Opinion
The Oracle: The NASS Cannot Amend the Constitution Through the Back Door
Published
4 years agoon
By
Eric
By Mike Ozekhome
In these trying times of our beleaguered Nation, the NASS should concentrate more on creatively making laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria. The recent amendment to the Electoral Act has caused too much needless national hoopla and ruckus. It ought not have been at the centre stage in a sane society. Is barring certain classes of persons from contesting elections simply because they are government appointees Nigeria’s bane at the moment? I think not.
Earlier, the NASS had, by its earlier proposed section 52(3) the amendment bill, sought to strip INEC of its control over elections and subject INEC to the control and supervision of the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) on the critical but sore issue of electronic voting and transmission of results.
This fatal step was later reluctantly reversed after Nigerians rose against it. I had spilled buckets of ink and made several television appearances, advocating to get it extirpated, root and branch, from the amendment bill. The NASS had ignored the fact that under section 158 of the 1999 Constitution, INEC “shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person”. They comfortably forgot that it is INEC and INEC alone that is responsible for organizing and supervising all elections to political offices; registering, monitoring of political parties; and conducting voter and civic education, including promotion of sound democratic processes. See also section 153 (f).
THE ALBATROS IN SECTION 84(12), (13) OF THE AMENDED ELECTORAL ACT
The NASS while amending the Electoral Act inserted subsections 12 and 13 into section 84 which, unlawfully, illegally and unconstitutionally disenfranchised serving political office holders from voting or being voted for at conventions or congresses of political parties. The offensive section 84(12) had provided thus:
“No political appointee at any level shall be voting delegate or to be voted for at the convention or congress of any political party for the purpose of the nomination of candidates for any election”.
Section 84 (13) drives this home, more pungently, thus:
“Where a political party fails to comply with the provisions of this Act in the conduct of its primaries, its candidate for the election shall not be included in the election for the particular position in issue”.
THE ALARMING OUSTER CLAUSE IN THE AMENDED ELECTORAL ACT
I am surprised that all the critics of the Federal High Court judgement in Umuahia delivered by the Honourable Justice Evelyn Anyadike have not adverted their minds to the more worrisome provision in section 84 (15), which, after granting the Federal High Court jurisdiction in section 84 (14), to entertain cases from “an aspirant who complains that the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party have not been complied with in selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court for redress”, went on to oust the jurisdiction of all courts on matters concerning primaries, thus:
“Nothing in this section shall empower the courts to stop the holding of primaries or general elections under this Act pending the determination of a suit”.
Interpreted in another way, section 84(15) is saying:
“Courts, please, allow political parties to first do maximum damage during their primaries and general elections, and subsequently entertain emerging suits thereafter after the wrong candidates would have emerged and after resources, time and energy would have been wasted by individuals, political parties, INEC and the electorate to conduct sham elections”. I am worried by this obnoxious ouster clause.
I believe that the above subsections are totally unconstitutional. They are ultra vires the powers of the NASS. What the NASS intended to do by subsections 12 and 13 of section 84 is to amend the Constitution through the backdoor, without going through the tortuous process prescribed in section 9 thereof; which deals with the mode of altering the provisions of the Constitution.
PRESIDENT BUHARI’S EARLIER OBJECTION
President Muhammadu Buhari had initially kicked and refused to assent to the Electoral Bill as initially amended by the NASS, which contained the above sub section. To escape from the avalanche of criticisms that trailed his initial withholding of assent, Buhari later reluctantly signed the Bill into Law; but with a caveat vide a letter to the NASS, to consider amending section 84(12) subsequently. He believed that subsection 84(12) imported into the Constitution extraneous matters such as blanket restriction and disqualification of political appointees who ought to be accorded protection. His argument is that a public officer could resign his office, withdraw or retire from service 30 days before the date of election in accordance with section 66(1) (f) of the 1999 Constitution. I think his handlers should have simply done an Executive amendment bill to the NASS; not a mere letter. But, I agree with his serious reservations about section 84(12).
