The Oracle
Disputes Between States and Federation: Examining the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Pt. 4)

By Mike Ozekhome
Introduction
In the last episode of this discourse, we concluded our discussion of the meaning of ‘dispute’ for the purpose of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We then examined the legal dimensions of disputes between the States and the Federation, defining the Federation and the conceptual link between it and the Federal Government of Nigeria. We concluded it with a discussion of the principles for the invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in disputes between States and the Federation.
In today’s episode, we shall conclude our discussion of the principles for the invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, highlighting instances where the jurisdiction of the court cannot be invoked. We will then consider the possibility of an individual invoking the original jurisdiction of the court, and consider an apparent shift in the position in two circumstances which are discussed, starting with the locus standi of a State to sue in the court to protect its inhabitants or indigenes. Enjoy.
Principles For The Invocation Of The Jurisdiction Of The Supreme Court (continues)
However, some cases have also been struck out for feigning ignorance of this dividing thin line. For instance, in ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF LAGOS STATE v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION, Ibid the Supreme Court declined original jurisdiction to entertain the action and struck it out. The plaintiff had sought a declaration that the Value Added Tax Act, Cap. VI, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, is null and void, to the extent that it provides for the imposition and collection of taxes on goods and services in Lagos State, outside the legislative competence of the National Assembly, and perpetual injunction, restraining the Federal Government from continuing to give effect to the provisions of the said Act. The 1st defendant filed a notice of preliminary objection, urging the court to strike out and/or dismiss the action, stating that the allegation of the plaintiffs is absurd and is trying to usurp the acts of an agency of the Federal Government. In its lead judgement delivered by DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, JSC, the apex court held that “the plaintiff had approached the wrong court because its claim clearly relates to the revenue of the government of the Federation, consequent upon the taxes of one of its agencies levies, and or/seeks the interpretation of the Constitution as to how the operation of the Constitution affects the 1st defendant or any of its agencies. The dispute pertained to the operation of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), in relation to an agency of the plaintiff. Rather, it was the Federal High Court that had jurisdiction on matters agency in relation to taxation of companies and other bodies”.
In the same breath, in the case of ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ABIA STATE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION, NWLR (2007) 2 SC 146, the action of the plaintiff was a challenge against the establishment and functions of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), as a federal agency operating in the States of the Federation. The Supreme Court held that this was not a dispute between the plaintiff and the Federal Government; neither was it a dispute between the plaintiff and the rest of the State Governments, which were joined as co-defendants.
Instances Where the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Cannot Be Invoked
The jurisdiction of the court cannot be invoked where:
a. There is a dispute on any criminal matter pursuant to the court’s original jurisdiction.
b. Any dispute arising between individuals at first instance.
c. Any dispute between persons and the Federal Government.
d. Any dispute between persons and a State Government.
e. Any action instituted by a corporate or statutory body.
f. Any action wherein a corporate body/institution/organization is made a party.
g. Any dispute between/amongst Local Government or between a Local Government and a State/the Federal Government.
The above instances were stated in the concurring judgement of I.T MUHAMMAD, JSC, as he then was, in the case of ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF RIVERS STATE v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF AKWA IBOM STATE 2011) All FWLR (pt. 579) 1023 S.C.
It is almost impossible to have this intriguing discourse without making reference or highlighting the need for locus standi before a matter can be filed at the Supreme Court.
Locus standi: Can An Individual Approach The Supreme Court?
Certainly, the answer to the poser is NO. In RE: LAGOS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, (2019) 1 NWLR (pt. 1652) 91, the Intervener/Applicant approached the Supreme Court via motion on seeking an order of the court granting leave to be heard in the proceedings between the plaintiffs and the defendant on whether the questions submitted by the plaintiffs for determination in its amended Originating Summons ought to be heard by the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Applicant was not one of the parties recognized by section 232(1) of the Constitution to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It further held that to that extent, the application was frivolous and the applicant was a busybody in a matter that did not involve her.
A Shift Of Position
Similarly, in ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ONDO STATE v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION& 19 ORS. (1983) 2 SNLR 269. The Ondo State Government brought an action against the Federal Government and 18 other States of the Federation under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. However, the 20th defendant was the then electoral body, that is, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO). The apex court held that the Electoral body, not being a State, cannot properly be brought before it as a court of first Instance.
