Connect with us

The Oracle

The Oracle: Passport Seizures, Retention, Revocation and Deprivation: Legal and Human Rights Implications (Pt. 2)

Published

on

Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

We commenced this treatise last week addressing the legal and human rights implications of passport seizures, retention, revocation, and deprivation, focusing on their impact on freedom of movement. We also examined the constitutional right to movement under Nigerian law and whether the requirement for a passport is a justifiable restriction on this right. Today, we shall continue with same and later delve into and conclude with discussing whether withholding a passport infringes on citizenship or public safety concerns and explore the broader significance of a passport as evidence of identity and nationality. Please come with me.
What Are The Requirements Of Citizenship Under The Law?

The answer to this question is contained in the provisions of Sections 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 (Chapter III) of the Constitution, which recognizes different categories of Nigerian citizenship, namely by birth, naturalisation and registration and their incidents. It is pertinent to mention that, apart from the other two categories of citizenship recognized by the Constitution, as aforesaid (i.e., by naturalization and by registration), the category of citizenship by birth provided for under section 25 of the Constitution clearly enjoys a superior status. This is because, unlike the other two, it cannot be taken away from any Nigerian who happens to fall within that class. This is clearly borne out by the provisions of Sections 28(1) and 30(2) of the Constitution, which expressly state, inter alia, that:
– Section 28(1): “a person shall forfeit forthwith his Nigerian citizenship if, not being a citizen of Nigeria by birth, he acquires or retains the citizenship or nationality of a country other than Nigeria, of which he is not a citizen by birth” and
Section 30(2). – “The President shall deprive a person other than a person who is a citizen of Nigeria by birth, of his citizenship, if he is satisfied from the records of proceedings of a court of law or other tribunal, or after due inquiry in accordance with regulations made by him, that-
(a) The person has shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal towards the Federal Republic of Nigeria; or
(b) The person has, during any war in which Nigeria was engaged unlawfully traded with the enemy or been engaged in or associated with any business that was … communicated with such enemy to the detriment of or with intent to cause damage to the interest of Nigeria”.

That being the case, I believe that it is curious for the Nigerian State to possess the capacity to deprive, withdraw, revoke or suspend the passports of Nigerian citizens by birth as was done (with the approval of the Supreme Court), in Director, DSS v AGBAKOBA, supra. Given its importance as virtually the only case on the issue, it is worthwhile to discuss it in extenso.

The Respondent, Olisa Agbakoba, was invited by the Netherlands Organization for International Development and Cooperation (NOVIB) to attend a conference which was scheduled to take place between 22nd and 25th April, 1992. On 21st April, 1992, he went to Murtala Muhammed International Airport, at Ikeja Lagos with a view to traveling to The Hague in the Netherlands. However, he could not board the plane because he was stopped by officers of the Nigerian State Security Service (SSS) who impounded his passport without giving any reason for the seizure. After fruitless efforts to regain the passport, the Respondent instituted a suit under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules seeking inter alia:

“1. A Declaration that the forceful seizure of the applicant’s passport No. A 654141 by agents of the State Security Services (Sic) (1st Respondent herein) on April 21, 1992 is a gross violation of the applicant’s right to personal liberty, freedom of thought, freedom of expression and freedom of movement respectively guaranteed under Section 32, 35, 36 and 38 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 (as amended) and is accordingly unconstitutional and illegal.
2. An order of mandatory injunction directing the respondents to release applicant’s passport No. A 654141 to him forthwith.”

The application which was filed in the High Court of Lagos State went before Akinboboye J. who refused it on the ground that the Respondent failed to satisfy the court that the passport was his personal property, and that the passport referred to the holder as “the bearer” and not “the owner”. Aggrieved by the decision, the Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal which allowed the appeal and granted the two reliefs earlier set out. Being dissatisfied with the Judgment, the Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court. The important issue which the court has to determine in the case was whether the seizure of the Respondent’s passport by officers of the S.S.S. was in contravention of his right to freedom of movement as guaranteed by Section 38 (1) of the 1979 Constitution which was then in force in Nigeria. In determining this issue the court necessarily had to decide whether possession of a passport is a right or a mere privilege which could be withdrawn by the Government in view of the decision of the trial court that the Respondent did not satisfy it that the passport was his personal property. At the Court of Appeal, Ayoola J.C.A (as he then was) who delivered the leading Judgment of that court had this to say on the point:

“In so far as passport is a certificate of identity and nationality and at the same time a request from one state to another to grant entry to the bearer, it stands to reason that a passport is normally an essential document in the exercise of the discretion by a foreign state, which at International law it has in the reception of aliens into its territory. To that extent a passport is normally an essential document for entry into foreign countries….I also hold that the possession of a passport in modern times makes exit out of Nigeria possible … the issue that follows from this conclusion is whether the possession of a passport or its withdrawal has any relevance to the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of movement, including the right of exit from Nigeria, with which this case is directly concerned….it can thus be seen that while the seizure of passport by a government agency such as the 1st Respondent can be interpreted as a direct expression of refusal of exit to the citizen, it is also a potent curb on the desire of the citizen to travel abroad and an evident clog on the exercise of his right of freedom of movement.”

Thus in the view of His Lordship there is a conflict in the statement endorsed on Nigerian Passports that the Passport remains the property of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the right which accrues to every citizen to hold such a Passport. The consequence of a passport being the property of the Government is, according to His Lordship, that the holder cannot deal with it as he pleased. He cannot transfer, sell or otherwise dispose of it. If for instance he ceases to be a citizen of Nigeria, he has an obligation, if requested, to return it to the ‘owner’, and the Nigerian Government as the owner of the passport has a right to recover the passport from anyone else who is not entitled to hold it. His Lordship then concluded that:
“The freedom of exit guaranteed by our constitution cannot be exercised without a passport and that freedom enshrined in Section 38 (1) of the Constitution carries with it a Concomitant right of every Citizen of Nigeria to a passport.”

Although the Judgment of the Court of Appeal that the seizure of the Respondent’s Passport amounted to a violation of his right to travel abroad guaranteed by Section 38 (1) of the Constitution was upheld by the Supreme Court, the leading Judgment of the apex court delivered by UWAIS C.J.N adopted a different line of reasoning to arrive at the same conclusion. At page 352 of the report UWAIS, C.J.N said:

“In determining the issues in the present case, it is not, with respect, necessary to indulge in the academic exercise of whether the right to travel abroad is concomitant with the right to hold a passport. The real issue in contention here is not whether the respondent had a right to hold a passport. He in fact had a passport already but which was impounded by an official of the SSS. It is whether such an act by the official was legal and constitutional.”

The C.J.N opined that the official of the SSS concerned in the case had no power to impound or withdraw the Respondent’s passport in the manner he did. The impounding was, illegal since it violated the provisions of Section 38 Subsection (1) of the Constitution and Section 5 Subsection 1 of the Passport (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. His Lordship held that the right to freedom of movement and the freedom to travel outside Nigeria is, according to guaranteed by the Constitution but the right to hold a passport was subject to the provisions of the Act.

The leading and majority Judgment of the court considered the question whether the right to travel abroad was concomitant with the right to hold a passport as posited by the Court of Appeal and the concurring Judgments of Ogundare, Ogwuegbu, and ONU, JJ.S.C agreed with the intermediate appellate court (per Ayoola, J.C.A as he then was) that the right to hold a passport was concomitant with the guaranteed right to travel abroad. Thus, to the extent that only three out of the seven Justices of the court that adjudicated over the case agreed with the Court of Appeal on this point, the view that the right to hold a passport is concomitant with the right of exit from Nigeria which was guaranteed by Section 38 (1) of the 1979 Constitution (now Section 41(1) of the 1999 Constitution) was an obiter dictum.

TO BE CONTINUED…

Thought for the week

“Life without liberty is like a body without spirit”. (Kahlil Gibran).

Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

The Oracle

The Oracle: The Independence of the Judiciary in a Democratic Dispensation (Pt. 3)

Published

on

By

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

Introduction

Another public outrage attended the ex parte order granted by a Lagos High Court against the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) restraining it from calling out workers on a planned nationwide strike to protest the hike in price of petroleum products by the Federal Government.  An Abuja High Court had refused the application because there was no genuine case of urgency. The Federal Government went down to Lagos and surprisingly a Lagos High Court, which had co-ordinate jurisdiction with the Abuja High Court granted the order.  The NLC president, Adams Oshiomhole  had to tell the whole world that the order was not binding on the NLC as it was obtained from the “Black market”.  The strike went on as planned and the image of the Judiciary was worse off and its independence seriously put in question.