WHY SECTION 84(12) AND (13) ARE OFFENSIVE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
QUALIFICATION AND DISQUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION
Sections 66 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution provide for circumstances under which certain public officers are qualified or disqualified from contesting for election.
QUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION
Let us start with sections 65 (1) and (2) and 106 of the Constitution which deal with qualification for election, as a member of Senate and House of Representatives; and House of Assembly respectively. See also sections 137(1) (g) and 182(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution.
These sections provide that such a person for Senate or House of Representatives or member House of Assembly of a state shall be qualified to contest election if he is a citizen of Nigeria and has attained the age of 35 years (30 years for a House of Representatives members; and 25 years for a House of Assembly member); is educated up to at least school certificate level or its equivalent; and he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party.
DISQUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION
By virtue of sections 66 (1) and 107 (1) respectively any of the above the Constitution, persons also is disqualified if he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a country other than Nigeria; adjudged to be a lunatic or a person of unsound mind; is under a sentence of death, imposed on him by a court of competent jurisdiction; or a sentence of imprisonment or fine involving dishonesty or fraud. Such a person is also not qualified if he is an undischarged bankrupt; is a member of any secret society; or he has presented a forged certificate to INEC.
The most critical subsection for our discussion here, is section 66(1) (f) which provides that if such a person is employed in the “Public service of the Federation” or “Public service of a state” and has not resigned, withdrawn or retired from such employment THIRTY DAYS before the date of election for a State, he shall be disqualified from contesting or being voted for.
Sections 107 (1), 147 (4) and 192(3) deal with offices of ministers of the Government of the Federation and Commissioners in a state, respectively. A minister or Commissioner shall be deemed to have “resigned” his membership of the National Assembly or a state House of Assembly upon taking the Oath of office as a minister or Commissioner.
THE EXTANT LAWS
It is therefore clear, per adventure, that aside the circumscribing and inhibiting factors restricting a public appointee from contesting offices as described above, section 84 (12) and 13 are unconstitutional, illegal, null, void and of no effect whatsoever in so far as they import other extraneous disqualifying factors not provided for or envisaged by the Constitution. The NASS cannot import into the Constitution other additional disqualifying factors.
SECTION 84(12) & (13) ALSO CONTRAVENE SECTIONS 40 AND 42 OF THE CONSTITUTION
Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution grants every Nigerian the right to assemble and associate freely with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interests. See Motorcycle Transport Union of Nigeria & ors vs. Delta state Motorcyclist Assoc & ors (2010) LPELR 4503 (CA); Lafia LG vs. Executive Governor Nassarawa state & Ors (2012) LPELR 20602 (SC).
In addition to the above, section 42 accords every Nigerian the right to freedom from discrimination. See Okafor & ors vs Ntoka (2017) LPELR – 42794 (CA); NMCN vs Adesina (2016) LPELR – 40610 (CA) The question is, why will any Nigerian be prevented or barred from being “a voting delegate or to be voted for at the convention or Congress of any political party for the nomination of candidates for any election” when the Constitution (the supreme law) has exhaustively outlined factors barring a person from contesting?
SECTIONS 84 AND 318 OF THE CONSTITUTION CONSIDERED
Section 66(1) (8) only provides for “public service” of the federation or the “public service of a state”. Do political appointees such as ministers, commissioners and personal aids qualify to be protected by these sections. I believe so.
Some people have argued that it is only public servants envisaged in section 84 and as defined in section 318 of the Constitution that are covered by the 30 days resignation notice. Political Appointees who hold offices at the pleasure of their appointor are not public servants within the meaning and intendment of sections 84 and 318 of the Constitution, they pontificate.
Specifically, the Court of Appeal in ONI v. FAYEMI & ORS (2019) LPELR-46622(CA) held that:
“A Minister, being a mere political appointee, cannot be regarded as an employee in the Public Service of the Federation and is consequently not constitutionally caught by the 30 days resignation rule imposed on employees in the Public Service”.
