Connect with us

The Oracle

The Oracle: The Plateau State Legislators’ Debacle: Between Law and Justice (Pt. 2)

Published

2 years ago

on

By Mike Ozekhome

INTRODUCTION

In the first part of this piece, we considered the background and grounds for removing legislators and posed the question: what is jurisdiction? We then examined APC’s case at the Election Tribunal after which we reviewed the consequences of determining a mater without jurisdiction. We further restated the reason why only a co-aspirant is competent to complain about primaries which produced a party’s candidate in an election. We reinstated the trite principle of law that a challenge to the conduct of a party primary ids a pre-election matter.
Today, we shall examine the following: the status of the court of appeal as the final court in legislative appeals, the refusal of the court to review the PDP law makers’ case and why the court cannot review or vary its own order made without jurisdiction. We shall also critically the plateau fiasco vis-à-vis the power of a court to review its own judgement given reasons why the Court of Appeal should have done same in the case of the Plateau state legislators. Enjoy.

COURT OF APPEAL AS FINAL COURT ON LEGISLATORS’ MATTERS

It appears that the Court of Appeal being the Court of last resort in respect of all appeals from the decisions of election petition tribunals in disputes arising from the conduct, outcome and legality of National Assembly and States House of Assembly elections becomes functus officio once it delivers its judgement and cannot reopen a matter it has pronounced upon with finality. In other words, a judgment once delivered by the intermediate court on National and State Houses of Assembly matters cannot be varied where it correctly represents what the Court decided. Nor shall the operative or substantive part of such judgement be varied or substituted. See the cases of Oyetibo & Anor v. Oyinloye (1987) LPELR-2883(SC) at 11-13. Dingyadi & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2011) LPELR 950 (SC); Udende v. Suswam & Ors (2023) LPELR-61304 (CA); and Owoo & Ors v. Edet & Anor (2013) LPELR – 22042 (CA).

THE COURT OF APPEAL’S RECENT DISMISSAL OF THE APPLICATION FOR A REVIEW INSTITUTED BY THE SACKED PDP PLATEAU LAWMAKERS

The sacked Plateau Legislators in an attempt to reclaim their lost positions in the light of the Supreme Court’s judgement in the Caleb Mutfwang case and it’s obiter pronouncement on the legislators’ injustice, filed a fresh application before the same Court of Appeal that had dismissed their appeal from the Plateau State Election Tribunal, requesting a review of the said judgement that sacked them. The appellate court however, as expected, on 28th February, 2024, dismissed the suit, describing it as a waste of judicial time, frivolous and lacking in merit. It further slammed a fine of N128 Million Naira (N8 Million per Applicant) on the already beleaguered Applicants.

BUT CAN A COURT THAT ACTS WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN THE FIRST PLACE NOT VARY ITS OWN JUDGEMENT DELIVERED WITHOUT SUCH JURISDICTION BY WAY OF A REVIEW?

The apex court had observed (on the Plateau Legislators’ case, albeit obiter), while delivering the judgment in the Governor Caleb Mutfwang appeal, that the lower tribunal and Court of Appeal erred as they acted without jurisdiction to have entertained the petitions sacking the lawmakers from the PDP over a matter bothering on internal affairs of their party. Couldn’t this issue of lack of jurisdiction as observed by the apex court have been further explored and subjected to the jurisdiction of the same Court of Appeal that delivered the judgement by way of review? Were the legislators wrong to have asked for a review? Let us have some guidance from earlier decisions of the Appellate courts. In Iteogu v. LPDC (2018) LPELR-43845(SC) 18-26, the Applicant had asked the apex court to revisit its decision concerning him which had been decided by the apex court in 2009. This application for revisitation stemmed from the fact that on the 12th July, 2013 and the 13th May, 2014, respectively, the Supreme Court had held in the cases of Aladejobi v. NBA (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1376) 66, and Rotimi Williams Akintokun v. Legal Practitioners’ Disciplinary Committee that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal directly from the LPDC. The Applicant’s posture in his case was that in those cases, the apex court had held that it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain appeals directly from the LPDC. He had therefore urged that there was the need to revisit his own case and declare that the decision or judgment of the apex court delivered in 2009 pertaining to him was given without vires and so set it aside and have his status restored as a legal practitioner. The apex court, per Justice Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili, JSC, while dismissing the application for review, held at pages 18 -26, inter alia, that aside the exception of the “slip rule”, the Supreme Court may only depart from its earlier decision in subsequent cases and thereby overrule itself. She emphasized that this:
“does not however mean that the previous decisions in those earlier cases differently decided would be given a new lease of life on account of this new development. The reason for this is self-evident as Oputa JSC stated in Adegoke Motors Ltd v Adesanya & Anor. (1989) 5 SCN113: (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 at 274 thus:”We are final not because we are infallible, rather we are infallible because we are final.” …. In other words, the Supreme Court enjoys the finality of its decisions. Except for clerical mistakes, accidental slips, or omissions, it seldom re-visits its decisions by way of review, variation or setting aside. Once the Supreme Court has entered judgment in a case, that decision is final and will remain so forever. The law may in the future be amended to affect future matters on the same subject, but for cases decided, that is the end of the matter.” (Emphasis supplied)
See also Anyagham v. FBN PLC (2021) LPELR – 55905 (CA); Emezie & Ors v. Linus & Anor (2016) LPELR – 40514 (CA); and Onuh & Anor v. Ogbe (2019) LPELR-48361 (CA).