However, the Supreme Court may have tacitly shifted its earlier position and nodded to this practice in circumstances such as:
1. Where a person suing through or suing the Attorney General; and
2. Where the main claim is between a State or States and the Federation.
Thus in the case of ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RIVERS STATE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BAYELSA STATE, (2013) 3 NWLR (pt. 1340) 123 SC, the apex court held that though section 232(1) has indicated that only governments can be competent parties when the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is being invoked, suing through and or suing a sitting Attorney General will not make the suit incompetent, as section 20 of the Supreme Court Act, 2004 permits that.
Also, in ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF RIVERS STATE v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF AKWA IBOM STATE, Ibid the Supreme Court held that even if other persons or institutions are made parties to a suit whereby the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked, such original jurisdiction will still avail if the main claims are between the State and the Federal Government or between States, because the existence of such dispute will fulfill the requirements of section 232 of the Constitution.
Locus Standi of States to Protect Their Citizens
Generally, the issue of locus standi was recently addressed by the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of ATTORNEY- GENERAL OF KADUNA STATE & ORS. V. ATTORNEY- GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ORS, 2023) LPELR-59936(SC) @(Pp 37 – 39 Paras B – B), where EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, JSC, illuminated thus:
“Let me now consider the argument that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to bring the suit because the questions raised for determination and the reliefs sought for in the Originating Summons and the affidavit in support thereof do not show any dispute of facts or law on which the existence or extent of their legal right depends. It is correct that S.232(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that the dispute between the Federation and a State or between States, over which this Court can exercise original jurisdiction, must be one that involves any question of law or fact on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends.
In other words, the dispute must arise over the plaintiff’s claim or assertion of the existence or extent of a right created or recognized and enforceable by law. This is the right, the breach of which entitles the plaintiff to remedy and gives him a right of action and a cause of action. The rights they assert in this suit are the right to be first consulted by the President as constituents of the Federation and the right to reasonable notice as such constituents before the President gave the directive or approval to the CBN to implement the change of currency notes, the right to protection of their states’ governance, economic and social order against massive disruptions and hardships that has resulted from the hasty and not well thought through and organized implementation of the change and the right to the establishment of adequate infrastructure and measures to prevent the said disruptions and hardships. It is obvious that the directive has been carried out. The fact is common knowledge, is not reasonably open to question and does not require proof, that the implementation of the directive has continued to deprive all persons and the plaintiffs access to a substantial part of their funds in banks, thereby forcefully and illegally depriving them their rights of ownership and use of the said funds for state functions. The President’s national broadcast of 16-2-2023 confirms this. Inherent in their status as constituents of the Federation under a democratic constitution, is their right to be consulted by the President before the exercise of any executive power of such magnitude as can have a far-reaching effect on the governance, economic and social order of each constituent of the Federation. Such a right is inherent in the idea of a Federation in a democracy. Without it, the Federation losses its sovereignty and the President becomes the sovereign and the Government of Nigeria a dictatorship.” (To be concluded next week).
Thought For The Week
“Presidents come and go, but the Supreme Court goes on forever”. (William Howard Taft).
The Oracle
The Oracle: A Critique of the New Supreme Court Rules and Sundry Legal Anomalies (Pt. 2)

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
Introduction
The first part of this intervention examined the constitutional authority for enacting the new Supreme Court Rules. It then asked what difference the new Rules made, with specific reference to the issues of costs, right of audience, conditions of appeal, its prohibition of stay of proceedings in interlocutory appeals and elections. In this week’s feature we shall discuss other anomalies of the enabling statute of the Supreme Court Rules vis-a-vis the 1999 Constitution as well as related statutes such as the Notaries Public Act. I then questioned the legitimacy of legal practitioners acting as Receivers/Managers. Is it proper or does it constitute a prohibited trade or business under Order 7 of the Legal Practitioners Rule of Professional Conduct, 2023. To find out, please read on.
