Opinion

Public Intellection and the Future of Nigeria by Wale Adebanwi

Published

5 years ago

August 25, 2021

Eric

What I will like to do is to attempt to take forward the critical role of public intellection through the authors reflections in the book under review.

But first a short story. In July 2019, I visited His Highness at the Gidan Rumfa in Kano to seek his views on a research project on the politics of austerity measures. At the end of the interview, we got talking briefly about Nigeria as His Highness rearticulated some of the developmental plans he had for Kano while also mentioning some of the challenges he was facing. In response, I accused him of abandoning Nigeria for the Kano throne. He disagreed. He explained that apart from taking up the mantle of his heritage, there were important and urgent developmental challenges that needed to be addressed in Kano, in particular, and the north of Nigeria, in general, for which his position as the Sarkin Kano was critical. But I insisted that the more important and urgent developmental challenges in Nigeria, for which his likes were needed, would not allow him, in the long run, to accomplish most of the goals he set for himself as the Emir of Kano.

The national body-politic was afflicted with multiple sclerosis, trying to save one of the limbs was therefore inadequate. What Nigeria needed were treatments that could ensure a speedy recovery from the attacks to the national brain and the central nervous system of the body-politic in order to modify the course of the disease and manage the symptoms. The problem in Kano and the north were manifestations of the fundamental problems of the Nigeria state. Thus, what needed saving first was not Kano; it was Nigeria. The appalling leadership in the state was only a reflection of the headship of the Nigerian state.
The book that is being presented today in an affirmation that, despite his position on Kanos urgent salvation, the author has always recognised that Nigeria not only needed to be saved but that, correspondingly, as poet and humanist, Odia Ofeimun, insists Nigeria was eminently saveable. Though there is no question that time is running out on Nigeria, especially so in a moment of our national history when utter cluelessness mixed with mindless indifference has been turned into a matter of regime pride and even governmental swagger, there are still many who hold out some hope for Nigeria. For the Good of the Nation: Essays and Perspectives, which includes essays, conference papers, and three interviews, published over the last two decades is not only a kind of manifesto by the author about Nigerias problems and possibilities, it is also a testament to the authors prodigy as well as a demonstration of his eclectic, even if polemical, take on the most critical issues of our time. More significant is the fact that the book is a testimony to the authors faith in Nigerias possibilities and our collective future as a people. Whether he is reflecting on the debates on the restructuring of the federation, redistributive justice and radical democratic imagination, interrogating Muslim political thought in the modern world, the intellectual sources of Islamist identities, or engaging with Foucauldian philosophy in probing Muslim history and the discursive trends in Islamic law in the context of Nigerias ethno-regional and ethno-religious tensions, including the struggle among Nigerias ruling and ruining class, the authors specific liberal spirit and commitment to Nigeria is strongly reflected in this book. For instance, this spirit and commitment lead the author to embrace the liberating and liberationist ethos of Thomas Paine and Betrand Russell, even while rejecting their atheism.

As my late friend, Pius Adesanmi, so able captures it in his Foreword to this book, the author demonstrates the core obligations of public intellection, not just in speaking truth to power, but also in stubbornly confronting, headlong, some of the complex or difficult issues of the Nigerian union, including those regarding the precept, nature and future of the union, the character of ethno-regional relations as well as elite politics, religion and the politics of piety, and also the uncomfortable question of gender equality in northern Nigeria. This stubborn devotion to confronting uncomfortable questions leads the author, in Adesanmis words, to a humanising synthesis of disparate political traditions (p. xxxi) as a praxis of intervention which seeks to create a middle ground of mutual sympathies and comprehension in a national oasis of acrimony and misunderstanding (ibid). Thus, it is important in this review to foreground the authors critical commitment to public intellection about the most important questions of the age.

Against this backdrop, the authors critical examination of these issues – including his intellectual orientation, his praxis, his ethno-regional location, his royal pedigree and privilege also constitutes a veritable ground for further contention. However, while the authors background and location define him, these essays show that they do not exhaust the authors intellectual, socio-economic as well as political orientations and convictions. A man of noble convictions does not have to be a nobleman. Therefore, that intellectual nobility is combined with the nobility of birth in this case is not natural. It is obvious from the essays that the authors social convictions developed over a lengthy period of both fascination with philosophical reflections from different historical eras as well as open mindedness towards the world. It is striking that the man who has since become the leader of the Tijaniyya movement is also, in this book, the non-sectarian advocate for religious tolerance.

