Opinion
The Oracle: The NASS Cannot Amend the Constitution Through the Back Door
Published
4 years agoon
By
Eric
By Mike Ozekhome
In these trying times of our beleaguered Nation, the NASS should concentrate more on creatively making laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria. The recent amendment to the Electoral Act has caused too much needless national hoopla and ruckus. It ought not have been at the centre stage in a sane society. Is barring certain classes of persons from contesting elections simply because they are government appointees Nigeria’s bane at the moment? I think not.
Earlier, the NASS had, by its earlier proposed section 52(3) the amendment bill, sought to strip INEC of its control over elections and subject INEC to the control and supervision of the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) on the critical but sore issue of electronic voting and transmission of results.
This fatal step was later reluctantly reversed after Nigerians rose against it. I had spilled buckets of ink and made several television appearances, advocating to get it extirpated, root and branch, from the amendment bill. The NASS had ignored the fact that under section 158 of the 1999 Constitution, INEC “shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person”. They comfortably forgot that it is INEC and INEC alone that is responsible for organizing and supervising all elections to political offices; registering, monitoring of political parties; and conducting voter and civic education, including promotion of sound democratic processes. See also section 153 (f).
THE ALBATROS IN SECTION 84(12), (13) OF THE AMENDED ELECTORAL ACT
The NASS while amending the Electoral Act inserted subsections 12 and 13 into section 84 which, unlawfully, illegally and unconstitutionally disenfranchised serving political office holders from voting or being voted for at conventions or congresses of political parties. The offensive section 84(12) had provided thus:
“No political appointee at any level shall be voting delegate or to be voted for at the convention or congress of any political party for the purpose of the nomination of candidates for any election”.
Section 84 (13) drives this home, more pungently, thus:
“Where a political party fails to comply with the provisions of this Act in the conduct of its primaries, its candidate for the election shall not be included in the election for the particular position in issue”.
THE ALARMING OUSTER CLAUSE IN THE AMENDED ELECTORAL ACT
I am surprised that all the critics of the Federal High Court judgement in Umuahia delivered by the Honourable Justice Evelyn Anyadike have not adverted their minds to the more worrisome provision in section 84 (15), which, after granting the Federal High Court jurisdiction in section 84 (14), to entertain cases from “an aspirant who complains that the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party have not been complied with in selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court for redress”, went on to oust the jurisdiction of all courts on matters concerning primaries, thus:
“Nothing in this section shall empower the courts to stop the holding of primaries or general elections under this Act pending the determination of a suit”.
Interpreted in another way, section 84(15) is saying:
“Courts, please, allow political parties to first do maximum damage during their primaries and general elections, and subsequently entertain emerging suits thereafter after the wrong candidates would have emerged and after resources, time and energy would have been wasted by individuals, political parties, INEC and the electorate to conduct sham elections”. I am worried by this obnoxious ouster clause.
I believe that the above subsections are totally unconstitutional. They are ultra vires the powers of the NASS. What the NASS intended to do by subsections 12 and 13 of section 84 is to amend the Constitution through the backdoor, without going through the tortuous process prescribed in section 9 thereof; which deals with the mode of altering the provisions of the Constitution.
PRESIDENT BUHARI’S EARLIER OBJECTION
President Muhammadu Buhari had initially kicked and refused to assent to the Electoral Bill as initially amended by the NASS, which contained the above sub section. To escape from the avalanche of criticisms that trailed his initial withholding of assent, Buhari later reluctantly signed the Bill into Law; but with a caveat vide a letter to the NASS, to consider amending section 84(12) subsequently. He believed that subsection 84(12) imported into the Constitution extraneous matters such as blanket restriction and disqualification of political appointees who ought to be accorded protection. His argument is that a public officer could resign his office, withdraw or retire from service 30 days before the date of election in accordance with section 66(1) (f) of the 1999 Constitution. I think his handlers should have simply done an Executive amendment bill to the NASS; not a mere letter. But, I agree with his serious reservations about section 84(12).
