The Oracle
The Oracle: The New Digital Colonialism: Navigating AI Policy Under Foreign Tech Dominance (Pt. 2)
Published
3 months agoon
By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
The inaugural installment of this piece was necessarily foundational, providing the background to the emergence of AI; how it transformed the digital space; applicable regulatory frameworks; its algorithimic transparency/accountability; its ethical dimensions and implications and the threat of foreign tech dominance/digital colonialism. This sophomore edition traces the evolution of AI; notable developments; the history of technological dependency in Africa and policy trends in the continent and beyond. Enjoy.
THE EVOLUTION OF AI
AI has progressed from rule-based systems to machine learning and deep learning models capable of autonomous decision-making. Applications range from healthcare diagnostics to autonomous vehicles, predictive policing, and financial algorithms. While AI enhances productivity, concerns arise over:
Job displacement due to automation. (Brynjolfsson, E., & McAfee, A. (2014). The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. W. W. Norton & Company).
Surveillance capitalism, where personal data is exploited for profit.
Algorithmic governance, where AI influences public policy without sufficient oversight (O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of Math Destruction. Crown Publishing.). The conceptual origins of Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be traced to the mid-20th century, when pioneering figures such as Alan Turing and John McCarthy began to explore the possibility of creating machines capable of simulating human intelligence. Turing’s seminal 1950 paper, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” posed the provocative question, “Can machines think?”—a question that laid the philosophical groundwork for modern AI research. (Turing, Alan M. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Mind 59, no. 236 (1950): 433–460.) McCarthy, who coined the term “artificial intelligence” in 1956, convened the historic Dartmouth Conference, widely considered the birth of AI as a formal field of inquiry (McCarthy, John et al., “A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence,” (1955).
EARLY ASPIRATIONS AND TECHNOLOGICAL MILESTONES
Early AI efforts focused on symbolic logic, rule-based systems, and expert systems, which relied on hand-coded rules to simulate decision-making processes. These systems, while limited in scope, found application in fields such as medical diagnostics (e.g., MYCIN) and chess-playing algorithms. The emergence of machine learning in the late 20th century—particularly supervised learning techniques—ushered in a new era in which machines could learn patterns from data rather than rely solely on pre-programmed rules.
The exponential growths in computing power, availability of big data, and algorithmic innovation have since culminated in what many scholars refer to as the “AI revolution.”
NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS
Notable developments include deep learning techniques powered by artificial neural networks, natural language processing exemplified by large language models (LLMs), and computer vision systems that rival or exceed human performance in specific domains (LeCun, Yann, Bengio, Yoshua, and Hinton, Geoffrey. “Deep Learning.” Nature 521, no. 7553 (2015): 436–444).
FROM AUTOMATION TO AUTONOMY
AI has transitioned from automating repetitive tasks to performing complex cognitive functions previously thought to be the exclusive domain of humans. Self-driving cars, AI legal assistants, autonomous drones, and AI-generated art demonstrate the breadth of AI’s applications. As these systems grow in sophistication, they increasingly exhibit autonomy—the capacity to make decisions and take actions without direct human intervention. This shift raises profound questions about accountability, transparency, and control.
ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPERENCY AND CONTROL
For example, autonomous weapons systems capable of selecting and engaging targets without human oversight challenge existing norms under international humanitarian law (IHL). Similarly, AI systems deployed in judicial or parole decisions raise concerns about bias, fairness, and due process, especially when the logic behind decisions is opaque even to their developers—a phenomenon referred to as the “black box problem.” (Pasquale, Frank. The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information. Harvard University Press, 2015).
HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCY IN AFRICA
The critique that digital technologies embody, enable, or reproduce colonial power relations is not new. As early as the 1970s, debates around communication and technology were linked to questions of sovereignty, inequality and dependency. In March 1976, at the Non-Aligned Media Seminar in Tunis, representatives from 38 NAM states and 13 observers declared that “colonialist, imperialist and racist powers have created effective means of information and communication which are conditioning the masses to the interests of these powers.” This seminar built on earlier efforts of the Non-Aligned Movement (est. 1955), which, by its 1973 Algiers summit, had embraced the decolonization of information, communication, and culture as part of the wider struggle for independence.