See also the following apposite cases:
Wilson v. Ag, Bendel state & Ors. (1985) LPELR-3496 (SC); PPA v. PDP & ORS (2009) LPELR-4865(CA); Shitta-Bey v. AG Federation & Anor (1995) LPELR-3055 (SC); Abubakar v. The Executive Governor, Gombe state & Ors (2002) LPELR-1124 (CA); MILITARY GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE V. ADEWUNMI (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 82) 280; Ojukwu v. Yar’ Adua (2008) 4NWLR (Pt. 1078/435; AG BENDEL STATE V. AIDEYAN (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 118) 646; ADAMU V. TAKORI (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt 540) 1387 (CA).
I earnestly believe the attention of these courts was NEVER specifically drawn to the definition of “Public Service of the Federation” and “Public Service of a State”. The definition of “Public Service” of the Federation means the service of the Federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation and includes…….”. The definition of “Public Service of the State” means the service of the State “in any capacity in respect of the Government of the state and includes service as …..”.
Thus, in both cases, the clause “any capacity” is used for both the Federal and State governments. Can anyone plausably argue that ministers, commissioners and other appointees of Mr president or a Governor of a State who draw their salaries, allowances and other perquisites of office from the Federal or State treasury are not engaged in “any capacity” in “respect of the Government of the Federation and State Government”? The other offices lined up in this interpretation section of 318 are merely in addition to, as the section specifically states that the specie of public officers outlined therein is merely in addition to those employed in “any capacity” in both the Federal and state Governments. (To be continued next week)
THE WORLD WE LIVE IN
“If you want to achieve something, you have to forget the boundaries that people create. No one knows your capabilities more than you” – (Anonymous).
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
“The illegal we do immediately. The unconstitutional takes a little longer.” (Henry Kissinger).
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Opinion
Kano Deputy Governorship: Why Murtala Sule Garo is Most Deserving
Published
12 hours agoon
April 21, 2026By
Eric
By Abdullahi Sa’idu Baba (Hafizi)
One of the defining slogans of the Governor of Kano State is “Kano First,” a principle that emphasizes prioritizing the collective interest, development, and unity of Kano State above all else. In line with this vision, Hon. Murtala Sule Garo stands out as the most suitable candidate for the position of Deputy Governor. His track record reflects a history of diligent and selfless service to Kano State, marked by consistent dedication to grassroots development and people-oriented governance. Over the years, he has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to advancing the welfare of the people, making him a natural fit for a leadership role that demands loyalty, competence, and a deep understanding of Kano’s needs.
Throughout his time in office, Garo distinguished himself through people-oriented policies and impactful empowerment initiatives. He became widely known for implementing large-scale programs that directly improved the livelihoods of youth and women across Kano State. Thousands benefited from his initiatives, which included financial support, business tools, and opportunities for economic independence. These efforts not only reduced poverty at the grassroots level but also demonstrated his belief in inclusive governance ensuring that the dividends of democracy reach even the most remote communities. His approach earned him recognition as a leader who “takes government to the people,” a rare quality that continues to endear him to the masses.
Beyond empowerment, Garo’s leadership style is defined by accessibility, generosity, and responsiveness. He has consistently been described as a “man of the people,” someone who listens, engages, and responds without bias. His political strength lies in his deep-rooted connection with communities across Kano, where he has built trust over the years through direct engagement and consistent support. This grassroots network has become one of his greatest political assets, positioning him as a unifying figure capable of mobilizing support across different demographics and political divides.
In the evolving political landscape of Kano State, Murtala Sule Garo has emerged as a leading and widely endorsed candidate for the position of Deputy Governor. Recent political development shows that he enjoys overwhelming support not only from key stakeholders within the APC, but also from the generality of the grassroots Kano electorate, reflecting not only his political relevance but also the confidence party leaders and stakeholders have in his experience, loyalty, and leadership capacity.
