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The Oracle: The Plateau State Legislators’ Debacle: Between Law and Justice

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By Mike Ozekhome

INTRODUCTION

Error is becoming a norm in Nigeria. It has become our tradition. We have become a country of oddities; a country of one error per minute! We have become unshockable. Sadly, we spend the bulk of our time discussing inanities that ordinarily should not be heard in any serious forum. When some of us speak out boldly about these issues, some bootlickers, fawners and ego masseurs who seek favours from government of the day accuse us of partisanship; or of attacking national leadership; or Justices of the Court. Last year, in Kano State, for example, we read about a certified True Copy of a judgment of the Court of Appeal, affirming a judgment and simultaneously overruling it at the same time. The said judgment not only created great uncertainty, it also cast aspersions on the Judiciary and the legal profession, which are expected to set professional standards for others to follow. The earlier we addressed, boldly, these unfortunate anomalies emanating from our courts, the better for the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. Those who know or follow my works as a constitutional lawyer, human rights activist and Pan- Nigerian very well know that I defend the Nigerian judiciary passionately with every fiber in me. This is because the judiciary is the only and last hope of the common man and woman. But we must be careful not to allow sentiments becloud our true sense of judgement and thus get consumed by the ricocheting consequences. Some persons insist we are still learning. I thought learning leads to improvement? Like late legendary proverbsmith, Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola once metaphorically and laconically asked, if it takes a man 20 years to learn madness, how many years will he require to practise it? The focus of this write-up concerns not only about the serious implications of the recent Supreme Court judgement in Mutfwang & Anor v. Nentawe & Ors; SC/CV/1179/2023, (unreported), delivered on 12th January, 2024, to the effect that the nomination and sponsorship of a candidate are pre-election matters which constitute internal affairs of political parties, but also how the judgement highlights the grave injustice done to about 22 Legislators of Plateau State whose victories were snatched by the Election Tribunals and the Court of Appeal and handed over on a platter of gold to the APC losers. This is one judgement, aside the cases of Sen. Hope Uzodinma & Anor v. Rt. Hon. Emeka Ihedioha & Ors (2020) JELR 86967 (SC) and APC V. Sherriff & Ors (2023) LPELR – 59953 (SC), that have sparked national debates and which will never melt away in a hurry.

The article seeks to know how the said Supreme Court judgment in respect of the gubernatorial election in Plateau State re-iterating that the nomination and sponsorship of a candidate for any election is a pre-election matter and an internal affair of a political party, impinged on the earlier judgements of the intermediate court nullifying victories of 22 PDP Legislators and handing them over to APC Legislators.

THE BACKGROUND

Recall that the Court of Appeal had held that the failure of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to comply with the orders of the High Court of Plateau State, Jos, directing it to conduct valid ward, local government and state congress elections before nominating its candidate for the various elective posts in the state was an incurable fundamental flaw. Relying on this finding, the Election Tribunal, under a petition brought by the All Progressives Congress (APC) and its members sacked many lawmakers elected on the platform of the PDP. Under Section 246 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Court of Appeal is the final Court of last resort on appeals emanating from the decisions of Election Petition Tribunals in disputes arising from the conduct, outcome and legality of National Assembly and States House of Assembly elections. The implication of this is that no appeal can be filed before the Supreme Court after the Court of Appeal had decided on the matter. However, as noted by the apex court in the recent judgment involving Governor Caleb Mutfwang of Plateau State, both the tribunal and the Court of Appeal were in grave error when they entertained the matter and the appeal respectively, as they lacked the requisite jurisdiction in the first instance.

GROUNDS FOR REMOVING LEGISLATORS

Can disobedience to a court order (which in any case was not correct, as found by the apex court in the Mutfwang Governorship appeal), be a ground to remove a legislator in the face of the clear provisions of sections 106 and 109 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), which respectively deal with qualification and disqualification for the office of members of the House of Representatives and Assembly? I think not. A long line of cases vindicates me. See for example, Onor & Anor v. INEC & Ors; SC/CV/1194/2023; (Unreported), delivered on 12th January, 2024. Thus, as found by the Supreme Court both in the Muftwang case and Onor & Anor v. INEC & Ors (Supra), disobedience to an earlier order made by a court (which was not even the case in the two matters) is not one of the qualifying or disqualifying factors of a Governor or Legislator. In the Onor & Anor v. INEC & Ors (Supra) which I handled, the apex court held that the punishment for a disobedient party is to take up contempt proceedings as provided for in the Sheriff and Civil Process Act, CAP 407; LFN 1990; not to use it to disqualify an elected person and take away his victory. Thus, brings us to the issue of jurisdiction.

WHAT IS JURISDICTION?

Jurisdiction is the authority of a court to proceed with the adjudication of a dispute. In Attorney General of Anambra State vs. Attorney General of the Federation (2005) FWLR (PT. 268) 1557, I.T Muhammad, JSC, held that: “Jurisdiction to a court of law is equated to blood in a living animal. Jurisdiction is the blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a Court of law, without which the action will be like an animal that has been drained of its blood. It will cease to have life and any attempt to resuscitate it without infusing blood into it would be an exercise in futility.”

APC’S GROUSE BEFORE THE PLATEAU STATE ELECTION TRIBUNAL

The grouse of the APC and its members before the Plateau State Election Tribunal and the Court of Appeal was premised on what they alleged to be invalid primaries conducted by the PDP. They had argued that the PDP had no structure in Plateau State (whatever that meant). But the trite position of the law now is that the issue of membership, nomination, submission of forms and sponsorship of candidates for elections are internal affairs of a political party as clearly provided for in Section 84(1) & (14) of the Electoral Act, 2022. Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act makes provisions before whom and where any issue emanating from the conduct of the primaries can be determined. It is an Aspirant that participated in the primaries that can complain to the Federal High Court. No other party has the vires to. Thus, section 84(14) of the Electoral Act, 2022, provides:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political have not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court for redress.”