Other Anomalies
Beyond the foregoing, it does appear that even the enabling statute of the apex court (apart from the Constitution, that is) the Supreme Court Act, Cap. S. 15, LFN 2004, also contains at least one provision which appears to be somewhat at odds with the Constitution. That provision is Section 11 of the Supreme Court Act which provides that “a single justice of the Supreme Court may exercise any power vested in that court other than the final determination of any cause or matter, provided that-
a) In criminal cause or matter, if any justice refuses an application for the exercise of any such power, the person making the application shall be entitled to have his application determined by the Supreme Court; and
b) In civil causes or matters, any order, direction or decision made or given in pursuance of the powers conferred by this section may be varied, discharged or reversed by the Supreme Court”.
It seems that this provision contradicts those of Section 234 of the 1999 Constitution which provide that “for the purpose of exercising any jurisdiction conferred upon it by this Constitution or any law, the Supreme Court shall be duly constituted if it consists of not less than five Justices of the Supreme Court; provided that where the Supreme Court is sitting to consider an appeal brought under Section 232(2)(b) or (c) of this Constitution, or to exercise its original jurisdiction in accordance with section 232 of the 1999 Constitution, the court shall be constituted by seven Justices”.
However, apart from section 11 of the Supreme Court Act, yet another anomalous provision, vis-à-vis those of section 232 of the 1999 Constitution as aforesaid, in my view, is constituted by section 14 of the Notaries Public Act, 2023, which stipulates as follows, inter alia:
“When inquiring into a complaint against a Notary Public, the Supreme Court, by the powers vested it in accordance with the provisions of this Act, shall be duly constituted when exercised by any three Justices of that court present and sitting together;
The decision of the majority of the three Justices shall be taken to be the decision of the Supreme Court”.
In this particular case (i.e., the Notaries Public Act), it does appear that the anomalies inherent therein are more fundamental, as it is not at all clear where the National Assembly acquired the authority to empower the Chief Justice to ‘anoint’ (the Act uses the word ‘appoint’) a legal practitioner as a Notary Public. The Constitution is certainly silent on it and I don’t think it can be reasonably inferred from the provisions of Item 68 of its Exclusive Legislative List.
One would have thought that such ‘ennoblements’ ought to be within the purview (or scope) of the powers of the Legal Practitioners Privileges Committee, which as its name suggests, is a multi-member body, instead of the case with Notaries Public, whose appointment is at the sole discretion of the Chief Justice. This is certainly odd.
Be that as it may, however, as I previously submitted, the anomalies in the Notaries Public Act extends beyond the forgoing. They include the oaths which newly-appointed Notaries Public are obliged to take, as contained in the First Schedule to the Act. The anomaly in this provision is that once again, the Constitution is silent on any power or authority (express or implied) of the National Assembly, to enact any provision requiring the taking of oaths, either by Notaries Public or any other person whosoever.
This is because, the Constitution appears to have covered that field vide the Seventh Schedule thereto. Needles to say, of this view is correct, it means that the Oaths Act is invalid, null and void, as it would be ultra vires the National Assembly. In other words, the only oath which persons occupying (or about to occupy) official positions other than those mentioned in that Schedule are obliged to take is the Oath of Allegiance contained therein. I hope I am wrong.
Can Legal Practitioners Be Receivers?
Yet another ominous legal anomaly is the age-long practice of Legal Practitioners acting as Receiver/Managers (usually appointed by banks) to manage the business and assets of their debtors and to recover debts owed to such banks. For a fee (usually a percentage of any debts actually recovered by the Receiver). Such appointments are usually made pursuant to specific clauses in Mortgage Debentures, All-Assets Debentures or Debenture Trust Deeds. Many (if not all) such legal practitioners so appointed are invariably engaged in active legal practice and they happily combine both occupations, having the best of both worlds and smiling all the way to the bank to such an extent that they are the envy of many of their professional colleagues who are not so privileged to wear two hats, as it were.
I believe that, to the extent that such legal practitioners are remunerated for rendering or performing such services as Receivers/ Managers, their status is somewhat ambiguous, as they are operating in what is, at best, ‘uncharted territory’. This is because the express (if not implied) provisions of Order 7 of the Legal Practitioners Rules of Professional Conduct, 2023 (and its previous iterations) appear to preclude them from combining the two. For ease of reference, they are set out below, viz:
“7. (1) Unless permitted by the General Council of the bar (hereinafter referred to as the “Bar Council”), a lawyer shall not practice as a legal practitioner at the same time as his practice any other profession.