WHY SECTION 84(12) AND (13) ARE OFFENSIVE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
QUALIFICATION AND DISQUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION
Sections 66 and 107 of the 1999 Constitution provide for circumstances under which certain public officers are qualified or disqualified from contesting for election.
QUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION
Let us start with sections 65 (1) and (2) and 106 of the Constitution which deal with qualification for election, as a member of Senate and House of Representatives; and House of Assembly respectively. See also sections 137(1) (g) and 182(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution.
These sections provide that such a person for Senate or House of Representatives or member House of Assembly of a state shall be qualified to contest election if he is a citizen of Nigeria and has attained the age of 35 years (30 years for a House of Representatives members; and 25 years for a House of Assembly member); is educated up to at least school certificate level or its equivalent; and he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party.
DISQUALIFICATION FOR ELECTION
By virtue of sections 66 (1) and 107 (1) respectively any of the above the Constitution, persons also is disqualified if he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a country other than Nigeria; adjudged to be a lunatic or a person of unsound mind; is under a sentence of death, imposed on him by a court of competent jurisdiction; or a sentence of imprisonment or fine involving dishonesty or fraud. Such a person is also not qualified if he is an undischarged bankrupt; is a member of any secret society; or he has presented a forged certificate to INEC.
The most critical subsection for our discussion here, is section 66(1) (f) which provides that if such a person is employed in the “Public service of the Federation” or “Public service of a state” and has not resigned, withdrawn or retired from such employment THIRTY DAYS before the date of election for a State, he shall be disqualified from contesting or being voted for.
Sections 107 (1), 147 (4) and 192(3) deal with offices of ministers of the Government of the Federation and Commissioners in a state, respectively. A minister or Commissioner shall be deemed to have “resigned” his membership of the National Assembly or a state House of Assembly upon taking the Oath of office as a minister or Commissioner.
THE EXTANT LAWS
It is therefore clear, per adventure, that aside the circumscribing and inhibiting factors restricting a public appointee from contesting offices as described above, section 84 (12) and 13 are unconstitutional, illegal, null, void and of no effect whatsoever in so far as they import other extraneous disqualifying factors not provided for or envisaged by the Constitution. The NASS cannot import into the Constitution other additional disqualifying factors.
SECTION 84(12) & (13) ALSO CONTRAVENE SECTIONS 40 AND 42 OF THE CONSTITUTION
Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution grants every Nigerian the right to assemble and associate freely with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interests. See Motorcycle Transport Union of Nigeria & ors vs. Delta state Motorcyclist Assoc & ors (2010) LPELR 4503 (CA); Lafia LG vs. Executive Governor Nassarawa state & Ors (2012) LPELR 20602 (SC).
In addition to the above, section 42 accords every Nigerian the right to freedom from discrimination. See Okafor & ors vs Ntoka (2017) LPELR – 42794 (CA); NMCN vs Adesina (2016) LPELR – 40610 (CA) The question is, why will any Nigerian be prevented or barred from being “a voting delegate or to be voted for at the convention or Congress of any political party for the nomination of candidates for any election” when the Constitution (the supreme law) has exhaustively outlined factors barring a person from contesting?
SECTIONS 84 AND 318 OF THE CONSTITUTION CONSIDERED
Section 66(1) (8) only provides for “public service” of the federation or the “public service of a state”. Do political appointees such as ministers, commissioners and personal aids qualify to be protected by these sections. I believe so.
Some people have argued that it is only public servants envisaged in section 84 and as defined in section 318 of the Constitution that are covered by the 30 days resignation notice. Political Appointees who hold offices at the pleasure of their appointor are not public servants within the meaning and intendment of sections 84 and 318 of the Constitution, they pontificate.