The appellate courts, in ringing tones, have upheld this trite position of the law in a plethora of cases: Enang v. Asuquo & Ors (2023) LPELR – 60042 (SC); Onubogu v. Anazonwu & Ors (2023) LPELR – 60288 (SC); Olabisi & Anor v. APC & Anor (2023) 59640 (CA); Odey v. APC & Ors (2023) LPELR – 59695 (CA); and Dickson v. LP & Ors (2023) LPELR – 60837 (CA). Indeed, the appellate courts have gone ahead to hold that a person or political party that attempts to peep through the fence to query the internal affairs of another political party wherein he /it was not a candidate in the primaries is nothing but a mere busy body and meddlesome interloper. See the cases of APC V. JEGA & Ors (2023) LPELR – 59866 (SC); Akpatason v. Adjoto & Ors (2019) LPELR – 48119 (SC); Daniel v. INEC & Ors (2015) LPELR – 24566 (SC); APGA & Ors V. APC & Anor (2023) LPELR – 59914 (CA); and PDP V. Edede & Anor (2022) LPELR-57480 (CA). Matters such as the Plateau Legislators cases where victories were snatched from the PDP winners and handed over to their opponents in the APC on a platter of gold were therefore carried out without the requisite jurisdiction of the Tribunals and the intermediate court. The Supreme Court said this much in the case of Mutfwang & Anor v. Nentawe & Ors (Supra).

CONSEQUENCES OF A COURT DETERMINING A MATTER WITHOUT JURISDICTION

It is trite law that any exercise carried out by a court of law without jurisdiction is a complete nullity. The tests for determining whether a court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate on a claim were laid down by the apex court in the causa celebre of Maduokolu vs. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. The apex court held in that case that a court is competent to adjudicate a claim when:
a. It is properly constituted concerning the number and qualification of its membership;
b. The subject matter of the action is within its jurisdiction;
c. The action is initiated by due process;
d. Any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction has been fulfilled.

ONLY A CO-ASPIRANT HAS THE LOCUS STANDI TO COMPLAIN

As clearly provided in Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act and Section 272 (3) of the 1999 Constitution, it is the Federal High Court and not an election tribunal that has the jurisdiction to adjudicate on pre-election issues and this must be carried out within 14 days. Also, it is only a co-aspirant in the primary being disputed that has the locus to challenge the conduct of the said primary; and not his opponent in another party. See the cases of Alahassan & Anor v. Ishaku & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40083 (SC); Otegbeye & Anor v. APC & Anor (2023) LPELR – 60030 (CA); Labour Party v. INEC & Ors (2023) LPELR – 60548 (CA); YPP V. APGA & Ors (2023) LPELR-59799 (CA); and Usman v. APC & Ors (2020) LPELR – 50308 (CA). Delivering his own judgement in the Mutfwang appeal (it was unanimous), Justice Emmanuel Agim held that the APC and its candidate who had challenged Mutfwang’s election were not members of the PDP and so could not competently challenge the primary elections held by the PDP. He also held that the tribunal and Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to have entertained the matter in the first place. He lectured further:
“The petition by the APC and its candidates is an abuse of the court process. I wonder why the matter came to court at all. This appeal is allowed. The legal profession should wake up or render itself irrelevant. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is set aside. My only worry is that a lot of people have suffered as a result of the Court of Appeal’s decision. It was absolutely wrong. The appeal is allowed.”

CHALLENGE TO PRIMARY ELECTION IS A PRE-ELECTION MATTER

Section 285(14) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, particularly (a), (b) and (c), delineates the circumstances which come under pre-election matters and; which can be challenged within the electoral framework. It encompasses an Aspirant’s grievance regarding non-compliance with the Electoral Act; or National Assembly regulations during political party primaries; disputes by Aspirants concerning their participation; and compliance issues with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). It also includes legal actions by political parties challenging INEC’s decisions, including disqualification of candidates; and complaints related to non-compliance with electoral laws in selection or nomination of candidates; election timetable; voter registration; and other preparatory activities for an election. See the cases of Anyakorah v. PDP & Ors (2022) LPELR-56876 (SC); APM V. INEC & Ors (2021) LPELR – 58375 (SC); Akpamgbo-Okadigbo & Ors v. Chidi & Ors (2015) LPELR – 24564 (SC); Salim v. CPC & Ors (2013) LPELR – 19928 (SC); Akinremi & Anor v. Suleiman & Ors (2022) LPELR – 56903 (CA); and APC V. Suleiman & Ors (2023) LPELR – 59911 (CA).

COURT OF APPEAL AS FINAL COURT ON LEGISLATORS’ MATTERS

It appears that the Court of Appeal being the Court of last resort in respect of all appeals from the decisions of election petition tribunals in disputes arising from the conduct, outcome and legality of National Assembly and States House of Assembly elections becomes functus officio once it delivers its judgement and cannot reopen a matter it has pronounced upon with finality. In other words, a judgment once delivered by the intermediate court on National and State Houses of Assembly matters cannot be varied where it correctly represents what the Court decided. Nor shall the operative or substantive part of such judgement be varied or substituted. See the cases of Oyetibo & Anor v. Oyinloye (1987) LPELR-2883(SC) at 11-13. Dingyadi & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2011) LPELR 950 (SC); Udende v. Suswam & Ors (2023) LPELR-61304 (CA); and Owoo & Ors v. Edet & Anor (2013) LPELR – 22042 (CA).