THE PLATEAU LEGISLATORS’ FIASCO

In the light of the above judgment of the Supreme Court, was there no remedy for those legislators who were wrongly sacked by the Court of Appeal? It is important to note that 22 PDP members in both chambers of the Nation’s and Plateau State Legislature were sacked by the Election Tribunals and the Court of Appeal, a development that left tongues wagging and ruckus generated across Nigeria. The legislators affected included two Senators – Simon Mwadkwon and Napoleon Bali; four members of the House of Representatives – Dachung Bagos, Beni Lar, Isaac Kwalu, and Peter Gyendeng Ibrahim; and 16 members of the Plateau State House of Assembly. They were all in PDP. Their constituents overwhelmingly voted for them. But the tribunal, supported by the Court of Appeal, felt otherwise. They took away the legislators’ victories and donated same on a platter of gold to the APC legislators who were roundedly trounced at the polls. The Plateau State people’s votes were rightly counted but the courts refused to make the votes count. This is what I have termed “Judocracy” in my OZEKPEDIA neologism, “as a genre of government practised only in Nigeria, where Presidents, Governors, Legislators and LG Chairmen are thrown up as having ‘won’ in an election. Their victory is immediately challenged. They get enmeshed in these legal calisthenics for the next 2 to 3 years of their corruption-ridden governance. Then, suddenly, they are conceived, incubated and delivered in the hallowed Chambers and precincts of our law courts, rather than through the ballot box. The will of the people is thereby subsumed in the decision and judgement of courts of law, the non-representatives of the people”. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yg8ByKVWWj)

SHOULD THIS PLATEAU STATE LEGISLATORS’ DEBACLE HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO THRIVE UNREMEDIED?

Our case laws are decided based on precedents. Precedent is retrospective and ensures that a given posture is maintained even at the risk that harm may be caused by it.

The apex court in the Mutfwang’s case noted (albeit, by way of obiter), that the Court of Appeal was wrong when it sacked those legislators lawfully elected under the platform of the PDP, as it lacked jurisdiction to do so. However, precedent is saying, “Yes, we admit that there was an error. Nothing can be done about it.” I humbly disagree with this perpetuation of injustice under the thin guise of “my hands are tied”, or “that nothing can be done about it”. Surely, something can be done about it. I agree with Emmanuel Agim, JSC, when he noted in his judgement that, “it is high time the legal profession woke up before it became irrelevant”. This admonition is in tandem with the admonition of venerable Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (JSC), in Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Adesanya & Anor (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 at 274, 275, to the effect that “When therefore it appears to learned counsel that any decision of this court has been given per incuriam, such counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such decision be overruled”. I also find solace in the complimentary and immortal words of Lord Denning in PARKER V. PARKER (1954) 2 All ER 22, where he illuminated thus:
“What is the argument on the other side? Only this, that no case has been found in which it has been done before. That argument does not appeal to me in the least. If we never do anything which has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere. The law will stand still while the rest of the world goes on, and that will be bad for both.”

Afterall, law is but a mere handmaid to deliver justice, which is why “ubi jus ibi remedium” (Bello v. AG Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR 820). Going by this, I humbly submit that when it comes to the critical issue of the court deciding a case in which it lacked jurisdiction in the first instance, then certainly, such a court has jurisdiction to revisit the said judgement and review it under certain laid down conditions. This is not a blanket or open-ended cheque for exhumation of buried cases. No.