Garo’s suitability for the role of Deputy Governor is further strengthened by his extensive experience in governance and party administration. Having served in multiple strategic positions, including organising roles, advisory capacities, and two consecutive terms as commissioner, he possesses both institutional knowledge and practical governance skills. His ability to navigate complex political structures while maintaining strong grassroots support makes him uniquely positioned to complement executive leadership and ensure stability in governance.
Looking ahead to future elections, Murtala Sule Garo’s political capacity remains one of his strongest advantages. He is widely regarded as a mobilizer who can energize the electorate, increase voter participation, and strengthen party unity. His influence at the ward and local government levels provides a strategic advantage for any administration he is part of, as he can effectively translate political goodwill into electoral success. Observers believe that his inclusion in leadership would not only consolidate party structures but also enhance governance outcomes through effective implementation of policies at the grassroots level.
Moreover, Garo represents a bridge between experience and youthful dynamism. His understanding of both traditional political structures and modern governance demands positions him as a forward-thinking leader capable of contributing meaningfully to Kano’s development agenda. His inclusive approach, engaging traditional rulers, youth groups, and stakeholders, suggests that he can foster a sense of collective ownership in governance, which is essential for sustainable development.
In conclusion, Hon. Murtala Sule Garo embodies the qualities of a competent administrator, a grassroots mobilizer, and a unifying political figure. His track record of service, empowerment, and community engagement presents a compelling case for his emergence as the next Deputy Governor of Kano State. With his proven ability to deliver results and connect with the people, he stands not only as a suitable candidate but as a strategic asset capable of driving progress, stability, and inclusive governance in Kano State’s future.
Abdullahi Sa’idu Baba (Hafizi) writes from Kano, and can be reached via Hafeeezsb@gmail.com
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Opinion
2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise
Published
4 days agoon
April 18, 2026By
Eric
By Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba
To be candid and straightforward, this article is written to sensitize Nigerians to the growing smear campaign against Atiku Abubakar, a campaign of calumny that appears less about national interest and more about political anxiety. The persistence and intensity of these attacks suggest one thing: there are powerful interests who see him not merely as a contender, but as a genuine threat. Yet, Nigerians are no longer easily distracted. The electorate is becoming more discerning, more interested in good governance.
Closely tied to this is the urgency of the 2027 presidential election. This is not just another electoral cycle, it may well represent a turning point in Nigeria’s history. Although Atiku Abubakar has confirmed 2027 to be his last presidential outing. That reality alone elevates the stakes. It presents Nigeria with a stark choice: to either harness a reservoir of experience at a critical moment or risk drifting further into uncertainty. In clear terms, 2027 is not just about political succession, it is about whether Nigeria recalibrates its direction or continues along a path of deepening national challenges.
The fundamental truth is that, experience and effective leadership are positively correlated, independent of age. Leadership in a complex state like Nigeria requires far more than youthful enthusiasm. It demands institutional memory, policy depth, negotiation skills, and the ability to manage crises with precision. It is therefore misguided to reduce leadership capability to age alone. Age neither guarantees competence nor invalidates it. Across the world, both young and elderly leaders have failed when they lacked the depth of experience required for governance. In Nigeria itself, recent experience with president Tinubu shows that leadership failure cannot be attributed to age alone. This underscores a critical point: the true dividing line between success and failure in leadership is not age, it is experience, particularly practical and relevant experience, which is too often overlooked.