THE COURT OF APPEAL’S RECENT DISMISSAL OF THE APPLICATION FOR A REVIEW INSTITUTED BY THE SACKED PDP PLATEAU LAWMAKERS

The sacked Plateau Legislators in an attempt to reclaim their lost positions in the light of the Supreme Court’s judgement in the Caleb Mutfwang case and it’s obiter pronouncement on the legislators’ injustice, filed a fresh application before the same Court of Appeal that had dismissed their appeal from the Plateau State Election Tribunal, requesting a review of the said judgement that sacked them. The appellate court however, as expected, on 28th February, 2024, dismissed the suit, describing it as a waste of judicial time, frivolous and lacking in merit. It further slammed a fine of N128 Million Naira (N8 Million per Applicant) on the already beleaguered Applicants.

BUT CAN A COURT THAT ACTS WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN THE FIRST PLACE NOT VARY ITS OWN JUDGEMENT DELIVERED WITHOUT SUCH JURISDICTION BY WAY OF A REVIEW?

The apex court had observed (on the Plateau Legislators’ case, albeit obiter), while delivering the judgment in the Governor Caleb Mutfwang appeal, that the lower tribunal and Court of Appeal erred as they acted without jurisdiction to have entertained the petitions sacking the lawmakers from the PDP over a matter bothering on internal affairs of their party. Couldn’t this issue of lack of jurisdiction as observed by the apex court have been further explored and subjected to the jurisdiction of the same Court of Appeal that delivered the judgement by way of review? Were the legislators wrong to have asked for a review? Let us have some guidance from earlier decisions of the Appellate courts. In Iteogu v. LPDC (2018) LPELR-43845(SC) 18-26, the Applicant had asked the apex court to revisit its decision concerning him which had been decided by the apex court in 2009. This application for revisitation stemmed from the fact that on the 12th July, 2013 and the 13th May, 2014, respectively, the Supreme Court had held in the cases of Aladejobi v. NBA (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1376) 66, and Rotimi Williams Akintokun v. Legal Practitioners’ Disciplinary Committee that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal directly from the LPDC. The Applicant’s posture in his case was that in those cases, the apex court had held that it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain appeals directly from the LPDC. He had therefore urged that there was the need to revisit his own case and declare that the decision or judgment of the apex court delivered in 2009 pertaining to him was given without vires and so set it aside and have his status restored as a legal practitioner. The apex court, per Justice Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili, JSC, while dismissing the application for review, held at pages 18 -26, inter alia, that aside the exception of the “slip rule”, the Supreme Court may only depart from its earlier decision in subsequent cases and thereby overrule itself. She emphasized that this:
“does not however mean that the previous decisions in those earlier cases differently decided would be given a new lease of life on account of this new development. The reason for this is self-evident as Oputa JSC stated in Adegoke Motors Ltd v Adesanya & Anor. (1989) 5 SCN113: (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 at 274 thus:”We are final not because we are infallible, rather we are infallible because we are final.” …In other words, the Supreme Court enjoys the finality of its decisions. Except for clerical mistakes, accidental slips, or omissions, it seldom re-visits its decisions by way of review, variation or setting aside. Once the Supreme Court has entered judgment in a case, that decision is final and will remain so forever. The law may in the future be amended to affect future matters on the same subject, but for cases decided, that is the end of the matter.” (Emphasis supplied) See also Anyagham v. FBN PLC (2021) LPELR – 55905 (CA); Emezie & Ors v. Linus & Anor (2016) LPELR – 40514 (CA); and Onuh & Anor v. Ogbe (2019) LPELR-48361 (CA).

THE PLATEAU LEGISLATORS’ FIASCO

In the light of the above judgment of the Supreme Court, was there no remedy for those legislators who were wrongly sacked by the Court of Appeal? It is important to note that 22 PDP members in both chambers of the Nation’s and Plateau State Legislature were sacked by the Election Tribunals and the Court of Appeal, a development that left tongues wagging and ruckus generated across Nigeria. The legislators affected included two Senators – Simon Mwadkwon and Napoleon Bali; four members of the House of Representatives – Dachung Bagos, Beni Lar, Isaac Kwalu, and Peter Gyendeng Ibrahim; and 16 members of the Plateau State House of Assembly. They were all in PDP. Their constituents overwhelmingly voted for them. But the tribunal, supported by the Court of Appeal, felt otherwise. They took away the legislators’ victories and donated same on a platter of gold to the APC legislators who were roundedly trounced at the polls. The Plateau State people’s votes were rightly counted but the courts refused to make the votes count. This is what I have termed “Judocracy” in my OZEKPEDIA neologism, “as a genre of government practised only in Nigeria, where Presidents, Governors, Legislators and LG Chairmen are thrown up as having ‘won’ in an election. Their victory is immediately challenged. They get enmeshed in these legal calisthenics for the next 2 to 3 years of their corruption-ridden governance. Then, suddenly, they are conceived, incubated and delivered in the hallowed Chambers and precincts of our law courts, rather than through the ballot box. The will of the people is thereby subsumed in the decision and judgement of courts of law, the non-representatives of the people”. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yg8ByKVWWj)

SHOULD THIS PLATEAU STATE LEGISLATORS’ DEBACLE HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO THRIVE UNREMEDIED?

Our case laws are decided based on precedents. Precedent is retrospective and ensures that a given posture is maintained even at the risk that harm may be caused by it.

The apex court in the Mutfwang’s case noted (albeit, by way of obiter), that the Court of Appeal was wrong when it sacked those legislators lawfully elected under the platform of the PDP, as it lacked jurisdiction to do so. However, precedent is saying, “Yes, we admit that there was an error. Nothing can be done about it.” I humbly disagree with this perpetuation of injustice under the thin guise of “my hands are tied”, or “that nothing can be done about it”. Surely, something can be done about it. I agree with Emmanuel Agim, JSC, when he noted in his judgement that, “it is high time the legal profession woke up before it became irrelevant.”

This admonition is in tandem with the admonition of venerable Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (JSC), in Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Adesanya & Anor (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 at 274, 275, to the effect that “When therefore it appears to learned counsel that any decision of this court has been given per incuriam, such counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such decision be overruled.”

