising of Representatives of the people elected on a non political or partisan basis-civil society, labour, youth, men and women’s groups, professionals, students, traditional institutions, faith-based organizations, persons living with disabilities and other stakeholders. It must then be subjected to a national referendum where every citizen, from the creeks of Yenagoa to the plains of Sokoto, from the savannah to the mangrove swamps, etc, casts a vote.

This process is not just a legal imperative-it is a national therapy. A referendum-based Constitution would erase the ghost of military rule and birth a fresh beginning and identity for Nigeria. It would convert cynical citizens into patriotic stakeholders. It would replace imposed obedience with inspired allegiance.

The time has come. Let the eagle soar again-not on colonial graves; not on military Decrees and diktats; but on the wings of popular consent of the people.
[See Clement Nwankwo, “Towards a People’s Constitution for Nigeria,” Cleen Foundation Policy Paper, 2021].

THE PATRIOTS’ PATRIOTIC BLUEPRINT FOR A PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTION
A Constitution must not only be written-it must be born. And like all legitimate births, it must pass through the womb of collective consent. The Patriots, a formidable assembly of distinguished elder statesmen and women, jurists, constitutional scholars, professionals, traditional and religious leaders and public intellectuals, have for years championed the cause of a People’s Constitution, not by revolution but by resolution; not with bayonets but with ballots; not by Decrees but through dialogue and democratic deliberation.
Their thesis is clear: no nation can build peace on the foundation of falsehood or silence, and no union can last where one part feels conscripted rather than convened. In the interest of national salvation-not sentiments-they propose a blueprint for constitutional rebirth anchored on Nigeria’s plurality.

PRACTICAL STEPS FOR NIGERIA’S CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS
Step 1: Enactment of Enabling Legislation:
• Executive Bill Pathway: The President submits an Executive Bill to the National Assembly, requesting promulgation of a law to enable INEC conduct elections into a Constituent Assembly on a non-partisan basis.This will comprise of 110 members made up of three representatives from each Senatorial zone of the 36 states of Nigeria and the FCT,Abuja (one per senatorial district). Such candidates are to campaign and run on their personal merit based on their own manifestos, not on political party platforms. This approach follows global best practice, as seen in Uganda (1989) and South Africa (1996).
• Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC):

Step 2: The elected Constituent Assembly sits publicly for the sole
purpose of drafting a new people’s Constitution. In this historic task, the Constituent Assembly shall consult widely across all segments of the society. They shall also draw inputs from:
• The 1960 Independence and 1963 Republican Constitution;
• The 2014 National Conference Report (over 600 consensus-based recommendations);
•Relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution;
• Relevant reports from Senate and House Committees on their Constitutional Review exercise;
• Nationwide submissions from ethnic nationalities, civil society, the military, Police, media, business,private sector,persons living with disabilities, academia,students leadership, labour, diaspora, traditional and religious leaders, elder statesmen and women, market men and women, and more.
Deliberations at the Constituent Assembly must be open to the public, transparent, and all-inclusive; modeled after the 1996 South African process which received over two million citizen submissions.

Step 3: Public Engagement and Harmonization
Once the initial draft is produced:
• The document must be translated into major local languages and subjected to town hall meetings, digital consultations, and public critique across the six geopolitical zones and the diaspora.
• The drafters shall revise and harmonize the draft based on inputs received.
This step ensures that the Constitution reflects lived realities, promotes civic ownership, and withstands democratic scrutiny.
Step 4: National Referendum
The harmonized final draft is subjected to a national referendum—a democratic mechanism for the people to either accept or reject the new Constitution.
The Constituent Assembly may in its wisdom adopt one of two suggested formats:
• Single Yes/No Vote on the entire draft Constitution (as done in Kenya in 2010 and Bangladesh in 1991).
• Clause-by-Clause Referendum, where citizens vote section-by-section, enabling granular endorsement or rejection. This format mirrors the 1963 Midwestern Referendum of 10th August, 1963.
A minimum voter turnout threshold shall be set to ensure democratic validity.
Step 5: Presidential Proclamation and Entry into Force
Once the referendum is concluded and the draft is approved,it is submitted to the President for assent.
• The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, acting under section 5 of the Constitution and in line with the powers vested in nim as head of the Executive, shall sign and proclaim the new Constitution into law, thus bringing about its enforcement.
It is only then that Nigeria can truly affirm the genuine foundational democratic statement: “We the people of Nigeria… do hereby give to ourselves this Constitution.”