The Tunis meeting marked the birth of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO); a call to redress global inequalities in media ownership, information flows, and infrastructure. Tunisian minister Mustapha Masmoudi highlighted the imbalance: “Almost 80 percent of the world news flow emanates from the major transnational agencies; however these devote only 20 to 30 percent of news coverage to the developing countries”. NWICO gained traction at UNESCO, culminating in the 1980 MacBride Report, which directly challenged the Western doctrine of “free flow of information.” The United States and the UK eventually withdrew from UNESCO in protest, but NWICO left a lasting intellectual and political legacy: it framed global communication as a site of structural inequality and technological dependency.
Building on these debates, communication scholars introduced the idea of electronic colonialism. Herbert Schiller’s Mass Communication and American Empire argued that U.S. commercial media systems were becoming instruments of empire. Thomas McPhail later extended this, defining electronic colonialism as “the dependent relationship of poorer regions on post-industrial nations, caused and established by the importation of communication hardware and foreign-produced software, along with engineers, technicians and related information protocols” (Jacob Mahlangu, ‘Technological Apartheid: The Digital Divide Between Africa and the West’ (Sagepub.com, 6th May, 2025) < https://advance.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.31124/advance.174652029.93416488/v1#:~:text=The%20digital%20divide%20between%20Africa%20and%20the%20West%20represents%20not,colonialism%2C%20and%20contemporary%20digital%20imperialism). This lens made clear that dependency was not only economic but also infrastructural and epistemic.
Parallel critiques arose in anthropology and development studies. Post-development theorists such as Arturo Escobar and James Ferguson argued that development projects often failed to empower but instead re-entrenched colonial hierarchies. They identified technology as a key tool in this process, framed as a “solution” but often deployed in paternalistic ways that deepened dependency. ICT4D (Information and Communication Technologies for Development) initiatives of the late 1990s and early 2000s exemplified this tension. While promising to democratize knowledge and spur development, many projects replicated older patterns: reliance on imported technology, disregard for local context, and reinforcement of global asymmetries.
By the late 2000s, scholars in postcolonial computing extended these critiques to human–computer interaction (HCI). They demonstrated how design practices in “development tech” mirrored colonial flows: low-cost labor and raw materials from the Global South, transformed into finished products exported back under narratives of benevolence. The One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) project (< https://laptop.org/ > Accessed on 16th September, 2025) epitomized this, marketed as a humanitarian innovation but dependent on the feminized labour of Asian workers in global supply chains.
In 2013, Dal Yong Jin introduced platform imperialism, analyzing how U.S. tech giants like Google, Apple and Facebook exerted global dominance through platform capitalism, intellectual property regimes and cross-border expansion (Jin, Dal Yong, ‘“The Construction of Platform Imperialism in the Globalization Era.” Triple C: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal For a Global Sustainable Information Society’ ( Researchgate.net, January, 2013) < https://researchgate.net/publication/275652379_Jin_Dal_Yong_2013_The_Construction_of_Platform_Imperialism_in_the_Globalization_Era_Triple_C_Communication_Capitalism_Critique_Open_Access_Journal_For_a_Global_Sustainable_Information_Society_111_145-#:~:text=Abstract,accumulation%20in%20the%20digital%20age. > Accessed on 16th September, 2025). His argument made explicit that digital platforms were not neutral infrastructures but instruments of geopolitical power.
These intellectual trajectories resonate strongly with dependency theory, advanced by Samir Amin, which argued that underdevelopment in the Global South is not accidental but structurally produced through dependence on the North. Applied to technology, this means Africa’s reliance on imported hardware, software, and infrastructures reinforces systemic subordination in the global digital hierarchy. Postcolonial thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Edward Said similarly highlighted how colonialism survives in cultural, psychological, and technological forms, keeping the Global South positioned as consumer rather than producer.
From NWICO to electronic colonialism, from ICT4D critiques to postcolonial computing and platform imperialism, the throughline is clear: each era has witnessed renewed forms of technological dependency. What changes are the technologies themselves: satellites, mass media, ICTs, platforms, and now AI, but the structural critique persists. Today’s debates on digital colonialism continue this intellectual lineage, reframing old concerns around sovereignty, extraction and dependency in terms of data, algorithms and artificial intelligence. Far from a rupture, this is the latest chapter in a long struggle for technological self-determination in Africa and the wider Global South.