Specifically, the Court of Appeal in ONI v. FAYEMI & ORS (2019) LPELR-46622(CA) held that:
“A Minister, being a mere political appointee, cannot be regarded as an employee in the Public Service of the Federation and is consequently not constitutionally caught by the 30 days resignation rule imposed on employees in the Public Service”.
See also the following apposite cases:
Wilson v. Ag, Bendel state & Ors. (1985) LPELR-3496 (SC); PPA v. PDP & ORS (2009) LPELR-4865(CA); Shitta-Bey v. AG Federation & Anor (1995) LPELR-3055 (SC); Abubakar v. The Executive Governor, Gombe state & Ors (2002) LPELR-1124 (CA); MILITARY GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE V. ADEWUNMI (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 82) 280; Ojukwu v. Yar’ Adua (2008) 4NWLR (Pt. 1078/435; AG BENDEL STATE V. AIDEYAN (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 118) 646; ADAMU V. TAKORI (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt 540) 1387 (CA).
I earnestly believe the attention of these courts was NEVER specifically drawn to the definition of “Public Service of the Federation” and “Public Service of a State”. The definition of “Public Service” of the Federation means the service of the Federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation and includes…….”. The definition of “Public Service of the State” means the service of the State “in any capacity in respect of the Government of the state and includes service as …..”.
Thus, in both cases, the clause “any capacity” is used for both the Federal and State governments. Can anyone plausably argue that ministers, commissioners and other appointees of Mr president or a Governor of a State who draw their salaries, allowances and other perquisites of office from the Federal or State treasury are not engaged in “any capacity” in “respect of the Government of the Federation and State Government”? The other offices lined up in this interpretation section of 318 are merely in addition to, as the section specifically states that the specie of public officers outlined therein is merely in addition to those employed in “any capacity” in both the Federal and state Governments. (To be continued next week)
THE WORLD WE LIVE IN
“If you want to achieve something, you have to forget the boundaries that people create. No one knows your capabilities more than you” – (Anonymous).
THOUGHT FOR THE WEEK
“The illegal we do immediately. The unconstitutional takes a little longer.” (Henry Kissinger).
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Opinion
Packed Centres and Penalty Heartbreak: How UCL Final Captured the City’s Imagination
Published
1 day agoon
June 6, 2026By
Eric
By Shakirat Akintola
The undeniable magnetic pull of elite European football was on full display as thousands of local enthusiasts filled viewing hubs, sports lounges, and open-air centers across Cities to witness the 2026 UEFA Champions League Final. The high-stakes encounter between Paris Saint-Germain and Arsenal effectively transformed standard weekend spots into arenas of intense passion and collective suspense.
Long before the 8:00 PM kickoff, popular viewing venues across the municipality were already recording unprecedented turnouts. Seats were fully booked hours in advance, prompting operators to arrange auxiliary seating, while latecomers lined the perimeters just to catch a glimpse of the screens. The crowd represented a vivid cross-section of the local football community: dedicated Arsenal supporters hopeful for a historic continental crown, and a vocal contingent of rival enthusiasts eager to witness the drama unfold.
The atmosphere fluctuated sharply through 120 minutes of grueling football, punctuated by the sharp commentary and spirited debates characteristic of local match-day culture. When Arsenal’s Kai Havertz opened the scoring in the 6th minute, the ensuing roar was deafening, momentarily uniting strangers in celebration. However, the equilibrium shifted completely when PSG’s Ousmane Dembélé converted a 65th-minute penalty, elevating the tension to a fever pitch as the game stretched into a exhausting period of extra time.
With local power infrastructure traditionally tested during peak weekend hours, venue operators relied heavily on heavy-duty backup generators to ensure uninterrupted transmission of the broadcast. Ultimately, the pinnacle of European club football was decided by a tense penalty shootout, culminating in a 4-3 victory for PSG after a 1-1 aggregate draw.
While the final whistle dealt a heavy emotional blow to the local Arsenal faithful, it triggered immediate celebrations among neutral observers, capping off an evening of unparalleled community engagement.