I also find solace in the complimentary and immortal words of Lord Denning in PARKER V. PARKER (1954) 2 All ER 22, where he illuminated thus:
“What is the argument on the other side? Only this, that no case has been found in which it has been done before. That argument does not appeal to me in the least. If we never do anything which has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere. The law will stand still while the rest of the world goes on, and that will be bad for both”.

Afterall, law is but a mere handmaid to deliver justice, which is why “ubi jus ibi remedium” (Bello v. AG Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR 820).

Going by this, I humbly submit that when it comes to the critical issue of the court deciding a case in which it lacked jurisdiction in the first instance, then certainly, such a court has jurisdiction to revisit the said judgement and review it under certain laid down conditions. This is not a blanket or open-ended cheque for exhumation of buried cases. No.

A COURT CAN REVIEW ITS JUDGMENT

Thus, by reason of a long line of decided cases by the Supreme Court itself, a court has the constitutional power to enforce, review or set aside its own judgements under special circumstances as provided for by law. This is not tantamount to the court sitting on appeal over its own judgements. In Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc v. L.G. C. Ltd (2020) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1707), pp. 17-18, paras. D-C, the Supreme Court, per Abba Aji, JSC, held that the court has the power and leeway to set aside its own judgement and rehear a case, inter alia, under the following circumstances: “…where any of the other parties obtained judgement by fraud or deceit…. When judgement was given without jurisdiction…”

WHY THE PLATEAU STATE LEGISLATORS’ JUDGEMENT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN REVIEWED BY THE COURT OF APPEAL

Surely, the judgement in the Plateau Legislators’ matter was dubiously obtained as there was no disobedience to any court order at all as rightly found by the Supreme Court in the sister Mutfwang case. All the cases had emanated from the same facts and circumstances. Secondly, both the Election Tribunal and the Court of Appeal lacked the requisite jurisdiction to have entertained the Legislators’ case the way they did in the first instance.

The reason or rationale behind this position in the above Stanbic IBTC case was graphically painted by Oputa, JSC, in Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Adesanya & Anor (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 at 274, 275, inter alia, thus: “We are final not because we are infallible, rather we are infallible because we are final. Justices of this court are human beings, capable of erring. It will certainly be shortsighted arrogance not to accept this obvious truth. It is true that this court can do inestimable good through its wise decisions, similarly, the court can do incalculable harm through its mistakes.

When therefore it appears to learned counsel that any decision of this court has been given per incuriam, such counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such decision be overruled. This court has the power to overrule itself (and had done so in the past) for it gladly accepts that it is far better to admit an error than to persevere in error.” (Emphasis supplied).

Thus, where a judgment of a court was obtained without jurisdiction; or is tainted with illegality; or was obtained by fraud, the court surely has the vires, constitutional power and jurisdiction to revisit such judgement, even if time had since elapsed. This is because time cannot and does not run against illegality or fraud. A party cannot be allowed to benefit, or continue to benefit from the product of its own illegality and void conduct. This position was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Nwosu v. APP & Ors (2020) 16 NWLR (PT 1749) 28, where it held thus, through many of its justices as follows: Per Eko, JSC: “No person is allowed to benefit from illegality as illegality confers no right”

Per Peter-Odili, JSC: “It is difficult in the light of the damming facts well pushed in this appeal wherein illegality was enthroned to be surveyed into endorsing of such acts and to allow the perpetrator of such profane acts to derive or profit from his own wrong”.

Per Amina Augie, JSC: “The court cannot close its eyes to it (illegality) and allow itself to be used as a tool to perpetuate illegality, in whatever form or guise”

See also the cases of GTB V. Innoson (Nig.) Ltd (2022) LPELR-56657 (SC); Enterprise Bank Ltd v. Aroso & Ors (2015) LPELR – 24720 (SC); Oladosu & Anor v. Olaojoyetan & Anor (2012) LPELR – 8676 (CA) and Eco Bank v. Teak Naturale Investment Ltd & Ors (2017) LPELR – 42389 (CA).

The Court of Appeal which was approached by the grieving PDP Legislators sure had the power and jurisdiction to have calmly looked at and reviewed its judgements which have since been irretrievably punctured by the Nigerian people and the apex court itself (albeit, obiter). It should have meticulously reviewed its earlier judgements, all of which were delivered without following judicial precedents as laid down by the Supreme Court on the very issues dealt with in those appeals. Law is about justice. Being Siamese twins, one without the other is an orphan. The Plateau Legislators’ cases hallmarked a dangerous precedent where neither the law nor justice was followed or attained. The Court of Appeal ought to have seized the opportunity of the fresh application to correct itself. If for nothing else, at least for the sake of posterity, justice, fairplay, equity and good conscience.

I so humbly submit.

PROF MIKE OZEKHOME is a holder of  SAN, CON, OFR, FCIArb, LL.M, Ph.D, LL.D, D.Litt, D.SC

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Opinion

The Extraordinary Educational Legacy of the Fani-Kayode Family

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By Emmanuel Owabor

There is no other family in the history of Africa in which there are five generations of graduates from Oxbridge-level universities.

From 1893 when Rev. Emmanuel Adelabi Kayode (Chief Femi Fani-Kayode’s great grandfather) graduated with honors with a Master of Arts degree in theology from Durham University, to 1922 when Justice Victor Adedapo Kayode (Chief Femi Fani-Kayode’s grandfather) graduated from Cambridge University with a law degree, to 1943 when Chief Remi Fani-Kayode (Chief Femi Fani-Kayode’s father) graduated from Cambridge University with a law degree, to 1984 when Chief Femi Fani-Kayode himself graduated from Cambridge University with a law degree, no family in Nigeria or indeed Africa and few in the world have had four generations of graduates from these elite institutions from such an early age.