AI POLICY TRENDS GLOBALLY AND IN AFRICA
Global AI policy is crystallizing around a few core themes: risk-based regulation of high-impact systems, the embedding of human rights (< https://2021-2025.state.gov/risk-management-profile-for-ai-and-human-rights/#:~:text=In%20March%202024%2C%20all%20193,the%20enjoyment%20of%20human%20rights.%E2%80%9D > (State.gov, 25th July, 2024) Accessed on 10th September, 2025) and ethics principles, and the development of technical standards to operationalize trustworthiness. The European Union’s AI (https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai > Accessed on 10th September, 2025) Act illustrates this risk-based approach by classifying systems according to potential harm and imposing proportionate obligations, while still promoting innovation. Similarly, the OECD AI Principles (< https://oecd.ai/en/ai-principles > (OECD.ai) Accessed on 10th September, 2025), the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (US) (< www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework > (NIST.gov) Accessed on 10th September, 2025), and UNESCO’s global AI ethics recommendations (< www.unesco.org/en/artificial-intelligence/recommendation-ethics#:~:text=Recommendation%20on%20the%20Ethics%20of%20Artificial%20Intelligence,human%20oversight%20of%20AI%20systems. > (UNESCO.Org) Accessed on 10th September, 2025) provide international benchmarks centered on transparency, accountability, robustness, and human oversight.
USA, EU, CHINA’S PREFERENCES
National strategies, however, diverge. The United States favours voluntary, sector-specific frameworks to preserve innovation flexibility (Tatevik Davtyan, ‘THE U.S. APPROACH TO AI REGULATION: FEDERAL LAWS, POLICIES, AND STRATEGIES EXPLAINED’ (scholarlycommons.law.case.edu, 24th January, 2025) < https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?params=/context/jolti/article/1172/&path_info=auto_convert.pdf > Accessed on 10th September, 2025). China pursues a state-driven, techno-industrial strategy linking AI to national development goals(Kyle Chan, Gregory Smith, Jimmy Goodrich, Gerard Dipippo, Konstantin F, Pilz ‘China’s Evolving Industrial Policy for AI’ (Rand.org, 26th June, 2025) < www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA4012-1.html > Accessed on 10th September, 2025). The EU relies on its regulatory power (“the Brussels effect”) to set global supplier standards (Marco Almada, Anca Radu, ‘The Brussels Side-Effect: How the AI Act Can Reduce the Global Reach of EU Policy’ (Cambridge.org, 19th February, 2024) < www.cambridge.org/core/journals/german-law-journal/article/brussels-sideeffect-how-the-ai-act-can-reduce-the-global-reach-of-eu-policy/032C72AEC537EBB6AE96C0FD90387E3E > Accessed on 10th September, 2025). Together, these approaches create a patchwork of norms that countries and companies must navigate. (To be continued).
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
“Like all technologies before it, Artificial Intelligence will reflect the values of its creators. So inclusivity matters – from who designs it to who sits on the company boards and which ethical perspectives are included” – Kate Crawford
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The Oracle
The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 4)
Published
1 month agoon
May 22, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
In our last discourse on this series, we examined the procedure for enforcement of fundamental rights, including applications for leave; as well as the substantive application itself and the reactions that follow. Today, we shall continues from where we stopped with the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto and later x-ray the applications to squash proceedings; applications for production and/or release of persons restrained; orders for bail, production and access to medication. Please read on.
SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS (Continues)
In the case of LAWRENCE OLUSEGUN ADEYEMO V. C.O.P, OYO STATE ([2021] LPELR-56272(CA)), the applicant requested the court for a writ of habeas corpus under order 2 of the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) rules 1979 which provision enjoined the applicant to serve all parties who are or might be interested in the proceedings. Although the affected party had put up appearance, but raised a preliminary objection to the application for non-compliance with the statutory conditions. Babalakin. J. (as he then was) struck out the application on the ground that order 2(1)(4) is mandatory whether the application is for mandamus, certiorari, or habeas corpus.