A COURT CAN REVIEW ITS JUDGMENT

Thus, by reason of a long line of decided cases by the Supreme Court itself, a court has the constitutional power to enforce, review or set aside its own judgements under special circumstances as provided for by law. This is not tantamount to the court sitting on appeal over its own judgements. In Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc v. L.G. C. Ltd (2020) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1707), pp. 17-18, paras. D-C, the Supreme Court, per Abba Aji, JSC, held that the court has the power and leeway to set aside its own judgement and rehear a case, inter alia, under the following circumstances:
“…where any of the other parties obtained judgement by fraud or deceit…. When judgement was given without jurisdiction…”.

WHY THE PLATEAU STATE LEGISLATORS’ JUDGEMENT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN REVIEWED BY THE COURT OF APPEAL

Surely, the judgement in the Plateau Legislators’ matter was dubiously obtained as there was no disobedience to any court order at all as rightly found by the Supreme Court in the sister Mutfwang case. All the cases had emanated from the same facts and circumstances. Secondly, both the Election Tribunal and the Court of Appeal lacked the requisite jurisdiction to have entertained the Legislators’ case the way they did in the first instance.

The reason or rationale behind this position in the above Stanbic IBTC case was graphically painted by Oputa, JSC, in Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Adesanya & Anor (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 at 274, 275, inter alia, thus:
“We are final not because we are infallible, rather we are infallible because we are final. Justices of this court are human beings, capable of erring. It will certainly be shortsighted arrogance not to accept this obvious truth. It is true that this court can do inestimable good through its wise decisions, similarly, the court can do incalculable harm through its mistakes. When therefore it appears to learned counsel that any decision of this court has been given per incuriam, such counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such decision be overruled. This court has the power to overrule itself (and had done so in the past) for it gladly accepts that it is far better to admit an error than to persevere in error.” (Emphasis supplied).
Thus, where a judgment of a court was obtained without jurisdiction; or is tainted with illegality; or was obtained by fraud, the court surely has the vires, constitutional power and jurisdiction to revisit such judgement, even if time had since elapsed. This is because time cannot and does not run against illegality or fraud. A party cannot be allowed to benefit, or continue to benefit from the product of its own illegality and void conduct. This position was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Nwosu v. APP & Ors (2020) 16 NWLR (PT 1749) 28, where it held thus, through many of its justices as follows:

Per Eko, JSC: “No person is allowed to benefit from illegality as illegality confers no right”

Per Peter-Odili, JSC: “It is difficult in the light of the damming facts well pushed in this appeal wherein illegality was enthroned to be surveyed into endorsing of such acts and to allow the perpetrator of such profane acts to derive or profit from his own wrong.”

Per Amina Augie, JSC: “The court cannot close its eyes to it (illegality) and allow itself to be used as a tool to perpetuate illegality, in whatever form or guise”

See also the cases of GTB V. Innoson (Nig.) Ltd (2022) LPELR-56657 (SC); Enterprise Bank Ltd v. Aroso & Ors (2015) LPELR – 24720 (SC); Oladosu & Anor v. Olaojoyetan & Anor (2012) LPELR – 8676 (CA) and Eco Bank v. Teak Naturale Investment Ltd & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42389 (CA).

The Court of Appeal which was approached by the grieving PDP Legislators sure had the power and jurisdiction to have calmly looked at and reviewed its judgements which have since been irretrievably punctured by the Nigerian people and the apex court itself (albeit, obiter). It should have meticulously reviewed its earlier judgements, all of which were delivered without following judicial precedents as laid down by the Supreme Court on the very issues dealt with in those appeals. Law is about justice. Being Siamese twins, one without the other is an orphan. The Plateau Legislators’ cases hallmarked a dangerous precedent where neither the law nor justice was followed or attained. The Court of Appeal ought to have seized the opportunity of the fresh application to correct itself. If for nothing else, at least for the sake of posterity, justice, fairplay, equity and good conscience. I so humbly submit.

(Concluded).

Related Topics:
Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

The Oracle

The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 4)

Published

1 month ago

on

May 22, 2026

By

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

In our last discourse on this series, we examined the procedure for enforcement of fundamental rights, including applications for leave; as well as the substantive application itself and the reactions that follow. Today, we shall continues from where we stopped with the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto and later x-ray the applications to squash proceedings; applications for production and/or release of persons restrained; orders for bail, production and access to medication. Please read on.

SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS (Continues)

In the case of LAWRENCE OLUSEGUN ADEYEMO V. C.O.P, OYO STATE ([2021] LPELR-56272(CA)), the applicant requested the court for a writ of habeas corpus under order 2 of the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) rules 1979 which provision enjoined the applicant to serve all parties who are or might be interested in the proceedings. Although the affected party had put up appearance, but raised a preliminary objection to the application for non-compliance with the statutory conditions. Babalakin. J. (as he then was) struck out the application on the ground that order 2(1)(4) is mandatory whether the application is for mandamus, certiorari, or habeas corpus.

However the Supreme Court in recent times in respect of the fundamental rights enforcements has favourably leaned towards the equitable principle of “Ubi Jus Ubi remedium”, therefore looking more at the substance rather than the form. Hence the liberalization of the procedure for the enforcement of fundamental rights as exposed in the case of ABACHA V. FAWEHINMI ((2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228) and UBI UJONG INAH & ORS V. MARCUS UKOI ((2001) (CA) 41981.

APPLICATION TO QUASH ANY PROCEEDINGS

Sometimes it may be necessary for an applicant by way of certiorari to apply to the court for an order that such proceedings be removed from a particular court or tribunal to another court for the purpose of being quashed for lack of power and/or jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings or make such order.

However, an applicant shall not be able to question the validity of any order, warrant, commitment, conviction, inquisition or record unless before the hearing of his application (Motion or summons), he has served a certified copy (CTC) thereof together with a Copy of the application on the Attorney-General of the Federation or of the State in which the applicant is being heard (as the case may be).

The court in granting an application seeking to quash proceedings, shall direct that the order, proceedings, conviction or the records of an inquisition be quashed forthwith upon being removed into the court hearing the application.

APPLICATION FOR PRODUCTION AND/OR RELEASE OF PERSON RESTRAINED

By virtue of Order 4 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court or judge to whom the application is made ex-parte may make an order forthwith for his release from such detention.

The court may also direct that an originating summons (as in form 2) be issued or that an application therefore be made by notice of motion (as in form 3). The court may also as it deem fit adjourn the ex-parte application so that notice thereof may be given to the person against whom the order for the release of the applicant is sought.

ORDER FOR BAIL, PRODUCTION, AND ACCESS TO MEDICATION

Pursuant to order 4 of the bail application, the court upon application may grant to the detainee reliefs including bail, production of the detainee, access to mediation etc.

The court may grant bail at ex-parte stage, pending the substantive application. Where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court may subject to its discretion order that the person restrained be produced in court. And where such order is so made, it shall constitute a sufficient warrant to any superintendent of a prison, police officer in charge of a police station, police officer in charge of the complainant or any other person responsible for his detention, to produce or ensure the production of the person so restrained or detained in court.

For the purpose of enforcing a person’s fundamental rights, no matter where a detainee is kept he can be allowed access to his personal physician or medically prescribed drugs.

It suffices to note here, that once an order has been made by the court pursuant to the Enforcement Rules, and for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights provided for in the constitution, such order must be complied with. Failure to obey or comply with any order so made by the court under these rules will incur proceedings for the committal of the party disobeying such an order.

CONCLUSION

Without any controversy, the idea of human rights and personal liberties has become firm and secured. The universality and immutability of human rights are now globally accepted. Consequently, any nation that slacks or shyies away from the diligent protection and enforcement of human rights stand the precarious risk of being shunned by decent and civilised nations. The United Nations seems to have captured the importance and primacy of the issue of human rights and its protection when it poignantly stated as follows:

“Human Rights and fundamental freedoms are the birth right of all human beings, their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Government” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

It is the duty of every Government everywhere and every courts of law in every jurisdiction to promote, protect, uphold, and ensure enforcement of fundamental Human rights at all times, because these rights encapsulate the very essence of man.

The end.

THOUGHTS FOR THE WEEK

“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI.

“Because no matter who we are or where we come from, we’re all entitled to the basic human rights of clean air to breathe, clean water to drink, and healthy land to call home”. – Martin Luther King III

“Human rights are not only violated by terrorism, repression or assassination, but also by unfair economic structures that creates huge inequalities”. – Pope Francis.