This process is not about undermining state institutions—it is about restoring them to legitimacy. It blends legality (via executive and legislative action) with legitimacy (via citizen participation and referendum). It affirms that sovereignty indeed resides with the people, not a political class; not a elitist group.

This roadmap ensures that Nigeria’s next Constitution is not a product of Decree, convenience, or elite consensus, but of collective national will, built through openness, participation, and inclusion.

CONCLUSION

A CALL TO NATIONAL ACTION

Nigeria stands today, not merely at a constitutional crossroads, but at a moral precipice. The air is thick with constitutional fatigue, the soil weary of authoritarian roots masked by democratic branches, and the soul of the nation suffocate under the weight of imposed structures (foreign and military) that neither resemble nor respect its people’s will.

It is no longer a question of whether the 1999 Constitution is flawed. That is settled. It is a graveyard of imposed ideas, a mausoleum of military fiat dressed in borrowed democratic robes. What is now urgent, pressing and constitutionally obligatory is what we, the Nigerian people must do to salvage her soul.

We must not tinker any longer with palliative amendments. The process of constitutional reform cannot merely be an elite sport, played behind closed doors in committee rooms in Abuja, choreographed by a political class more interested in electoral advantage than nation-building. No. It must begin and end with the people.
The people, in their villages and towns, their religious centres and schools, their market places and offices-they are the sovereigns. Not military Decrees of yesteryears. Not the colonially inherited scaffolds of exclusion. Not the self-serving silence of our complicit elites.

As argued above, the role of the National Assembly under sections 4 and 9 of the 1999 Constitution is not to wear the toga of originators. It is not their prerogative to determine in isolation the next chapter of our nationhood. Rather, they must become enablers, facilitators of a people-driven process rooted in popular sovereignty.
The Patriots, in their timeless wisdom, hug this national moment. Their peaceful blueprint for constitutional renewal, laid out with clarity and democratic precision, calls for a step-by-step people’s conference, one divorced from state capture, one driven by inclusivity, and culminating in a national referendum.

This process is not a romantic idealism. It is national necessity. It is legal realism. It is historical debt owed to a citizenry long ignored and dedpised.

Furthermore, at a time where the sword increasingly overshadows the scale, when guns echo louder than reason, the law must reassert itself-not in violence, not in Decrees, but in institutional dialogue. We are not a banana republic. We are a sovereign Republic founded on law and justice.And it is time we returned to that foundation with humility and courage.
Now therefore, dear Nigerians-activists and artisans, farmers,professors and pensioners, youth and students, academia,diaspora, market men and women,military and police, and elderstatesmen and women,religious and traditional leaders- we call upon you. Let this be the hour of national reawakening and rebirth. Let this be the season when democracy is not just recited but rewritten. Let it not be said that in our moment of reckoning, we chose silence over courage, cynicism over hope, and apathy over action.
Let the President, National Assembly initiate enabling Executive Bill; Let the NASS pass it into law. Let the process commence towards a truly people-led constitutional process. Let the Constituent Assembly deliberate and agree on a draft new Constitution.Let the NASS in its new law mandate INEC to organsise a people’s referendum . Let civil society and other stake holders mobilize town halls, public debates grassroots dialogues to aid the Constituent Assembly. Let the courts be courageous in defending the people’s right to re-found their nation. Let the press amplify, not suppress. Let the young rise and the old lead by example and with conscience.

Let it be said of this generation: They inherited a broken Constitution. They rebuilt it and gave us a new one.
Let Nigeria rise anew, not on the crumbling scaffolds of imposed legality, but on the sacred shoulders of popular legitimacy. This is the lens I recommend to Kolawole and others to appreciate the Patriots’ pateiotic position. God bless Nigeria.