Global political trends reinforce this reality. In the United States, voters returned Donald Trump to power over Kamala Harris, reflecting a preference for perceived experience over age. Figures such as Bernie Sanders remain influential well into their later years, shaping national discourse. Similarly, in Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected again at an advanced age because voters trusted his tested capacity to lead during difficult times. A similar pattern recently played out in West Africa. In Liberia, the younger incumbent George Weah was defeated by the significantly older Joseph Boakai. That outcome was widely interpreted as a preference by Liberians for experience and not youthful appeal. These examples are not coincidences. They illustrate a consistent global pattern that when nations face uncertainty, they turn to experience. Nigeria must not waste the experience of Atiku Abubakar like it happened with remarkable figures like Obafemi Awolowo, Chief MKO Abiola and Malam Aminu Kano in the past.
Beyond the question of age lies another critical issue: political strategy. The debate over who should carry the opposition banner in 2027 must be guided by political reality. Nigeria’s recent history makes this abundantly clear. When Goodluck Jonathan sought re-election, the opposition were less influenced by sentiment. Instead, they made a strategic calculation, searching for a candidate with national reach and electoral strength, an idea that birthed Muhammadu Buhari as the opposition candidate, despite his previous electoral defeats.
It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument that Atiku Abubakar should be excluded on the basis that he has contested before. By that same reasoning, Buhari would never have emerged as a viable candidate. Political persistence is not a weakness; it is often a reflection of conviction, resilience, and determination. Elections are not won by novelty alone, they are won by structure, experience, and the ability to connect with a broad electorate.
Equally unconvincing is the argument that 2027 should be determined by zoning or that it is “still the turn of the South.” If the opposition is serious about unseating president Tinubu, it must prioritize a candidate with the experience, national appeal, and political structure required to achieve that goal. Atiku Abubakar is therefore the “asset” of the today. His eight years as Vice President under Olusegun Obasanjo provided him with deep exposure to governance, economic reform, and institutional development. Beyond public office, he is widely recognized as a seasoned politician and an established businessman with independent wealth, an important factor in a political environment often clouded by concerns about misuse of public resources.
Interestingly, it’s increasingly clear that Nigerians are moving beyond superficial narratives. The electorate is more focused on outcomes, on who can stabilize the economy, strengthen institutions, and restore confidence in governance. The conversation is shifting from age to ability, from rhetoric to results.
As 2027 approaches, the choice before Nigeria is becoming clearer. This is not a contest of personalities or a debate about generational symbolism. It is a question of capacity, preparedness, and national survival. History, both global and local, points in one direction: when experience is sidelined, nations pay the price.
Nigeria cannot afford that mistake again…
Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba writes from Kano, and can be reached via drssbaba@yahoo.com
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Opinion
Leadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security
Published
4 days agoon
April 18, 2026By
Eric
By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD
“Security is not built by arms alone, but by the quality of leadership that turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and divergent interests into common purpose.” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD
Abstract
In an era of complex transnational threats, effective regional and continental security hinges less on military capabilities or institutional frameworks and more on the quality of leadership. This article explores how visionary, adaptive, ethical, and inclusive leadership serves as the critical catalyst for transforming shared vulnerabilities into collective strength. Through in-depth case studies of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside comparative insights from the European Union and ASEAN, it demonstrates that leadership determines whether security protocols remain aspirational or deliver tangible protection. The analysis highlights both successes and limitations, identifying key attributes of effective security leadership: strategic foresight, consensus-building, institutional coordination, and accountability. Ultimately, the article argues that investing in high-calibre leadership at every level is essential for building resilient, people-centred security systems capable of addressing contemporary challenges and contributing to a more stable global order.
Introduction
Effective regional and continental security depends far more on leadership than on military hardware, intelligence capabilities, or financial resources alone. Leadership supplies the vision, political will, strategic coherence, ethical foundation, and sustained commitment required to transform fragmented national efforts into unified, sustainable security outcomes. In an era marked by transnational threats — terrorism, organised crime, climate-induced conflicts, cyber vulnerabilities, irregular migration, and hybrid warfare — the quality of leadership at regional and continental levels determines whether security architectures deliver genuine protection or remain aspirational documents on paper.