There are a range of issues, ideas, and praxis for the reader to engage with in this almost 500 page thought-provoking and in some cases, provocative book. I can only mention a few as I do not have the time and the space to deal with the sheer complexity of the issues here. However, I will point to two of these issues as illustrations of the authors deep reflections, fine intellection, as well as profound, even if contentious, declamations about the Nigerian condition.

The first is about the political conditions of Nigeria. I place this under the episteme of national survival that is, in Foucauldian terms, “the implicit [and explicit] rules of formation which governs what constitutes legitimate forms of knowledge about the essential character of the Nigerian state in this age. This includes ethno-regional and ethno-religious relations and tensions, the structure of the federation, and the nature and process of recruitment for national leadership. The author who dismisses the Afenifere and Ohaneze, and following Balarabe Musa, accuses “the Yoruba bourgeoisie” of representing “the greatest problem to nation-building” (p. 23) in the first year of Obasanjos presidency, is the same who affirms that Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe were, unlike Sir Ahmadu Bello, right in pursuing a strong centre within a federal structure, while concluding that “The Northern bourgeoisie and the Yoruba bourgeoisie have conspired to keep the Igbo out of the scheme of things” (p. 24). While he rejects the attempts to make all Northern Muslims to take responsibility for what he describes as the un-Islamic actions of past northern leaders (p. 37), and rejects a crude and cruel caricature of the Northern Muslim, the author concedes that it is a caricature that finds credibility in the abundance of evidence (p. 227) even while adding in another essay that if there is anything [about] which the political leadership of the North stands guilty as charged, it would be its contemptible and cowardly silence, its tolerance of evil and its open fraternisation with despots. As an example, the silence of Emirs and many notable political and religious leaders in the face of the injustice to which Chief M.K.O. Abiola was subjected is inexplicable” (pp. 37-38). It is no wonder he didnt keep silent when he also became an emir. (Although, the reigning emirs might respond that no wonder he is no longer an emir!”) Also, the author agrees with most of what northern Christians have to say about northern Muslim elite (p. 55) even while insisting that the northern Muslim poor, perhaps more so than northern Christians, have been visited with adversity by the northern elite.

One of the most significant goals of this volume, it seems to me, is how to ensure national survival. While the reader may not agree with the author about his diagnosis or prognosis, I suspect that most people across the political and ideological spectrum who are committed to national survival including both the proponents and opponents of restructuring or national conference will agree with the part of the book which speaks powerfully to the spirit of the theme of this book: For the Good of the Nation. I will quote the author: there is a second, perhaps more fundamental reason, for discussing the structure of the federation. It is the reality that the elite merely exploit or manipulate the secondary contradictions in our polity. They neither created nor concocted them. The historical process which brought together these heterogeneous groups was never destined to achieve a magical and immediate erosion of their histories and a total submersion of their identities into a common national milieu. [Thus] the task of nation-building does not lie in ignoring these differences, as the military have tried to do. Unity is not necessarily synonymous with uniformity. But it also does not lie in a defeatist attitude of despair or a return to a nihilist era of ethnic agendas and tribal warfare. The tragedy of Nigeria does not lie in its diversity, nor in its population, nor in its resources. Our tragedy lies in the lack of a truly nationalist and visionary leadership, an elite that harnesses the diverse streams that flow into the melting pot called Nigeria (p. 5).

Against this background, I strongly recommend that you read the authors take on federalism and state creation as well as his take on the experiences of the northern minorities and the Igbo in the post-Civil War era.

The second is about the explication, explanation and/or reconsideration of Islam, the role of Islam in Nigerias history as well as the philosophical reflections on Islam and modernity and the implications of theocratic praxis for the future of Nigeria. In his role as an explainer and defender of Islam and Islamic theology and even Islamic jurisprudence in order to achieve rationality within and outside the Islamic world towards achieving inter-cultural understanding and inter-faith dialogue, the author, as the book shows, has been assailed by doctrinaire Islamists as well as non-Muslims. But as a polymath who is also a theologian, one who is as confident about his knowledge in Islamic jurisprudence as well as the arcane philosophy of ancient Greece, the author competently takes on both the adherents and outsiders or traducers of Islam on different issues, including the Shariah, gender relations within Islam and in the larger contemporary society. One of the key issues that the author attempts to settle in this book is the conflation of culture/tradition with Islam. He engages in an intricate analysis of tradition and culture in ancient Arabia and tradition and culture in Northern Nigeria in order to separate out both from Islamic religion. This is in response to the religious precepts mobilized ignorantly, in his view, by the clerics for instance, in the treatment of women.