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Opinion

Kano Deputy Governorship: Why Murtala Sule Garo is Most Deserving

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By Abdullahi Sa’idu Baba (Hafizi)

One of the defining slogans of the Governor of Kano State is “Kano First,” a principle that emphasizes prioritizing the collective interest, development, and unity of Kano State above all else. In line with this vision, Hon. Murtala Sule Garo stands out as the most suitable candidate for the position of Deputy Governor. His track record reflects a history of diligent and selfless service to Kano State, marked by consistent dedication to grassroots development and people-oriented governance. Over the years, he has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to advancing the welfare of the people, making him a natural fit for a leadership role that demands loyalty, competence, and a deep understanding of Kano’s needs.

Throughout his time in office, Garo distinguished himself through people-oriented policies and impactful empowerment initiatives. He became widely known for implementing large-scale programs that directly improved the livelihoods of youth and women across Kano State. Thousands benefited from his initiatives, which included financial support, business tools, and opportunities for economic independence. These efforts not only reduced poverty at the grassroots level but also demonstrated his belief in inclusive governance ensuring that the dividends of democracy reach even the most remote communities. His approach earned him recognition as a leader who “takes government to the people,” a rare quality that continues to endear him to the masses.

Beyond empowerment, Garo’s leadership style is defined by accessibility, generosity, and responsiveness. He has consistently been described as a “man of the people,” someone who listens, engages, and responds without bias. His political strength lies in his deep-rooted connection with communities across Kano, where he has built trust over the years through direct engagement and consistent support. This grassroots network has become one of his greatest political assets, positioning him as a unifying figure capable of mobilizing support across different demographics and political divides.

In the evolving political landscape of Kano State, Murtala Sule Garo has emerged as a leading and widely endorsed candidate for the position of Deputy Governor. Recent political development shows that he enjoys overwhelming support not only from key stakeholders within the APC, but also from the generality of the grassroots Kano electorate, reflecting not only his political relevance but also the confidence party leaders and stakeholders have in his experience, loyalty, and leadership capacity.

Garo’s suitability for the role of Deputy Governor is further strengthened by his extensive experience in governance and party administration. Having served in multiple strategic positions, including organising roles, advisory capacities, and two consecutive terms as commissioner, he possesses both institutional knowledge and practical governance skills. His ability to navigate complex political structures while maintaining strong grassroots support makes him uniquely positioned to complement executive leadership and ensure stability in governance.

Looking ahead to future elections, Murtala Sule Garo’s political capacity remains one of his strongest advantages. He is widely regarded as a mobilizer who can energize the electorate, increase voter participation, and strengthen party unity. His influence at the ward and local government levels provides a strategic advantage for any administration he is part of, as he can effectively translate political goodwill into electoral success. Observers believe that his inclusion in leadership would not only consolidate party structures but also enhance governance outcomes through effective implementation of policies at the grassroots level.

Moreover, Garo represents a bridge between experience and youthful dynamism. His understanding of both traditional political structures and modern governance demands positions him as a forward-thinking leader capable of contributing meaningfully to Kano’s development agenda. His inclusive approach, engaging traditional rulers, youth groups, and stakeholders, suggests that he can foster a sense of collective ownership in governance, which is essential for sustainable development.

In conclusion, Hon. Murtala Sule Garo embodies the qualities of a competent administrator, a grassroots mobilizer, and a unifying political figure. His track record of service, empowerment, and community engagement presents a compelling case for his emergence as the next Deputy Governor of Kano State. With his proven ability to deliver results and connect with the people, he stands not only as a suitable candidate but as a strategic asset capable of driving progress, stability, and inclusive governance in Kano State’s future.

Abdullahi Sa’idu Baba (Hafizi) writes from Kano, and can be reached via Hafeeezsb@gmail.com

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Opinion

2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise

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By Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba

To be candid and straightforward, this article is written to sensitize Nigerians to the growing smear campaign against Atiku Abubakar, a campaign of calumny that appears less about national interest and more about political anxiety. The persistence and intensity of these attacks suggest one thing: there are powerful interests who see him not merely as a contender, but as a genuine threat. Yet, Nigerians are no longer easily distracted. The electorate is becoming more discerning, more interested in good governance.