The Indispensable Role of Leadership in Regional and Continental Security
Leadership in security contexts operates across multiple interconnected layers. At the strategic level, it involves setting a long-term vision that anticipates emerging threats and aligns collective resources before crises escalate. At the operational level, it demands the ability to coordinate institutions, mobilise resources, and execute joint actions efficiently. At the relational level, it requires building and maintaining trust among sovereign states with often competing interests, historical grievances, and differing priorities.
Effective leaders in this domain exhibit several critical attributes. They demonstrate visionary foresight, the capacity to read complex geopolitical and socio-economic trends and translate them into proactive strategies. They exercise adaptive decision-making, adjusting approaches as threats evolve while preserving core principles. They practise inclusive diplomacy, forging consensus without compromising sovereignty. Above all, they uphold ethical integrity and accountability, ensuring that security measures respect human rights and maintain public legitimacy. Without these qualities, even the most sophisticated security protocols risk becoming ineffective or counterproductive.
ECOWAS in West Africa: Leadership-Driven Collective Security
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975 primarily as an economic integration body, has evolved into one of Africa’s most sophisticated and tested regional security mechanisms. This transformation was not inevitable but resulted from deliberate, courageous, and often pragmatic leadership in response to existential threats that threatened to engulf the entire sub-region.
The pivotal moment came in the early 1990s when Liberia descended into a devastating civil war. Faced with the risk of regional contagion, ECOWAS leaders, particularly Nigeria’s General Ibrahim Babangida and Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, took the unprecedented step of creating the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 — Africa’s first sub-regional peacekeeping force. This was a bold departure from the Organisation of African Unity’s strict non-interference policy. ECOMOG’s interventions in Liberia (1990–1997) and Sierra Leone (1997–2000) prevented state collapse, contained the spread of conflict, and created political space for negotiated settlements and eventual democratic transitions.
Leadership played a pivotal role in these outcomes. Nigerian leadership provided the bulk of troops and financial resources, while Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings offered critical diplomatic backing. The willingness of several heads of state to commit substantial national resources despite domestic criticism demonstrated a rare form of collective political will. These interventions also led to important institutional developments, including the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and later the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).
In more recent years, ECOWAS leadership has continued to evolve. During the 2010–2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS applied sustained diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force, contributing significantly to the eventual restoration of constitutional order. In response to the rise of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, ECOWAS has strengthened intelligence sharing, supported the Multinational Joint Task Force, and promoted greater coordination among affected states. The organisation has also demonstrated its preventive diplomacy capacity in The Gambia (2016–2017), where firm but measured leadership helped resolve a dangerous post-election standoff without large-scale violence, and in Guinea (2021), where it applied sanctions and mediation to encourage return to constitutional rule.
Yet ECOWAS leadership has also encountered significant limitations. Divergent national interests, chronic funding shortfalls, and occasional leadership vacuums have sometimes slowed or complicated responses. The recent wave of military coups and political transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger (2021–2023) tested the organisation’s cohesion and exposed the challenge of enforcing normative standards when powerful member states resist collective decisions. These episodes underscore a recurring truth: regional security leadership is only as strong as the political commitment and institutional capacity behind it.
Despite these challenges, ECOWAS remains one of the most advanced regional security mechanisms on the continent. Its evolution from an economic community to a security actor demonstrates how visionary leadership, combined with institutional innovation and political will, can enable a regional organisation to respond effectively to complex security threats. The ECOWAS experience offers enduring lessons: effective regional security leadership must be proactive rather than reactive, adaptive to new threats, inclusive of multiple stakeholders, and continuously reinforced through institutional reform and sustained political will.
African Union’s Continental Leadership: The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has emerged as a central actor in shaping Africa’s security landscape through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Established following the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, APSA represents a fundamental shift in African leadership philosophy — moving from the OAU’s rigid doctrine of non-interference to the AU’s principle of “non-indifference” when grave circumstances threaten peace and stability.