Another controversial ex-parte order was that made by a judge in the Abuja Division of the Federal High Court restraining the governor of Anambra State Dr. Chris  Ngige from parading himself as governor. The order (which, apart from the questionability of the perceived extreme urgency attending it) could not be reconciled with the state of immunity enjoyed by the governor under the Constitution. The governor had to borrow the “Black market” appellation from Oshiomhole.  Even more  controversial and outrageous ex parte orders were dished out by the same court on the Anambra crisis alone.

At the heart of the issue of abuse of ex parte orders (especially in political issues) is the attendant erosion of public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the Judiciary.   The ugly implications were rightly summed up by a writer as follows:

“In these instances of judicial recklessness, there was always the palpable belief that unseen hands moved the court to issue such controversial ex parte orders.  That is the meaning of the ‘black market’ reference made by Oshiomhole and Ngige.  None of them was prepared to obey a ‘black market’ order obtained outside the ‘official market’! They never obeyed and nothing happened!

Abuse of ex parte injunction aside from the grave implications it has on the independence of the Judiciary, is also capable of wide scale socio-political disaster as was the case with the annulment of the June 12 Presidential Election.  The Judiciary set the key note of the disaster that followed when an Abuja High Court presided over the late Hon. Justice Bassey Ikpeme made an ex parte order restraining the conduct of the presidential election.

In the popular case of Kotoye V C. B. N 24 the Supreme Court settled the principles governing the grant of ex parte injunctions. Principally, the order can be made,

  • When there is a real urgency but not a self-induced or self-imposed urgency.
  • Where it is necessary to preserve the res which is in danger or imminent danger of being destroyed, and
  • Where there is a real impossibility of bringing the application for such injunction on notice and serving the other party.

When these factors are inapplicable, a wise judge that imbibed good judicial milk would exercise his/her discretion by turning down the application and asking the applicant to put the respondent on notice.  The institution has always stood against the menace of this abuse over the years.  The former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Hon.  Justice Mohammed Bello once bemoaned,

“indeed, there is urgent need among some of us, the judges, to appreciate that ex parte injunction which was devised as a vehicle for the carriage of instant justice in proper cases should not be converted into a bulldozer for the  demolition of substantial justice, we should all realize that justice should be done to public functionaries and public institutions.

It has also been reiterated that lawyers equally have a role to play in the war against abuse of ex parte injunction.  In this direction, the Hon. Justice C. P.N. Selong opined thus:

“In as much as the speech of the learned Chief Justice was directed at judges, I beg to opine that the same caution should apply to legal practitioners, after all both judges and legal practitioners are Ministers in the Temple of Justice.  It is my humble view that an honest lawyer who abides by the ethics of the profession should not bring an application which is manifestly unjust”.

The need for restraint from both the Bench and the Bar on the issue was reiterated at the Annual Bar Conference, Enugu by the then Chief Justice of Nigeria, Honourable Justice Mohammadu L. Uwais, who counseled thus:

“I think it is not out of place to appeal to legal practitioners at large to exercise more restraint in and desist from advising their clients to bring absurd applications to court for ex parte injunctions.  You will agree with me that unless such applications are brought, the inconsiderate and reckless judges amongst us will not find the opportunity to embarrass the judiciary and the profession in general’’.

It must be noted, that it is not in all cases where a judge grants an order perceived to be wrong that an actual case of influence arises.  However, the perception of the public about justice is important – whether such perception is rightly or wrongly placed.  This is because the standard of justice has always been objective:  based on the notion of the reasonable man.  Justice must not just be done, but manifestly be seen to be done.  As one writer aptly put it:

“The role of the Judiciary in maintaining socio-political order cannot be compromised and once the citizen believes that somebody, other than the law and his judicial conscience, tells the judge what to say or do, then, the dangers of a system break down and institutional failure becomes real”.