Closely tied to this is the urgency of the 2027 presidential election. This is not just another electoral cycle, it may well represent a turning point in Nigeria’s history. Although Atiku Abubakar has confirmed 2027 to be his last presidential outing. That reality alone elevates the stakes. It presents Nigeria with a stark choice: to either harness a reservoir of experience at a critical moment or risk drifting further into uncertainty. In clear terms, 2027 is not just about political succession, it is about whether Nigeria recalibrates its direction or continues along a path of deepening national challenges.

The fundamental truth is that, experience and effective leadership are positively correlated, independent of age. Leadership in a complex state like Nigeria requires far more than youthful enthusiasm. It demands institutional memory, policy depth, negotiation skills, and the ability to manage crises with precision. It is therefore misguided to reduce leadership capability to age alone. Age neither guarantees competence nor invalidates it. Across the world, both young and elderly leaders have failed when they lacked the depth of experience required for governance. In Nigeria itself, recent experience with president Tinubu shows that leadership failure cannot be attributed to age alone. This underscores a critical point: the true dividing line between success and failure in leadership is not age, it is experience, particularly practical and relevant experience, which is too often overlooked.

Global political trends reinforce this reality. In the United States, voters returned Donald Trump to power over Kamala Harris, reflecting a preference for perceived experience over age. Figures such as Bernie Sanders remain influential well into their later years, shaping national discourse. Similarly, in Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected again at an advanced age because voters trusted his tested capacity to lead during difficult times. A similar pattern recently played out in West Africa. In Liberia, the younger incumbent George Weah was defeated by the significantly older Joseph Boakai. That outcome was widely interpreted as a preference by Liberians for experience and not youthful appeal. These examples are not coincidences. They illustrate a consistent global pattern that when nations face uncertainty, they turn to experience. Nigeria must not waste the experience of Atiku Abubakar like it happened with remarkable figures like Obafemi Awolowo, Chief MKO Abiola and Malam Aminu Kano in the past.

Beyond the question of age lies another critical issue: political strategy. The debate over who should carry the opposition banner in 2027 must be guided by political reality. Nigeria’s recent history makes this abundantly clear. When Goodluck Jonathan sought re-election, the opposition were less influenced by sentiment. Instead, they made a strategic calculation, searching for a candidate with national reach and electoral strength, an idea that birthed Muhammadu Buhari as the opposition candidate, despite his previous electoral defeats.

It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument that Atiku Abubakar should be excluded on the basis that he has contested before. By that same reasoning, Buhari would never have emerged as a viable candidate. Political persistence is not a weakness; it is often a reflection of conviction, resilience, and determination. Elections are not won by novelty alone, they are won by structure, experience, and the ability to connect with a broad electorate.

Equally unconvincing is the argument that 2027 should be determined by zoning or that it is “still the turn of the South.” If the opposition is serious about unseating president Tinubu, it must prioritize a candidate with the experience, national appeal, and political structure required to achieve that goal. Atiku Abubakar is therefore the “asset” of the today. His eight years as Vice President under Olusegun Obasanjo provided him with deep exposure to governance, economic reform, and institutional development. Beyond public office, he is widely recognized as a seasoned politician and an established businessman with independent wealth, an important factor in a political environment often clouded by concerns about misuse of public resources.

Interestingly, it’s increasingly clear that Nigerians are moving beyond superficial narratives. The electorate is more focused on outcomes, on who can stabilize the economy, strengthen institutions, and restore confidence in governance. The conversation is shifting from age to ability, from rhetoric to results.

As 2027 approaches, the choice before Nigeria is becoming clearer. This is not a contest of personalities or a debate about generational symbolism. It is a question of capacity, preparedness, and national survival. History, both global and local, points in one direction: when experience is sidelined, nations pay the price.

Nigeria cannot afford that mistake again…

Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba writes from Kano, and can be reached via drssbaba@yahoo.com

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Leadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security

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By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

“Security is not built by arms alone, but by the quality of leadership that turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and divergent interests into common purpose.” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

Abstract

In an era of complex transnational threats, effective regional and continental security hinges less on military capabilities or institutional frameworks and more on the quality of leadership. This article explores how visionary, adaptive, ethical, and inclusive leadership serves as the critical catalyst for transforming shared vulnerabilities into collective strength. Through in-depth case studies of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside comparative insights from the European Union and ASEAN, it demonstrates that leadership determines whether security protocols remain aspirational or deliver tangible protection. The analysis highlights both successes and limitations, identifying key attributes of effective security leadership: strategic foresight, consensus-building, institutional coordination, and accountability. Ultimately, the article argues that investing in high-calibre leadership at every level is essential for building resilient, people-centred security systems capable of addressing contemporary challenges and contributing to a more stable global order.