The architecture comprises five key pillars: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund. This comprehensive framework was designed to enable Africa to take primary responsibility for its own peace and security rather than relying predominantly on external actors.
Leadership has been the critical variable in APSA’s performance. The decision by African heads of state to create the Peace and Security Council marked a bold act of continental leadership, giving the AU authority to authorise interventions in cases of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. One of the most visible demonstrations of this leadership was the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched in 2007. Despite enormous challenges, AMISOM — later reconfigured as the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) — helped degrade Al-Shabaab’s control over large parts of the country and created space for political processes and state-building. This mission showcased the AU’s willingness to deploy troops and sustain long-term engagement where international partners were initially hesitant.
Another significant example is the AU’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Darfur (Sudan), South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Lake Chad Basin. In each case, the effectiveness of AU leadership depended heavily on the political will and diplomatic skill of key member states, the AU Commission Chairperson, and the Peace and Security Council. The AU’s successful facilitation of the 2019 political transition in Sudan and its ongoing mediation efforts in multiple conflict zones further illustrate how continental leadership can create pathways for dialogue when national institutions falter.
However, the AU’s leadership has also encountered notable limitations. Funding shortages, logistical constraints, and sometimes divergent interests among member states have hampered rapid and decisive action. The 2011 Libya intervention exposed deep divisions within the AU, while recent political transitions and coups in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea) have tested the Union’s ability to enforce its normative frameworks consistently. These experiences reveal that continental leadership remains vulnerable to the sovereignty concerns of member states and the challenge of translating political consensus into operational effectiveness.
Despite these constraints, the AU has made important strides in institutionalising leadership for peace and security. The adoption of the African Union Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030 and the ongoing efforts to fully operationalise the African Standby Force reflect a long-term strategic vision. The Union has also strengthened its partnership with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, recognising that effective continental security requires layered leadership — with RECs often acting as first responders and the AU providing strategic oversight and legitimacy.
The African Union’s journey demonstrates both the immense potential and the inherent difficulties of continental leadership in security matters. When leadership is bold, united, and well-resourced, the AU can play a transformative role in preventing conflict, managing crises, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. When leadership is fragmented or under-resourced, progress slows and opportunities for timely intervention are lost.
SADC Regional Interventions: Leadership, Solidarity, and the Limits of Collective Action
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) offers a distinct model of regional security leadership shaped by its historical struggle against apartheid and a strong emphasis on sovereignty and consensus. Originally formed in 1980 to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, SADC has gradually expanded its security role through the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.
SADC’s most prominent military intervention occurred in 1998 in Lesotho. Following a disputed election and political violence, South Africa and Botswana, acting under SADC authority, launched Operation Boleas to restore order and facilitate new elections. While the intervention achieved its immediate objectives, it was criticised for limited consultation with other SADC members and for being perceived as South African dominance rather than genuine collective action. This episode highlighted both the potential and the sensitivities of SADC leadership in security matters.
A more sustained and complex engagement has been SADC’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 2013, SADC has supported the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Comprising troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, the FIB was mandated to conduct offensive operations against armed groups. South African leadership was instrumental in pushing for the creation of the FIB, reflecting Pretoria’s strategic interest in stabilising the Great Lakes region. The intervention has had mixed results: it helped degrade some armed groups but has struggled with the sheer complexity of conflict dynamics, resource constraints, and the challenge of addressing root causes such as governance failures and illicit resource exploitation.
More recently, in 2021, SADC deployed the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to address the escalating insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. The mission, led by South African forces with contributions from several member states, aimed to support the Mozambican government in restoring security and protecting civilians. Leadership from South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania was critical in mobilising rapid deployment. While SAMIM has contributed to the degradation of insurgent capabilities and the protection of key economic installations, challenges remain, including coordination with Rwandan forces operating in the same theatre and the need for a stronger focus on addressing underlying socio-economic grievances.