Accordingly, the resolve of the National Judicial Council (NJC) to henceforth deal with judges who grant ex parte orders with recklessness cannot but be supported and encouraged.  Charity begins at home.  The filthy Augean stable must be cleansed.

We have concentrated on the issue of in-house cleaning by the Judiciary itself because we realize that the most ready and devastating blow to the independence of the Judiciary in the mind of the public is usually struck by the inability of some of the judges themselves to conduct the affairs of the Bench so judicially and judiciously as to inspire public confidence in their independence from external influence. Even some lawyers themselves fall into the league of those members of the public who doubt the independence of the Judiciary on the ground of questionable judicial orders.  In this regard, Uche Onyegorocha, a lawyer and member of the House of Representatives while responding to a question from the press on the unpopular pronouncements of a Federal High Court judge, said:

“I see undue influence in the whole process.  I see a person that is not acting independently.  Like I said earlier I see people playing the drum for him in the bush and he is dancing on the street”.

But beyond the question of conduct of the members of the Bench in handling cases brought before them are more technical and political issues of political, economic/fiscal and intellectual independence. These we shall presently address.

POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

The Judiciary ought to be apolitical in a democratic dispensation to safeguard its independence.  Accordingly, judges should not only be free from political affiliation, but the system should be organized in such a manner as to ensure that a judge does not give a decision biased in favour of a political party, especially the ruling party.  Accordingly, Nwabueze identified two forms of judicial involvement in politics (i.e organized politics) as:

  • decisions biased in favour of a ruling party, and
  • judicial membership of political parties.

It is submitted that Nigeria’s adoption of multiparty democracy is healthy for the protection of the ‘political independence’ of the Judiciary.  The term ‘political independence’ should be understood to mean the freedom of the Judiciary from having any form of political influence exerted ion it as to undermine its independence from any individual, group or another arm of government.  Nigeria should strive to refuse any attempt to reduce the country into a one-party democracy since the political independence of the Judiciary would obviously be difficult to be achieved therein. The concept of an apolitical judge is utopian in a one-party system.  According to Mr. Justice Georges, a former Chief Justice of Tanzania,

“The concept of the judge as neutral, belonging to no party in the multiparty democracy, can have no meaning …. Where there is one party”.

It has been argued that the involvement of the Executive in the appointment of Judges undermines the imperatives for the freedom of the Judiciary from political influence.  It is however, our view that the system of appointment under the Constitution is the best we can have at present. If more caution is employed in the appointment of judges, no problem of want of independence would be posed by the appointment method.  Nigeria is not yet ripe for election of judges or else the system would be thoroughly polluted by politics.  (We shall look at the issue of appointment of judges subsequently).

Indications that a cross section of Nigerians believe that a section of the Judiciary might have compromised their judicial oath can be gleaned from this passage from a major national daily:

“The Chief Justice of the Federation, from indications, prefers his colleagues to stand above the fray of Nigeria’s turbulent political process.  This position may have been informed by the ignominious role played by the judiciary in the country’s chequered political history.  But despite the goodwill enjoyed by the judiciary due to a mature handling of suits, that sought to stop the recent general elections, the (sic) a section of the bench may have unwittingly placed this third arm of government in the dock”. (To be continued).

Thought for the Week

“We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and the judiciary is the safeguard of our property and our liberty and our property under the Constitution” – Charles Evans Hughes

Continue Reading

The Oracle

The Oracle: The Independence of the Judiciary in a Democratic Dispensation (Pt. 2)

Published

on

By

By Prof Mike Ozekhome

Introduction

Last week we commenced this series with some operational definitions, today we shall continue and conclude on the definitions and take a critical look at some cases – their good parts, deficiencies and worst case scenarios. Read on. 

Definition of Terms (continues)

During the colonial and military regimes, the Executive always attempted to undermine the Judiciary, erode its independence and powers of coercion and have a field day with illegality and impunity.  On those occasions, the Judiciary always stood up courageously to uphold the rule of law.  In Eshugbayi Eleko Vs. Government of Nigeria the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever the deportation of the Oba of Lagos from his domain to an entirely different part of Nigeria on the ground, inter alia, that the Governor had no such power inspite of the fact that the Governor was then vested with both executive and legislative powers. It held:

“No member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice.”