Introduction

Effective regional and continental security depends far more on leadership than on military hardware, intelligence capabilities, or financial resources alone. Leadership supplies the vision, political will, strategic coherence, ethical foundation, and sustained commitment required to transform fragmented national efforts into unified, sustainable security outcomes. In an era marked by transnational threats — terrorism, organised crime, climate-induced conflicts, cyber vulnerabilities, irregular migration, and hybrid warfare — the quality of leadership at regional and continental levels determines whether security architectures deliver genuine protection or remain aspirational documents on paper.

The Indispensable Role of Leadership in Regional and Continental Security

Leadership in security contexts operates across multiple interconnected layers. At the strategic level, it involves setting a long-term vision that anticipates emerging threats and aligns collective resources before crises escalate. At the operational level, it demands the ability to coordinate institutions, mobilise resources, and execute joint actions efficiently. At the relational level, it requires building and maintaining trust among sovereign states with often competing interests, historical grievances, and differing priorities.

Effective leaders in this domain exhibit several critical attributes. They demonstrate visionary foresight, the capacity to read complex geopolitical and socio-economic trends and translate them into proactive strategies. They exercise adaptive decision-making, adjusting approaches as threats evolve while preserving core principles. They practise inclusive diplomacy, forging consensus without compromising sovereignty. Above all, they uphold ethical integrity and accountability, ensuring that security measures respect human rights and maintain public legitimacy. Without these qualities, even the most sophisticated security protocols risk becoming ineffective or counterproductive.

ECOWAS in West Africa: Leadership-Driven Collective Security

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975 primarily as an economic integration body, has evolved into one of Africa’s most sophisticated and tested regional security mechanisms. This transformation was not inevitable but resulted from deliberate, courageous, and often pragmatic leadership in response to existential threats that threatened to engulf the entire sub-region.

The pivotal moment came in the early 1990s when Liberia descended into a devastating civil war. Faced with the risk of regional contagion, ECOWAS leaders, particularly Nigeria’s General Ibrahim Babangida and Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, took the unprecedented step of creating the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 — Africa’s first sub-regional peacekeeping force. This was a bold departure from the Organisation of African Unity’s strict non-interference policy. ECOMOG’s interventions in Liberia (1990–1997) and Sierra Leone (1997–2000) prevented state collapse, contained the spread of conflict, and created political space for negotiated settlements and eventual democratic transitions.

Leadership played a pivotal role in these outcomes. Nigerian leadership provided the bulk of troops and financial resources, while Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings offered critical diplomatic backing. The willingness of several heads of state to commit substantial national resources despite domestic criticism demonstrated a rare form of collective political will. These interventions also led to important institutional developments, including the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and later the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).

In more recent years, ECOWAS leadership has continued to evolve. During the 2010–2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS applied sustained diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force, contributing significantly to the eventual restoration of constitutional order. In response to the rise of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, ECOWAS has strengthened intelligence sharing, supported the Multinational Joint Task Force, and promoted greater coordination among affected states. The organisation has also demonstrated its preventive diplomacy capacity in The Gambia (2016–2017), where firm but measured leadership helped resolve a dangerous post-election standoff without large-scale violence, and in Guinea (2021), where it applied sanctions and mediation to encourage return to constitutional rule.

Yet ECOWAS leadership has also encountered significant limitations. Divergent national interests, chronic funding shortfalls, and occasional leadership vacuums have sometimes slowed or complicated responses. The recent wave of military coups and political transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger (2021–2023) tested the organisation’s cohesion and exposed the challenge of enforcing normative standards when powerful member states resist collective decisions. These episodes underscore a recurring truth: regional security leadership is only as strong as the political commitment and institutional capacity behind it.

