The Oracle
The Oracle: Natasha’s Recall, NJC’s Code of Conduct/Judicial Discipline Regulations – Matters Arising
Published
1 year agoon
By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
The dramatic on/off attempt to recall the Senator representing Kogi central Senatorial District in the National Assembly has focused public attention on that hitherto obscure and seldom used process. While the public has been regaled (if not quite transfixed) with the apparently determined and desperate attempt by her supposed constituents to recall her (and her equally robust push-back), the body at the centre of it all – the electoral umpire – has been no less up-to-the-job with its prompt assessments and verdicts (so far, in her favour). INEC roundly rejected the recall process on the ground that it has not met the constitutional requirements of section 69(a) of the 1999 Constitution.
However, what few observers have noticed (much less commented on) is the legal framework which underpins the entire process – INEC’s Guidelines for Recalling Members of the National and State Houses of Assembly, 2024. I will get to the details shortly, but it is quite interesting that a similar handicap, in my opinion, afflicts an even more sensitive regulatory document, the NJC’s (National Judiciary Council) Regulations for the Discipline of Judicial Officers. I believe both documents are potentially problematic for the following reasons, starting with that of INEC as aforesaid.
INEC’S RECALL GUIDELINES, 2024
This would-be sledgehammer which Senator Natasha’s traducers sought to deploy for her removal is expressed on its face to have been made by INEC pursuant to Sections 69, 110 and 160 of the Constitution, Sections 2(c) and 113 of the Electoral Act, 2022, “and all other powers enabling it in that behalf”. At its foot (its conclusion), it bears the signature of Prof. Mahmood Yakubu, INEC’s Chairman. Therein, in my view, lies the problem. This is because, an enactment which is supposedly made by a multi-member body cannot validly be endorsed or executed by only one of them – without an express authorization to that effect. Administrative bodies must act within the scope of their statutory powers and follow administrative due process. See the cases of Ajiboye V. Attorney-General of the Federation (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 345) 765 and Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40.
The relevant law is Section 27(2) of the Interpretation Act, which provides that where a body established by an enactment comprises three or more persons and is empowered to make subsidiary instruments, for any such instrument to be valid, it should be “executed under the hand of any two of the members thereof as may be authorized by such body generally for that purpose or specially or any particular occasion”.
Now, by virtue of Paragraph 14(1) of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, INEC consists of a Chairman and twelve members (called “National Electoral Commissioners”). Section 148 of the Electoral Act, 2022 empowers INEC to make regulations, guidelines or manuals for the purpose of giving effect to the Act. Even though Section 147 of the Act empowers the Commission to delegate “any of its powers and functions to any National Electoral Commissioner, Resident Electoral Commissioner, electoral officer, or any other officer of the Commission or any other officer appointed under the provisions of (the) Act,” curiously, not only are the Guidelines themselves not expressed to have been made pursuant to the aforesaid provisions of Section 148 of the Electoral Act, more importantly, they are silent on any delegation of the power to enact them by the Commission to its Chairman, as contemplated by Section 147 of the Electoral Act.
The implication of this defect is glaring: the Recall Guidelines are ultra vires the sole executor thereof, INEC’s Chairman, because by virtue of the aforesaid combined provisions of Section 27(2) of the Interpretation Act and Paragraph 14(b) of the Third Schedule to the Constitution, they should have borne the imprimatur (been “executed under the hand”) of at least two of INEC’s Commissioners or officers. There are limits to statutory and constitutional powers due to the supremacy of due process over the ultra vires acts of public officers. See the cases of Attorney-General of Lagos State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 833)1 and Minister of Internal Affairs v. Shugaba Darman (1982) 3 NCLR 915. This ought to have completely put paid to Senator Natasha’s entire recall saga, and forcing INEC to go back to the drawing-board. This remains to be seen, of course. The “wahala” of reviewing without supposed ballot papers of recall. The law might yet hand her a technical victory – seemingly without firing a shot.
NJC’S JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REGULATIONS 2017
This document appears to be even more problematic than INEC’s Guidelines. How is that so? This is so because even though the Regulations were expressly made by the NJC on the 9th day of March, 2017, there is nothing on their face to indicate to suggest that they were executed by any officer of that distinguished body of Jurists – not even the Honourable Chief Justice of Nigeria who is its head by virtue of Paragraph 20(1) of the 3rd Schedule of the 1999 Constitution. The same paragraph provides that the NJC consists of twenty-three members.