For all his intellectual exertions in explicating the conditions of egalitarian national life, particularly his virulent critique of the conditions of poverty in the north and the misinterpretations of Islamic doctrines, the author has been a target of critics. As he writes in the book, “My interventions have been received with not a little discomfort, but truthful discourse is no respecter of sensibilities” (p. 226). Some, as he acknowledges, have even described him as an arrogant secularist who claims to destabilize the noble edifice of Northern Muslim society, a pretender to being a reformer in the league of Dan Fodio, an agent of the West and dealer in usury, a Marxist who places reason above revelation (p. 330). In a sense, the author wears this criticism as a badge of honour. Why? Because it reveals the kind of misunderstanding and denunciation that serious public intellection exposes one to. I will add that it is significant that the author has been accused of all these. Despite the irony of accusing the caliph of the Tijaniyya Movement of being a secularist, I think that what these collection of essays show is the complex nature of the thought and praxis of the author.

An able and nimble mind and one of the most cerebral and controversial Nigerians of his age, the author, as this book again demonstrates, remains a compelling puzzle even in a sense, an oxymoron: a Nobleman Rebel, or Rebel Nobleman. He is as fierce and committed a defender of the tradition and privilege of royalty as he is a fiery and unhampered instigator of dissent and discontent among the underprivileged; he is as comfortable in a pinstripe suit with bow tie or a Chairman Mao suit as he is in the long flowing gown and regal costume of Kano royalty complete with a veil over his face; he is as suave in the company of global and local aristocrats, billionaires and leaders as he is as unpretentious among the “commoners” and poor pupils learning the tarteel. This compelling puzzle is partly why he attracts the kind of criticism referenced above and also partly why this book recommends itself for close attention. But the cardinal reason why this book is important is not merely because of the tension between nobility and rebellion that the author represents; in my view, it is because of the cardinal concern of the reflections on the future of Nigeria. And what a fitting moment to reflect again on the future of what many from one extreme of Boko Haram would-be theocrats to the other extreme of ethno-regional secessionists regard as Lugards bastard child.

One key question that the author does not address in this book, which I will suggest he needs to take up in the volume that will follow the book he is now completing at Oxford on his Central Bank years, is on the practical steps necessary in producing the kind of leadership that he preaches for in this book. If indeed the fundamental problem of Nigeria, as he argues, is leadership, what is to be done, particularly about ensuring that people of goodwill who have the needed capacity are able to be at the helm of affairs in Nigeria? What is to be done to ensure that the electorate themselves stop recruiting one incompetent man after another?
Let me conclude on what we might call a “hopeful” note. The author was conscious of the implications of some of his dark prognosis about the Nigerian condition. Therefore, in the first essay, Issues in Restructuring Corporate Nigeria, he writes, But the audience may ask, is there any hope for this country? My answer is yes. One of the reasons for his position was because of his generation of young, educated Nigerians ready to take up the gauntlet, and ignite the hopes, for a renewed Nigeria. When he wrote this, he was 38. The author is no longer that young. At 60, does he retain this hope? If he does, the hope is not shared by many contemporary young people from those lining behind Nnamdi Kanu and those behind Sunday Adeyemi (Sunday Igboho) to the Boko Haram aspiring theocrats. What is to be done about those who have given up on Nigeria including the millions who may not be organising for another country but are truly sick of the existing one? What is the role of public intellection in responding to this moment that appears like the eve of the tragic denouement in Nigerias history? This is where the authors harsh judgement on the Nigerian elite is relevant. Many believe that if Nigeria collapses, the masses will suffer most. That is true. But it is also true that members of the parasitic Nigerian elite cannot survive in any space on planet earth other than Nigeria. It is therefore in their paramount interest to ensure the good of the nation. Hence, in this moment in our national history when the future of Nigeria appears hazy, this collection of essays and perspectives leads us back to that important but underappreciated epic song by Sonny Okosuns, Which Way Nigeria?
That song speaks directly to the theme of this book. I believe that beyond the polemics of the essays in the book, beyond the matters we agree or disagree on, beyond the authors pedigree, his philosophical engagements with politics, religion and society, and his intellectual fascination with contrarian praxis, beyond all these, is the faith, as the book affirms, that binds us together in this potentially great but much abused polity. Against this backdrop, I leave you with the core message of this book which is captured in Sonny Okosuns’ charge: Lets save Nigeria, so Nigeria won’t die!
I thank you for your attention.