However the Supreme Court in recent times in respect of the fundamental rights enforcements has favourably leaned towards the equitable principle of “Ubi Jus Ubi remedium”, therefore looking more at the substance rather than the form. Hence the liberalization of the procedure for the enforcement of fundamental rights as exposed in the case of ABACHA V. FAWEHINMI ((2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228) and UBI UJONG INAH & ORS V. MARCUS UKOI ((2001) (CA) 41981.
APPLICATION TO QUASH ANY PROCEEDINGS
Sometimes it may be necessary for an applicant by way of certiorari to apply to the court for an order that such proceedings be removed from a particular court or tribunal to another court for the purpose of being quashed for lack of power and/or jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings or make such order.
However, an applicant shall not be able to question the validity of any order, warrant, commitment, conviction, inquisition or record unless before the hearing of his application (Motion or summons), he has served a certified copy (CTC) thereof together with a Copy of the application on the Attorney-General of the Federation or of the State in which the applicant is being heard (as the case may be).
The court in granting an application seeking to quash proceedings, shall direct that the order, proceedings, conviction or the records of an inquisition be quashed forthwith upon being removed into the court hearing the application.
APPLICATION FOR PRODUCTION AND/OR RELEASE OF PERSON RESTRAINED
By virtue of Order 4 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court or judge to whom the application is made ex-parte may make an order forthwith for his release from such detention.
The court may also direct that an originating summons (as in form 2) be issued or that an application therefore be made by notice of motion (as in form 3). The court may also as it deem fit adjourn the ex-parte application so that notice thereof may be given to the person against whom the order for the release of the applicant is sought.
ORDER FOR BAIL, PRODUCTION, AND ACCESS TO MEDICATION
Pursuant to order 4 of the bail application, the court upon application may grant to the detainee reliefs including bail, production of the detainee, access to mediation etc.
The court may grant bail at ex-parte stage, pending the substantive application. Where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court may subject to its discretion order that the person restrained be produced in court. And where such order is so made, it shall constitute a sufficient warrant to any superintendent of a prison, police officer in charge of a police station, police officer in charge of the complainant or any other person responsible for his detention, to produce or ensure the production of the person so restrained or detained in court.
For the purpose of enforcing a person’s fundamental rights, no matter where a detainee is kept he can be allowed access to his personal physician or medically prescribed drugs.
It suffices to note here, that once an order has been made by the court pursuant to the Enforcement Rules, and for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights provided for in the constitution, such order must be complied with. Failure to obey or comply with any order so made by the court under these rules will incur proceedings for the committal of the party disobeying such an order.
CONCLUSION
Without any controversy, the idea of human rights and personal liberties has become firm and secured. The universality and immutability of human rights are now globally accepted. Consequently, any nation that slacks or shyies away from the diligent protection and enforcement of human rights stand the precarious risk of being shunned by decent and civilised nations. The United Nations seems to have captured the importance and primacy of the issue of human rights and its protection when it poignantly stated as follows:
“Human Rights and fundamental freedoms are the birth right of all human beings, their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Government” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
It is the duty of every Government everywhere and every courts of law in every jurisdiction to promote, protect, uphold, and ensure enforcement of fundamental Human rights at all times, because these rights encapsulate the very essence of man.
The end.
THOUGHTS FOR THE WEEK
“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI.
“Because no matter who we are or where we come from, we’re all entitled to the basic human rights of clean air to breathe, clean water to drink, and healthy land to call home”. – Martin Luther King III
“Human rights are not only violated by terrorism, repression or assassination, but also by unfair economic structures that creates huge inequalities”. – Pope Francis.
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The Oracle
The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 3)
Published
1 month agoon
May 15, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
Last week’s installment examined amongst others, the features of what constitutes violation of fundamental rights and posed the question- whether enforcement of such rights is restricted to the mechanism of the FREP Rules? This week contuse the same theme by discussing the procedure for enforcing fundamental rights, including applications for leave; the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto. Please read on.
PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT (Continues)
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal (Benin Division) dilated on the procedure in the case of N.U.T Vs. COSST ((2007) 23 E-WRN / 03 (CA).), thus:
“By virtue of Order 1 rule 2(2) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, no application for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement within that state of any such rights shall be made unless leave therefore has been granted in accordance with the rules. Thus, while an applicant can approach the High Court in a state where the infringement of his rights occurs or is likely to occur for redress he has to obtain leave of the appropriate High Court before he can apply to enforce his rights. In the instant case, even if the case was a fundamental right case the suit was not commended by due process, as the respondents approached the court by way of originating summons contrary to the provision of Order 1 rule 2(2) of the Fundamental Right (Enforcement) Rules.
An application for the enforcement of fundamental right becomes incompetent if the main claim does not fall within the ambit or precinct of chapter IV of the Constitution. Any claim that falls outside chapter IV of the Constitution becomes ancillary claim. Therefore, for an applicant for enforcement of fundamental rights to be competent, it must be within the provisions of chapter IV of the Constitution.
This point reverberated in W.A.E.C Vs. Akinwumi, (2008) JELR 49485 (SC), where the Supreme Court succinctly held that:
“In ascertaining the justicieability or competence of a suit commenced by way of application under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, the court must ensure that the enforcement of the fundamental rights under chapter IV of the Constitution is the claim and not ancillary claim. Where the claim is not the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be said to be properly invoked, and the action is liable to be struck out on ground of incompetence.”
Also, in Unilorin Vs. Oluwadare (2008) JELR 55842 (CA), the court adumbrated the point as follows, when it held that:
“When an application is brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979, a condition precedent to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction is that the enforcement of fundamental rights or the securing of the enforcement thereof should be the main claim and not an accessory claim. Enforcement of fundamental right or securing the enforcement thereof should, from the appellant’s claim as presented, be the principal or fundamental claim as presented, and not accessory claim. However, where the main claim or principal claim is not the enforcement or securing the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be properly exercised as it will be incompetent. In the instant case, the respondent’s claim, being a challenge to his expulsion as a student from the 1st Appellant institution, is not one of those claims/reliefs envisaged by the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules.
See also Gafar Vs. Govt., Kwara State, (2007) JELR 53915 (SC); Unical Vs. Ugochukwu 2007-LD-CA-232.
It is important to note that an applicant seeking redress for the infringement of his Fundamental Rights shall in addition to declaratory and injunctive orders also be entitled to an award of damages. This is because in fundamental right cases, the law presumes that damages flow naturally from the injury suffered by the victim as a result of the violation of the rights.
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
By virtue of Judgment (Enforcement) Rules in Nigeria, no application for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement within a state, of any such rights shall be made unless leave therefore has been granted in accordance with these rules. Also, any application for such leave must be made ex-parte to the appropriate court and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought, and grounds on which it is sought and by an affidavit verifying the facts relied on.
The deadline for filling an application for leave is not later than 12 (twelve) Months after the date of the happening of the event complained of, unless the judge is satisfied that extenuating circumstances exist. In case of ongoing act, an action can be brought after 12 Months deadline, at any point during the continuation of the wrong. An applicant must however file the application for leave not later than the day preceding the date of hearing. The court may in granting leave to the applicant impose such terms and condition as it may deem fit, as security for cost.
It is to be noted that leave once granted, shall operate as a stay of all actions relating to or connected with a complaint which forms the subject matter of the application until the determination of the substantive suit.
The ex-parte application for leave must specify the provisions of the enforcement procedure Rules under which it is brought, the precise content of the relief to be requested once the application for leave has been granted and cursory reference to relevant laws. This must be accompanied by an affidavit verifying relevant facts to be relied on.
The deadline for filing an application for leave is not later than 12(twelve) months after the date of the happening of the event complained of, unless the judge is satisfied that extenuating circumstances exist. In cases of ongoing act, an action can be brought after 12month deadline, at any point during the continuation of the wrong. An applicant must however file the application for leave not later than the day preceding the date of hearing. The court may in granting leave to the applicant impose such terms and conditions as it may deem fit, as security for cost.
It is to be noted that leave once granted, shall operate as a stay of all actions relating to or connected with a complaint which forms the subject matter of the application until the determination of the substantive suit.