Despite these challenges, ECOWAS remains one of the most advanced regional security mechanisms on the continent. Its evolution from an economic community to a security actor demonstrates how visionary leadership, combined with institutional innovation and political will, can enable a regional organisation to respond effectively to complex security threats. The ECOWAS experience offers enduring lessons: effective regional security leadership must be proactive rather than reactive, adaptive to new threats, inclusive of multiple stakeholders, and continuously reinforced through institutional reform and sustained political will.

African Union’s Continental Leadership: The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has emerged as a central actor in shaping Africa’s security landscape through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Established following the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, APSA represents a fundamental shift in African leadership philosophy — moving from the OAU’s rigid doctrine of non-interference to the AU’s principle of “non-indifference” when grave circumstances threaten peace and stability.

The architecture comprises five key pillars: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund. This comprehensive framework was designed to enable Africa to take primary responsibility for its own peace and security rather than relying predominantly on external actors.

Leadership has been the critical variable in APSA’s performance. The decision by African heads of state to create the Peace and Security Council marked a bold act of continental leadership, giving the AU authority to authorise interventions in cases of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. One of the most visible demonstrations of this leadership was the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched in 2007. Despite enormous challenges, AMISOM — later reconfigured as the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) — helped degrade Al-Shabaab’s control over large parts of the country and created space for political processes and state-building. This mission showcased the AU’s willingness to deploy troops and sustain long-term engagement where international partners were initially hesitant.

Another significant example is the AU’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Darfur (Sudan), South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Lake Chad Basin. In each case, the effectiveness of AU leadership depended heavily on the political will and diplomatic skill of key member states, the AU Commission Chairperson, and the Peace and Security Council. The AU’s successful facilitation of the 2019 political transition in Sudan and its ongoing mediation efforts in multiple conflict zones further illustrate how continental leadership can create pathways for dialogue when national institutions falter.

However, the AU’s leadership has also encountered notable limitations. Funding shortages, logistical constraints, and sometimes divergent interests among member states have hampered rapid and decisive action. The 2011 Libya intervention exposed deep divisions within the AU, while recent political transitions and coups in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea) have tested the Union’s ability to enforce its normative frameworks consistently. These experiences reveal that continental leadership remains vulnerable to the sovereignty concerns of member states and the challenge of translating political consensus into operational effectiveness.

Despite these constraints, the AU has made important strides in institutionalising leadership for peace and security. The adoption of the African Union Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030 and the ongoing efforts to fully operationalise the African Standby Force reflect a long-term strategic vision. The Union has also strengthened its partnership with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, recognising that effective continental security requires layered leadership — with RECs often acting as first responders and the AU providing strategic oversight and legitimacy.

The African Union’s journey demonstrates both the immense potential and the inherent difficulties of continental leadership in security matters. When leadership is bold, united, and well-resourced, the AU can play a transformative role in preventing conflict, managing crises, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. When leadership is fragmented or under-resourced, progress slows and opportunities for timely intervention are lost.

SADC Regional Interventions: Leadership, Solidarity, and the Limits of Collective Action

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) offers a distinct model of regional security leadership shaped by its historical struggle against apartheid and a strong emphasis on sovereignty and consensus. Originally formed in 1980 to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, SADC has gradually expanded its security role through the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

SADC’s most prominent military intervention occurred in 1998 in Lesotho. Following a disputed election and political violence, South Africa and Botswana, acting under SADC authority, launched Operation Boleas to restore order and facilitate new elections. While the intervention achieved its immediate objectives, it was criticised for limited consultation with other SADC members and for being perceived as South African dominance rather than genuine collective action. This episode highlighted both the potential and the sensitivities of SADC leadership in security matters.

A more sustained and complex engagement has been SADC’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 2013, SADC has supported the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Comprising troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, the FIB was mandated to conduct offensive operations against armed groups. South African leadership was instrumental in pushing for the creation of the FIB, reflecting Pretoria’s strategic interest in stabilising the Great Lakes region. The intervention has had mixed results: it helped degrade some armed groups but has struggled with the sheer complexity of conflict dynamics, resource constraints, and the challenge of addressing root causes such as governance failures and illicit resource exploitation.