Adebanwi, until recently, the Rhodes Professor of Race Relations, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, is the Presidential Penn Compact Professor of Africana Studies, University of Pennsylvania, United States.

Opinion

Kano Deputy Governorship: Why Murtala Sule Garo is Most Deserving

Published

16 hours ago

April 21, 2026

Eric

By Abdullahi Sa’idu Baba (Hafizi)

One of the defining slogans of the Governor of Kano State is “Kano First,” a principle that emphasizes prioritizing the collective interest, development, and unity of Kano State above all else. In line with this vision, Hon. Murtala Sule Garo stands out as the most suitable candidate for the position of Deputy Governor. His track record reflects a history of diligent and selfless service to Kano State, marked by consistent dedication to grassroots development and people-oriented governance. Over the years, he has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to advancing the welfare of the people, making him a natural fit for a leadership role that demands loyalty, competence, and a deep understanding of Kano’s needs.

Throughout his time in office, Garo distinguished himself through people-oriented policies and impactful empowerment initiatives. He became widely known for implementing large-scale programs that directly improved the livelihoods of youth and women across Kano State. Thousands benefited from his initiatives, which included financial support, business tools, and opportunities for economic independence. These efforts not only reduced poverty at the grassroots level but also demonstrated his belief in inclusive governance ensuring that the dividends of democracy reach even the most remote communities. His approach earned him recognition as a leader who “takes government to the people,” a rare quality that continues to endear him to the masses.

Beyond empowerment, Garo’s leadership style is defined by accessibility, generosity, and responsiveness. He has consistently been described as a “man of the people,” someone who listens, engages, and responds without bias. His political strength lies in his deep-rooted connection with communities across Kano, where he has built trust over the years through direct engagement and consistent support. This grassroots network has become one of his greatest political assets, positioning him as a unifying figure capable of mobilizing support across different demographics and political divides.

In the evolving political landscape of Kano State, Murtala Sule Garo has emerged as a leading and widely endorsed candidate for the position of Deputy Governor. Recent political development shows that he enjoys overwhelming support not only from key stakeholders within the APC, but also from the generality of the grassroots Kano electorate, reflecting not only his political relevance but also the confidence party leaders and stakeholders have in his experience, loyalty, and leadership capacity.

Garo’s suitability for the role of Deputy Governor is further strengthened by his extensive experience in governance and party administration. Having served in multiple strategic positions, including organising roles, advisory capacities, and two consecutive terms as commissioner, he possesses both institutional knowledge and practical governance skills. His ability to navigate complex political structures while maintaining strong grassroots support makes him uniquely positioned to complement executive leadership and ensure stability in governance.

Looking ahead to future elections, Murtala Sule Garo’s political capacity remains one of his strongest advantages. He is widely regarded as a mobilizer who can energize the electorate, increase voter participation, and strengthen party unity. His influence at the ward and local government levels provides a strategic advantage for any administration he is part of, as he can effectively translate political goodwill into electoral success. Observers believe that his inclusion in leadership would not only consolidate party structures but also enhance governance outcomes through effective implementation of policies at the grassroots level.

Moreover, Garo represents a bridge between experience and youthful dynamism. His understanding of both traditional political structures and modern governance demands positions him as a forward-thinking leader capable of contributing meaningfully to Kano’s development agenda. His inclusive approach, engaging traditional rulers, youth groups, and stakeholders, suggests that he can foster a sense of collective ownership in governance, which is essential for sustainable development.

In conclusion, Hon. Murtala Sule Garo embodies the qualities of a competent administrator, a grassroots mobilizer, and a unifying political figure. His track record of service, empowerment, and community engagement presents a compelling case for his emergence as the next Deputy Governor of Kano State. With his proven ability to deliver results and connect with the people, he stands not only as a suitable candidate but as a strategic asset capable of driving progress, stability, and inclusive governance in Kano State’s future.