The ex-parte application for leave must specify the provisions of the enforcement procedure Rules under which it is brought, the precise content of the relief to be requested once the application for leave has been granted and a cursory reference to relevant laws. This must be accompanied by an affidavit verifying relevant facts to be relied on.
SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS
After obtaining leave, the applicant can apply for an enforcement order by way of NOTICE OF MOTION (as in form 1) or ORIGINATING SUMMONS (as in form 2). In the celebrated case of SHUGABA, A. DARMAN V. MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & ORS. ((1981) 2 NCLR 459). It was held inter-alia that the proper procedure to be followed in an application for enforcement or securing the enforcement of fundamental rights and redress for violation of same is guided by the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rule 1979 which requires that where leave has been granted to apply for the order being asked the application for, such order must be made by notice of motion or originating summons to the appropriate court.
The motion or summons, together with a copy of the statement submitted in conjunction with the application for leave, must then be served on all persons directly affected. Unless the court directs otherwise, there must be at least 8 clear days between service of the motion or summons and the date fixed for hearing.
A substantive application either by motion or summons seeking for substantive reliefs, remedies or orders may include such prayers as:
a. Unconditional release of the detainee
b. Payment of a certain sum of money as compensation in the event of the arrest and detention being illegal, unwarranted, null and void.
The court may equally make any other ancillary order after hearing argument from counsel on all sides based on the affidavit and counter-affidavit.
It should be noted that failure to adhere to the procedure laid down by the Enforcement Rules may lead to the entire proceedings being nullified. The court shall upon objection being raised for non-compliance with the rules strike the entire proceedings out. (To be continued).
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI
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The Oracle
The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 1)
Published
2 months agoon
May 1, 2026By
Eric
By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN
INTRODUCTION
Man as distinct from other beings is rational and has morals. He has the power of reason which enables him to differentiate between right and wrong, between good and bad, and also between justice and injustice. He therefore possesses honour and dignity which are higher than that of other beings. Human rights are necessary to protect this honour and dignity which nature has bestowed on human kind. They ensure (where these rights are enforced) that human kind is not degraded or made inhumane. Chapter IV (Sections 17-32) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963, had provided that:
“No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman degrading punishment or other treatment.”
This has been replicated in section 3 of the 1999 Constitution. Equally, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Right, 1984 declares that:
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and right. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”
There is therefore a great need to protect and ensure the protection of these inherent rights and freedoms.
WHAT IS A RIGHT?
Before discussing the ways and means by which one may enforce his fundamental human rights, it is apposite to first understand the context in which “right” is used.
‘Right’ in ordinary language means power of free action; a demand, inherent in one person and incident upon another. It is an interest recognized by law, respect for which is a duty and disregard of which is wrong. It refers to the cultural, political, social, economic advantage to which a person has just claim, either morally or in law. It is distinct from privilege.
Right described as ‘human’ refers to a category of rights which are specified and in most cases protected by law. Every human being is entitled to such rights and no person may be denied of such rights except through the due process of law. Cranston therefore holds the strong view that:
“A human right is something of which no one may be deprived without a great affront to justice. These are certain deeds which should never be invaded some things which are supremely sacred”
Kayode Eso, JSC. (as he then was) re-affirmed the importance of human rights in RANSOME KUTI Vs. A-G OF THE FEDERATION, (1985) CLR 6(d) (SC), when he said of human rights:
“… It is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact is antecedent to the political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilized existence… and what has been done is to have these rights enshrined in the Constitution so that the rights could be immutable to the extent of the non-immutability of the constitution itself.”
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS?
“Fundamental rights” are generally regarded as those aspects of human rights which have been recognized and entrenched in the constitution of a country. They are specially provided for to enhance human dignity and liberty in every modern state. In the Nigerian context, the terms “human right”, “fundamental right” and “fundamental human right” are always used interchangeably. This has been justified by a learned author who posited forcefully that:
“Human rights remain so, whether they occur in the international plane or within municipal confines and whether they are called ‘human rights’ or ‘fundamental rights’. It should be noted that the international bill of rights – the universal declaration of Human rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- use the expression fundamental human rights, so also the U.N charter.” (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948).