“The turnout yesterday surpassed our expectations,” noted a prominent sports lounge manager in the area. “We had to expand our seating capacity outdoors to accommodate the crowd. Win or lose, an event of this magnitude serves as the ultimate weekend anchor for our people.”
Beyond the tactical display on the pitch in Budapest, Saturday’s massive turnout underscored a broader reality: in our communities, European football finals are no longer merely televised sports events—they have evolved into vital social rituals that define the weekend landscape.
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Opinion
The Trials of Leadership in National Security: Lessons, Challenges and Enduring Solutions
Published
1 day agoon
June 6, 2026By
Eric
By Tolulope A. Adegoke
“True leadership in security is not measured by the strength of weapons or the reach of intelligence, but by the courage to protect the vulnerable, the wisdom to unite the divided, and the integrity to build systems that endure beyond fear — transforming the trials of today into the foundations of a safer, more just tomorrow.” – Tolulope A. Adegoke, PhD
Leadership in security matters is among the most demanding responsibilities any head of state or government can bear. It requires balancing the protection of lives and property with respect for human rights, navigating complex political pressures, managing limited resources, and responding to both visible and invisible threats. In many nations, especially in Africa, the trials of leadership in this domain reveal deep structural, historical, and human challenges. Yet, they also offer profound opportunities for authentic leadership to emerge — leadership that is ethical, strategic, inclusive, and people-centred. This write-up examines these trials through the lenses of Nigeria, broader Africa, and the wider world, before proposing comprehensive, viable, and sustainable solutions that can safeguard lives, properties, businesses, and national stability without compromising democratic values or human dignity.
The Nigerian Experience: Leadership Under Fire
Nigeria presents one of the most complex case studies of leadership trials in security. As Africa’s most populous nation and largest economy, it faces multiple, overlapping threats: Boko-Haram insurgency in the Northeast, banditry and kidnapping in the Northwest, farmer-herder conflicts in the Middle Belt, separatist agitations in the Southeast, and urban crime in major cities, which cut across the entirety.
Successive Nigerian leaders have grappled with these challenges under intense public scrutiny. The Buhari administration (2015–2023) prioritised military offensives against Boko-Haram, achieving territorial gains, but struggling with asymmetric warfare, intelligence gaps, and humanitarian consequences. The current Tinubu administration has emphasised a “whole-of-government” approach, combining kinetic operations with socio-economic interventions. However, persistent challenges such as corruption in security procurement, poor coordination between agencies, inadequate funding for intelligence, and the politicisation of security appointments continue to undermine effectiveness.
The trials here are multifaceted: limited political will in some quarters, ethnic and religious dimensions that complicate responses, inadequate technological infrastructure for modern policing, and the sheer scale of the country’s geography and population. Leadership in Nigeria’s security space has often been reactive rather than proactive, with short-term military solutions sometimes overshadowing long-term governance and development strategies.
Broader African Context: Patterns and Variations
Across Africa, leadership trials in security share common threads but manifest differently. In the Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), military coups have complicated counter-terrorism efforts, with new juntas struggling to balance sovereignty concerns with the need for international support. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia’s leadership faced the devastating Tigray conflict, highlighting how internal political disputes can rapidly escalate into humanitarian catastrophes.
The Democratic Republic of Congo continues to battle armed groups in the East, where weak state presence, illegal mineral exploitation, and regional interference create a vicious cycle. South Sudan and Somalia illustrate the immense difficulty of building security institutions from near-zero capacity after prolonged conflict.
What unites these cases is the tension between sovereignty and effectiveness, limited state capacity, and the challenge of addressing both immediate security threats and underlying drivers such as poverty, youth unemployment, and governance deficits. Leadership that succeeds tends to combine military resolve with political inclusion and development-focused interventions. Failures often stem from over-reliance on force, exclusionary politics, or inability to coordinate national and regional responses.