(2) A lawyer shall not practice as a legal practitioner while personally engaged in –
(a) The business of buying and selling commodities;
(b) The business of a commission agent;
(c) Such other trade or business which the Bar Council may from time to time declare to be incompatible with practice as a lawyer or as tending to undermine the high standing of the profession.(3) For the purpose of this rule, “trade or business” includes all forms of participation in any trade or business, but does not include –
(a) Membership of the Board of Directors of a company which does not involve executive, administrative or clerical functions;
(b) Being secretary of a company; or
(c) Being a shareholder in a company”.
Conclusion
Well-intentioned as the innovations of the new Supreme Court Rules undoubtedly are, it ought not to blind us to their inherent anomalies, some of which are outlined above. It is in this light that one cannot but observe that the new rules (particularly, its prescriptions for the summary termination of appeals by the court (suo motu) for non-compliance with conditions of appeals, as well as denial of right of audience to Counsel who fail to pay costs awarded against them) appear to elevate the rules above the need to do substantial justice.
This is worrisome, as it is something of a throwback to the days of old when justice was often sacrificed on the altar of rule-backed technicality and is rather unfortunate, as it bears remembering that, as the apex has repeatedly held:
“(Although) rules of court are meant to be complied with, (however) the principal object of courts is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with those rights . . . Rules of court are made to help the court in its primary duty and objective, namely, to do justice to the parties by deciding on the merits of their case. Those rules are mere hand-maids to justice and, inflexibility of the rules will only serve to render justice grotesque. It will therefore be undesirable to (enact) rules which will merely enable one party to score, not a victory on the merits, but a technical knockout at the expense of a hearing on the merits… If strict observance of a rule of practice will produce injustice, then a court of justice will naturally prefer doing justice to obeying a rule which is no longer an aid to justice.”
See NNEJI v CHUKWU, supra, @ pg. 207per Oputa, JSCJ. I need say no more.
Pointing out the forgoing anomalies is our bounden duty as Counsel, because, as observed by the Supreme Court in IFEZUE Vs MBADUGHA (1984) 1 SCNLR 427 (quoting, with approval, from ST. JOHN SHIPPING CORP v J. RANK LTD (1975) 1 & B 267 @ 282) “One must not be deterred from enunciating the correct principle of law simply because it may have startling or even calamitous results”.
(The end).
Thought for the week
“The Supreme Court, of course, has the responsibility of ensuring that our government never oversteps its proper bounds or violates the rights of individuals. But the Court must also recognize the limits on itself and respect the choices made by the American people”. (Elena Kagan).
The Oracle
The Oracle: A Critique of the New Supreme Court Rules and Sundry Legal Anomalies (Pt.1)

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
Introduction
The immediate past Chief Justice of Nigeria (Hon. Justice Ariwoola) ought to be remembered for the parting gift of sorts which he handed to the court, lawyers and litigants in the form of the Supreme Court Rules, 2024. Enacted on the eve of his departure in September 2024, the rules have been broadly welcomed by stakeholders for harmonizing the disparate rules of practice and procedure applicable in that court (the last iteration of the rule, in 1985 and the sundry practice directions which have been added to it since then) into what is hopefully a harmonious whole. Is that hope misplaced or is it deserved? Are the rules (or any of their provisions) problematic, anomalous or even out rightly ultra vires (and therefore invalid) vis-a-vis relevant standards and norms such as the Constitution, the Legal Practitioners Act and the African Charter on Human & Peoples rights? Let us find out, but first, the usual preliminaries.
Practice And Procedure of The Supreme Court Of Nigeria
By virtue of section 236 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice of Nigeria is empowered to make rules of practice and procedure applicable in the Supreme Court. Those powers and however not at large, but are to be exercised subject to the provisions any Act of the National Assembly. That statute is the Supreme Court Act, section 9 of which provides that “subject to the provision of any other enactment, the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court shall be in accordance with this Act and rules of
court.”
What Difference Do The New Rules Make?
As previously noted, the new Supreme Court rules (SCR) have been broadly welcomed by all and sundry, given the public’s perception that they introduced innovations to the court’s justice delivery tool-kit. As ever, however, the devil is in the detail and we shall see to what extent, if any, the rules live up to the hype. In this regard, I believe at least three of the supposed innovations of the rules give room for not a little concern. I am referring here to the provisions dealing with costs, right of audience, conditions for prosecuting appeals and restrictions within the exercise of such rights by a party. We take them seriatim.