Continue Reading

The Oracle

The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 3)

Published

1 month ago

on

May 15, 2026

By

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

Last week’s installment examined amongst others, the features of what constitutes violation of fundamental rights and posed the question- whether enforcement of such rights is restricted to the mechanism of the FREP Rules? This week contuse the same theme by discussing the procedure for enforcing fundamental rights, including applications for leave; the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto. Please read on.

PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT (Continues)
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal (Benin Division) dilated on the procedure in the case of N.U.T Vs. COSST ((2007) 23 E-WRN / 03 (CA).), thus:

“By virtue of Order 1 rule 2(2) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, no application for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement within that state of any such rights shall be made unless leave therefore has been granted in accordance with the rules. Thus, while an applicant can approach the High Court in a state where the infringement of his rights occurs or is likely to occur for redress he has to obtain leave of the appropriate High Court before he can apply to enforce his rights. In the instant case, even if the case was a fundamental right case the suit was not commended by due process, as the respondents approached the court by way of originating summons contrary to the provision of Order 1 rule 2(2) of the Fundamental Right (Enforcement) Rules.

An application for the enforcement of fundamental right becomes incompetent if the main claim does not fall within the ambit or precinct of chapter IV of the Constitution. Any claim that falls outside chapter IV of the Constitution becomes ancillary claim. Therefore, for an applicant for enforcement of fundamental rights to be competent, it must be within the provisions of chapter IV of the Constitution.

This point reverberated in W.A.E.C Vs. Akinwumi, (2008) JELR 49485 (SC), where the Supreme Court succinctly held that:

“In ascertaining the justicieability or competence of a suit commenced by way of application under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, the court must ensure that the enforcement of the fundamental rights under chapter IV of the Constitution is the claim and not ancillary claim. Where the claim is not the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be said to be properly invoked, and the action is liable to be struck out on ground of incompetence.”

Also, in Unilorin Vs. Oluwadare (2008) JELR 55842 (CA), the court adumbrated the point as follows, when it held that:

“When an application is brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, a condition precedent to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction is that the enforcement of fundamental rights or the securing of the enforcement thereof should be the main claim and not an accessory claim. Enforcement of fundamental right or securing the enforcement thereof should, from the appellant’s claim as presented, be the principal or fundamental claim as presented, and not accessory claim. However, where the main claim or principal claim is not the enforcement or securing the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be properly exercised as it will be incompetent. In the instant case, the respondent’s claim, being a challenge to his expulsion as a student from the 1st Appellant institution, is not one of those claims/reliefs envisaged by the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules.

See also Gafar Vs. Govt., Kwara State, (2007) JELR 53915 (SC); Unical Vs. Ugochukwu 2007-LD-CA-232.

It is important to note that an applicant seeking redress for the infringement of his Fundamental Rights shall in addition to declaratory and injunctive orders also be entitled to an award of damages. This is because in fundamental right cases, the law presumes that damages flow naturally from the injury suffered by the victim as a result of the violation of the rights.

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE

By virtue of Judgment (Enforcement) Rules in Nigeria, no application for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement within a state, of any such rights shall be made unless leave therefore has been granted in accordance with these rules. Also, any application for such leave must be made ex-parte to the appropriate court and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought, and grounds on which it is sought and by an affidavit verifying the facts relied on.

The deadline for filling an application for leave is not later than 12 (twelve) Months after the date of the happening of the event complained of, unless the judge is satisfied that extenuating circumstances exist. In case of ongoing act, an action can be brought after 12 Months deadline, at any point during the continuation of the wrong. An applicant must however file the application for leave not later than the day preceding the date of hearing. The court may in granting leave to the applicant impose such terms and condition as it may deem fit, as security for cost.
It is to be noted that leave once granted, shall operate as a stay of all actions relating to or connected with a complaint which forms the subject matter of the application until the determination of the substantive suit.

The ex-parte application for leave must specify the provisions of the enforcement procedure Rules under which it is brought, the precise content of the relief to be requested once the application for leave has been granted and cursory reference to relevant laws. This must be accompanied by an affidavit verifying relevant facts to be relied on.

The deadline for filing an application for leave is not later than 12(twelve) months after the date of the happening of the event complained of, unless the judge is satisfied that extenuating circumstances exist. In cases of ongoing act, an action can be brought after 12month deadline, at any point during the continuation of the wrong. An applicant must however file the application for leave not later than the day preceding the date of hearing. The court may in granting leave to the applicant impose such terms and conditions as it may deem fit, as security for cost.