In Lakanmi & Another Vs. A-G, Western State, the Supreme Court courageously declared null and void Edict No. 5 of 1967 promulgated by the Western State Government and Decree No, 48 and 45 of 1968 promulgated by the Federal Military Government, on the ground that they were ad hominem legislations.  The legislations dealt with forfeiture of assets.  The Supreme Court held that the 1963 Constitution clearly provided for separation of powers between the Judicial and the Executive and that Decree No. 45 of 1968 was a clear usurpation of the Judicial powers of the courts.  Chief Rotimi Williams has then argued that the Decree which named specific people and confiscated their property were ad hominem and unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court held that the legislations amounted to judicial rather than legislative acts and struck them down.  In reply, the Federal Military Government of General Yakubu Gown promulgated Decree No. 28 of 1970 to undermine the Judiciary.  The Decree was audacious and even brutal in its title:  “The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers Decree No. 28 of 1970.”  The Decree restated the sacredness and unquestionability of any Decree or Edict promulgated or purported to be promulgated by the military government.  But the Adetokunbo Ademola-led Supreme Court at the time was not intimidated.

In Governor of Lagos State Vs. Ojukwu Kayode Eso,JSC emphatically declared that:

“Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, the Executive, the Legislature (while it lasts) and the Judiciary are equal partners in the running of a successful government. The powers granted by the constitution to these organs by Section 4 (Legislative Powers), Section 5 (Executive Powers) and  Section 6  (Judicial Powers) are classified under an omnibus umbrella  known under part II to the Constitution as Powers of the Federal  Republic of Nigeria’. The organs wield those powers and one must never exist in sabotage of the other or else there is chaos, Indeed there will be no federal government. I think, for one organ, and more especially the Executive, which holds all the physical powers, to put up itself in sabotage or deliberate contempt of the other is to stage  an executive subversion of the constitution it is to uphold. Executive lawlessness tantamount to a deliberate violation of the constitution.”

There are many  cases decided during the military era and under democratic environment that underscore the relentless efforts by other arms  of government, especially the Executive to erode  the independence and vibrancy of the Judiciary as a way  of expanding their own frontiers of influence, unquesitonability and impunity.

Since the Executive has considerable (if not total) influence over the wealth of the State and over the appointment of Judges, it continuously seeks to make the Judiciary dependent by starving it of funds and by influencing the enthronement of mediocrity  on the Bench.  Issues in independence of the Judiciary may thus be broadly classified into three, viz, political independence, economic independence and intellectual independence.  Before looking at these issues in detail, we may take a look at the face of Nigeria’s Judiciary so that the issues can simultaneously be matched with the ease.

The Case (The Good, The Bad, The Ugly)

“Since I made the order of the remand of the accused person last Thursday and up till about 10 minuets before I sat this morning, I have been under untold pressure and threat from many quarters urging me to arrive at a particular decision ever before I listen to the accused.  Let me make it that as a Muslin, the teaching of my religion is clear about death being  the ultimate.  I am therefore not bothered about any such threat.  I am, however, worried about the untold pressure coming, as it were, from unexpected quarters…  To continue with this case will…..be a breach of the solemn pledge I made when I became a judge (i.e) to administer justice without fear or favour and without ill-will or affection.  In view of the foregoing, I hereby remit this case file to the honourable chief judge for re-assignment to another judge.”

In this way,  Honourable Justice Mashood Abass of the Oyo State High Court washed his hands off, like Pontius Pilate, of the trial of Otunba Iyiola Omisore and other accused persons standing trial for the murder of Late Chief Bola Ige, SAN (Slain Attorney-general of the Federation).  After the controversial withdrawal of the judge, allegations of undue pressure, bribery, arm-twisting tactics, threats and promises directed against the judge inundated the media.

Before, the breaking of this unpalatable story, a sordid allegation of bribery had been trailing the Election Tribunal that sat in Akwa Ibom State over the petition of Dr. Imeh Umanah, against the election of the then incumbent governor, Obong Victor Attah.