Costs
The new Rules provide that not only will counsel who supposedly engage in abuse of court process be penalized with punitive costs to be paid personally by such counsel (including those acting for state/federal governments and public institutions), any counsel who defaults in making such payments will not have the right of audience in any superior court in Nigeria. I believe this is problematic for at least two reasons. To start with, the right to counsel of one’s choice- in criminal cases- is a fundamental right under section 36(6)(c) of the constitution. To that extent, it is clear that to deny a suspect or accused person of that right on the ground that the counsel is in default of certain costs awarded against him would violate this constitutional right (which, by the way, is also guaranteed under Article 7 of the African (charter).
Beyond that, however, the Legal Practitioners Act also provides (in section S thereof) that a legal practitioner shall have the right of audience in all courts of law in Nigeria. That right is subject to only one condition under the Act: payment of annual practicing fee by such legal practitioners. The Act is silent on any default by a legal practitioner to pay costs as a ground for denying him audience in court: expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the express mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of others, which might
otherwise be included. See ATT-GEN. OF THE FEDERATION v
ABUBAKAR (2007) ALL FWLR pt. 375 pg.405 @553B
Right of Audience
Yet another problematic provision of the rules is the one which limits the number of Counsel appearing in any given case before the apex court. Under the new rules, this is pegged at 6, including a senior advocate where there are more than one Senior Advocate, the number of Counsel is pegged at a maximum of 8. I believe this is an undue fetter on a party’s right to Counsel of his or her choice, which, criminal cases, is a fundamental right. No rule of court can abridge or curtail a fundamental right under the Constitution or the African Charter.
Not even an Act of the National Assembly. The Constitution is supreme and, next to it, is the African Charter. See ABACHA V FAWEHINMI (2000) 6 NWLR pt.660 pg.228 @315 and IGP v ANPP (2007) 18 NWLR pt. 1066 pg. 457@500C.
Furthermore, however, this particular provision of the new rules is too sweeping as it extends beyond the Supreme Court to all superior courts of record in Nigeria. By virtue of section 6(5) of the Constitution, such courts includes the Court>of Appeal, the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, the High Court of a States, Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT, the Sharia Court of Appeal of States, Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT and of the states. I believe it is anomalous for this provision of the new rules to purport to apply to these other courts because it is trite law rules of practice and practice enacted for one court only apply to that court and cannot apply to that court and cannot apply to other courts: See NNEJI v CHUKWU (1988) 3 NWLR pt. 81 pg. 184 @205 per Oputa, JSC. A head of court is only empowered to enact rules of procedure applicable to that court and no other: TUKUR v. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1988) 1NWLR Pt. 117 pg. 39 @50
Conditions of appeal
Another anomalous provision of the new rules, in my view, is the requirement for a prospective appellant to provide a bon d or guarantee that he will diligently prosecute the appeal. This is novel stipulation is a condition for hearing the appeal. A similar provision is the requirement of an undertaking by the appellant to pay damages to the respondent in the event that the appeal is unsuccessful. I believe that both stipulations are problematic as they impose undue fetters on the exercise of the right of appeal. The apex court has repeatedly frowned upon such restrictions on the right of access to court. See UGWU v ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR pt. 1048 pg. 367 @ 450 per Tobi JSC, where it was held as follows:
“Right of access to court is a constitutional right, which is guaranteed in the constitution, and no law… can subtract from or derogate from it or deny any person of it.” See also GLOBAL EXCELLENCE Vs DUKE (2007) 16 NWLR pt 1059 pg.22, and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples rights.
No stay of proceedings in interlocutory appeals
On the stipulation of the rules that the apex Court will never grant applications for stay of proceedings in interlocutory appeals, the apex Court appears to have departed from its long standing tradition of not denying a party “(be he the appellant or the respondent) the opportunity of being heard for fear that such attitude might cause a temporary delay in the disposal of the case.” See NNEJI v CHUKWU, supra, @ page 200, per Wali, JSC.
Such a shift in the policy of the Apex Court is worrisome because it transcends the practice and procedure of the court and impinges on the fundamental issue of access to court, fair hearing and to have one’s cause heard, all of which are implicitly recognized and guaranteed under the constitution and the African charter as aforesaid.