The fifth generation of Oxbridge-level graduates was led by Chief Femi Fani-Kayode’s eldest daughter, Miss Folake Fani-Kayode, who graduated with a degree from Durham University in 2009 (like her great, great grandfather, Rev. Emmanuel Adelabi Kayode had done, 116 years earlier.

Since then numerous other children of Chief Femi Fani-Kayode have graduated from top British and western Universities.

This represents an extraordinary legacy of first class education from the best Universities the world for five uninterrupted generations.

No other Nigerian or African family has achieved this and very few even in the Western world.

Emmanuel Owabor is a Director of Content Service, a Public Policy Expert and a Public Affairs commentator of many years. He can be reached via owabor.e@gmail.com.

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Opinion

A Holistic Framework for Addressing Leadership Deficiencies in Nigeria, Others

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By Tolulope A. Adegoke PhD

“Effective leadership is not a singular attribute but a systemic outcome. It is forged by institutions stronger than individuals, upheld by accountability with enforceable consequences, and sustained by a society that demands integrity as the non-negotiable price of power. The path to renewal—from national to global—requires us to architect systems that make ethical and competent leadership not an exception, but an inevitable product of the structure itself” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

Introduction: Understanding the Leadership Deficit

Leadership deficiencies in the modern era represent a critical impediment to sustainable development, social cohesion, and global stability. These shortcomings—characterized by eroded public trust, systemic corruption, short-term policymaking, and a lack of inclusive vision—are not isolated failures but symptoms of deeper structural and ethical flaws within governance systems. Crafting effective solutions requires a clear-eyed, unbiased analysis that moves beyond regional stereotypes to address universal challenges while respecting specific contextual realities. This document presents a comprehensive, actionable framework designed to rebuild effective leadership at the national, continental, and global levels, adhering strictly to principles of meritocracy, accountability, and transparency.

I. Foundational Pillars for Systemic Reform

Any lasting solution must be built upon a bedrock of core principles. These pillars are universal prerequisites for ethical and effective governance.

1.      Institutional Integrity Over Personality: Systems must be stronger than individuals. Governance should rely on robust, transparent, and rules-based institutions that function predictably regardless of incumbents, thereby minimizing personal discretion and its attendant risks of abuse.

2.      Uncompromising Accountability with Enforceable Sanctions: Accountability cannot be theoretical. It requires independent oversight bodies with real investigative and prosecutorial powers, a judiciary insulated from political interference, and clear consequences for misconduct, including loss of position and legal prosecution.

3.      Meritocracy as the Primary Selection Criterion: Leadership selection must transition from patronage, nepotism, and identity politics to demonstrable competence, proven performance, and relevant expertise. This necessitates transparent recruitment and promotion processes based on objective criteria.

4.      Participatory and Deliberative Governance: Effective leaders leverage the collective intelligence of their populace. This demands institutionalized channels for continuous citizen engagement—beyond periodic elections—such as citizen assemblies, participatory budgeting, and formal consultation processes with civil society.

II. Context-Specific Strategies and Interventions

A. For Nigeria: Catalyzing National Rebirth Through Institutional Reconstruction
Nigeria’s path requires a dual focus: dismantling obstructive legacies while constructing resilient, citizen-centric institutions.

·         Constitutional and Electoral Overhaul: Reform must address foundational structures. This includes a credible review of the federal system to optimize the balance of power, the introduction of enforceable campaign finance laws to limit monetized politics, and the implementation of fully electronic, transparent electoral processes with real-time result transmission audited by civil society. Strengthening the independence of key bodies like INEC, the judiciary, and anti-corruption agencies through sustainable funding and insulated appointments is non-negotiable.

·         Genuine Fiscal Federalism and Subnational Empowerment: The current over-centralization stifles innovation. Empowering states and local governments with greater fiscal autonomy and responsibility for service delivery would foster healthy competition, allow policy experimentation tailored to local contexts, and reduce the intense, often violent, competition for federal resources.

·         Holistic Security Sector Reform: Addressing insecurity requires more than hardware. A comprehensive strategy must include community-policing models, merit-based reform of promotion structures, significant investment in intelligence capabilities, and, crucially, parallel programs to address the root causes: youth unemployment, economic inequality, and environmental degradation.

·         Investing in the Civic Infrastructure: A functioning democracy requires an informed and engaged citizenry. This mandates a national, non-partisan civic education curriculum and robust support for a free, responsible, and financially sustainable press. Protecting journalists and whistleblowers is essential for maintaining transparency.

B. For Africa: Leveraging Continental Solidarity for Governance Enhancement
Africa’s prospects are tied to its ability to act collectively, using regional and continental frameworks to elevate governance standards.

·         Operationalizing the African Governance Architecture: The African Union’s mechanisms, particularly the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), must transition from voluntary review to a system with meaningful incentives and consequences. Compliance with APRM recommendations could be linked to preferential access to continental infrastructure funding or trade benefits under the AfCFTA.

·         The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as a Governance Catalyst: Beyond economics, the AfCFTA can drive better governance. By creating powerful cross-border commercial interests, it builds domestic constituencies that demand policy predictability, dispute resolution mechanisms, and regulatory transparency—all hallmarks of sound leadership.

·         Pan-African Human Capital Development: Strategic investment in continental human capital is paramount. This includes expanding regional centers of excellence in STEM and public administration, fostering academic and professional mobility, and deliberately cultivating a new generation of technocrats and leaders through programs like the African Leadership University.

·         Consistent Application of Democratic Norms: Regional Economic Communities (RECs) must enforce their own democratic charters uniformly. This requires establishing clear, automatic protocols for responding to unconstitutional changes of government, including graduated sanctions, rather than ad-hoc diplomatic responses influenced by political alliances.

C. For the Global System: Rebuilding Equitable and Effective Multilateralism
Global leadership crises often stem from outdated international structures that lack legitimacy and enforceability.