It is to be noted that leave once granted, shall operate as a stay of all actions relating to or connected with a complaint which forms the subject matter of the application until the determination of the substantive suit.

The ex-parte application for leave must specify the provisions of the enforcement procedure Rules under which it is brought, the precise content of the relief to be requested once the application for leave has been granted and a cursory reference to relevant laws. This must be accompanied by an affidavit verifying relevant facts to be relied on.

SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS

After obtaining leave, the applicant can apply for an enforcement order by way of NOTICE OF MOTION (as in form 1) or ORIGINATING SUMMONS (as in form 2). In the celebrated case of SHUGABA, A. DARMAN V. MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & ORS. ((1981) 2 NCLR 459). It was held inter-alia that the proper procedure to be followed in an application for enforcement or securing the enforcement of fundamental rights and redress for violation of same is guided by the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rule 1979 which requires that where leave has been granted to apply for the order being asked the application for, such order must be made by notice of motion or originating summons to the appropriate court.

The motion or summons, together with a copy of the statement submitted in conjunction with the application for leave, must then be served on all persons directly affected. Unless the court directs otherwise, there must be at least 8 clear days between service of the motion or summons and the date fixed for hearing.

A substantive application either by motion or summons seeking for substantive reliefs, remedies or orders may include such prayers as:

a. Unconditional release of the detainee
b. Payment of a certain sum of money as compensation in the event of the arrest and detention being illegal, unwarranted, null and void.

The court may equally make any other ancillary order after hearing argument from counsel on all sides based on the affidavit and counter-affidavit.

It should be noted that failure to adhere to the procedure laid down by the Enforcement Rules may lead to the entire proceedings being nullified. The court shall upon objection being raised for non-compliance with the rules strike the entire proceedings out. (To be continued).

THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK

“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI

Continue Reading

The Oracle

The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 1)

Published

2 months ago

on

May 1, 2026

By

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN 

INTRODUCTION 

Man as distinct from other beings is rational and has morals. He has the power of reason which enables him to differentiate between right and wrong, between good and bad, and also between justice and injustice. He therefore possesses honour and dignity which are higher than that of other beings. Human rights are necessary to protect this honour and dignity which nature has bestowed on human kind. They ensure (where these rights are enforced) that human kind is not degraded or made inhumane. Chapter IV (Sections 17-32) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963, had provided that:

“No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman degrading punishment or other treatment.”

This has been replicated in section 3 of the 1999 Constitution. Equally, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Right, 1984 declares that:

“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and right. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” 

There is therefore a great need to protect and ensure the protection of these inherent rights and freedoms.

WHAT IS A RIGHT?

Before discussing the ways and means by which one may enforce his fundamental human rights, it is apposite to first understand the context in which “right” is used. 

‘Right’ in ordinary language means power of free action; a demand, inherent in one person and incident upon another. It is an interest recognized by law, respect for which is a duty and disregard of which is wrong. It refers to the cultural, political, social, economic advantage to which a person has just claim, either morally or in law. It is distinct from privilege.

Right described as ‘human’ refers to a category of rights which are specified and in most cases protected by law. Every human being is entitled to such rights and no person may be denied of such rights except through the due process of law. Cranston therefore holds the strong view that:

“A human right is something of which no one may be deprived without a great affront to justice. These are certain deeds which should never be invaded some things which are supremely sacred” 

Kayode Eso, JSC. (as he then was) re-affirmed the importance of human rights in RANSOME KUTI Vs. A-G OF THE FEDERATION, (1985) CLR 6(d) (SC),  when he said of human rights:

“… It is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact is antecedent to the political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilized existence… and what has been done is to have these rights enshrined in the Constitution so that the rights could be immutable to the extent of the non-immutability of the constitution itself.” 

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS?

“Fundamental rights” are generally regarded as those aspects of human rights which have been recognized and entrenched in the constitution of a country. They are specially provided for to enhance human dignity and liberty in every modern state. In the Nigerian context, the terms “human right”, “fundamental right” and “fundamental human right” are always used interchangeably. This has been justified by a learned author who posited forcefully that:

“Human rights remain so, whether they occur in the international plane or within municipal confines and whether they are called ‘human rights’ or ‘fundamental rights’. It should be noted that the international bill of rights – the universal declaration of Human rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- use the expression fundamental human rights, so also the U.N charter.” (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948). 