Indeed, similar provisions in Section 27(2) of the Interpretation Act prescribe that the NJC Regulations ought to bear the imprimatur of at least two of its members. Its failure in this regard, with the greatest respect, is even worse because I am not aware of any provision – similar to those of Section 147 of the Electoral Act, 2022 – which empowers the Council to delegate any, some or all its powers (especially of enacting subsidiary instruments such as the Regulations) to any of its members (presumably the Hon. CJN). This lacuna is too obvious to be over-emphasized – much less overlooked. It should be squarely addressed by concerned authorities.
RULES OF EVIDENCE
Beyond the foregoing fatal structural defect, a fundamentally more worrisome aspect of the NJC Regulations, in my humble view, are the provisions of Regulation 21(3) thereof which stipulate that the rules of evidence do not apply to the Investigating Committee’s hearings. This provision is curious, to say the least, given that the Regulations are meant to guide an investigation into judicial misconduct – to probe allegations of ethical violations and malfeasance against judicial officers who, by their very calling, are trained to apply (and have been applying virtually throughout their entire careers) the rules of evidence codified in the Evidence Act, 2011.
This provision is problematic because by virtue of the provisions of Item 23 of the Exclusive Legislative List of the Constitution, only the National Assembly is competent to legislate on evidence. See the case of AG Abia State v. AG Federation (2002) LPELR-611 (SC). That being the case, the broader question becomes whether the other evidence-related provisions of the NJC’s said Regulations – namely Regulation 21(2), (4), (5), (7) and (8) might legitimately come under scrutiny. They stipulate as follows:-
<span;><span;>- (2): “All testimony taken at the hearing shall be given under oath or affirmation and recorded”;
<span;><span;>- (4): “The complainant shall be given an opportunity to produce evidence and call witnesses”;
<span;><span;>- (5): “At any hearing of the Investigating Committee, the subject judge has the right to present evidence, to compel the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of witnesses and to cross examine, in person or by Counsel, Committee Witness”;
<span;><span;>- (7): “The Investigating Committee may take oral evidence if it considers it necessary to do so”;
<span;><span;>- (8): “The Investigating Committee must arrange for any evidence given orally to be recorded in a transcript or by electronic recording”.
The significance of the foregoing is underscored by the fact that the NJC is not one of the bodies which are specifically excluded from the application of the Evidence Act, 2011, under the provisions of Section 256 of the Evidence Act. The maxim is expresso uniu est exclusio alterius (the express mention of a thing in a statute implies the exclusion of others which otherwise might be included). See P.H.C.S. LTD VS MIGFO LTD. (2012) All FWLR Pt. 642 pg. 1615.
I humbly submit that the foregoing view is buttressed by Item 68 of the Exclusive Legislative List of the Constitution which stipulate that the power of the National Assembly to legislate on the substantive subject matters of the preceding Items (1-67) in that List includes “any matter incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere in (the) List.”
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PUBLIC AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Yet, another interesting issue is the Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers 2016. Is the fact that it appears to be co-extensive with the Code of Conduct for Public Officers under the Constitution in the Fifth Schedule thereof anomalous in any way?. Has the Constitution covered the field or can the more detailed and specific provisions of the latter co-exist with it? Is enacting a Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers among the powers donated to the NJC under Paragraph 21 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution? That is the question.
This issue is somewhat topical given the ongoing story about the propriety of the chairmanship of the Board of Trustees of the IBB golf club, Abuja, by the President of the Court of Appeal. Given the provisions of Rule 9.3 of the said Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers 2016 which expressly permits judicial officers to join sporting organisations. One wonders whether Hon. Justice Monica Dongban-Mensem breaches any Code of Conduct to so act. I very doubt if the Code of Conduct for Public Officers under the Constitution bans such engagements. Although she may be on sure footing, to so act, this must be subjected to public perception of the Head of the Intermediate Court intermingling with the hordes of politicians that daily patronize the Golf Club. And perception is invariably reality. With Justice Emeka Nwite’s restraining order against her and others from being nominated and presented pending the determination of the Originating suit – the many peels of the onions are just unfolding.
In all, the non-endorsement of the foregoing vital regulatory instruments (including the Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers) in the manner required by law might make them vulnerable to challenge by ambitious counsel and litigants who might fall back on such complaints in the absence of more fundamental objections or defences. Let those in charge of amendments to these laws do the needful immediately.