·         Reforming Archaic Multilateral Institutions: The reform of the United Nations Security Council to reflect 21st-century geopolitical realities is essential for its legitimacy. Similarly, the governance structures of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank must be updated to give emerging economies a greater voice in decision-making.

·         Combating Transnational Corruption and Illicit Finance: Leadership deficiencies are often funded from abroad. A binding international legal framework is needed to enhance financial transparency, harmonize anti-money laundering laws, and expedite the repatriation of stolen assets. This requires wealthy nations to rigorously police their own financial centers and professional enablers.

·         Fostering Climate Justice and Leadership: Effective global climate action demands leadership rooted in equity. Developed nations must fulfill and be held accountable for commitments on climate finance, technology transfer, and adaptation support. Leadership here means honoring historical responsibilities.

·         Establishing Norms for the Digital Age: The technological frontier requires new governance. A global digital compact is needed to establish norms against cyber-attacks on civilian infrastructure, the use of surveillance for political repression, and the cross-border spread of algorithmic disinformation that undermines democratic processes.

III. Universal Enablers for Transformative Leadership

Certain interventions are universally applicable and critical for cultivating a new leadership ethos across all contexts.

·         Strategic Leadership Development Pipelines: Nations and institutions should invest in non-partisan, advanced leadership academies. These would equip promising individuals from diverse sectors with skills in ethical decision-making, complex systems management, strategic foresight, and collaborative governance, creating a reservoir of prepared talent.

·         Redefining Success Metrics: Moving beyond Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the primary scorecard, governments should adopt and be assessed on holistic indices that measure human development, environmental sustainability, inequality gaps, and citizen satisfaction. International incentives, like preferential financing, could be aligned with performance on these multidimensional metrics.

·         Creating a Protective Ecosystem for Accountability: Robust, legally enforced protections for whistleblowers, investigative journalists, and anti-corruption officials are fundamental. This may include secure reporting channels, legal aid, and, where necessary, international relocation support for those under threat.

·         Harnessing Technology for Inclusive Governance: Digital tools should be leveraged to deepen democracy. This includes secure platforms for citizen feedback on legislation, open-data portals for public spending, and digital civic assemblies that allow for informed deliberation on key national issues, complementing representative institutions.

Conclusion: The Collective Imperative for Renewal

Addressing leadership deficiencies is not a passive exercise but an active, continuous project of societal commitment. It requires the deliberate construction of systems that incentivize integrity and penalize malfeasance. For Nigeria, it is the arduous task of rebuilding a social contract through impartial institutions. For Africa, it is the strategic use of collective action to elevate governance standards continent-wide. For the world, it is the courageous redesign of international systems to foster genuine cooperation and justice. Ultimately, the quality of leadership is a direct reflection of the standards a society upholds and enforces. By implementing this multilayered framework—demanding accountability, rewarding merit, and empowering citizens—a new paradigm of leadership can emerge, transforming it from a recurrent source of crisis into the most reliable engine for human progress and shared prosperity.

Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.comglobalstageimpacts@gmail.com

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Opinion

Tali Shani vs Mike Ozekhome: How a Legal Mole-Hill Was Turned into a Mountain

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By Abubakar D. Sani, Esq

INTRODUCTION

News of the decision of a British Tribunal in respect of a property situate in London, the UK’s capital, whose ownership was disputed has gained much publicity since it was delivered in the second week of September 2025. For legal reasons, the charges brought against prominent lawyer, Chief Mike Ozekhome, SAN, based on same is the most that can be said of it as no arraignment was made before Hon. Justice Kekemeke of the High court of the FCT, Abuja, sitting in Maitama.

Accordingly, this intervention will be limited to interrogating the common, but false belief (even in legal circles), that the Tribunal somehow indicted him with conclusive ‘guilt’. I intend to argue that this belief is not correct; and that, on the contrary, nothing could be further from the truth. For the sake of context, therefore, it is necessary to refer to relevant portions of the decision of Judge Paton (the name of the Tribunal’s presiding officer), which completely exonerated Chief Ozekhome, but which his detractors have always conveniently suppressed.

WHAT DID THE TRIBUNAL SAY?

Not a few naysayers, smart-alecs, emergency analysts and self-appointed pundits have been quick to latch on to some passages in the judgement of the Tribunal which disagreed with Ozekhome’s testimony to justify their crucifixion of Chief Ozekhome – even without hearing his side of the story or his version of events. This is a pity, of course, especially for the supposedly learned senior lawyers among them who, by ignoring the age-old principle of fair hearing famously captured as audi alterem partem (hear the other side) have unwittingly betrayed patent bias, malice, malevolence and utter lack of bona fides as the major, if not exclusive, motivator of their view-points and opinions. I have particularly watched about five of such senior lawyers shop from one platform to another, with malicious analysis to achieve nothing, but reputational damage. They know themselves.

Before proceeding to those portions, it is important to acknowledge that the Tribunal conducted a review of the evidence placed before it. The proceedings afforded all parties the opportunity to present their respective cases. The learned Judge carefully evaluated the testimonies, documentary exhibits and surrounding circumstances and rendered a reasoned decision based on the materials before the Tribunal.

It is also not in doubt that the Tribunal made certain critical observations in the course of assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the plausibility of their explanations. Such evaluative comments are a normal and inevitable feature of judicial fact-finding, particularly in property tribunals in contested proceedings involving complex transactions and disputed narratives. They do not amount to indictment.

It is precisely the improper isolation and mischaracterization of some of these observations that have given rise to the present misconception that the Tribunal somehow pronounced a verdict of guilt on Chief Ozekhome. It is therefore necessary to place the relevant excerpts in their proper legal and factual context, so as to demonstrate how the self-same tribunal exonerated Ozekhome.