In Enugu State, matters came to a head when an Election Tribunal had to relocate to Abuja to complete its job after alleging that Enugu State was no longer safe for its honourable members.  These are bad times for the Judiciary!.

But in Anambra State,  the State Chief Judge, Honourable Justice C. J. Okoli proved to be a pride of the Judiciary when he smartly ‘made himself unavailable’ during the July 10, 2003 abduction of the governor of Anambra State,  Dr. Chris Ngige by his political enemies.  The House of Assembly had passed a motion asking the Chief Judge to swear in the Deputy Governor as incumbent governor, but the Chief Judge was not available to carry out the resolution.  By that act, his lordship saved the Judiciary from being enmeshed in the dirty politics of the state, which almost consumed the other arms of government.

More than any other factor, the abuse of ex-parte injunction by some judges has immensely contributed to the erosion of public confidence in the Judiciary under this democratic dispensation.  Most of the ex parte orders granted under controversial circumstances involved situations where the Executive was either the direct beneficiary or had an interest which the public believed (rightly or wrongly) the Judiciary merely ‘co-operated’ to protect.  This perception is a dangerous omen for independence of the Judiciary, because the Justice must not only be done but must be manifestly seen to have been done.

During this democratic dispensation, an Abuja High Court granted an ex parte order stopping the national convention which of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) when preparation for the convention had already gulped millions of naira and party members had already converged at the venue in Abuja.  Most Nigerians did not believe that the Judge was not acting in the interest of the rival ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) given the controversial and damaging circumstances under which the order was made.  The resulting outrage cost the judge his job.

Another, Abuja High Court made an order restraining the National Assembly from further deliberating on a bill before it to amend the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000.  The Executive was interested in killing the bill. The order was made in defiance of the trite principle of the doctrine of separation of powers which precludes the courts from assuming jurisdiction over a bill that has not become law.  In articulating the position of the Court of Appeal on the question of Judicial interference in the law making process purportedly under section 4(8) of the 1999 Constitution, Hon. Justice Mamman Nasir, P. said:

“though the courts have been given very wide powers under the subsection, the intention is not to authorize the Judiciary to interfere with the legitimate exercise of the powers of the legislature or the procedure to be followed in such exercise at power given to the courts comes into action after the legislature has enacted the law…”.

A similar controversy trailed the ex parte order given by the same Abuja Federal High Court which directed the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to issue a certificate of return to Chief Adolphus Wabara (PDP) as Senator representing the Abia South Senatorial Zone.  INEC complied (apparently reluctantly) and Wabara became the president of the senate the next day.   The source of the controversy was that INEC had earlier declared Elder Dan Imo (ANPP) as the winner of the seat.  As Ogbham-Emeka, a counsel in Mike Ozekhome’s Chambers observed about the controversy in ThisDay Law,

“The question how the Abuja Federal High Court assumed jurisdiction over the matter and how the issue became one suitable for an ex parte order raked up a lot of dust. When the dust subsided not a few people concluded that it was the court and not the electorate that gave Senator Wabara the Abia South Senatorial ‘mandate’.  But that was not to be the end of the regime of such demonstrable judicial anarchy that force litigants to choose which court order to obey and which not to obey, a situation that spells doom for a regime of law and order”. (To be continued).

Thought for the Week

“A functioning, robust democracy requires a healthy, educated, participatory followership and an educated, morally grounded leadership”. (Chinua Achebe).

Continue Reading

The Oracle

The Oracle: Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Pt. 4)

Published

on

By

By Prof Mike Ozekhome SAN

INTRODUCTION

In our last discourse on this series, we examined the procedure for enforcement of fundamental rights, including applications for leave; as well as the substantive application itself and the reactions that follow. Today, we shall continues from where we stopped with the substantive application itself and the reactions thereto and later x-ray the applications to squash proceedings; applications for production and/or release of persons restrained; orders for bail, production and access to medication. Please read on.

SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION: THE MOTION OR SUMMONS (Continues)

In the case of LAWRENCE OLUSEGUN ADEYEMO V. C.O.P, OYO STATE ([2021] LPELR-56272(CA)), the applicant requested the court for a writ of habeas corpus under order 2 of the fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) rules 1979 which provision enjoined the applicant to serve all parties who are or might be interested in the proceedings. Although the affected party had put up appearance, but raised a preliminary objection to the application for non-compliance with the statutory conditions. Babalakin. J. (as he then was) struck out the application on the ground that order 2(1)(4) is mandatory whether the application is for mandamus, certiorari, or habeas corpus.