Since the Constitution specifically provides for fundamental rights, Nigerian Court have found it expedient to draw a line of dichotomy between ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental rights’. Thus, in UZOUKWU & ORS Vs. EZEONU II & ORS, (1991) 6 NWLR (pt 200) p. 708, the Court of Appeal (per Nasir P. C. A) put in with apt clarity and lucidity:

“Due to the development of Constitutional law in the field, distinct difference has emerged between ‘Fundamental Right’ and ‘Human Rights’. It may be recalled that human rights were derived from and out of the wider concept of natural rights. They are rights which every civilized society must accept as belonging to each person as human being. These were termed human rights. When the United Nations made its declaration it was in respect of Human Rights which belong to all human beings irrespective of citizenship, race, religion and so on. This has now formed part of international law. Fundamental Rights remain in the realm of domestic law. They are fundamental because they have been guaranteed by the fundamental law of the country, that is by the Constitution.”   

Nature and Classification of Human Rights

Human rights are generally grouped under five sub-headings namely; Civil Rights, Political Rights, Social Rights, Economic Rights and Cultural Rights. We shall however discuss these classifications under two broad further categorization, that is:

Civil and Political Rights: these includes the right to self-determination, the right to life, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, freedom from slavery and forced labour, the right to fair trial, right to privacy, freedom of thought conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, the right of assembly, freedom of association, and movement, the right to marry and found a family, the right to participate in one’s Government either directly or through freely elected representatives, and the right to nationality and equality before the law.

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC Rights) include the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to organize, form and join trade unions, the right to social security, the right to collective bargaining, the right to property, the right to education, the right to participate in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.

The importance of these rights cannot be over emphasized. So important are they that they have been universally recognized and acclaimed by the international community. The universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other United Nations Covenant on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human race on an equal scale as the foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the world.  

NOW THIS

HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA AND INTERNATIONAL CHARTERS AND CONVENTIONS

The emergence of human rights in documented form in Nigeria can be traced to the Nigeria Bill of Rights of 1959. This was incorporated into the 1960 Independence Constitution in 1963; these rights were reproduced 111 of the 1963 Republican Constitution. These fundamental human rights are provided for in Chapter Iv of both the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with some improvements.

The reverence of these human rights can be seen from their recognition, promotion and protection under international law. Charters and Conventions have been globally drawn, and under various economic, geographical and political blocs for the promotion and protection from abuse of these rights. The United Nation (UN) has been championing the global protection of these rights as can be seen from the various chapters of the UN charter. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1984) proclamation states as follows:

“This Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all the end that every individual and every organ of society keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measure, national and international to secure observance both among people of member states themselves and among people of territories under their jurisdiction.”

Article 30 of the Charter further provides thus:

“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any action aimed at the destruction of any of the  rights and freedoms set forth herein.”

The Declaration by its provisions sets out the minimum standard to be observed by countries of the world in relation to human rights. 

There is also the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights which has become, in Nigeria, a potent source of quick remedy against gross violation of human rights under municipal laws which remedy could not be traced to the laws because of ouster clauses built in them. The charter has since been ratified in Nigeria as African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap 10 1 FN 1990. The importance of the African Charter was underlined by Eniola Longe J, in the case of MOHAMMED GARUBA & ORS V. A.G OF LAGOS STATE & ORS (Unreported Suit No. ID/559/90), when he held:

“The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of which Nigeria is a signatory is now made into our law… Even if its aspect in our constitution is suspended or ousted by provisions of our local law, the international aspect of it cannot be unilaterally abrogated…”

AND THIS LIMITATION ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Under section 45 of the 1999 Constitution and many constitutional expressions of fundamental rights, certain qualifications or restriction which are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society are incorporated in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health or for the purpose protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons. Consequently, the aforesaid rights are generally subjected to these limitations.

ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS

Procedure for the enforcement of the fundamental rights provisions enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is guided and regulated by the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979. It is pertinent to state here that the above rules are made pursuant to the powers conferred on the Chief Justice of Nigeria by section 46(3) of the Constitution, which provided thus:

“The Chief Justice of Nigeria may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purpose of this section.” (To be continued).

THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK

“Each state, so that it does not abridge the great fundamental rights belonging, under the Constitution, to all citizens, may grant or withhold such civil rights as it pleases; all that is required is that, in this respect, its laws shall be impartial”. (Lyman Trumbull).

Continue Reading

Trending