Global Perspectives: Universal Lessons
Globally, leadership trials in security are equally evident. The United States has faced challenges in balancing domestic security with civil liberties, particularly in the post-9/11 era. Colombia’s long struggle against FARC and drug cartels showed how sustained leadership, institutional reform, and international partnerships can eventually yield results. Sri Lanka’s post-civil war experience highlights both the possibilities of reconciliation and the dangers of majoritarian policies that alienate minorities.
These global cases reinforce a key lesson: authentic security leadership is never purely military. It requires integrating intelligence, law enforcement, justice, development, and diplomacy. Leaders who ignore any of these elements often achieve temporary calm at the cost of long-term instability.
The Hallmarks of Authentic Leadership in Security
Authentic leadership in security matters is defined by several non-negotiable traits:
- Strategic Foresight: Anticipating threats through robust intelligence and early warning systems.
- Ethical Balance: Protecting citizens without violating their rights.
- Inclusive Approach: Ensuring security policies do not disproportionately target specific ethnic or religious groups.
- Institutional Building: Investing in professional, well-equipped, and accountable security agencies.
- Transparency and Accountability: Regular public reporting and independent oversight.
- Regional and International Cooperation: Recognising that no nation can secure itself in isolation.
Comprehensive Solutions and the Way Forward
To overcome these trials, the following integrated solutions are recommended:
For Nigeria: Building a Cohesive National Security Architecture
- Creation of a National Security and Development Council: This high-level body should bring together security agencies, economic ministries, state governors, traditional rulers, and civil society to align security strategies with socio-economic interventions. Regular town hall meetings should be institutionalised to incorporate grassroots perspectives.
- Community-Oriented Policing and Intelligence Reform: Strengthen community policing by recruiting and training local officers who understand cultural dynamics. Establish neighbourhood watch systems with legal backing and technology support (CCTV, drones, and data analytics) to improve early warning and response.
- Youth Empowerment and Deradicalisation Programmes: Launch a National Youth Security and Prosperity Initiative targeting at-risk youths with vocational training, entrepreneurship grants, mentorship, and psychological support. Partner with faith-based organisations and traditional leaders for culturally sensitive deradicalisation efforts.
- Security Sector Reform and Professionalisation: Increase funding for training, welfare, and modern equipment while introducing performance-based promotions and independent oversight boards to reduce corruption and improve accountability.
- Judicial and Legislative Strengthening: Fast-track security-related cases through specialised courts and ensure adequate funding for the justice system to reduce impunity.
For Africa: Continental and Regional Solutions
- Strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): The African Union should fully operationalise the African Standby Force with dedicated funding and rapid deployment protocols. Regular joint exercises with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) will improve interoperability.
- Establishment of an African Security Academy: A continental institution to train a new generation of ethical, professional security leaders in modern intelligence, counter-terrorism, cyber security, and human rights-compliant operations.
- Harmonised Migration and Border Management Framework: Develop clear, humane policies that facilitate legal labour mobility while strengthening border controls against criminal networks. Joint border posts and shared intelligence platforms between ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD would reduce irregular migration pressures.
- Economic Integration as Security Strategy: Accelerate the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) implementation with special focus on youth employment, women’s economic empowerment, and cross-border value chains. Shared prosperity reduces the desperation that fuels conflict and migration.
Global and Systemic Solutions
- Responsible International Partnerships: Global partners should shift from short-term military aid to long-term capacity building in governance, justice, and economic development. Support should be conditioned on transparency and human rights compliance.
- Diaspora Engagement Frameworks: African governments should create structured programmes to harness the skills, capital, and networks of the diaspora for national development and peacebuilding.
- Global Norms on Arms Control and Conflict Financing: Strengthen international cooperation to curb the flow of small arms and illegal minerals that fuel African conflicts.