More recently, in 2021, SADC deployed the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to address the escalating insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. The mission, led by South African forces with contributions from several member states, aimed to support the Mozambican government in restoring security and protecting civilians. Leadership from South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania was critical in mobilising rapid deployment. While SAMIM has contributed to the degradation of insurgent capabilities and the protection of key economic installations, challenges remain, including coordination with Rwandan forces operating in the same theatre and the need for a stronger focus on addressing underlying socio-economic grievances.

SADC’s security interventions reveal a distinct leadership pattern dominated by a few influential member states, particularly South Africa. This “hegemonic leadership” model has enabled action when consensus is difficult to achieve but has also generated resentment among smaller states wary of South African dominance. Zimbabwe and Angola have also played significant roles in specific contexts, while smaller states have contributed troops and political legitimacy.

The consensus-based decision-making culture within SADC has been both a strength and a limitation. It ensures broad buy-in when agreement is reached, but it can lead to slow or diluted responses when member states have divergent interests. The principle of “quiet diplomacy” has often prioritised political dialogue over forceful intervention, sometimes delaying decisive action.

SADC interventions have achieved notable successes. They have prevented state collapse in Lesotho, contributed to stabilisation efforts in the DRC, and helped contain the Cabo Delgado insurgency. The organisation has also developed important normative frameworks, including the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and mechanisms for electoral observation and conflict prevention.

However, limitations are equally evident. Funding remains chronically inadequate, often forcing reliance on external partners or lead nations. Logistical challenges, interoperability issues among national forces, and uneven political commitment have constrained operational effectiveness. Critics argue that SADC’s responses have sometimes prioritised regime security over human security, particularly in cases involving member states’ internal political crises.

The SADC experience underscores several important lessons about regional security leadership. First, hegemonic leadership can enable rapid action but risks undermining legitimacy and long-term cohesion. Second, consensus-based systems require strong mediation and facilitation skills to convert agreement into effective implementation. Third, sustainable security leadership must address both immediate threats and underlying structural drivers such as poverty, inequality, and governance deficits. Finally, SADC’s trajectory shows that regional organisations can play meaningful security roles even without a single dominant power, provided there is sufficient political will and institutional adaptability.

Comparative Insights from Other Regions

Global experiences reinforce these lessons. The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has succeeded largely because of consistent institutional leadership and shared norms among member states, enabling joint missions and rapid response capabilities. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s consensus-based leadership model has helped maintain stability amid complex geopolitical tensions, although it has occasionally been criticised for slower decision-making. These cases confirm that effective regional security leadership requires a delicate balance between respect for sovereignty and the courage to pursue collective action.

Persistent Challenges and Pathways Forward

Leadership in regional and continental security faces recurring obstacles: divergent national interests, resource constraints, weak institutional capacity, and external interference. Political transitions and electoral cycles can disrupt continuity, while hybrid threats demand leaders capable of integrating diverse tools and actors.

To build more effective security leadership, regional and continental organisations must invest deliberately in leadership development. This includes targeted programmes that cultivate strategic foresight, ethical governance, collaborative skills, and crisis management capabilities. Institutional mechanisms should be designed to ensure policy continuity beyond changes in individual leaders. Greater inclusion of civil society, youth, and women in security decision-making can enhance legitimacy and broaden perspectives. Finally, partnerships with global actors should be pursued in ways that preserve African agency and ownership.

Conclusion

Leadership remains the single most decisive factor in regional and continental security. It is the invisible bridge that transforms fragile agreements into enduring peace, turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and converts divergent national interests into a common purpose. The experiences of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union across the continent, and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside valuable lessons from Europe and Southeast Asia, consistently demonstrate one fundamental truth: even the most sophisticated security architectures will falter without visionary, ethical, and collaborative leadership.

In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, where threats respect no borders, the quality of leadership at every level — from heads of state to technical experts within regional commissions — will ultimately determine whether Africa and other regions merely survive successive crises or rise to build lasting stability and prosperity.

The challenge before current and future leaders is clear: to move beyond rhetoric and embrace the difficult work of forging unity, exercising foresight, upholding accountability, and investing in people-centred security solutions. Those who answer this call will not only secure their nations and regions but will also leave a legacy of peace that benefits generations yet unborn and contributes meaningfully to a more stable global order.

True security is not built by arms alone. It is built by leadership that dares to imagine, unite, and act for the common good.

Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.comglobalstageimpacts@gmail.com

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