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The Oracle
The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 4)
Published
1 month agoon
May 22, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
In our last discourse on this series, we examined the procedure for enforcement of fundamental rights, including applications for leave; as well as the substantive application itself and the reactions that follow. Today, we shall continues from where we stopped with the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto and later x-ray the applications to squash proceedings; applications for production and/or release of persons restrained; orders for bail, production and access to medication. Please read on.
SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS (Continues)
In the case of LAWRENCE OLUSEGUN ADEYEMO V. C.O.P, OYO STATE ([2021] LPELR-56272(CA)), the applicant requested the court for a writ of habeas corpus under order 2 of the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) rules 1979 which provision enjoined the applicant to serve all parties who are or might be interested in the proceedings. Although the affected party had put up appearance, but raised a preliminary objection to the application for non-compliance with the statutory conditions. Babalakin. J. (as he then was) struck out the application on the ground that order 2(1)(4) is mandatory whether the application is for mandamus, certiorari, or habeas corpus.
However the Supreme Court in recent times in respect of the fundamental rights enforcements has favourably leaned towards the equitable principle of “Ubi Jus Ubi remedium”, therefore looking more at the substance rather than the form. Hence the liberalization of the procedure for the enforcement of fundamental rights as exposed in the case of ABACHA V. FAWEHINMI ((2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228) and UBI UJONG INAH & ORS V. MARCUS UKOI ((2001) (CA) 41981.
APPLICATION TO QUASH ANY PROCEEDINGS
Sometimes it may be necessary for an applicant by way of certiorari to apply to the court for an order that such proceedings be removed from a particular court or tribunal to another court for the purpose of being quashed for lack of power and/or jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings or make such order.
However, an applicant shall not be able to question the validity of any order, warrant, commitment, conviction, inquisition or record unless before the hearing of his application (Motion or summons), he has served a certified copy (CTC) thereof together with a Copy of the application on the Attorney-General of the Federation or of the State in which the applicant is being heard (as the case may be).
The court in granting an application seeking to quash proceedings, shall direct that the order, proceedings, conviction or the records of an inquisition be quashed forthwith upon being removed into the court hearing the application.
APPLICATION FOR PRODUCTION AND/OR RELEASE OF PERSON RESTRAINED
By virtue of Order 4 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court or judge to whom the application is made ex-parte may make an order forthwith for his release from such detention.
The court may also direct that an originating summons (as in form 2) be issued or that an application therefore be made by notice of motion (as in form 3). The court may also as it deem fit adjourn the ex-parte application so that notice thereof may be given to the person against whom the order for the release of the applicant is sought.
ORDER FOR BAIL, PRODUCTION, AND ACCESS TO MEDICATION
Pursuant to order 4 of the bail application, the court upon application may grant to the detainee reliefs including bail, production of the detainee, access to mediation etc.
The court may grant bail at ex-parte stage, pending the substantive application. Where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court may subject to its discretion order that the person restrained be produced in court. And where such order is so made, it shall constitute a sufficient warrant to any superintendent of a prison, police officer in charge of a police station, police officer in charge of the complainant or any other person responsible for his detention, to produce or ensure the production of the person so restrained or detained in court.
For the purpose of enforcing a person’s fundamental rights, no matter where a detainee is kept he can be allowed access to his personal physician or medically prescribed drugs.
It suffices to note here, that once an order has been made by the court pursuant to the Enforcement Rules, and for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights provided for in the constitution, such order must be complied with. Failure to obey or comply with any order so made by the court under these rules will incur proceedings for the committal of the party disobeying such an order.
CONCLUSION
Without any controversy, the idea of human rights and personal liberties has become firm and secured. The universality and immutability of human rights are now globally accepted. Consequently, any nation that slacks or shyies away from the diligent protection and enforcement of human rights stand the precarious risk of being shunned by decent and civilised nations. The United Nations seems to have captured the importance and primacy of the issue of human rights and its protection when it poignantly stated as follows:
“Human Rights and fundamental freedoms are the birth right of all human beings, their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Government” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
It is the duty of every Government everywhere and every courts of law in every jurisdiction to promote, protect, uphold, and ensure enforcement of fundamental Human rights at all times, because these rights encapsulate the very essence of man.
The end.
THOUGHTS FOR THE WEEK
“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI.