Building a United Africa Mindset: Cultural and Educational Transformation
Sustainable security requires changing how citizens think. A genuine United Africa mindset can be cultivated through:
- Pan-African Education Curriculum: Teach shared African history, Ubuntu philosophy, and success stories of regional cooperation from primary school onwards.
- Youth and Cultural Exchange Programmes: Expand scholarships, sports tournaments, arts festivals, and technology bootcamps that connect young Africans across borders.
- Media and Storytelling Initiatives: Support content creators who highlight positive intra-African collaboration and shared identity.
- Citizen Diplomacy Platforms: Encourage town twinning, joint community development projects, and people-to-people initiatives between different African nations.
Conclusion: Leadership as the Bridge to Enduring Security
The trials of leadership in security matters reveal both the fragility and resilience of states. In Nigeria, Africa, and the wider world, the challenges are immense, but they are not insurmountable. Authentic leadership — courageous, ethical, inclusive, strategic, and people-centred — remains the most reliable bridge between threat and safety, between division and unity, between fragility and resilience.
The way forward demands a fundamental shift: from reactive security to proactive peace-building, from militarised responses to holistic development, and from narrow national interests to enlightened regional solidarity. When leaders embrace this higher calling, they do not merely manage crises — they transform societies.
Africa, and indeed the world, does not need perfect leaders. It needs honest, committed, and visionary ones who understand that the ultimate measure of security leadership is not the number of weapons acquired, but the number of lives protected, dignities restored, and futures secured. The time for such leadership is now.
Dr. Tolulope A. Adegoke, AMBP-UN is a globally recognized scholar-practitioner and thought leader at the nexus of security, governance, and strategic leadership. His mission is dedicated to advancing ethical governance, strategic human capital development, resilient nation building, and global peace. He can be reached via: tolulopeadegoke01@gmail.com, globalstageimpacts@gmail.com
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Opinion
Nigeria’s Persistent Insecurity Challenge and It’s Stark Realities
Published
2 days agoon
June 5, 2026By
Eric
Prof Soji Adejumo
As Nigeria continues to battle insecurity from all fronts, an alarming trend has surfaced. The strategic kidnapping of school children and teachers portend grave dangers for the progress and development of Nigeria. By making schools and religious worship sites lethal targets, the foundation of educational development and habitat of faith based ethical codes and moral instructions for societal development are under existential threats. What is more alarming is the apparent inability of state and national security forces to dislodge the terrorists from their strongholds. No nation can survive in an environment of insecurity, fear and wanton destruction of lives without any hope of a robust response by government forces.
A situation where terrorists and bandits dictate bizarre and humiliating terms of negotiations to Government and state actors will ultimately force government to go on its knees to appease these _bestiae in carne humana_ or animals in human skins.
The recent abduction of school pupils and teachers in Oriire Local Government of Oyo State and brutal killing of some teachers has shown how seriously weakened the national security architecture is. The most relevant question now is: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” (who Guards the guards?). When the national security apparatus is headed and commanded by elements from the same tribes and ethnicity as the tormentors, a clear approach to security salvation is very dim and becomes a mental puzzle.
Insecurity in this 21st century cannot be solved by field permutations alone but by a combination of force and cutting edge technologies. We have watched the USA and Iran war and seen at first hand how both sides have deployed highest technologies to counter and demolish enemy strongholds.
We have seen how America extracted downed pilots from deep enemy territories using technologies with pinpoint accuracy just to save three precious American lives. Security is all about surveillance, threat detection and prevention. High level surveillance requires dedicated live satelite and internet communication. America leads the world with over 10,000 satelites in low and deep space with about 250 satelites dedicated to defence. Iran operates about 31 satelites in low orbit and has cross links with satelites of some allied countries. Nigeria struggles with 3 or 4 non dedicated satelites. How then do we monitor terrorists right from their bases to when they are in motion? Satelites that can track and report suspicious movements are totally out of Nigeria’s direct influence. Nigerian security probably depends on the same satelite communication that the terrorists and bandits bandits also use and deploy perhaps with better coordination. Nigerians conservatively, spend about 2 to 3 million Dollars on Elon Musk’s SpaceX every month and the terrorists and bandits are also active subscribers of the same Satelites via SpaceX STARLINK.