Elections
The provisions of the rules in election related appeals are also problematic for the simple reason that election matters being sui generis, the relevant prescriptions are to be found in the Electoral Act, 2022, specifically, section 140 thereof, which provide as follows:
“(1) The rules of procedure to be adopted for election petitions and appeals arising therefrom shall be as set out in the first schedule to this Act;
“(2) The president of the court of appeal may issue practice directions to the-
(a) Court of Appeal in respect of pre-election and post-election
(b) Election tribunal, in respect of post-election matters”
Curiously, however, the Act is silent on the Chief Justice of Nigeria.
In other words, it doesn’t confer a similar power on the CJN in respect of electoral appeals to the apex court, as it does on the President of the Court of Appeal. Whether it is deliberate or out of oversight is hard to fathom. What is clear is that, by virtue of the combined provisions of Items 22 and 68 of the Exclusive Legislative List, read along with Paragraph 2(b) or Part III of the Second Schedule to the Constitution, the National Assembly possesses the exclusive power to legislate on the practice and procedure in election-related litigation. To the extent that the Assembly has not delegated that power to the CJN in the same way as it did to the president of the Court of Appeal, the implication is that the Assembly did not intend to do so, but rather to reserve it to itself in appeals at the Supreme Court in electoral matters, on the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius aforesaid and that the provisions of the first schedule to the act have covered the field in such appeals at the apex court. The upshot of this is that the prescriptions of the new rules in electoral appeals at the apex court are ultra vires, the Hon. CJN, with the greatest respect. See ATTORNEY-GENENERAL OF ABIA STATE Vs. ATTORNEY-GENENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2002) 6 NWLR Pt. 763 pg. 264 @ 369 & 391, Per Kutigi, JSC and Uwais, CJN. Respectively. (To be continued).
Though for the week
“The Supreme Court is the last line of defense for the separation of powers and for the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution”. (Brett Kavanaugh).
The Oracle
The Oracle: The Role of Courts in Enforcement of Judgments (Pt. 2)

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
Introduction
We commenced this episode last week with a definition of the court and its functions. We also looked at the meaning of judgement, the different kinds of judgements and the modalities for enforcing monetary judgements. Today we shall continue and conclude with the role of the court in enforcing judgements. Enjoy.
Modalities for Enforcement of Monetary judgments (continues)
Afterwards, the sales of the property can only occur at the expiration of 15 days from date of attachment, unless the judgment debtor requests otherwise in writing. The above application for a writ of fi fa is initiated by way of a motion on notice.
Garnishee Proceedings
A garnishee proceeding is when the judgment debtor has money due to him in possession of another person, such as Bank or other financial institutions. Under this procedure, the court will order that third party or the financial institution; the garnishee, based on an application filed by the judgment creditor (the garnishor) to pay the judgment debtor’s money in their possession to the to the court. The court upon receipt of the money from the third party shall subsequently pay it to the judgment creditor as settlement of the judgment debt (See Sections 83 – 92 of the Sheriff and Civil Processes Act.).
The judgment creditor initiates this process through a motion ex parte, for an order nisi, which is a conditional order, compelling the garnishee to appear before the court and show reasonable cause why he should not be made to pay the debt to the creditor. If the garnishee fails to show cause, an order nisi may be made absolute and the sum awarded will be judgment will be enforceable against him, as if he were the judgment debtor and the appropriate writ of execution may be issued against him.
Judgment Summons
Under the Judgment summon the judgment creditor initiates the process to court for the issuance of a judgment debtor summons, and invites the debtor to court to answer, on oath, questions as to his means. (Section 55, of the Sheriff and Civil Processes Act).
Pursuant to section 63, of the Sheriff and Civil Processes Act, the outcome of the invitation are:
– The judgment debtor may be committed to prison for failure to settle debt, when it is on record that he refused to pay the money deliberately.
– The court may give an order attaching his property for sale.
– The court may give an order for payment in installments.
– The court may give an order for the discharge of judgment debtor from prison.