“Because no matter who we are or where we come from, we’re all entitled to the basic human rights of clean air to breathe, clean water to drink, and healthy land to call home”. – Martin Luther King III
“Human rights are not only violated by terrorism, repression or assassination, but also by unfair economic structures that creates huge inequalities”. – Pope Francis.
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The Oracle
The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 3)
Published
1 month agoon
May 15, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
Last week’s installment examined amongst others, the features of what constitutes violation of fundamental rights and posed the question- whether enforcement of such rights is restricted to the mechanism of the FREP Rules? This week contuse the same theme by discussing the procedure for enforcing fundamental rights, including applications for leave; the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto. Please read on.
PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT (Continues)
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal (Benin Division) dilated on the procedure in the case of N.U.T Vs. COSST ((2007) 23 E-WRN / 03 (CA).), thus:
“By virtue of Order 1 rule 2(2) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, no application for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement within that state of any such rights shall be made unless leave therefore has been granted in accordance with the rules. Thus, while an applicant can approach the High Court in a state where the infringement of his rights occurs or is likely to occur for redress he has to obtain leave of the appropriate High Court before he can apply to enforce his rights. In the instant case, even if the case was a fundamental right case the suit was not commended by due process, as the respondents approached the court by way of originating summons contrary to the provision of Order 1 rule 2(2) of the Fundamental Right (Enforcement) Rules.
An application for the enforcement of fundamental right becomes incompetent if the main claim does not fall within the ambit or precinct of chapter IV of the Constitution. Any claim that falls outside chapter IV of the Constitution becomes ancillary claim. Therefore, for an applicant for enforcement of fundamental rights to be competent, it must be within the provisions of chapter IV of the Constitution.
This point reverberated in W.A.E.C Vs. Akinwumi, (2008) JELR 49485 (SC), where the Supreme Court succinctly held that:
“In ascertaining the justicieability or competence of a suit commenced by way of application under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, the court must ensure that the enforcement of the fundamental rights under chapter IV of the Constitution is the claim and not ancillary claim. Where the claim is not the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be said to be properly invoked, and the action is liable to be struck out on ground of incompetence.”
Also, in Unilorin Vs. Oluwadare (2008) JELR 55842 (CA), the court adumbrated the point as follows, when it held that:
“When an application is brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, a condition precedent to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction is that the enforcement of fundamental rights or the securing of the enforcement thereof should be the main claim and not an accessory claim. Enforcement of fundamental right or securing the enforcement thereof should, from the appellant’s claim as presented, be the principal or fundamental claim as presented, and not accessory claim. However, where the main claim or principal claim is not the enforcement or securing the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be properly exercised as it will be incompetent. In the instant case, the respondent’s claim, being a challenge to his expulsion as a student from the 1st Appellant institution, is not one of those claims/reliefs envisaged by the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules.
See also Gafar Vs. Govt., Kwara State, (2007) JELR 53915 (SC); Unical Vs. Ugochukwu 2007-LD-CA-232.
It is important to note that an applicant seeking redress for the infringement of his Fundamental Rights shall in addition to declaratory and injunctive orders also be entitled to an award of damages. This is because in fundamental right cases, the law presumes that damages flow naturally from the injury suffered by the victim as a result of the violation of the rights.
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
By virtue of Judgment (Enforcement) Rules in Nigeria, no application for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement within a state, of any such rights shall be made unless leave therefore has been granted in accordance with these rules. Also, any application for such leave must be made ex-parte to the appropriate court and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought, and grounds on which it is sought and by an affidavit verifying the facts relied on.
The deadline for filling an application for leave is not later than 12 (twelve) Months after the date of the happening of the event complained of, unless the judge is satisfied that extenuating circumstances exist. In case of ongoing act, an action can be brought after 12 Months deadline, at any point during the continuation of the wrong. An applicant must however file the application for leave not later than the day preceding the date of hearing. The court may in granting leave to the applicant impose such terms and condition as it may deem fit, as security for cost.
It is to be noted that leave once granted, shall operate as a stay of all actions relating to or connected with a complaint which forms the subject matter of the application until the determination of the substantive suit.
The ex-parte application for leave must specify the provisions of the enforcement procedure Rules under which it is brought, the precise content of the relief to be requested once the application for leave has been granted and cursory reference to relevant laws. This must be accompanied by an affidavit verifying relevant facts to be relied on.