Abdullahi Sa’idu Baba (Hafizi) writes from Kano, and can be reached via Hafeeezsb@gmail.com

Opinion

2027: Why Nigeria Can’t Afford to Lose Atiku’s Experience and Expertise

Published

4 days ago

April 18, 2026

Eric

By Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba

To be candid and straightforward, this article is written to sensitize Nigerians to the growing smear campaign against Atiku Abubakar, a campaign of calumny that appears less about national interest and more about political anxiety. The persistence and intensity of these attacks suggest one thing: there are powerful interests who see him not merely as a contender, but as a genuine threat. Yet, Nigerians are no longer easily distracted. The electorate is becoming more discerning, more interested in good governance.

Closely tied to this is the urgency of the 2027 presidential election. This is not just another electoral cycle, it may well represent a turning point in Nigeria’s history. Although Atiku Abubakar has confirmed 2027 to be his last presidential outing. That reality alone elevates the stakes. It presents Nigeria with a stark choice: to either harness a reservoir of experience at a critical moment or risk drifting further into uncertainty. In clear terms, 2027 is not just about political succession, it is about whether Nigeria recalibrates its direction or continues along a path of deepening national challenges.

The fundamental truth is that, experience and effective leadership are positively correlated, independent of age. Leadership in a complex state like Nigeria requires far more than youthful enthusiasm. It demands institutional memory, policy depth, negotiation skills, and the ability to manage crises with precision. It is therefore misguided to reduce leadership capability to age alone. Age neither guarantees competence nor invalidates it. Across the world, both young and elderly leaders have failed when they lacked the depth of experience required for governance. In Nigeria itself, recent experience with president Tinubu shows that leadership failure cannot be attributed to age alone. This underscores a critical point: the true dividing line between success and failure in leadership is not age, it is experience, particularly practical and relevant experience, which is too often overlooked.

Global political trends reinforce this reality. In the United States, voters returned Donald Trump to power over Kamala Harris, reflecting a preference for perceived experience over age. Figures such as Bernie Sanders remain influential well into their later years, shaping national discourse. Similarly, in Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected again at an advanced age because voters trusted his tested capacity to lead during difficult times. A similar pattern recently played out in West Africa. In Liberia, the younger incumbent George Weah was defeated by the significantly older Joseph Boakai. That outcome was widely interpreted as a preference by Liberians for experience and not youthful appeal. These examples are not coincidences. They illustrate a consistent global pattern that when nations face uncertainty, they turn to experience. Nigeria must not waste the experience of Atiku Abubakar like it happened with remarkable figures like Obafemi Awolowo, Chief MKO Abiola and Malam Aminu Kano in the past.

Beyond the question of age lies another critical issue: political strategy. The debate over who should carry the opposition banner in 2027 must be guided by political reality. Nigeria’s recent history makes this abundantly clear. When Goodluck Jonathan sought re-election, the opposition were less influenced by sentiment. Instead, they made a strategic calculation, searching for a candidate with national reach and electoral strength, an idea that birthed Muhammadu Buhari as the opposition candidate, despite his previous electoral defeats.

It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument that Atiku Abubakar should be excluded on the basis that he has contested before. By that same reasoning, Buhari would never have emerged as a viable candidate. Political persistence is not a weakness; it is often a reflection of conviction, resilience, and determination. Elections are not won by novelty alone, they are won by structure, experience, and the ability to connect with a broad electorate.

Equally unconvincing is the argument that 2027 should be determined by zoning or that it is “still the turn of the South.” If the opposition is serious about unseating president Tinubu, it must prioritize a candidate with the experience, national appeal, and political structure required to achieve that goal. Atiku Abubakar is therefore the “asset” of the today. His eight years as Vice President under Olusegun Obasanjo provided him with deep exposure to governance, economic reform, and institutional development. Beyond public office, he is widely recognized as a seasoned politician and an established businessman with independent wealth, an important factor in a political environment often clouded by concerns about misuse of public resources.

Interestingly, it’s increasingly clear that Nigerians are moving beyond superficial narratives. The electorate is more focused on outcomes, on who can stabilize the economy, strengthen institutions, and restore confidence in governance. The conversation is shifting from age to ability, from rhetoric to results.

As 2027 approaches, the choice before Nigeria is becoming clearer. This is not a contest of personalities or a debate about generational symbolism. It is a question of capacity, preparedness, and national survival. History, both global and local, points in one direction: when experience is sidelined, nations pay the price.