Since the Constitution specifically provides for fundamental rights, Nigerian Court have found it expedient to draw a line of dichotomy between ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental rights’. Thus, in UZOUKWU & ORS Vs. EZEONU II & ORS, (1991) 6 NWLR (pt 200) p. 708, the Court of Appeal (per Nasir P. C. A) put in with apt clarity and lucidity:
“Due to the development of Constitutional law in the field, distinct difference has emerged between ‘Fundamental Right’ and ‘Human Rights’. It may be recalled that human rights were derived from and out of the wider concept of natural rights. They are rights which every civilized society must accept as belonging to each person as human being. These were termed human rights. When the United Nations made its declaration it was in respect of Human Rights which belong to all human beings irrespective of citizenship, race, religion and so on. This has now formed part of international law. Fundamental Rights remain in the realm of domestic law. They are fundamental because they have been guaranteed by the fundamental law of the country, that is by the Constitution.”
Nature and Classification of Human Rights
Human rights are generally grouped under five sub-headings namely; Civil Rights, Political Rights, Social Rights, Economic Rights and Cultural Rights. We shall however discuss these classifications under two broad further categorization, that is:
Civil and Political Rights: these includes the right to self-determination, the right to life, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, freedom from slavery and forced labour, the right to fair trial, right to privacy, freedom of thought conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, the right of assembly, freedom of association, and movement, the right to marry and found a family, the right to participate in one’s Government either directly or through freely elected representatives, and the right to nationality and equality before the law.
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC Rights) include the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to organize, form and join trade unions, the right to social security, the right to collective bargaining, the right to property, the right to education, the right to participate in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.
The importance of these rights cannot be over emphasized. So important are they that they have been universally recognized and acclaimed by the international community. The universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other United Nations Covenant on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human race on an equal scale as the foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the world.
NOW THIS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA AND INTERNATIONAL CHARTERS AND CONVENTIONS
The emergence of human rights in documented form in Nigeria can be traced to the Nigeria Bill of Rights of 1959. This was incorporated into the 1960 Independence Constitution in 1963; these rights were reproduced 111 of the 1963 Republican Constitution. These fundamental human rights are provided for in Chapter Iv of both the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with some improvements.
The reverence of these human rights can be seen from their recognition, promotion and protection under international law. Charters and Conventions have been globally drawn, and under various economic, geographical and political blocs for the promotion and protection from abuse of these rights. The United Nation (UN) has been championing the global protection of these rights as can be seen from the various chapters of the UN charter. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1984) proclamation states as follows:
“This Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all the end that every individual and every organ of society keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measure, national and international to secure observance both among people of member states themselves and among people of territories under their jurisdiction.”
Article 30 of the Charter further provides thus:
“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any action aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”
The Declaration by its provisions sets out the minimum standard to be observed by countries of the world in relation to human rights.
There is also the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights which has become, in Nigeria, a potent source of quick remedy against gross violation of human rights under municipal laws which remedy could not be traced to the laws because of ouster clauses built in them. The charter has since been ratified in Nigeria as African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap 10 1 FN 1990. The importance of the African Charter was underlined by Eniola Longe J, in the case of MOHAMMED GARUBA & ORS V. A.G OF LAGOS STATE & ORS (Unreported Suit No. ID/559/90), when he held:
“The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of which Nigeria is a signatory is now made into our law… Even if its aspect in our constitution is suspended or ousted by provisions of our local law, the international aspect of it cannot be unilaterally abrogated…”
AND THIS LIMITATION ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Under section 45 of the 1999 Constitution and many constitutional expressions of fundamental rights, certain qualifications or restriction which are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society are incorporated in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health or for the purpose protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons. Consequently, the aforesaid rights are generally subjected to these limitations.
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Procedure for the enforcement of the fundamental rights provisions enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is guided and regulated by the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979. It is pertinent to state here that the above rules are made pursuant to the powers conferred on the Chief Justice of Nigeria by section 46(3) of the Constitution, which provided thus:
“The Chief Justice of Nigeria may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purpose of this section.” (To be continued).
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
“Each state, so that it does not abridge the great fundamental rights belonging, under the Constitution, to all citizens, may grant or withhold such civil rights as it pleases; all that is required is that, in this respect, its laws shall be impartial”. (Lyman Trumbull).
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