“Paragraph 98: Once one steps back from that material, and considers the Respondent’s own direct personal knowledge of relevant matters relating to this property, this only commences in 2019. That is, he confirmed, when he was first introduced to Mr. Tali Shani – he thought in about January of that year. He did not therefore know him in 1993, or at any time before January 2019. He could not therefore have any direct knowledge of the circumstances of the purchase of this property, or its management prior to 2019. He had, however, known the late General Useni for over 20 years prior to his death, as both his lawyer and friend.

“Paragraph 103: Such of the Respondent’s written evidence had been about the very recent management of the property, and in particular his dispute over its management (and collection of rents) with one Nicholas Ekhorutowen, who provided no evidence in this case. The Respondent confirmed in oral evidence that it was upon the execution of the powers of attorney that he came into possession of the various pre registration title and conveyancing documents which formed part of his disclosure. These had been handed over to him by the next witness who gave evidence, Mr. Akeem Johnson.

“Paragraph 168: Unlike the fictitious “Ms. Tali Shani”, a man going by the name of Mr. Tali Shani exists and gave evidence before me in that name. A certified copy of an official Nigerian passport was produced both to the Land Registry and this Tribunal, stating that Mr. Tali Shani was born on 2nd April 1973. I do not have the evidence, or any sufficient basis, to find that this document – unlike the various poor and pitiful forgeries on the side of the “Applicant” – is forged, and I do not do so.

“Paragraph 200: First, I find that General Useni, since he was in truth the sole legal and beneficial owner of this property (albeit registered in a false name), must in some way have been connected to this transfer, and to have directed it. He was clearly close to, and on good terms with, the Respondent. There is no question of this being some sort of attempt by the Respondent to steal the general’s property without his knowledge.

“Paragraph 201: As to precisely why General Useni chose to direct this transfer to the Respondent, I do not need to (and indeed cannot) make detailed findings. I consider that it is highly possible that it was in satisfaction of some debt or favour owed. The Respondent initially angrily denied the allegation (made in the various statements filed on behalf of the “Applicant”) that this was a form of repayment of a loan of 54 million Naira made during the general’s unsuccessful election campaign. In his oral evidence, both he and his son then appeared to accept that the general had owed the Respondent some money, but that it had been fully paid off. The general himself, when asked about this, said that he “did not know how much money he owed” the Respondent.

“Paragraph 202: I do not, however, need to find precisely whether (and if so, how much) money was owed. The transfer may have been made out of friendship and generosity, or in recognition of some other service or favour. The one finding I do make, however, is that it was the decision of General Useni to transfer the property to the Respondent.”

It must be emphasised that even where a court finds that a witness has given inconsistent, fluctuating, or implausible testimony, as some have latched on, such a finding does not, without more, translate into civil or criminal liability. At best, it affects the weight and credibility to be attached to such evidence. It does not constitute proof of fraud, conspiracy, or criminal intent. See MANU v. STATE (2025) LPELR-81120(CA) and IKENNE vs. THE STATE (2018) LPELR-446­95 (SC)

Notwithstanding the Tribunal’s engagement with the evidence, certain passages had been selectively extracted and sensationalised by critics. On the ipssisima verba (precise wordings) of the Tribunal, only the above paragraphs which are always suppressed clearly stand out in support of Chief Ozekhome’s case, as the others were more like opinions.

Some paragraphs in the judgement in particular, appear to have been carefully selected as “weapons” in Chief Ozekhome’s enemies’ armoury, as they are most bandied about in the public space. The assumption appears to be that such findings are conclusive of his guilt in a civil property dispute. This is unfortunate, as the presumption of innocence is the bedrock of our adversarial criminal jurisprudence. It is a fundamental right guaranteed under section 36 of the Constitution and Article 7 of the African Charter which, regrettably, appear to have been more observed in the breach in his case.

More fundamentally, the selective reliance on few passages that disagreed with his evidence or testimony and that of Mr. Tali Shani, ignore the above wider and more decisive findings of the Tribunal itself. A holistic reading of the judgment reveals that the Tribunal was far more concerned with exposing an elaborate scheme of impersonation, forgery, and deception orchestrated in the name of a fictitious Applicant, Ms Tali Shani, and not Mr. Tali Shani (Ozekhome’s witness), who is a living human being. These findings, which have been largely ignored in public discourse, demonstrate that the gravamen of the Tribunal’s decision lay not in any indictment of Chief Ozekhome, but in the collapse of a fraudulent claim against him, which was founded on false identity and fabricated documents.

The Tribunal carefully distinguished a fake “Ms” Tali Shani (the Applicant), who said she was General Useni’s mistress and owner of the property, and the real owner, Mr Tali Shani, who was Chief Ozekhome’s witness before the Tribunal. It was the Tribunal’s finding that she was nothing but a phantom creation and therefore rejected her false claim to the property (par. 123). It also rejected the evidence of her so called cousin (Anakwe Obasi) and purported son (Ayodele Obasi) (par. 124).

The Tribunal further found that it was the Applicant and her cohorts that engaged in diverse fraud with documents such as a fraudulent witness statement purportedly from General Useni; all alleged identity documents; fabricated medical correspondence; the statement of case and witness statements; a fake death certificate; and a purported burial notice. (Paragraph 125). Why are these people not concerned with Barrister Mohammed Edewor, Nicholas Ekhoromtomwen, Ayodele Damola, and Anakwe Obasi? Why mob-lynching Chief Ozekhome?

The Tribunal found that the proceedings amounted to an abuse of process and a deliberate attempt to pervert the course of justice. It therefore struck out the Applicant’s claim (Paragraphs 130–165). The Tribunal significantly found that Mr Tali Shani exists as a human being and had testified before it in June, 2024. It accepted a certified Nigerian passport he produced, and accepted its authenticity and validity (Paragraph 168). Can any objective person hold that Ozekhome forged any passport as widely reported by his haters when the maker exists?