However the Supreme Court in recent times in respect of the fundamental rights enforcements has favourably leaned towards the equitable principle of “Ubi Jus Ubi remedium”, therefore looking more at the substance rather than the form. Hence the liberalization of the procedure for the enforcement of fundamental rights as exposed in the case of ABACHA V. FAWEHINMI ((2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228) and UBI UJONG INAH & ORS V. MARCUS UKOI ((2001) (CA) 41981.

APPLICATION TO QUASH ANY PROCEEDINGS

Sometimes it may be necessary for an applicant by way of certiorari to apply to the court for an order that such proceedings be removed from a particular court or tribunal to another court for the purpose of being quashed for lack of power and/or jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings or make such order.

However, an applicant shall not be able to question the validity of any order, warrant, commitment, conviction, inquisition or record unless before the hearing of his application (Motion or summons), he has served a certified copy (CTC) thereof together with a Copy of the application on the Attorney-General of the Federation or of the State in which the applicant is being heard (as the case may be).

The court in granting an application seeking to quash proceedings, shall direct that the order, proceedings, conviction or the records of an inquisition be quashed forthwith upon being removed into the court hearing the application.

APPLICATION FOR PRODUCTION AND/OR RELEASE OF PERSON RESTRAINED

By virtue of Order 4 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court or judge to whom the application is made ex-parte may make an order forthwith for his release from such detention.

The court may also direct that an originating summons (as in form 2) be issued or that an application therefore be made by notice of motion (as in form 3). The court may also as it deem fit adjourn the ex-parte application so that notice thereof may be given to the person against whom the order for the release of the applicant is sought.

ORDER FOR BAIL, PRODUCTION, AND ACCESS TO MEDICATION

Pursuant to order 4 of the bail application, the court upon application may grant to the detainee reliefs including bail, production of the detainee, access to mediation etc.

The court may grant bail at ex-parte stage, pending the substantive application. Where an applicant complains of wrongful or unlawful detention, the court may subject to its discretion order that the person restrained be produced in court. And where such order is so made, it shall constitute a sufficient warrant to any superintendent of a prison, police officer in charge of a police station, police officer in charge of the complainant or any other person responsible for his detention, to produce or ensure the production of the person so restrained or detained in court.

For the purpose of enforcing a person’s fundamental rights, no matter where a detainee is kept he can be allowed access to his personal physician or medically prescribed drugs.

It suffices to note here, that once an order has been made by the court pursuant to the Enforcement Rules, and for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights provided for in the constitution, such order must be complied with. Failure to obey or comply with any order so made by the court under these rules will incur proceedings for the committal of the party disobeying such an order.

CONCLUSION

Without any controversy, the idea of human rights and personal liberties has become firm and secured. The universality and immutability of human rights are now globally accepted. Consequently, any nation that slacks or shyies away from the diligent protection and enforcement of human rights stand the precarious risk of being shunned by decent and civilised nations. The United Nations seems to have captured the importance and primacy of the issue of human rights and its protection when it poignantly stated as follows:

“Human Rights and fundamental freedoms are the birth right of all human beings, their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Government” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

It is the duty of every Government everywhere and every courts of law in every jurisdiction to promote, protect, uphold, and ensure enforcement of fundamental Human rights at all times, because these rights encapsulate the very essence of man.

The end.

THOUGHTS FOR THE WEEK

“Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom, understood as the expression of a dimension that is at once individual and communitarian – a vision that brings out the unity of the person while clearly distinguishing between the dimension of the citizen and that of the believer”. – Pope Benedict XVI.

“Because no matter who we are or where we come from, we’re all entitled to the basic human rights of clean air to breathe, clean water to drink, and healthy land to call home”. – Martin Luther King III

“Human rights are not only violated by terrorism, repression or assassination, but also by unfair economic structures that creates huge inequalities”. – Pope Francis.

Continue Reading

Trending