Sequestration
An application for sequestration can be initiated at a High Court (See Section 82 of the SCPA). It is similar to a writ of Fi Fa, but, in sequestration, the intention is not to sell the property or transfer title, but to appoint “commissioners” to enter the judgment debtor’s immovable property for the purpose of collecting and keeping the rent or profits accruing on the property, or to seize the property and detain until the judgment debtor clears himself of contempt. Until the court makes an order that is contrary to this, which may often times be for the debt be settled out of the funds obtained (Order 11 Rule 9 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules).
Judgment for Possession
Judgment for possession is when the judgment obtained is for possession of the property which was in dispute before the court. Under this possessory judgment, there are various modes of enforcement, just the way it is in the monetary judgment. The modes of enforcement are as follow:
Writ of Possession: Writ of possession applies to cases of recovery of premises. Recovery of possession in this regard is more than the possession between landlords and tenants. Writ of possession cannot be issued by the court, until the expiration of the day the judgment debtor is ordered to give possession of the land. but were there exists no such day, the court may order possession at the expiration of 14 days from the day judgment entered (Order IV Rule 1(1) of the Judgment Enforcement Rules).
Warrant of Possession: The process of warrant of possession applies to recovery of premises between landlords and tenants. This process is adopted by the landlord in recovery the premises from the tenant in line with the order of court.
Committal Order: Under the Committal Order, the judgment debtor may at times be committed to prison until he obeys the judgment and/or delivers possession of the property Section 72 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act).
Judgment for The Delivery of Goods
This is where the judgment obtained is for the delivery of goods from the judgment Debtor to the judgment Creditor. The modes of enforcement are the same with the mode of enforcement in the judgment of possession.
The Role Of The Courts In The Enforcement Of Judgment
The role of courts in the enforcement of judgments is critical to ensuring that legal judgments are upheld and that parties comply with court judgments, orders, rulings and decisions. The courts in Nigeria have several roles in enforcing judgments. However, before such enforcements take place the court shall have made and order, ruling or entered a judgment as the case maybe. A judgment is a final decision of the court that settles the dispute between or amongst the disputing litigants by determining the obligations and rights of either of the parties. Court judgments can be classified into in personam, in rem or qusiin rem. Judgments of courts are legally enforceable.
These are some roles a court may adopt in enforcing judgments; here are key aspects of these roles, which include but not limited to the following:
Judgment Enforcement Mechanisms: Courts provide various mechanisms for enforcing judgments, including writs of execution, garnishment, and attachments. These tools allow the winning party to collect what is owed to them.
Hearing Enforcement Actions: Courts hear motions and applications related to the enforcement of judgments. If a debtor fails to comply with a judgment, the creditor can petition the court for assistance, and the court will evaluate the evidence and circumstances.
Contempt of Court: If a party fails to comply with a court order, the court may hold them in contempt. This can lead to penalties, including fines or imprisonment, to compel compliance.
Judicial Oversight: Courts oversee the enforcement process to ensure it complies with the law. They ensure that enforcement actions are lawful and do not violate rights or due process.
Mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Courts may encourage or require mediation to resolve enforcement disputes, helping parties come to an agreement without further litigation.
Appeals and Judicial Review: If a party disagrees with the enforcement actions taken by the court, they may have the right to appeal. Courts review the enforcement decisions to ensure they align with legal standards.
Equitable Relief: In some cases, courts can provide equitable relief, such as injunctions, to prevent a party from taking actions that would undermine the judgment.
Support for Creditor Rights: Courts protect the rights of creditors, ensuring that they have a fair opportunity to collect debts owed under a judgment.
Public Policy Considerations: Courts must balance individual rights with public policy, ensuring that enforcement actions do not infringe on fundamental rights while promoting the rule of law.
Issuing of summons, writs, warrants, and subpoenas, orders of attachment, freezing of assets, Injunctions and Garnishee proceedings.
The role of the courts in the enforcement of a judgment is one and the same as the role of the courts in obtaining the judgment itself. It is of no use for a judgment creditor to secure a judgment and not enforce the said judgment against the judgment debtor. This is because, none enforcement of the judgment may deny the judgment creditor the fruit or benefit of this judgment. The role of the court is the importance of the mechanisms of enforcement as enlightened.
All the procedures for the enforcement and execution of judgments, whether monetary, possessory or recover of land, all of which were succinctly explained above, are designed to assist the judgment creditor to reap the benefit of the judgment, through the powers vested in the court by the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria and other various Rules of Courts (Federal and States) to hear the applications brought and argued before it.