Nigeria cannot afford that mistake again…

Dr. Sani Sa’idu Baba writes from Kano, and can be reached via drssbaba@yahoo.com

Opinion

Leadership As Decisive Force in Regional and Continental Security

Published

4 days ago

April 18, 2026

Eric

By Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

“Security is not built by arms alone, but by the quality of leadership that turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and divergent interests into common purpose.” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD

Abstract

In an era of complex transnational threats, effective regional and continental security hinges less on military capabilities or institutional frameworks and more on the quality of leadership. This article explores how visionary, adaptive, ethical, and inclusive leadership serves as the critical catalyst for transforming shared vulnerabilities into collective strength. Through in-depth case studies of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside comparative insights from the European Union and ASEAN, it demonstrates that leadership determines whether security protocols remain aspirational or deliver tangible protection. The analysis highlights both successes and limitations, identifying key attributes of effective security leadership: strategic foresight, consensus-building, institutional coordination, and accountability. Ultimately, the article argues that investing in high-calibre leadership at every level is essential for building resilient, people-centred security systems capable of addressing contemporary challenges and contributing to a more stable global order.

Introduction

Effective regional and continental security depends far more on leadership than on military hardware, intelligence capabilities, or financial resources alone. Leadership supplies the vision, political will, strategic coherence, ethical foundation, and sustained commitment required to transform fragmented national efforts into unified, sustainable security outcomes. In an era marked by transnational threats — terrorism, organised crime, climate-induced conflicts, cyber vulnerabilities, irregular migration, and hybrid warfare — the quality of leadership at regional and continental levels determines whether security architectures deliver genuine protection or remain aspirational documents on paper.

The Indispensable Role of Leadership in Regional and Continental Security

Leadership in security contexts operates across multiple interconnected layers. At the strategic level, it involves setting a long-term vision that anticipates emerging threats and aligns collective resources before crises escalate. At the operational level, it demands the ability to coordinate institutions, mobilise resources, and execute joint actions efficiently. At the relational level, it requires building and maintaining trust among sovereign states with often competing interests, historical grievances, and differing priorities.

Effective leaders in this domain exhibit several critical attributes. They demonstrate visionary foresight, the capacity to read complex geopolitical and socio-economic trends and translate them into proactive strategies. They exercise adaptive decision-making, adjusting approaches as threats evolve while preserving core principles. They practise inclusive diplomacy, forging consensus without compromising sovereignty. Above all, they uphold ethical integrity and accountability, ensuring that security measures respect human rights and maintain public legitimacy. Without these qualities, even the most sophisticated security protocols risk becoming ineffective or counterproductive.

ECOWAS in West Africa: Leadership-Driven Collective Security

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975 primarily as an economic integration body, has evolved into one of Africa’s most sophisticated and tested regional security mechanisms. This transformation was not inevitable but resulted from deliberate, courageous, and often pragmatic leadership in response to existential threats that threatened to engulf the entire sub-region.

The pivotal moment came in the early 1990s when Liberia descended into a devastating civil war. Faced with the risk of regional contagion, ECOWAS leaders, particularly Nigeria’s General Ibrahim Babangida and Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, took the unprecedented step of creating the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 — Africa’s first sub-regional peacekeeping force. This was a bold departure from the Organisation of African Unity’s strict non-interference policy. ECOMOG’s interventions in Liberia (1990–1997) and Sierra Leone (1997–2000) prevented state collapse, contained the spread of conflict, and created political space for negotiated settlements and eventual democratic transitions.

Leadership played a pivotal role in these outcomes. Nigerian leadership provided the bulk of troops and financial resources, while Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings offered critical diplomatic backing. The willingness of several heads of state to commit substantial national resources despite domestic criticism demonstrated a rare form of collective political will. These interventions also led to important institutional developments, including the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and later the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).

In more recent years, ECOWAS leadership has continued to evolve. During the 2010–2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS applied sustained diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force, contributing significantly to the eventual restoration of constitutional order. In response to the rise of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, ECOWAS has strengthened intelligence sharing, supported the Multinational Joint Task Force, and promoted greater coordination among affected states. The organisation has also demonstrated its preventive diplomacy capacity in The Gambia (2016–2017), where firm but measured leadership helped resolve a dangerous post-election standoff without large-scale violence, and in Guinea (2021), where it applied sanctions and mediation to encourage return to constitutional rule.

Yet ECOWAS leadership has also encountered significant limitations. Divergent national interests, chronic funding shortfalls, and occasional leadership vacuums have sometimes slowed or complicated responses. The recent wave of military coups and political transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger (2021–2023) tested the organisation’s cohesion and exposed the challenge of enforcing normative standards when powerful member states resist collective decisions. These episodes underscore a recurring truth: regional security leadership is only as strong as the political commitment and institutional capacity behind it.