The deadline for filing an application for leave is not later than 12(twelve) months after the date of the happening of the event complained of, unless the judge is satisfied that extenuating circumstances exist. In cases of ongoing act, an action can be brought after 12month deadline, at any point during the continuation of the wrong. An applicant must however file the application for leave not later than the day preceding the date of hearing. The court may in granting leave to the applicant impose such terms and conditions as it may deem fit, as security for cost.
It is to be noted that leave once granted, shall operate as a stay of all actions relating to or connected with a complaint which forms the subject matter of the application until the determination of the substantive suit.
The ex-parte application for leave must specify the provisions of the enforcement procedure Rules under which it is brought, the precise content of the relief to be requested once the application for leave has been granted and a cursory reference to relevant laws. This must be accompanied by an affidavit verifying relevant facts to be relied on.
SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS
After obtaining leave, the applicant can apply for an enforcement order by way of NOTICE OF MOTION (as in form 1) or ORIGINATING SUMMONS (as in form 2). In the celebrated case of SHUGABA, A. DARMAN V. MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & ORS. ((1981) 2 NCLR 459). It was held inter-alia that the proper procedure to be followed in an application for enforcement or securing the enforcement of fundamental rights and redress for violation of same is guided by the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rule 1979 which requires that where leave has been granted to apply for the order being asked the application for, such order must be made by notice of motion or originating summons to the appropriate court.
The motion or summons, together with a copy of the statement submitted in conjunction with the application for leave, must then be served on all persons directly affected. Unless the court directs otherwise, there must be at least 8 clear days between service of the motion or summons and the date fixed for hearing.
A substantive application either by motion or summons seeking for substantive reliefs, remedies or orders may include such prayers as:
a. Unconditional release of the detainee
b. Payment of a certain sum of money as compensation in the event of the arrest and detention being illegal, unwarranted, null and void.
The court may equally make any other ancillary order after hearing argument from counsel on all sides based on the affidavit and counter-affidavit.
It should be noted that failure to adhere to the procedure laid down by the Enforcement Rules may lead to the entire proceedings being nullified. The court shall upon objection being raised for non-compliance with the rules strike the entire proceedings out. (To be continued).
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI
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The Oracle
The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 1)
Published
2 months agoon
May 1, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
Man as distinct from other beings is rational and has morals. He has the power of reason which enables him to differentiate between right and wrong, between good and bad, and also between justice and injustice. He therefore possesses honour and dignity which are higher than that of other beings. Human rights are necessary to protect this honour and dignity which nature has bestowed on human kind. They ensure (where these rights are enforced) that human kind is not degraded or made inhumane. Chapter IV (Sections 17-32) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963, had provided that:
“No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman degrading punishment or other treatment.”
This has been replicated in section 3 of the 1999 Constitution. Equally, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Right, 1984 declares that:
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and right. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”
There is therefore a great need to protect and ensure the protection of these inherent rights and freedoms.
WHAT IS A RIGHT?
Before discussing the ways and means by which one may enforce his fundamental human rights, it is apposite to first understand the context in which “right” is used.
‘Right’ in ordinary language means power of free action; a demand, inherent in one person and incident upon another. It is an interest recognized by law, respect for which is a duty and disregard of which is wrong. It refers to the cultural, political, social, economic advantage to which a person has just claim, either morally or in law. It is distinct from privilege.
Right described as ‘human’ refers to a category of rights which are specified and in most cases protected by law. Every human being is entitled to such rights and no person may be denied of such rights except through the due process of law. Cranston therefore holds the strong view that:
“A human right is something of which no one may be deprived without a great affront to justice. These are certain deeds which should never be invaded some things which are supremely sacred”
Kayode Eso, JSC. (as he then was) re-affirmed the importance of human rights in RANSOME KUTI Vs. A-G OF THE FEDERATION, (1985) CLR 6(d) (SC), when he said of human rights:
“… It is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact is antecedent to the political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilized existence… and what has been done is to have these rights enshrined in the Constitution so that the rights could be immutable to the extent of the non-immutability of the constitution itself.”
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS?
“Fundamental rights” are generally regarded as those aspects of human rights which have been recognized and entrenched in the constitution of a country. They are specially provided for to enhance human dignity and liberty in every modern state. In the Nigerian context, the terms “human right”, “fundamental right” and “fundamental human right” are always used interchangeably. This has been justified by a learned author who posited forcefully that:
“Human rights remain so, whether they occur in the international plane or within municipal confines and whether they are called ‘human rights’ or ‘fundamental rights’. It should be noted that the international bill of rights – the universal declaration of Human rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- use the expression fundamental human rights, so also the U.N charter.” (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948).