Having examined the factual findings of the Tribunal and their proper context, the next critical issue is the legal status and probative value of such findings. The central question, therefore, is whether the observations and conclusions of a foreign tribunal, made in the course of civil proceedings, are sufficient in law to establish civil or criminal liability against a person in subsequent proceedings.

STATUS OF JUDGEMENTS UNDER THE LAW

The relevant statutory provisions in Nigeria are sections 59, 60, 61, 173 and 174 of the Evidence Act 2011, provide as follows, respectively:

Section 59: “The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any court from taking cognisance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact, evidence of which is admissible when the question is whether such court ought to take cognisance of such suit or to hold such trial”;
Section 60(I): “A final judgment, order or decree of a competent court, in the exercise of probate. Matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character. or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is admissible when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such legal persons to an) such thing, is relevant (2) Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof (a)that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation; (b) that any legal character. to which it declares any such person to be entitled. accrued to that person at the time when such judgment order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person; (c) that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease; and (d) that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment. order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property”;

Section 61: “Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 60 are admissible if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the inquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state”

Section 173: “Every judgment is conclusive proof, as against parties and privies. of facts directly in issue in the case, actually decided by the court. and appearing from the judgment itself to be the ground on which it was based; unless evidence was admitted in the action in which the judgment was delivered which is excluded in the action in which that judgment is intended to be proved”.;

Section 174(1): “If a judgment is not pleaded by way of estoppel it is as between parties and privies deemed to be a relevant fact, whenever any matter, which was or might have been decided in the action in which it was given, is in issue, or is deemed to be relevant to the issue in any subsequent proceeding”;

(2):”Such judgment is conclusive proof of the facts which it decides, or might have decided, if the party who gives evidence of it had no opportunity of pleading it as an estoppel”.
It can be seen that the decision of the Tribunal falls under the purview of section 61 of the Evidence Act, as the provisions of sections 59 and 60 and of sections 173 and 174 thereof, are clearly inapplicable to it. In other words, even though some Judge Paton’s findings in respect of Chief Ozekhome’s testimony at the Tribunal relate to matters of public nature (i.e., the provenance and status of No. 79 Randall Avenue, Neasden, London, U.K and the validity of his application for its transfer to him) none of those comments or even findings is in any way conclusive of whatever they may assert or state (to use the language of section 60 of the Evidence Act).

In this regard, see the case of DIKE V NZEKA (1986) 4 NWLR pt.34 pg. 144 @ 159 where the Supreme Court construed similar provisions in section 51 of the old Evidence Act, 1948. I agree with Tar Hon, SAN (S. T. Hon’s Law of Evidence in Nigeria, 3rd edition, page 1041) that the phrase ‘public nature’ in the provision is satisfied where the judgement is clearly one in rem as opposed to in personam. It is pertinent to say a few words about both concepts, as they differ widely in terms of scope. The former determines the legal status of property, a person, a particular subject matter, or object, against the whole world, and is binding on all persons, whether they were parties to the suit or not. See OGBORU V IBORI (2005) 13 NWLR pt. 942 pg. 319 @407-408 per I. T. Muhammed, JCA (as he then was).

This was amplified by the apex court in OGBORU V UDUAGHAN (2012) LLJR -SC, where it held, per Adekeye, JSC that: “A judgment in rem maybe defined as the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction determining the status of a person or thing as distinct from the particular interest of a party to the litigation. Apart from the application of the term to persons, it must affect the “res” in the way of condemnation forfeiture, declaration, status or title”.

By contrast, “Judgments ‘in personam’ or ‘inter partes’, as the name suggests, are those which determine the rights of parties as between one another to or in the subject matter in dispute, whether it be corporeal property of any kind whatever or a liquidated or unliquidated demand but which do not affect the status of either things or persons or make any disposition of property or declare or determine any interest in it except as between the parties (to the litigation). See HOYSTEAD V TAXATION COMMISSIONERS (1926) A. C. 155. These include all judgments which are not judgments in rem. None of such judgments at all affects any interest which third parties may have in the subject matter. As judgment inter partes, though binding between the parties and their privies, they do not affect the rights of third parties. See CASTRIQUE V IMRIE 141 E. R. 1062; (1870) L. R. 4H. L. 414”.

Suffice it to say that the decision of the London Property Tribunal was, in substance, one affecting proprietary rights in rem, in the sense that it determined the status and registrability of the property in dispute. However, it did not determine any civil or criminal liability, nor did it pronounce on the personal culpability of any party. The implication of this is that, even though the decision was in respect of a matter of a public nature, it was, nonetheless, not conclusive as far as proof of the status of the property, or – more importantly – Chief Ozekhome’s role in relation to it. Indeed, the property involved was not held to have been traced to the owner (General Useni) as having ever tried or convicted for owning same. I submit that the foregoing is the best case scenario in terms of the value of Judge Paton’s said decision, because under section 62 of the Evidence Act, (depending, of course, on its construction), it will fare even worse, as it provides that judgments “other than those mentioned in sections 59. 60 and 61 are inadmissible unless the judgment, etc is a fact in issue or is admissible under some other provision of this or any other Act”.

CONCLUSION

Some people’s usual proclivity to rush to judgment and condemn unheard any person (especially a high profile figure like Chief Ozekhome), has exposed him to the worst kind of unfair pedestrian analysis, malice, mud-slinging and outright name-calling especially by those who, by virtue of their training, ought to know better, and, therefore, be more circumspect, restrained and guarded in their utterances. This is all the more so because, no court of competent jurisdiction has tried or pronounced him guilty. It is quite unfortunate how some select lawyers are baying for his blood.

The decision of the London Tribunal remains what it is: a civil determination on attempted transfer of a property based on the evidence before it. It is not, and cannot be, a substitute for civil or criminal adjudication by a competent court. The presumption of innocence under Nigerian laws remains inviolable. Any attempt by commentators to usurp that judicial function through premature verdicts is not only improper, but inimical to the fair administration of justice.

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