Despite these challenges, ECOWAS remains one of the most advanced regional security mechanisms on the continent. Its evolution from an economic community to a security actor demonstrates how visionary leadership, combined with institutional innovation and political will, can enable a regional organisation to respond effectively to complex security threats. The ECOWAS experience offers enduring lessons: effective regional security leadership must be proactive rather than reactive, adaptive to new threats, inclusive of multiple stakeholders, and continuously reinforced through institutional reform and sustained political will.

African Union’s Continental Leadership: The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has emerged as a central actor in shaping Africa’s security landscape through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Established following the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, APSA represents a fundamental shift in African leadership philosophy — moving from the OAU’s rigid doctrine of non-interference to the AU’s principle of “non-indifference” when grave circumstances threaten peace and stability.

The architecture comprises five key pillars: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund. This comprehensive framework was designed to enable Africa to take primary responsibility for its own peace and security rather than relying predominantly on external actors.

Leadership has been the critical variable in APSA’s performance. The decision by African heads of state to create the Peace and Security Council marked a bold act of continental leadership, giving the AU authority to authorise interventions in cases of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. One of the most visible demonstrations of this leadership was the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched in 2007. Despite enormous challenges, AMISOM — later reconfigured as the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) — helped degrade Al-Shabaab’s control over large parts of the country and created space for political processes and state-building. This mission showcased the AU’s willingness to deploy troops and sustain long-term engagement where international partners were initially hesitant.

Another significant example is the AU’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Darfur (Sudan), South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Lake Chad Basin. In each case, the effectiveness of AU leadership depended heavily on the political will and diplomatic skill of key member states, the AU Commission Chairperson, and the Peace and Security Council. The AU’s successful facilitation of the 2019 political transition in Sudan and its ongoing mediation efforts in multiple conflict zones further illustrate how continental leadership can create pathways for dialogue when national institutions falter.

However, the AU’s leadership has also encountered notable limitations. Funding shortages, logistical constraints, and sometimes divergent interests among member states have hampered rapid and decisive action. The 2011 Libya intervention exposed deep divisions within the AU, while recent political transitions and coups in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea) have tested the Union’s ability to enforce its normative frameworks consistently. These experiences reveal that continental leadership remains vulnerable to the sovereignty concerns of member states and the challenge of translating political consensus into operational effectiveness.

Despite these constraints, the AU has made important strides in institutionalising leadership for peace and security. The adoption of the African Union Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030 and the ongoing efforts to fully operationalise the African Standby Force reflect a long-term strategic vision. The Union has also strengthened its partnership with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, recognising that effective continental security requires layered leadership — with RECs often acting as first responders and the AU providing strategic oversight and legitimacy.

The African Union’s journey demonstrates both the immense potential and the inherent difficulties of continental leadership in security matters. When leadership is bold, united, and well-resourced, the AU can play a transformative role in preventing conflict, managing crises, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. When leadership is fragmented or under-resourced, progress slows and opportunities for timely intervention are lost.

SADC Regional Interventions: Leadership, Solidarity, and the Limits of Collective Action

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) offers a distinct model of regional security leadership shaped by its historical struggle against apartheid and a strong emphasis on sovereignty and consensus. Originally formed in 1980 to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, SADC has gradually expanded its security role through the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

SADC’s most prominent military intervention occurred in 1998 in Lesotho. Following a disputed election and political violence, South Africa and Botswana, acting under SADC authority, launched Operation Boleas to restore order and facilitate new elections. While the intervention achieved its immediate objectives, it was criticised for limited consultation with other SADC members and for being perceived as South African dominance rather than genuine collective action. This episode highlighted both the potential and the sensitivities of SADC leadership in security matters.

A more sustained and complex engagement has been SADC’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since 2013, SADC has supported the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Comprising troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, the FIB was mandated to conduct offensive operations against armed groups. South African leadership was instrumental in pushing for the creation of the FIB, reflecting Pretoria’s strategic interest in stabilising the Great Lakes region. The intervention has had mixed results: it helped degrade some armed groups but has struggled with the sheer complexity of conflict dynamics, resource constraints, and the challenge of addressing root causes such as governance failures and illicit resource exploitation.