A query sent to an AI chatbot on the use of Elon Musk satellites to identify bandits in Nigeria brought startling responses. I will quote portions here: “Satellites from Elon Musk’s companies can be used to track bandits, but in practice, it is difficult and complex. One of the early customers of Elon Musk’s Starlink internet are terrorists and criminal elements involved in kidnapping. Nigerian military and government face a frustrating paradox: while the technology exists to track these devices, bandits are actively exploiting Musk’s Starlink for secure communication, making them harder to find. Starlink provides high-speed, portable internet to deep forests and remote areas where traditional cell towers don’t exist. This has unfortunately become a tool for non-state actors to coordinate and communicate with encrypted signals without detection.Tracking Difficulties:
The Nigerian Presidency has cited that security agencies cannot easily trace or block internet activities from bandits using Starlink because the terminals operate directly from space, complicating standard IP-address tracking used for local networks. Tracing a bandit’s connection often requires SpaceX’s direct assistance to pinpoint the exact locations.
Aside from internet hardware, private commercial imaging satellites (like SpaceX’s partner imagery networks or services such as Planet Labs and Maxar) can capture high-resolution imagery of bandit camps and movements. However, because they are constantly orbiting, they only provide periodic snapshots rather than real-time tracking, requiring coordination with on-the-ground intelligence to be truly actionable”.
Nigeria does not have to be at a digital Cross roads here. All Internet devices have unique and real time IP Addresses to function and be maintained. These devices are on regular subscriptions and have to be maintained by renewal of their subscriptions. The bandits have hundreds of these devices and the Nigerian military have captured and confiscated more than 500 of these from terrorists camps. Thats a good way of tracing the pattern of purchase, registration and physical location and movements of these devices.
The Federal Government cannot allow foreign satelite operators to run business in the country without active regulation. Recently Elon Musk expressed worries about the ise of its satelites by the Trump Administration for defence but thats all he can do. The American Government has powers to determine how much of SpaceX can be used by American enemies. Bandits can easily afford satelite technologies access as it is less than N1,500 a day per device and they make far more than that from ransom payments. Nigerian security forces should lace up their boots and force satelite access providers to locations identified as terrorists bases to suspend or shut down such service at least temporarily to allow federal forces have full intelligence coordination of such locations. It does not require rocket science to do this. I know certain European countries that have a central headquarters monitoring ALL GSM communications in the country through specialised Algorithms and codes silently scanning and digitally listening to all audio calls and chats and flagging off suspicious communication trails for further processing monitoring and investigation. These are very complex and time consuming security architectures and networks but the results improve national security tremendously. All the huge monies paid out as ransom could have been better utilised to build this architecture. However it is doubtful if this can ever be done as long as the same ethnicity responsible for kidnapping and associated crimes are allowed to manage the national security architecture.
This is again where the failure of our national educational system is very glaring. Universities are centres of national development through cerebral and intellectual research and pursuits. I am not aware of any university in Nigeria running programmes or research aimed at developing appropriate software and hardware designs that can be used for National Security. I am not aware of any direct or indirect link, synergy or partnership between our universities and national security installations.
Most of the critical intellectual components are probably still outsourced outside the country from Universities with less imposing physical infrastructure compared to our Universities but far more superior intellectual content. There are 12 National Universities Commission (NUC) approved universities in Oyo state and not a single can make any intellectual contribution to the fight against insecurity and terrorism by way intellectual support in Internet and Communication Technologies. Our Universities curriculum should be totally overhauled for International relevance and not just be national monuments of white washed sepulchres.
Prof Soji Adejumo (Ajiroba of Ibadanland) writes from Ibadan, Nigeria.
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