Since the Constitution specifically provides for fundamental rights, Nigerian Court have found it expedient to draw a line of dichotomy between ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental rights’. Thus, in UZOUKWU & ORS Vs. EZEONU II & ORS, (1991) 6 NWLR (pt 200) p. 708, the Court of Appeal (per Nasir P. C. A) put in with apt clarity and lucidity:
“Due to the development of Constitutional law in the field, distinct difference has emerged between ‘Fundamental Right’ and ‘Human Rights’. It may be recalled that human rights were derived from and out of the wider concept of natural rights. They are rights which every civilized society must accept as belonging to each person as human being. These were termed human rights. When the United Nations made its declaration it was in respect of Human Rights which belong to all human beings irrespective of citizenship, race, religion and so on. This has now formed part of international law. Fundamental Rights remain in the realm of domestic law. They are fundamental because they have been guaranteed by the fundamental law of the country, that is by the Constitution.”
Nature and Classification of Human Rights
Human rights are generally grouped under five sub-headings namely; Civil Rights, Political Rights, Social Rights, Economic Rights and Cultural Rights. We shall however discuss these classifications under two broad further categorization, that is:
Civil and Political Rights: these includes the right to self-determination, the right to life, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, freedom from slavery and forced labour, the right to fair trial, right to privacy, freedom of thought conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, the right of assembly, freedom of association, and movement, the right to marry and found a family, the right to participate in one’s Government either directly or through freely elected representatives, and the right to nationality and equality before the law.
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC Rights) include the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to organize, form and join trade unions, the right to social security, the right to collective bargaining, the right to property, the right to education, the right to participate in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.
The importance of these rights cannot be over emphasized. So important are they that they have been universally recognized and acclaimed by the international community. The universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other United Nations Covenant on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human race on an equal scale as the foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the world.
NOW THIS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA AND INTERNATIONAL CHARTERS AND CONVENTIONS
The emergence of human rights in documented form in Nigeria can be traced to the Nigeria Bill of Rights of 1959. This was incorporated into the 1960 Independence Constitution in 1963; these rights were reproduced 111 of the 1963 Republican Constitution. These fundamental human rights are provided for in Chapter Iv of both the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with some improvements.
The reverence of these human rights can be seen from their recognition, promotion and protection under international law. Charters and Conventions have been globally drawn, and under various economic, geographical and political blocs for the promotion and protection from abuse of these rights. The United Nation (UN) has been championing the global protection of these rights as can be seen from the various chapters of the UN charter. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1984) proclamation states as follows:
“This Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all the end that every individual and every organ of society keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measure, national and international to secure observance both among people of member states themselves and among people of territories under their jurisdiction.”
Article 30 of the Charter further provides thus:
“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any action aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”
The Declaration by its provisions sets out the minimum standard to be observed by countries of the world in relation to human rights.
There is also the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights which has become, in Nigeria, a potent source of quick remedy against gross violation of human rights under municipal laws which remedy could not be traced to the laws because of ouster clauses built in them. The charter has since been ratified in Nigeria as African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap 10 1 FN 1990. The importance of the African Charter was underlined by Eniola Longe J, in the case of MOHAMMED GARUBA & ORS V. A.G OF LAGOS STATE & ORS (Unreported Suit No. ID/559/90), when he held:
“The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of which Nigeria is a signatory is now made into our law… Even if its aspect in our constitution is suspended or ousted by provisions of our local law, the international aspect of it cannot be unilaterally abrogated…”
AND THIS LIMITATION ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Under section 45 of the 1999 Constitution and many constitutional expressions of fundamental rights, certain qualifications or restriction which are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society are incorporated in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health or for the purpose protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons. Consequently, the aforesaid rights are generally subjected to these limitations.
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Procedure for the enforcement of the fundamental rights provisions enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is guided and regulated by the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979. It is pertinent to state here that the above rules are made pursuant to the powers conferred on the Chief Justice of Nigeria by section 46(3) of the Constitution, which provided thus:
“The Chief Justice of Nigeria may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purpose of this section.” (To be continued).
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
“Each state, so that it does not abridge the great fundamental rights belonging, under the Constitution, to all citizens, may grant or withhold such civil rights as it pleases; all that is required is that, in this respect, its laws shall be impartial”. (Lyman Trumbull).
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