It should be worthy of note, that the court will not just on its own perform or carryout the enforcement and/or execution processes just because the judgment was entered in that same court or in a court of coordinate jurisdiction. Therefore, an assiduous judgment creditor and his lawyer is expected to adopt any of the procedures explained above, that suits the type of judgment secured against the judgment debtor. In adopting the processes, the judgment creditor shall file the necessary application before the court and argue same. It is only when the court is satisfied with the submission put forward by the judgment creditor to demonstrate his entitlement in the reliefs granted, that the court will go ahead to act in the line with the laws the application was brought pursuant to.
However, where a Court is called upon to enforce its judgment or the judgment of another Court, the enforcing Court cannot blindly and sheepishly follow the dictates and interpretation of the judgment creditor or his counsel and enforce the judgment based on such dictates. Rather, it is the duty of the enforcing Court to enforce the terms of the judgment as expressed by the Court in its judgment. See IGBADOO & ANOR V. KEYSTONE BANK LTD, (2021) LPELR-52677(CA).
It is trite that an order for the enforcement of a valid judgment of a Court of law must address exactly what the judgment being enforced decided. The exact terms of the judgment cannot be varied and must be enforced in exactly the same terms as was determined. See IGBOKOYI V LAWAL (2013) LPELR-27.
Therefore, it is very succinct to state that the role and duty of the court in enforcing judgment is as contained in the above judicial pronouncements, which is for the court to act strictly in accordance with the contents of the judgment.
Secondly, the courts are empowered under the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, and under the various High Courts (Federal or States) Rules to entertain the applications filed by the judgment creditor as well as the judgment debtor. The court is duty bound to look at all the processes no matter how stupid the application may look. In law the failure by a Court which is under a duty to hear and determine every application before it no matter how frivolous it may be failed in its duty to render impartial and fair justice to the parties before it and such an unjust judgment reached in utter breach of the right to fair hearing of the Appellant or any party for that matter is a nullity and nothing valid or worth anything can come out from such a null judgment. See Ani V. Nna & Ors (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt.440) 101 @ p. 120.
CONCLUSION
Having regards to the above paper, it is correct to state that the role of the court is to determine applications brought before it by the judgment creditor for enforcement of judgment. In hearing and determining the applications, the court must be an unbiased umpire and act in accordance with the law and not emotions. It should be home in mind that a Court of law is expected to hold the scale of justice evenly as an unbiased umpire whose jurisdiction is to evaluate the evidence presented from both sides of the legal divide. See OGBULI & ANOR v. OGBULI & ANOR (2007) LPELR-8129(CA).
In concluding one can say that in the administration of justice a court cannot really enforce a judgment until it has officially made an order, a ruling or entered a judgment of the court and if the affected party refuses to obey then enforcement proceedings can be initiated against such a party. There are also enabling powers enshrined in the various enactments that ensure and empower the role of courts to enforce their judgments. In performing its role of enforcing judgments the courts also the jurisdiction to stipulate a time within which judgment, order or ruling is to be complied with.
There is a limitation period for enforcing courts’ judgments in Nigeria and it varies depending on the type of judgment and whether it’s a local or foreign judgment. In the case of local judgments it is twenty-four [24] months and in the case of foreign judgments it is twelve [12] months. However, under the provisions of the 2004 Act, a foreign judgment can be enforced at any time within six [6] years from the date it was delivered.
Courts play a vital role in the enforcement of judgments, orders, ruling and legal decisions by providing mechanisms for collection, ensuring compliance, overseeing the process, and resolving disputes that arise during enforcement. Their involvement is essential for maintaining the rule of law, protecting the rights of parties, the integrity of the legal system and ensuring that justice is served.
In summarizing, conflicting judgments could as is always the case; most of the time complicates judicial proceedings, including garnishee actions, requiring careful resolution through appeals and the application of legal doctrines. The Attorney-General plays a crucial role in representing the state’s interests, by providing legal advice, intervening when necessary, and ensuring that garnishee proceedings are conducted fairly and in accordance with the law. This role is essential in maintaining the rule of law, equity, the integrity of the judicial system and protecting public interest.
(Concluded).
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