SADC’s security interventions reveal a distinct leadership pattern dominated by a few influential member states, particularly South Africa. This “hegemonic leadership” model has enabled action when consensus is difficult to achieve but has also generated resentment among smaller states wary of South African dominance. Zimbabwe and Angola have also played significant roles in specific contexts, while smaller states have contributed troops and political legitimacy.
The consensus-based decision-making culture within SADC has been both a strength and a limitation. It ensures broad buy-in when agreement is reached, but it can lead to slow or diluted responses when member states have divergent interests. The principle of “quiet diplomacy” has often prioritised political dialogue over forceful intervention, sometimes delaying decisive action.
SADC interventions have achieved notable successes. They have prevented state collapse in Lesotho, contributed to stabilisation efforts in the DRC, and helped contain the Cabo Delgado insurgency. The organisation has also developed important normative frameworks, including the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and mechanisms for electoral observation and conflict prevention.
However, limitations are equally evident. Funding remains chronically inadequate, often forcing reliance on external partners or lead nations. Logistical challenges, interoperability issues among national forces, and uneven political commitment have constrained operational effectiveness. Critics argue that SADC’s responses have sometimes prioritised regime security over human security, particularly in cases involving member states’ internal political crises.
The SADC experience underscores several important lessons about regional security leadership. First, hegemonic leadership can enable rapid action but risks undermining legitimacy and long-term cohesion. Second, consensus-based systems require strong mediation and facilitation skills to convert agreement into effective implementation. Third, sustainable security leadership must address both immediate threats and underlying structural drivers such as poverty, inequality, and governance deficits. Finally, SADC’s trajectory shows that regional organisations can play meaningful security roles even without a single dominant power, provided there is sufficient political will and institutional adaptability.
Comparative Insights from Other Regions
Global experiences reinforce these lessons. The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has succeeded largely because of consistent institutional leadership and shared norms among member states, enabling joint missions and rapid response capabilities. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s consensus-based leadership model has helped maintain stability amid complex geopolitical tensions, although it has occasionally been criticised for slower decision-making. These cases confirm that effective regional security leadership requires a delicate balance between respect for sovereignty and the courage to pursue collective action.
Persistent Challenges and Pathways Forward
Leadership in regional and continental security faces recurring obstacles: divergent national interests, resource constraints, weak institutional capacity, and external interference. Political transitions and electoral cycles can disrupt continuity, while hybrid threats demand leaders capable of integrating diverse tools and actors.
To build more effective security leadership, regional and continental organisations must invest deliberately in leadership development. This includes targeted programmes that cultivate strategic foresight, ethical governance, collaborative skills, and crisis management capabilities. Institutional mechanisms should be designed to ensure policy continuity beyond changes in individual leaders. Greater inclusion of civil society, youth, and women in security decision-making can enhance legitimacy and broaden perspectives. Finally, partnerships with global actors should be pursued in ways that preserve African agency and ownership.
Conclusion
Leadership remains the single most decisive factor in regional and continental security. It is the invisible bridge that transforms fragile agreements into enduring peace, turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and converts divergent national interests into a common purpose. The experiences of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union across the continent, and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside valuable lessons from Europe and Southeast Asia, consistently demonstrate one fundamental truth: even the most sophisticated security architectures will falter without visionary, ethical, and collaborative leadership.
In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, where threats respect no borders, the quality of leadership at every level — from heads of state to technical experts within regional commissions — will ultimately determine whether Africa and other regions merely survive successive crises or rise to build lasting stability and prosperity.
The challenge before current and future leaders is clear: to move beyond rhetoric and embrace the difficult work of forging unity, exercising foresight, upholding accountability, and investing in people-centred security solutions. Those who answer this call will not only secure their nations and regions but will also leave a legacy of peace that benefits generations yet unborn and contributes meaningfully to a more stable global order.
True security is not built by arms alone. It is built by leadership that dares to imagine, unite, and act for the common good.
Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.com, globalstageimpacts@gmail.com
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