More recently, in 2021, SADC deployed the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) to address the escalating insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. The mission, led by South African forces with contributions from several member states, aimed to support the Mozambican government in restoring security and protecting civilians. Leadership from South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania was critical in mobilising rapid deployment. While SAMIM has contributed to the degradation of insurgent capabilities and the protection of key economic installations, challenges remain, including coordination with Rwandan forces operating in the same theatre and the need for a stronger focus on addressing underlying socio-economic grievances.

SADC’s security interventions reveal a distinct leadership pattern dominated by a few influential member states, particularly South Africa. This “hegemonic leadership” model has enabled action when consensus is difficult to achieve but has also generated resentment among smaller states wary of South African dominance. Zimbabwe and Angola have also played significant roles in specific contexts, while smaller states have contributed troops and political legitimacy.

The consensus-based decision-making culture within SADC has been both a strength and a limitation. It ensures broad buy-in when agreement is reached, but it can lead to slow or diluted responses when member states have divergent interests. The principle of “quiet diplomacy” has often prioritised political dialogue over forceful intervention, sometimes delaying decisive action.

SADC interventions have achieved notable successes. They have prevented state collapse in Lesotho, contributed to stabilisation efforts in the DRC, and helped contain the Cabo Delgado insurgency. The organisation has also developed important normative frameworks, including the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and mechanisms for electoral observation and conflict prevention.

However, limitations are equally evident. Funding remains chronically inadequate, often forcing reliance on external partners or lead nations. Logistical challenges, interoperability issues among national forces, and uneven political commitment have constrained operational effectiveness. Critics argue that SADC’s responses have sometimes prioritised regime security over human security, particularly in cases involving member states’ internal political crises.

The SADC experience underscores several important lessons about regional security leadership. First, hegemonic leadership can enable rapid action but risks undermining legitimacy and long-term cohesion. Second, consensus-based systems require strong mediation and facilitation skills to convert agreement into effective implementation. Third, sustainable security leadership must address both immediate threats and underlying structural drivers such as poverty, inequality, and governance deficits. Finally, SADC’s trajectory shows that regional organisations can play meaningful security roles even without a single dominant power, provided there is sufficient political will and institutional adaptability.

Comparative Insights from Other Regions

Global experiences reinforce these lessons. The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has succeeded largely because of consistent institutional leadership and shared norms among member states, enabling joint missions and rapid response capabilities. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s consensus-based leadership model has helped maintain stability amid complex geopolitical tensions, although it has occasionally been criticised for slower decision-making. These cases confirm that effective regional security leadership requires a delicate balance between respect for sovereignty and the courage to pursue collective action.

Persistent Challenges and Pathways Forward

Leadership in regional and continental security faces recurring obstacles: divergent national interests, resource constraints, weak institutional capacity, and external interference. Political transitions and electoral cycles can disrupt continuity, while hybrid threats demand leaders capable of integrating diverse tools and actors.

To build more effective security leadership, regional and continental organisations must invest deliberately in leadership development. This includes targeted programmes that cultivate strategic foresight, ethical governance, collaborative skills, and crisis management capabilities. Institutional mechanisms should be designed to ensure policy continuity beyond changes in individual leaders. Greater inclusion of civil society, youth, and women in security decision-making can enhance legitimacy and broaden perspectives. Finally, partnerships with global actors should be pursued in ways that preserve African agency and ownership.

Conclusion

Leadership remains the single most decisive factor in regional and continental security. It is the invisible bridge that transforms fragile agreements into enduring peace, turns shared vulnerability into collective strength, and converts divergent national interests into a common purpose. The experiences of ECOWAS in West Africa, the African Union across the continent, and SADC in Southern Africa, alongside valuable lessons from Europe and Southeast Asia, consistently demonstrate one fundamental truth: even the most sophisticated security architectures will falter without visionary, ethical, and collaborative leadership.

In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, where threats respect no borders, the quality of leadership at every level — from heads of state to technical experts within regional commissions — will ultimately determine whether Africa and other regions merely survive successive crises or rise to build lasting stability and prosperity.

The challenge before current and future leaders is clear: to move beyond rhetoric and embrace the difficult work of forging unity, exercising foresight, upholding accountability, and investing in people-centred security solutions. Those who answer this call will not only secure their nations and regions but will also leave a legacy of peace that benefits generations yet unborn and contributes meaningfully to a more stable global order.

True security is not built by arms alone. It is built by leadership that dares to imagine, unite, and act for the common good.

Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, and resilient nation-building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.com, globalstageimpacts@gmail.com